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Abstract 
In The Problem of Immanence in Kant and Deleuze, I reassess Kant's project in 
the light of its origins in Leibnizian rationalism. In his early works Kant seeks to 
ground the principle of sufficient reason as a 'real' rather than a 'logical' 
principle; it is this project that shapes his 'critical' formulation of the problem of 
the 'synthetic apriori'. I claim that Kant's project of 'immanent critique' never 
quite escapes the continuing requirement for metaphysical and teleological 
grounds, and that in the Opus Posthumum we find Kant returning to his rationalist 
roots in order to find a new relation between self, world and God, the three Ideas 
of reason. In parallel to this story, I argue that in his major work Difference and 
Repetition, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze effects a return to Leibnizian 
philosophy (in pursuit of a new account of sufficient reason) which allows him to 
resolve in retrospect certain problems that arose in the unfolding of Kant's 
philosophy. 
My account is conducted on both historical and philosophical levels. From 
the historical point of view, I suggest firstly that Deleuze's return to the 
problematic of 'immanence' should be seen as providing an alternative 
transformation of Kantianism to the better known trajectory of German idealism, 
one that is more faithful to Kant's project in its historical totality. Secondly, I 
demonstrate how Deleuze's interpretation is facilitated by insightful readings of 
more neglected thinkers of the post-Kantian period such as Maimon, Novalis and 
Holderlin. 
Philosophically, the weight of the thesis lies with the extensive 
development of two themes. Firstly Kant's theories of Ideas and intuition are 
interpreted from a Deleuzian standpoint, in order to provide materials for a theory 
of nonconceptual difference. Secondly, a new perspective is taken on the question 
of the primacy of self-consciousness in Kantian philosophy. 
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Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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trans. and ed. M.l Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
CJ: Critique of Judgment, trans. and ed. W. Pluhar (Indianopolis: Hackett, 
1987). 
OP: Opus posthumum, trans. and ed. E. Forster & M. Rosen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
C: Correspondence, trans. and ed. A. Zweig (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
LM: Lectures on Metaphysics, trans. and ed. K. Ameriks & S. Naragon 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
PP: Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. M.l Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
TP: Theoretical Philosophy, trans. and ed. D. Walford & R. Meerbote 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
Works by Gilles Deleuze 
All works by Deleuze, with the exception of Difference and Repetition, are cited 
in translation except where none exists. I cite references to the English translation 
of Difference and Repetition first, followed by a reference to the French edition. 
DR: Difference and Repetition (paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968); 
Difference and Repetition (trans. P. Patton, London: Athlone, 1994). 
\l.1 
Preface 
I shall briefly recount the genesis of this thesis because it reflects in reverse the 
present structure of the work. I started my research with the intention of coming to 
an understanding of the claims and context of Gilles Deleuze's fascinating but 
enigmatic magnum opus from 1968, Difference and Repetition.} At length~ after 
considerable detours into radical empiricism (William James, with reference to 
Hume and Russell) and process philosophy (Bergson~ Whitehead), it became clear 
that, despite his animadversions to the contrary~ Deleuze~s project could only be 
understood from within the philosophical problematic discovered and developed 
by Kant and the post-Kantians. In a way reminiscent of the post-Kantians, 
De1euze firstly attempts to transform Kantianism from within, and secondly to use 
this transformation to provide access to a philosophy of absolute self-
differentiation. Like Hegel, Deleuze claims to have produced ''the only realised 
Ontology" (DR 303/387). It became clear that Deleuze's famous objections to 
Hegel are only part of the story - in fact he seems to accept many of Hegel's 
fundamental moves. He seems to accept the necessity of a tum to the absolute, 
while paradoxically returning to Kantian methods and distinctions to carry this 
out. 
Thus my proj ect could not proceed without attempting to understand 
Deleuze's relation to post-Kantianism. However, what was to be made of the fact 
that Deleuze had devoted so much scholarly energy to rereading some of the 
major pre-Kantian philosophers, such as Spinoza, Leibniz and Hume? Deleuze's 
interest in Spinoza was perhaps the easiest to explain, as it could be seen as a new 
confrontation with that dominant, but vexing presence who hangs over the post-
\111 
Kantian project. Just as the post-Kantians returned to Spinoza to complete 
Kantianism, so too does Deleuze's return exactly mirror this aim' I suooest in 
, t:>t:> 
chapter 2 that Deleuze finds in Spinoza an account of 'absolute difference' that 
can be placed in competition with Hegel's similar account. 
But what of Leibniz and Hume? Perhaps, if post-Kantianism was an 
attempt to reconcile the goals of pre-Kantian metaphysics with the critical claims 
of Kant, then Deleuze could be seen as repeating this project with a new 
thoroughness, by returning to these other major figures. Deleuze would then be 
returning to the question of the genesis of Kantianism from problems left by 
Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hume, in order once more to put in question the nature, 
limits, and status of Kantianism itself Implicit in such a reorientation 
would be the kinds of questions that preoccupied the post-Kantians: what is the 
philosophical status of Kantian critique itself? Does it, or can it, have a consistent 
metacritical dimension? What is the relation between metacritique and 
metaphysics? Lastly, could these questions about the nature and limits of Kant's 
self-critique of reason be pursued through a questioning of the notion of 
"immanence"? From Spinoza to Kant to Hegel, this notion of immanence seemed 
to serve for Deleuze as a secret thread running through modem philosophy, in 
which the relation of critique and metaphysics was played out. 
Despite my conviction that this was the key to Deleuze's philosophy, it 
was nevertheless apparent that many aspects of Deleuze' s discussion of Kant were 
truncated, while his explicit discussions of Hegel were very inadequate. It was 
also clear that, if Deleuze was doing what I thought he was, he had never 
explicitly drawn together his conclusions and self-consciously justified them. 
Indeed, while Deleuze's works from 1953 to 1968 did seem to be consistently 
elaborating approaches to the questions I have just outlined, Deleuze swiftly 
followed what appeared to be his definitive statement of the issues, Difference 
and Repetition, with the publication in 1969 of Logic of Sense, a philosophical 
work no less ambitious, but apparently constructed on very different principles, 
with only an analogical relation to the project he had been developing for 15 years 
1 Difference et repetition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1968): translated by P. Patton. 
London: Athlone, 1994. I cite the pagination from the English translation first followed by the 
French. 
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previously.2 Shortly after this Deleuze seemed to tum his back on systematic 
philosophy altogether with the publication, with Felix Guattari, of the notorious 
Anti-Oedipus. The project to construct "the only realised Ontology" around the 
themes of difference and repetition, seemed to recede into the distant past, 
forgotten by Deleuze himself, and forgotten by other philosophers who now 
associated Deleuze with (and perhaps excommunicated him because of) the 
majestic folie that was Anti-Oedipus. For these reasons, then, reconstructing 
Deleuze's project along the lines I have outlined seemed a rather perilous 
enterprise, the more so because it seemed to me that Deleuze's earlier project was 
a good one, and I was not at all clear why he had forsaken it. 
My reading of Deleuze therefore began to develop a more explicitly 
reconstructive aspect; it became necessary to reconstruct the kind of things 
Deleuze should be saying to defend his project. In particular it was necessary to 
spell out and augment aspects of his reading of Kant, and to elaborate aspects of 
his philosophy in general which would allow him to fend off the rival claims of 
Hegel. In the process of this reconstruction, the project inevitably began to extend 
into are-reading of the metacritical issues in Kant and post-Kantianism in general 
which, while inspired by Deleuze, went beyond a reading of De leuze. Much of the 
work has involved detailed reading of Kant and Hegel together with secondary 
literature upon them. I began to have a prospective thesis which dealt with the 
abiding theme of immanence equally in Kant, Hegel and Deleuze. The idea 
became that Deleuze's philosophy can be seen as the latest development in a 
newly interpreted philosophical history of post-Kantianism. It has been 
impossible, however, to carry out this project of comparing the three philosophers. 
I have had to focus instead on developing a reading of Kant's problematic that 
explains and justifies how Deleuze's problematic can be seen to arise from it and 
provides consistent solutions to enduring problems within Kantianism. However, I 
hope that my aim to compare Deleuze' s and Hegel's respective transformations of 
Kantianism remains visible and, if not defended here, at least suggestive. 
The structure is as follows. The introduction presents an account of 
Deleuze's relation to post-Kantianism (a related appendix develops a general 
2 The Logic of Sense (trans. M. Lester, C. Stivale & C. Boundas. London: Athlone, 1990). Despite 
the differences between Difforence and Repetition and The Logic of Sense. which I take to be 
account of the notion of metacritique). 3 Part One contains two chapters \\·hich 
attempt a general reorientation of Kant's project, firstly with regard to the issue of 
the self-critique of reason (or 'immanent critique'), then by returning to Kant's 
pre-critical writings to assess the development of Kant's problematic from issues 
in Hume, Leibniz and Spinoza. In Part Two Kant's critical resolutions of his 
earlier problematic are placed alongside an alternative trajectory developed by 
Deleuze, which starts from the same 'pre-critical' matrix, but inhabits and 
transforms Kant's critique in such a way that certain aporias faced by Kant 
concerning the relation between critique and metaphysics are resolved by 
Deleuze's persistent retention of Leibnizian and Spinozist themes. The four 
chapters in Part Two are divided into two pairs of chapters, in which Kantian and 
Deleuzian views are developed in parallel. Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with 
the relations between critique and idealism, and in particular with the crucial yet 
problematic status of the noumenon. Chapter 3 concerns what I take to be the 
fundamental moves of Kant's critical project, and concerns the relations between 
the Transcendental Aesthetic, idealism, and metacritique, while chapter 4 starts to 
develop Deleuze's unusual reading of these issues. Chapters 5 and 6 concern the 
relation between the questions quid facti and quid juris in Kant and Deleuze. In 
chapter 5 this embraces issues in the Transcendental Analytic such as the status of 
the Transcendental Deduction, the account of concepts and the question of the 
status of apperception, while chapter 6 develops what I perceive to be Deleuze's 
ultimate solutions to problems encountered in Kant's treatment of these topics. 
I have attempted to keep focussed on the metacritical dimensions of the 
philosophies involved, and the relations between them; in doing so, I hope my 
main theme can emerge: the possibility of an effective new reading of Kant 
conducted under the horizon of Deleuze's renewed problematisation of Kant's 
'Copernican tum'. I attempt to discern a coherent movement that runs from 
Leibniz-Kant-Deleuze, and that has its problematic Archimedean point in the 
philosophical prospect of immanence. However my approach to the issue of 
metacritique will be far from formal because of what I take to be the inherence 
Deleuze's main philosophical statements, I l,ill neyertheless at times refer to passages of the latter 
which I belieye to be consistent "ith the earlier project. 
3 I should emphasise that this thesis requires no prior knowledge of Deleuze on the part of the 
reader: I hope to generate the issues that animate Difference and Repetition from a reading of 
problems il1.Kantianism. 
and implication of metacritical issues in the very fabric of the theories for which 
they provide the ultimate ground. Thus, for Kant, metacritical issues govern the 
procedures of critique itself; for instance, I will argue that the Transcendental 
Deduction of the Categories is itself meant to be justified from the perspective of 
Kant's system as a whole. For Hegel, metacritical aspects are intrinsic in the 
speculative experience undergone by phenomenological consciousness (in the 
Phenomenology), and the thought unfolded by the dialectical thinker (in the 
Logic). For Deleuze, transcendental empiricism will provide an 'analogous locus 
(mirroring the term 'speculative experience') of the overlap between metacritical 
and critical dimensions. However, in reading Kant and Deleuze, I will place 
myself against readings of metacritique which identify the subject of thought with 
the subject of experience. I emphasise the difference between the metacritical 
justifications made possible by the thinker or philosopher who is conducting the 
critique, and the account of the subject of experience in the system the 
philosopher is demonstrating and justifying. 
This thesis is also the product of an intersection between two 
contemporary philosophical currents, that of Deleuze's work and of the current 
and ongoing renaissance in the study of Kant and the post-Kantian philosophers. 
It is certainly an exciting time to be studying this latter tradition of thought, as not 
a month goes by without the appearance of new publications by a community of 
researchers (mostly German and American) who are excavating this tradition with 
a depth and intensity never before seen. It is to be hoped that this research has a 
profound impact in the future upon the foundations of what has come to be known 
as 'continental philosophy', as well as on philosophy in general. 
On the other hand, I think it is no exaggeration to say that in general the 
philosophical reception of Deleuze has been disastrous. The main reason for this, 
as already suggested, is Deleuze's publication in the 1970's with Felix Guattari of 
Anti-Oedipus and its companion volume, A Thousand Plateaus (under the 
collective title of Capitalism and Schizophrenia). Now, whatever the merit of 
these texts, it is enough to venture the suggestion that they will only really 
become comprehensible once Deleuze's earlier work is understood, to which they 
constantly refer. 4 It has in fact gone almost unnoticed that Deleuze, between 1953 
4 I do not discuss the role of these te~1S in Deleuze' s own development. However. it may be 
observed that despite the unorthodo~~'. disciplinary transgressions. and general bizarreness of 
.xli 
and 1968, was engaged with a unified, consistent and profoundly philosophical 
project whose riches and sophistication far outweigh, and in many ways are 
distinct from, the results and procedures of these later works. Thus a set of 
converging doxai about Deleuze has quickly formed. To critical theorists, he is 
merely another of the 'French Nietzscheans' (whereas in major works such as 
Difference and Repetition Nietzsche is by no means a dominant presence); to 
others in the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition, if they are aware of his work at 
all, it is as an example of a peculiarly French predilection for irrationalism 
(whereas much of Deleuze's research concerns Kantian themes and high 
rationalists such as Spinoza and Leibniz); to others, Deleuze is a postmodernist 
(still further from the truth, as this thesis will show by implication). Added to this 
situation is the fact that much of the work done on Deleuze has been from a 
'cultural theory' perspective. In short, Deleuze's philosophy remains a largely 
unmined source at present.s Nevertheless it must be recognised that this kind of 
situation is perhaps inevitable for new and difficult philosophical work It needs 
only to be recalled that Kant was denounced in his time not only as a Berkeleyan 
idealist, but as a Spinozist,6 while Hegel continues to be regarded as a mystical 
pantheist. In the future, I hope at least that those influenced and interested by the 
post-Kantian tradition might begin to see the intrinsic interest and relevance of 
Deleuze's project to them, and conversely that those interested in Deleuze will be 
able to gain from research into Kant and Hegel. Speculative thought is perhaps the 
area of philosophy where the exchange of ideas, without partisanship, can be 
pursued most freely. 
these volumes, Deleuze still maintained in 1980 that he was writing "philosophy, nothing but 
philosophy, in the traditional sense of the word" ('8 Ans Apres: Entretien 1980', with Catherine 
Clement in L Arc 49, 1980), 99. It is telling that when this statement has been quoted. as in B. 
Massumi's foreword to his translation of A Thousand Plateaus (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988. ix), the last clause has been omitted! 
5 In the bibliography I have referred only to secondary literature on Deleuze that has philosophical 
relevance to this thesis. 
6 Cf 'What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking', in Religion within the Bounds of .\Jere 
Reason (trans. A Wood & G. di Giovanni, Cambridge: Canlbridge University Press, 1998), 11. 
Ak 8: 143. Kant is referring to Jacobi. 
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Introduction 
The Problem of Immanence 
1 Deleuze and the Post-Kantians 
In this thesis I claim that the philosophical work of Deleuze represents the latest 
flowering of the project, begun in the immediate wake of Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason (CPR), to complete consistently the 'Copernican revolution' in 
philosophy. Contrary to appearances, the Copernican tum is a living presence in 
Deleuze's work, perhaps even more so than for many other contemporary 
philosophers. Several times in Difference mld Repetition (DR), Deleuze speaks of 
carrying forward and completing the Copernican revolution; in particular, he 
writes of "a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference 
having its own concept" (DR 41/59).1 In a sense, the peculiarity of Deleuze's 
work, its strangely classical style and its apparent lack of the contemporary sine 
qua non of irony, comes from its direct continuation of the Kantian turn. 2 It 
revolves in the orbit of 18th_19th century philosophy. Deleuze's attacks on Kant 
and Hegel are therefore reminiscent of the attacks of the post-Kantians on Kant; 
they arise from a deep proximity to their objects. 
Kant had subjected philosophy to a Copernican tum (CPR Bxvi) by 
constructing a critique that grounded and provided limits for all possible claims of 
I For other references to the completion of the Copernican revolution, cf. DR 86/117, 162/210, 
180/233.249/320. 
:: As I mentioned in the preface. my study of Deleuze is largely confined to the works of 1953-
1968. 
knowledge and morality. The right to this critique was secured by his claim to 
have secured the 'highest principles' of apriori cognition (CPR A150-158/B190-
197). However, an unease quickly developed in young philosophers such as 
Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel that, while the 'spirit' of Kant's critique 
was legitimate, the 'letter' was inadequate. The critical project lacked the method 
it deserved if it really was to provide the 'highest principles'. Schelling wTote to 
Hegel in 1795, ''Philosophy is not yet at an end. Kant has provided the results. 
The premises are still missing. And who can understand results \vithout 
premises?,,3 Three fundamental steps are taken by the post-Kantians~ taken 
together they can be said to comprise the project of meta critique. 
1. Firstly it had to be questioned whether the critique itself was as pure 
as it could have been~ whether the materials, form and technique of the critique 
itself had been suffiCiently justified. In Kant's case, examples of materials and 
forms would include the distinction between sensibility and understanding, and 
the form of intuition, while examples of techniques would include procedures 
drawn from the theory of judgment and the presupposition of apriori facts about 
cognition. Such elements could only be sufficiently justified if the justification 
was immanent to the critique itself 
2. But such a requirement leads to the issue of how critique itself can 
possibly be conceived. What kind of philosophical activity is critique? Is it even 
possible to conceive a distinctive notion of critique? If, for instance, Kant aims to 
show the necessary conditions of possible experienceo then how can he show the 
validity of his own procedure if he is within the experience for which he is 
accounting? That is, the activity of critique entails being both necessarily 'in' the 
experience as conditioned, and 'out' of it in order to conceive the conditions of 
that experience. Lewis White Beck characterises metacritique in terms of an 
analogy with the notion of metalanguage. As each language will have a 
metalanguage in which its rules can be spelled outo so Kant can be characterised 
as a "transcendental grammariano,4 However, as Beck acknowledges, if the 
critique is the attempt to ground knowledge then there occur problems particular 
3 Schelling to Hegel. January 5, 1795, in Hegel: The Leners. trans. C. Butler & c. Seiler 
(Bloomington: Indiana Uniyersity Press. 1984), 29. 
4 L.W. Beck 'Toward a Meta-Critique of Pure Reason', in Essays on Kant and Hume (New 
Hayen: Yale, 1978), 26f 
1 
to the 'meta' status of critique. For how can we justify with our cognitive faculties 
that the very elements Kant uses for his critique of the cognitive faculties are the 
correct elements for such a critique? Beck states that Kant is caught between two 
equally vicious alternatives - an infinite regress, or an intrinsically artificial 
halting of a regress by means of an appeal to facts, for instance 'facts of reason' . 5 
Now, there seem to be two general paths leading off from this issue. On 
the one hand, it can be argued that, as one cannot gain insight into the very 
conditions that allow one to have any insight at all, the status of critique itself is 
nonsense. Such was Wittgenstein's solution to a similar issue, and it is echoed by 
many contemporary anti-foundationalist philosophers who find themselves having 
to deal with this kind of problem. 6 On the other hand, there is the sincere attempt 
to find a coherent and consistent way to justify critique itself, undertaken by the 
post-Kantians and whose failure is still held by many not to have yet been 
demonstrated. This latter path, I believe, is taken both by the post-Kantians and 
Deleuze.7 
3. Now these two steps taken by the post-Kantians led to a third, 
complicated issue that would provide the defining problematic within which post-
Kantian philosophy moved. If metacritique was successful, then it would attain a 
self-grounding apriority that would surely no longer simply be critique, but 
philosophy itself 8 The true attainment of first principles could then be achieved 
through a genetic approach, rather than through the procedure of finding 
5 ThieL 31f. We will see in the nexi chapter whether this assessment does justice to the full structure 
of Kant's critical project. 
6 For an overview, see William Maker, Philosophy without Foundations (Albany: SUNY, 1994). 
1-20. 
7 Interestingly, A W. Moore is one analytic philosopher who has shmvn interest in Deleuze' s 
project from a Wittgensteinian point of view precisely because he eXl'lores the transcendental 
status of the domain of 'nonsense'. See Points of Tlew (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1997). 
chapters 5 & 9. While Moore cites The Logic o/Sense, I am interested in Deleuze's theories up to 
Difference and Repetition, where I believe Deleuze still shows interest in a systematic 
reconstruction of Kant's project, along the lines of the post-Kantians. I cannot undertake a 
comparison of my \iews "'ith Moore's here. 
8 Cf. Reinhold 'The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge', in G. di Giovanni & H.S. Harris 
eds. Between Kant and Hegel (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 66f. Fichte's second preface (1798) to 
'Concerning the Concept of the Tnssenschafilehre' gives a clear example of the vacillation that 
continued to beset Fichte concerning the true distinction of critique and philosophy (but note that 
he calls philosophy 'metaphysics' here, in contradistinction to Reinhold who carefully 
distinguishes philosophy and metaphysics.). While Fichte claims that a 'pure critique' should 
precede 'pure metaphysics'. he confesses that "it "ill not become easy to render a systematic and 
comprehensive account of the procedure of the Wissenschaftlehre until it is possible to prmide a 
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conditions. 9 But what, then, was the true relation of critique to philosophy? How 
was critical method to be related to philosophical method? Fichte, Schelling and 
Hegel, amongst others, are all distinguished by their different solutions to this 
problem of the relation of method and genesis. For Fichte, the act of self-
consciousness itself provided the dynamic template for genesis. For Schelling, 
self-consciousness presupposed a more profound identity of subject and object. 
the genesis of the articulations of which had to be constnlcted by the philosopher. 
For Hegel, by commencing with a Phenomenology of Spirit, the critique of 
philosophy was itself articulated as a genesis which, by its eventual attainment of 
completeness, would achieve the status of philosophy. 
The threefold problem of metacritique can be seen as the enduring legacy 
left by the post-Kantians to modem philosophy. Philosophers, at least in the 
European tradition, can be defined as 'modem' to the extent that they operate 
within this problematic of seeking a method for metacritique. However, it is 
precisely on the issue of the interrelation of critique, philosophy and method that 
the work of Deleuze superficially appears to be least modem. Indeed, it should 
first be noted that Deleuze's major critical studies have centred around the three 
great 'pre-critical' thinkers, Hume, Spinoza and Leibniz. While his study of 
Nietzsche devotes a whole chapter to the issue of 'critique', it has been roundly 
criticised for its apparent recourse to 'pre-critical' metaphysics; Deleuze' s notion 
of 'total critique' appears to depend wholly on a peculiar metaphysics of 'active 
and reactive forces'. 10 Contrary to the practices of Kant and the German idealists, 
with whom I wish to bracket him, we find little evidence of any preoccupation in 
Deleuze with their predominant concern to produce and account for method. In 
fact, Deleuze seems to be critical of the very idea of method: ''Method ... is the 
pure exposition of this science itself', Fichte, EarZv Philosophical TVritings, eel D. Breazeale 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 98. 
9 Deleuze expresses the intimacy of his project "ith that of the post-Kantians through many 
references to the importance of this distinction between genesis and conditioning. Cf. DR 15~-
158/200-205. l70/221. 
10 Yietzsche and Philosophy (trans. H. Tomlinson, London: Athlone, 1983). is perhaps the best-
kno'\\n of Deleuze' s works. and has been the most subjected to criticism. for instance by D. 
Breazeale in 'Hegel and Nietzsche' (Xietzsche-Studien 4. 1975) 158-162. and S. Houlgate. in 
Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of J1etaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni\"ersity Press 
1986), 5-8. I agree "ith these criticisms to the ex1ent that the book by itself. does not hold up 
against Hegelian criticism. but I ,,,ould add that the book perhaps benefits from being seen "ithin 
the contex1 of Deleuze's somewhat peculiar strategy for doing the history of philosophy, which I 
touch on in Appendix I 
manifestation of a common sense or the realisation of a Cogitatio natura, and 
presupposes a good will as though this were a 'premeditated decision' of the 
thinker" (DR 165).11 But surely the issues involved in critique are necessarily 
methodological, and without such method, then the right to do philosophy, or at 
least a philosophy that can be at home in 'modernity', remains in doubt? The 
issues of where to begin, how to justify the beginning, how to proceed~ these are 
all topics of the utmost importance for critical philosophy, yet Deleuze treats 
these issues with a cavalier attitude. 12 In what sense, then, can Deleuze be, as I am 
suggesting, the latest of the post-Kantians? 
There are broadly two ways one could approach such an issue, without 
slanting it so that particular post-Kantian methods would be already presupposed 
as the most correct kind of approach. The first way would be to explore the very 
notion of metacritique, particularly in its concrete development in post-Kantian 
philosophy, and to find ifDeleuze has any good reasons in general for suggesting 
a different approach to the problem, which, while explaining his lack of explicit 
concern with methodology, would still discernibly relate his approach to the post-
Kantian tradition. In this thesis I have chosen not to follow this path, but the 
reader may like to tum to Appendix I to find a propaedeutic for this kind of 
treatment~ there the issues dealt with in the thesis are broached in a more formal 
way, that is nevertheless consistent with the conclusions of the thesis. 
There is another way to broach the issue of Deleuze's relation to the post-
Kantian problem of metacritique, and that is to return to Kant himself. I have 
chosen to take this route for two reasons. Firstly, out of a suspicion that the post-
Kantian charge that Kant had more or less ignored metacritical issues has itself 
perhaps been too uncritically accepted. It is a peculiar fact that treatments of 
metacritical issues in Kant are hard to find~ no direct defense of Kant against the 
charge is made, the burden of proof often being implicitly put onto the post-
Kantians to find an adequate resolution of the metacritical issues they themselves 
11 Cf. Sietzsche and Philosophy, 103f, 110 for Deleuze's account of Nietzsche's antipathy to 
method. 
12 Deleuze's attitude to what Hegelians call the 'problem of beginning' in }Eticular borders on the 
sarcastic. After hvo long and ex1remely densely argued chapters of DR Deleuze begins chapter 
three with the words "Where to begin in philosophy has always - rightly - been regarded as a yery 
delicate problem, for beginning means eliminating all presuppositions" (DR 129/169). Despite 
going on to argue that it is in fact possible to haYe a presuppositionless beginning. the issue has 
already been dislodged from any transparent status by its yery position in the book. 
have raised. However, it seems to me that, especially if one pays attention to the 
development of Kant's project as a whole, from its 'pre-critical' beginnings to its 
end in the Opus posthumum, Kant himself did have the metacritical problem of 
the self-justification of the critical project firmly in view, even if he may not 
ultimately have come to a satisfactory resolution of the problem. I spend much of 
the thesis defending this claim, and my second reason for my general approach 
grows out of it. That is, perhaps Deleuze's philosophy can be understood precisely 
as a return to this original Kantian framing of metacritical issues. If this is right, it 
would explain the apparent invisibility of metacritical method from Deleuze's 
wor~ given that the Kantian metacritical method is also far from explicit. But this 
is not all: it seems to me at least possible that Deleuze's philosophy can be seen as 
resolVing the enduring problems in Kant's original approach to metacritique. My 
approach to the problem of metacritique, then, is twofold: to re-excavate the 
Kantian project, and to show how Deleuze's philosophy can be seen as an attempt 
to complete this project. 
As a consequence I start to piece together an alternative trajectory within 
post-Kantianism to the usual one of Fichte-Schelling-Hegel. Firstly, by 
emphasising the importance of Leibniz for Kantianism, it is possible to bring an 
unruly figure in post-Kantianis~ Solomon Maimon, once more into the picture. 
Maimon's Leibnizianism and his decentering of the importance of apperception 
have prevented him from being treated with the interest that the other post-
Kantians have received in recent studies. As I will show, these are precisely the 
characteristics that make him interesting for Deleuze, and with good reason. The 
latter part of the thesis is in particular concerned with deciding the exact place and 
status of apperception in Kant, and I show that Deleuze's tum to Maimon, 
Holderlin and Novalis can be seen as consolidating a hidden and attractive 
trajectory emanating from Kantianism. I suggest that these thinkers are in some 
ways more attentive to certain tensions in Kant's project (concerning 
apperception, teleology, idealism and their metacritical relevance) than are the 
more well-known German idealist avatars of post-Kant ian ism. 
To assuage any preliminary doubts about my proposal that Deleuze's 
philosophy be seen as a continuation and transformation of Kantianism, it is worth 
pointing out that Deleuze's Kantianism is evident in the very structure of DR. our 
main text. The arrangement of this text displays the kind of segmentation of 
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different transcendental issues that we find in CPR albeit in a different order. The 
first chapter, 'Difference in itself', outlines the formal structure of Deleuze' s 
account; the second, 'Repetition for itself', gives a novel account of temporal 
synthesis; 'The Image of Thought' has the character of a discussion of philosophy 
as propadeutic, as "treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself' 
(CPR Bxxii). The fourth chapter, on the explicitly Kantian issue of 'Ideas of 
Reason' takes the title of 'Ideal Synthesis of Difference', 13 and the final chapter, 
'Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible', is a belated 'Transcendental Aesthetic'. 
After DR Kant all but disappears from Deleuze's project, thus rendering his 
writings ever more enigmatic. At the end of this introduction I explain why I deal 
only with his writings up to 1968, and why I think they remain superior to the 
developments forged during the rest of his philosophical career. 
2 What is Immanence? 
So far I have merely stated that Deleuze's philosophy represents an impliCit 
alternative to post-Kantian developments concerning the relation of critique and 
philosophy. This is still an 'external view' of Deleuze' s motivation, as I have not 
yet given a sense of how Deleuze himself sees his project. In fact, it is extremely 
hard to find any statements in Deleuze's writings about his goals, which is surely 
one more reason why his work has so far escaped the attention of philosophers. 
His writings seem hermetically sealed; we are left without clues to an entrance 
into them, or reasons why we should even want to enter them. For the rest of this 
chapter, I explore and compare some of the rare explicit directions Deleuze gives 
for reading his philosophy, and focus on the name of the key problem that 
emerges, that of immanence. 
We can start by taking two statements which seem to present momentarily 
revealing insights into Deleuze's motivating problem, and which are relevant, yet 
apparently at a striking tangent to, the framework so far developed. Firstly, there 
is a section on Kant in Deleuze's late television interviews, where Kant is 
described as the philosopher of the tribunal of reason. After describing at length 
his "fascinated horror" at this tribunal, Deleuze pauses to muse over the question 
13 Inaccurately translated in the English version as 'Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference' . 
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of why somebody is attracted, or has an "affinity" for a particular kind of 
problem. He then confesses that he feels "connected to problems that try to find 
the means to do away with the system of judges, and replace it with something 
else".14 So we are faced with a problem at the outset: when Deleuze finally lets us 
in on what his problem is, it is described in terms of a deep anti-Kantianism. The 
first statement can be counterposed with the following: 
Setting out a plane of immanence, tracing out a field of immanence, is something 
all the authors I've worked on have done (even Kant - by denouncing any 
transcendent application of the syntheses of the imagination, although he sticks to 
possible experience rather than real experimentation).15 
Taken together, these two statements are even more enigmatic than they are apart. 
Firstly, I have already suggested how Kantian some of Deleuze's concerns are. 
But secondly, surely the notion of immanence is above all bound up with Kant's 
notion of immanent critique, that is, the notion that a tribunal of reason must take 
place in which reason must criticise itself. What can immanence be without a 
system of judges? So the phrase "even Kant" in the second citation is very 
peculiar. By putting Kant's role in the philosophy of immanence in doubt, and 
silently excluding Hegel, Deleuze is obviously creating a very unusual notion of 
immanence, and thus seems to be in the grip of a "problem" that would be barely 
recognisable to most modern European philosophers. 16 
Understanding what Deleuze might mean in his references to 'immanence' 
is anything but simple. For instance, we might try to define it negatively against 
transcendence. Every thing, proposition and principle could be understood in 
terms of a single system of principles, which logically and metaphysically would 
not allow for the conceivability of any outside. But what would justify the validity 
of this "plan" of immanence? Its justification cannot be secured simply by the 
14 Abecedaire. 'K comme Kant'. He also says of his short book on Kant, "My book on Kant was 
different" I like it I did it as a book about an enemy that tries to show how his system works. its , - ,.., . 
various cogs - the tribunal of Reason. the legitimate exercise of the faculties". Yegotiations (trans. 
M. Joughin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).6. For a still more negatiYe assessment 
of Kant, cf. Dialogues (trans. H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam, London: Athlone, 1987).9. We have 
already seen that Kant is much more than an 'enemy' for Deleuze. But maybe Kant is. as Hegel 
might say, the internal enemy of Deleuze's work. 
15 Negotiations, 144. 
16 It should be noted that I have excluded 'immanence' from my list of abstract metacritical criteria 
in Appendix 1. This is because for Kant and the post-Kantians, inmlanence does not play any 
continuous thematic role. Rather it simply has an adverbial function, which can be analysed into 
the enactment of conformity to the criteria listed (eg. systematicity. circularity. intrinsic genetic 
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exclusion of transcendence. Immanence in such a case would surely be a very 
general, all too abstract criterion for the self-grounding internality of 
philosophical principles, which would only be defined against "transcendence" 
insofar as the latter would express a failure to engage in the project of self-
grounding. Transcendence would simply be defined by fiat as not philosophical at 
all. While III his later works, Deleuze does begin to use the 
immanence/transcendence couplet in such a way, in Spinoza and the Problem of 
Expression (1968), he more carefully defines immanence against emanation rather 
than transcendence. 17 This means at least that emanative philosophies could be 
shown in some way to actively fail the commitment of philosophy in general to 
immanence, through the reintroduction of transcendence. However, even in this 
work, the opposition of immanence and emanation seems to depend ultimately on 
a simple equation of immanence with philosophy. Deleuze never does what one 
wants him to do, which is to compare this abstract notion of immanence with 
Kantian, or Hegelian specifications of what immanence might be and how the 
notion might justify itself If immanence were to be defined very basically as a 
quality belonging to a self-supporting, and self-generating system, this would 
remain opaque without a series of other questions that would delineate the method 
and genesis by which such a system was constructed, and whether it relies, for 
instance, on intellectual intuition, or on transcendental, teleological, if not 
dialectical grounds. 18 We appear to find no direct discussion by Deleuze of such 
issues in relation to immanence. 
However, I suggest that we nevertheless tum to Kant to comprehend the 
first glimmers of the meaning of immanence in Deleuze. As will become clearer 
later, there are two distinct senses of immanence implied in Kant's work. On the 
relation between critique and philosophy). As I "ill suggest, it is only in Deleuze that 
'immanence' takes on a problematic status as a criterion in itself. 
1: Cf. the chapter 'Immanence and the Historical Components of E:x-pression', l69f; the book is 
translated as Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (trans. M. Joughin. New York: Zone, 1992). 
18 For this reason. Yirmiyahu Yovel's second volume of Spinoza and Other Heretics, The 
Adventures of lmm'anence (pnnceton: Princeton University Press, 1989) proves disappointing. His 
claims about immanence are "'(1) immanence is the only and overall horizon of being, (2) it is 
equally the only source of value and normativeness and (3) absorbing this recognition into one's 
life is a prelude - and precondition - for whatever liberation (or emancipation) is in store for 
humans". xi. While these are all accurate descriptions of immanence. they remain abstract as they 
don't incorporate into their definitions the kind of metacritical issues the post-Kantians discovered 
to be necessary in the elaooration of immanence. Henry Allison takes Y ovel to task for foregoing 
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one hand, there is the explicitly metacritical issue of how a self-critique. or 
immanent critique, of reason is possible. But this can be distinguished, on the 
other hand, from the result of immanent critique as Kant sees it - the restriction to 
the immanent use of empirical cognition. However, even in Kant himself (as I 
show in chapter 3), transcendental procedure and the restriction produced and 
consolidated by that procedure are related in a mysterious way that is essential to 
the central question of this thesis. I will argue that the Hegelian notion that the 
critical apprehension of limits requires in some sense their transgression is already 
affirmed in a highly particular way in Kant, and is taken up in a new way by 
Deleuze. 19 For Deleuze, indeed, the result of transcendental philosophy will not 
primarily be the dictum that all philosophy must conform to the conditions for the 
possibility of experience, that is, enact the immanent use of the structures of 
experience - in fact, Deleuze encourages their trmlscendent use or exercise 
[exercice], as it is precisely this that will critically reveal the limits of experience. 
Deleuze's notion of immanence, I contend, will require the transcendent use of 
the faculties, and the activity of thought beyond experience. 
The complex position of the notion of immanence in Kant should not be 
overlooked in attempting to understand Deleuze's treatment of the notion. 
Another disturbing statement by Deleuze can be brought to light which begins to 
detach Deleuzian immanence more decisively from the post-Kantian metacritical 
context (immanence as the signification of self-grounding systematic totality): 
"Immanence", says Deleuze, "is the very vertigo of philosophy".20 That is, far 
from signifying the completion or satisfaction of metacritical systematicity, 
immanence is given the character of a loss of control, analogous to the movement 
beyond experience just described. For Deleuze, critical and philosophical activity 
must be considered in terms of a movement towards immanence. Now, Deleuze 
the necessary encounter of Spinoza with Kant in 'Spinoza and the Philosophy of Inunanence: 
Reflections on Yovel"s The Adventures of Immanence', InqUiry (35. 1992).59-62. 
19 "No one knows, or even feels, that anything is a limit or defect until he is at the same time 
aoove and beyond it ... A limit or imperfection in knowledge comes to be termed a limit or 
imperfection, 'only when it is compared with the actually present Idea of the universal. of a total, 
and perfect", Hegel. Encyclopedia Logic, trans. Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), # 60, 91f. The 
notion that the Idea is "actually present" is clearly the controversial one in Hegel. In chapter -I- I 
"ill deal 'with Deleuze's novel negotiation between Kant and Hegel on this issue of the absolute 
nature of Ideas. 
20 Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. 180. Cf. What is Philosoph,v? -1-8 for a late reaffirmation 
of this phrase. 
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will ultimately call his ideal of such activity "transcendental empiricism~', a term 
which is analogous to the Hegelian notion of "speculative experience".:: 1 But 
whereas for Hegel immanence would seem to describe both the intrinsic self-
grounding procedure of metacritical philosophy and the satisfaction achieved by 
the consciousness described within the procedure, and thus serves as a mark of the 
union of the critique of experience and philosophy itself, in Deleuze the distance 
of the critical activity of transcendental empiricism from its expression in 
systematic terms seems to be marked. 
From a post-Kantian point of view, the structure of DR seems to hark 
back to Kant's own organisation of his works according to a traditional model, 
that is, without any concern to make the content and form of the philosophical 
work coincide. Deleuze would claim that the genesis of the limits encountered in 
experience gives us no clue about how methodologically to generate the 
philosophical system itself The self-generation and justification of the system for 
the philosopher does not reflect formally the self-generation of the structure of 
experience. The procedure of self-critique is therefore not directly mirrored in the 
shape of a system of experience. 22 By returning to Kant, I will suggest that 
Deleuze's apparent failure to produce an interlocking system of form and content 
does not in fact reflect a lack, but has its source in good metacritical reasons. 
Perhaps a formally and aesthetically perfect system, such as Hegel's or 
Heidegger's is not in fact possible; perhaps the persistent attempt to produce a 
philosophy of immanence will be fragmented and in some formal respects 
unsatisfying. But this would not yet betoken any philosophical or even 
metacritical failure as such. Perhaps the fate of metacritical philosophy is to return 
21 I borrow the term from G. Kortian. .\fetacritique (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1980), 37. Hegel remarks that the Phenomenology is "the Science of the experience which 
consciousness goes through" (Phenomenology, trans. A V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), 21: cf 56); but the recollection of this eX'jJerience "for us" (ibid 56) can also be 
called an eX'jJerience~ hence "speculative experience". However, this tenn only strictly applies to 
the Phenomenology, as works such as the Science of Logic concern "thought" alone. We will 
encounter in the last chapter Deleuze' s negotiation between the notions of 'e:\'jJerience' and 
'thought'. 
22 As claimed in Appendix L this does not rule out the necessity that systematic circularity must be 
potentially possible at some point in his system: it only dislodges circularity from its determining 
role. 
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III some ways to being "philosophy, nothing but philosophy, in the traditional 
sense of the word"?23 
But wouldn't we slip away from the substance of the Copernican tum in 
this case? Not only its methodological aspect, but the content of the idea of 
immanence being developed here seems enigmatic. For the notion that 
immanence is an end towards which experience is pulled resounds with echoes of 
Platonism and high rationalism. Deleuze's synthesis of the notion of thought 
beyond experience and the goal of immanence are reminiscent of Plotinus' 
description of the ascent of the contemplative thinker to the level of absolute 
intellect, where thought and its object are merged.24 This fundamentally 
Aristotelian notion that thought and object are united in the active intellect would 
in this case fulfil the criterion of a thought of immanence while actually being the 
polar opposite of the critical notion of immanence, that is, the requirement that all 
apriori thought be referred to the human subject. Similarly, immanence in this 
form is the rationalist ideal of the classical philosophers, and is only preserved by 
Kant as an ideal of pure reason, not, surely, as a basis for critique itself. 
Rather than refining the notion of immanence, then, surely all that has 
been done so far is deeply to problematise it, so that it risks becoming a swirling 
indeterminacy that we might begin to find evidence of in 'all' philosophies? It is 
necessary then to take pause for a moment. Could it be that Deleuze simply never 
properly explicated or even formulated his fundamental problem?25 Immanence 
would then be a 'problem' which remains resistant to conceptualisation. It would 
then be a kind of 'secret' . Jacques Derrida' s obituary for Deleuze intimated 
something of the sort. In its closing lines Derrida laments the fact that he and 
Deleuze never had the, philosophical encounter that they owed each other. "My 
first question, I believe, would have concerned ... the word 'immanence' on which 
he always insisted, in order to make or let him say something that no doubt still 
remains secret to US".26 Derrida has expressed here the paradox of Deleuze's 
~3 '8 Ans Apres: Entretien 1980'. 99. 
:4 Cf R T. Wallis. Neoplatonism (London: Duckworth, 1995). 54L 62. Once again. we find 
Deleuze exhibiting another property attributed to the post-Kantians - here the tendency to return to 
the most metaphysical and mystical of philosophical systems: the re-emergence of Bruno. Proclus 
and Plotinus in Schelling. in particular. is echoed by Deleuze. 
~5 In Appendix I it was sho\m how Deleuze argues that one cannot create concepts and articulate 
problems at the same time. 
:6 1. Derrida 'II me faudra errer tout seu!"' Liberation, 7 November 1995. 38. 
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philosophy - the notion of immanence surely implies the most public, the least 
secret (occluded, transcendent), and yet Derrida confesses that he remains 
excluded from this thought, this secret (despite, one might add, being the other 
major philosopher of 'difference' of De leuze's time). 
We have seen that the notion of immanent critique is problematised by 
Deleuze, and that no systematic demonstration is apparent of how immanence is 
to be secured. For the post-Kantians the fact that method is of primary importance 
displaces immanence to the status of an adverb, so that, for instance, for Hegel the 
notion of 'absolute subject' is more important than 'immanence' as it indicates 
how immanence is achieved. There is, however, one other concept that Deleuze 
uses precisely in order to explicate further this how of immanence. It is the 
concept of expression. Deleuze writes of an 
immediate and adequate expression of an absolute Being that comprises in it all 
beings, and is explicated in the essence of each. Expression comprehends all 
these aspects: complication, explication, inherence, implication. And these 
aspects of expression are also the categories of immanence. Immanence is 
revealed as expression, and expression as immanent, in a system of logical 
relations within which the two notions are correlative. 27 
However, once again it is surely Hegel who is considered to take the notion of the 
immanent self-critique of reason the furthest, precisely through creating a system 
of reason that is both fully self-reflecting and self-expressive. The above passage 
could even have been written by Hegel, except for the first word. In this sense, 
Hegel would not only be the philosopher of immanence, but of expression. 28 Now 
Deleuze never really gives a clear explanation of why exactly he disagrees with 
Hegel's notion of immanence; in many cases all we are left with is ad hominem 
attacks on 'Hegelianism' or 'dialectics'. Although immanence is Deleuze's 
problem, it is also Hegel's, and we should now take a preliminary look at this 
~- Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 175. 
~8 See C. Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 3-50 for an account of the 
Romantic legacy of the concept of eX"Pression in Hegers writings. Taylor's account of Hegel's 
, eX"Pressh ism' as the self-realisation ofthe absolute, however, leaves unresolved some of the main 
problems concerning the validity of Hegel" s move beyond Kant His argument that "the design of 
the universe could be shown to flow of necessity from the single basic goal: that rational 
subjecthity be" (p. 93), appeals to a metaph.vsical teleology that a Kantian does not have to accept: 
the notion that 'rational subjectivity' contains an intrinsic goal is better defended by R Pippin on 
transcendental groWlds; cf. Hegel's Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 39f, 
99f. However. Taylor does articulate well the metacritical status of ex-pression when he says "the 
universe reflects rational necessity in two ways: it conforms to it and it expresses it. It can be seen 
as in a sense analogous to a statement'. 108. Jean Hyppolite will be shm\n to elaborate on this 
idea below. 
perplexing rivalry that Deleuze exhibits against Hegel, through the lens of the 
concept of expression. Insofar as Deleuze is often taken to be the anti-Hegelian 
par excellence, the results of this first look will turn out to be surprising. 
3 Deleuze, Hyppolite and Hegel 
In 1955 Deleuze wrote a review of his teacher Jean Hyppolite's book Logic and 
Existence in which not only does he make clear how much he accepts of 
Hyppolite's reading of Hegel, but he also provides the only published plan, that I 
know of, in which he lays out the aims of his future philosophical project. 29 
Deleuze begins by saying that Hyppolite's main theme is that "Philosophy must 
be ontology, it cannot be anything else; but there is no ontology of essence, there 
is only an ontology of sense". 30 He adds that "that philosophy must be ontology 
means first of all that it is not anthropology". Before we see why the philosophy 
of sense will terminate in an ontology, we should first unfold this notion of sense. 
The use of the word 'sense' or 'Sinn' does not seem especially vital in 
Hegel's own work, but Hyppolite makes clear that he is using it instead of the 
more familiar 'notion', or 'concept'. Why does he do this? While there is 
undoubtedly a Husserlian inspiration at work, this move also draws out the sense 
in which the concept in Hegel is a philosophical reality, it expresses reality. 
Hyppolite cites Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics: 
Sense is this wonderful word which is used in two opposite meanings. On the one 
hand it means the organ of immediate apprehension, but on the other hand we 
mean by it the sense, the significance, the thought, the universal underlying the 
thing. And so sense is connected on the one hand with the immediate external 
aspect of existence, and on the other hand with its inner essence.31 
29 It is worth noting that the only dedicatee of any book by Deleuze is Hyppolite, "in sincere and 
respectful homage". in Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human 
.Vature (trans. C. Boundas, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). 
30 Review of Jean Hyppolite, reprinted in Hy-ppolite, Logic and Existence, trans. L. Lawlor and A 
Sen (Albany: SUNY 1997), 191-195. In his 1978 lectures on Kant, Deleuze describes how for 
Kant '"there is no longer an essence behind appearance, there is rather the sense or non-sense of 
what appears" (Seminar 1, 5). This signifies "a radically new atmosphere of thought to the point 
where I can say that in this respect we are all Kantians". The sensible world is no longer different 
in kind from its ideal essence and philosophical method is no longer subject to the effort of either 
deriving the sensible from the ideal or the ideal from the sensible. and accommodating the one to 
the other. A new approach is possible: as Deleuze says. "something appears, tell me what it 
signifies or, and this amounts to the same thing. tell me what its condition is" (ibid). 
31 Hegel. .-lesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art (trans. T.M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford Uniyersity Press. 
1988). 128-9. quoted in Hyppolite. Logic and E'(istence. 2'+. 
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For Hegel these two opposite meanings signify a common source; they signify 
that the universal will be generated in the sensible; that the universal concept and 
the singular intuition are two aspects of the self-differentiation of the absolute. 
The articulation of the structure of the self-differentiation is what Hyppolite will 
call sense, while the movement itself can be called expression. For Hegel the 
problem with Kant's critique is that the concept, the ideal, remains too extenlai to 
the thing itself: "the categories are no fit terms to express the Absolute".32 The 
concept is never merely possible in Hegel; a Kantian possible concept (eg. of' 100 
thalers') is not really a concept, but merely "a content-determination of my 
consciousness,,;33 that is, it is merely a representation. A concept, rather, is 
ultimately and intrinsically neither representational nor referential, but expressive 
of a reality. This couple sense/expression will be taken up by Deleuze; both Hegel 
and Deleuze are against philosophies of representation because such philosophies 
claim to express what is by right a metacritically justified absolute within a 
framework that remains relative to subjective representational experience (ie. 
which has only been justified anthropologically), so that the concept of expression 
doesn't ever gain its full extension. 
Kant therefore is only partially aware of the transition to which he is 
midwife: "from the being of logic to the logicity of being".34 In these terms, the 
thing-in-itself is a contradictory left-over (contradictory because it is utterly empty 
yet is meant to be essential) from an ontology of essence, and confuses the 
transparent purity of the process of expression. For Hegel, there will ultimately be 
nothing outside the concept: absolute idealism will express every aspect of being. 
It is for this reason that Hyppolite says that "immanence is complete" in Hegel. 3:-
A philosophy of immanence is one that transparently expresses every aspect of 
being. So when we hear Deleuze talking of immanence, we can no longer neglect 
the Hegelian resonance of this term; moreover, when Deleuze talks of expression, 
and the idea that all modem philosophy, starting from Kant, is a philosophy of 
sense, we should also hear this Hegelian reading of the essential tendency of 
Kantian thought. 
3: Encyclopedia Logic, #44. 72. 
33 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. One-Volume Edition. ed. Hodgson (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988) 184. Cf. Encyclopedia Logic # 51. 8~-5. 
34 Hyppoiite. Logic and Existence. 176. 
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Now, Hyppolite systematises the notion of sense because he wants to lay 
priority on the special character of the Logic in Hegel's system. For Hyppolite, the 
Logic is the expression of being itself; it is the high point of Hegel's system in 
which "the concept, such as it appears in dialectical discourse, is [unlike in the 
Phenomenology] simultaneously truth and certainty, being and sense; it is 
immanent to this being which says itself,.36 Hegel's logic is a logic of sense. in 
which the sense of being itself is said through the genesis of concepts produced by 
the philosopher. 37 Attempting to avoid the anthropomorphic view of Hegel 
promoted by Kojeve earlier in the century, Hyppolite tries to restore the high 
metaphysical status of the Hegelian system; hence, like Deleuze, his anti-
humanism is an echo· of the claims of classical philosophy.38 In an important 
sentence for Deleuze, Hyppolite says that 
Hegel is still too Spinozistic for us to be able to speak of a pure humanism; a pure 
humanism culminates only in skeptical irony and platitude. Undoubtedly, the 
Logos appears in the human knowledge that interprets and says itself, but here 
man is only the intersection of this knowledge and this sense. Man is 
consciousness and self-consciousness, while at the same time natural Dasein, but 
consciousness and self-consciousness are not man. They say being as sense in 
man. They are the very being that knows itself and says itself. 39 
The implication of Hyppolite's reading here is that the phenomenological and 
historical parts of Hegel's system are anthropological entries into the system. 
H yppolite is influenced by Heidegger's 'Letter on Humanism': man is the 'place', 
the structural possibility that Being can reveal itself as suc~ and express its sense 
through 'man'. After man has been broken down and introduced into the absolute 
by the Phenomenology, the Logic, absolved of humanism, retraces the ideal 
genesis of the sense of being. This would be the meaning of Hegel's statement 
that the content of the Science of Logic "is the exposition of God as he is in his 
eternal essence prior to the creation of nature and a finite mind".40 
35 Ibid 176. 
36 Ib·d· 3-1 ). 
37 Ibid 175. 
38 The tum of Hyppolite from the humanism still present in his Genesis and Structure of Hegel's 
Phenomen%gv of Spirit (trans. S. Cherniak & 1. Heckman. Eyanston: Northwestem 197~) to an 
anti-hwnanist reading in Logic and Existence is overlooked by Judith Butler, in her account of 
French Hegelianism. Subjects of Desire (New York: Columbia University Press. 1999) but 
Michael Roth. in Knowing and History (Ithaca. Cornell University Press. 1988). 66-80. charts 
Hyppolite's trajectory in detail. 
39 Loe:ic and E:'dstence, 20. 
-10 HegeL Science of Logic, trans. A V. Miller (New York: Hunlanities Press. 1989).50. 
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In his review of Hyppolite, Deleuze affirms fully this reading of Hegel I 
now cite at length two of the most important passages. The first places Deleuze' s 
development of the notion of difference explicitly within the context of Hegelian 
self-differentiation: 
[T]he external, empirical difference of thought and being [in the Kantian system] 
has given way [in Hegel] to the difference identical with Being, to the difference 
internal to the Being which thinks itself.. .. In the Logic, there is no longer, 
therefore, as in the empirical, what I say on the one side and on the other side the 
sense of what I say - the pursuit of one by the other which is the dialectic of the 
Phenomenology. On the contrary, my discourse is logical or properly 
philosophical when I say the sense of what I say, and when in this manner Being 
. 1£41 says rtse . 
I claim that Deleuze will never depart from this image of a "properly 
philosophical" discourse. That is, his philosophy will be a philosophy of the 
absolute; it will accept the move from the relativity of knowledge in Kant to the 
notion of the absolute and the method of genesis. Deleuze in fact shares none of 
the reservations about Hegelian immanence that are exhibited by his fellow post-
war French philosophers. He has no bad conscience about the notion of 
immanence and does not construct a philosophy of difference in order to subvert 
immanence (and introduce some notion of 'irreducible otherness' into it), but in 
order to fulfil it (precisely as Hegel does). Our problem will be to explain how and 
why Deleuze returns to Kant to carry out precisely this aim. Deleuze concludes 
the review with some pregnant questions for Hyppolite after summarising the 
mains claim of his book: 
Following Hyppolite, we recognise that philosophy, if it has a meaning, can only 
be an ontology and an ontology of sense. The same being and the same thought 
are in the empirical and the absolute. But the difference between thought and 
being is sublated in the absolute by the positing of the Being identical to 
difference which, as such, thinks itself and reflects itself in man. This absolute 
identity of being and difference is called sense .... The richness of Hyppolite's 
book could then let us wonder this: can we not construct an ontology of 
difference which would not have to go up to contradiction, because contradiction 
would be less than difference and not more? Is not contradiction itself only the 
phenomenal and anthropological aspect of difference?42 
We thus have four criteria laid out in 1955 for Deleuze's future philosophy. 
Firstly, like Hegel, he believes that Kantian critique must lead to an implicit 
philosophical affirmation of the logicity of being. Secondly, he affirms that the 
-11 Reyiew of Hyppolite. Logic and Existence, 194. 
-1~ Ibid 195. 
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philosophy of immanence must also be a philosophy of the absolute, therefore all 
differentiation found in it will be internal, self-generated, differentiation. Thirdly. 
this philosophy must be able to say its own sense. Finally, we also have the 
suggestion that the absolute claims of Hegelian philosophy must be purified of 
dependence on phenomenal and anthropological content, and that this latter 
category, for some unspecified reason, includes the concepts of contradiction and 
negation. 
Now, if we tum to look for an actualisation of this project, we appear to 
find it not in DR at all, but in Spinoza and the Problem of Expression, published 
in the same year. It is in Spinoza that Deleuze finds the fullest flowering of an 
alternative model of immanent self-differentiation that remains faithful to the 
Hegelian schema just outlined, while transforming it through a notion of 
difference without contradiction. Deleuze attempts to enact a philosophical 
construction of absolute immanence through a reading in particular of the first 
book of the Ethics. 43 He arguably fulfils certain conditions a post-Kantian would 
require of Spinoza, for instance by accentuating the genetic aspects of Spinoza's 
system. 44 Spinoza would thus appear to provide our destination on the path to 
understand what Deleuze means by immanence. However, the place of Spinoza in 
Deleuze's philosophy turns out to be extremely complicated, and in fact 
unresolved throughout his writings. It will tum out, in fact, that Spinozism will be 
just as haunting and irresolvable a presence in Deleuze as it was in the work of the 
post -Kantians. 
4 Spinoza and the Problem of Immanence 
Post-Kantian philosophy had an enduring fascination with Spinoza, who for Kant 
remained peripheral to the German rationalist tradition embodied by Leibniz and 
Wolff. The post-Kantians sought to revive the philosophical dignity and majesty 
of Spinozism in the light of Kantian jurisdictions against metaphysics. For Fichte, 
43 Deleuze disputes Hegel's criticism of Spinoza' s method for being mereZv geometrical. arguing 
that there is a process of genetic definition in Spinoza, which he "ill attempt to retrace: 
E-rpressiol1ism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 20-I. 
44 Ibid 18I where Deleuze claims that the post-Kantians were not sufficiently aware of "the 
presence in Spinozism of that genetic movement of self-development for which they sought 
anticipations eyerywhere". 
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the Wissenschaftlehre was "Spinozism made systematic; save only that any given 
self is itself the one substance"; 45 this evaluation persists in various forms through 
Schelling and Hegel. In his Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism mld CritiCism, 
Schelling recognised that "it was precisely Spinoza who ... thought of absolute 
necessity and absolute freedom as identical",46 which was exactly the aim of 
Schelling himself. In the Science of Logic, Spinozism represents the culmination 
of the Doctrine of Essence, and seems to be only overtaken by Hegel insofar as 
Spinoza had not adequately worked out that substance and causality had to issue 
in reciprocal interaction, the resolution of which takes us into the Doctrine of the 
Notion. Indeed Hegel's critique of Spinoza through the explication of the 
dependence of substance on causality and reciprocity can be seen as an 
intensification of Spinoza' s causa sui, rather than a refutation. Both Schelling and 
Hegel remarked upon the futility of 'refuting' Spinoza.47 He had to be 
incorporated, without overwhelming their systems.48 
But the more Spinoza was accepted, the more difficult it became to 
overcome him. In the Science of Logic, Hegel implicitly criticises Fichte's 
recourse to the argument that "for anyone who does not presuppose as an 
established fact the freedom and self-subsistence of the self-conscious subject 
there cannot be any refutation of Spinozism".49 Hegel points out that this is not 
-15 Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, 119. 
46 Schelling, in The Unconditional in Human Knowledge, trans. F. Marti (Lewisberg: Brucknell 
University Press, 1980), 189. 
-1" Cf. Hegel, Science of Logic, 58l. 
48 However, Spinoza is sometimes represented as the yery antithesis of the German idealist project 
(cf., for instance, A Bowie, Schelling and .A/odem European Philosophy. London: Routledge, 
1993. 17-28). This ,iew overlooks a fundamental distinction in the perception of Spinoza in the 
wake of the celebrated 'Pantheism Controversy' of the 1780's. On the one hand F.H. Jacobi 
understood Spinoza as the philosopher who most accurately displays the tendency of philosophical 
reason to lead to an infinite regress of causes or reasons. On the other hand howeyer, Spinozist 
infinity ,,"'as shown by Herder not to involve a potential regress, but rather the affirmation of actual 
infinity. If thought and being could be shown, by way of a return to Leibniz and contemporary 
vitalism, to issue from the same principle, then this philosophy of absolute infinity is far from a 
nihilistically regressive demonstration of the futility of reason, but its highest flowering in the 
form of a Romantic pantheism. It is this latter Spinoza who is celebrated by Schelling and Hegel. 
Cf. Herder, God: Some Conversations, trans. F.H. Burkhardt (New York: Veritas, 1943). 107. In 
The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992). 243-6. J. 
Zanmtito shows how Herder, by eAl'licitly comparing his reading of Spinoza "ith Jacobi' s. opened 
up the problematic status of Spinoza for the future Gennan idealists. Hegel did in fact read 
Herder's God (cf. his letter to Mehmel of March 26, 1802, in Hegel: The Letters, 90). F. Beiser on 
the other hand foregrounds Jacobi's reading of Spinoza's notion of infinity. while characterising 
Herder's Spinozism predominantly in terms of vitalism: cf. The Fate of Reason (Cambridge. Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1987),83-85, 159-163. 
49 Science of Logic, 581. 
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enough: Spinozism can indeed account for thought and explain freedom. ~or is it 
sufficient to say, as Fichte did, that the difference between Spinozism and 
Fichtean freedom lay simply in "the kind of person one is",50 that is, in one's 
insistence on one's own freedom. Thus, Hegel's sublation of Spinoza will occur, 
not through the affirmation of the fact of freedom, but on systematic grounds. "In 
my view, which can be justified only by the exposition oj the system itself 
everything turns on grasping and expressing the True not only as Substance, but 
equally as Subjecf,.51 However, precisely determining the success of systematic 
criteria is, as has been suggested in Appendix I, no easy matter. 
Deleuze said that the philosopher he worked upon "most according to the 
norms of the history of philosophy" was Spinoza. 52 All of our discussion of the 
notion of immanence up until now thus seems to lead towards Spinoza as the 
holder of the secret of its meaning. Deleuze affirms in 1991 that it is indeed 
Spinoza who sets out ''the 'best' plane of immanence".53 In the Spinoza book of 
1968, Deleuze fashions a history of the philosophy of immanence, from the 
Neoplatonists through to Duns Scotus, which culminates in Spinoza. 
However, there are three problems. Firstly, at a general philosophical 
level, it is not at all clear how seriously Deleuze intends his account of Spinoza to 
genuinely compete on its own terms with Hegel and post-Kantianism. 54 Given the 
amount of work that is done explicitly engaging with Kant and Hegel in DR 
50 Fichte, 'First Introduction to the Tflssenschajtslehre'. in Fichte, Introductions to the 
Wissenschaftslehre. trans. D. Breazeale (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994).20. 
5! Hegel, Phenomenology. 10 (first italics mine). The reference to "system" here is to the whole of 
Hegel's system, which the Preface introduces. 
5~ Dialogues, 15. 
53 What is Philosophy? 60. 
54 Although Deleuze claims to find a "genetic movement of self-development" in Spinoza. the 
presence of such a genesis would still seem only leave us \\1th an (early) Schellingean absolute, 
and not yet an internally self-justifying Hegelian absolute. Deleuze would have to deal with 
Hegel's critique of Schelling, and all the evidence suggests that Deleuze' s criticisms of Hegel lie 
elsewhere (as I "vill show in the body of the thesis). Cf. also Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (trans. 
R. Hurley. San Francisco: City Lights, 1988),83-6 (on 'Method'), where Deleuze further suggests 
that the entrance into Spinoza's system is incorporated in a (metacritically) circular way into the 
unfolding of the system as a whole. However, the suggestion is merely formal. and Deleuze's 
implicit comparison of Spinoza' s requirement to move "as quickly as possible" from the starting 
point of the possession of a "true idea" to the idea of God (cf. Treatise on the Emendation of the 
intellect. ed. G.H.R Parkinson, London: Eyeryman, 1993. 231, 237), with Fichte's similar 
requirement in the opening arguments of the 1794 Science o/Knowledge (trans. Heath & 1. Lachs. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982: cf. 94, "we choose that which offers us the 
shortest road to our goal"). remains undeveloped (and again undefended against possible Hegelian 
objections of abstraction). See Deleuze's ex-plicit comparisons of Spinoza and Fichte in 
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(where Spinoza plays quite a minimal role), it surely seems more plausible to 
suggest that rather than attempting (and failing) in Spinoza and the Problem of 
Expression to set up a version of Spinozism that can seriously compete with the 
metacritical intensity of post-Kantianism, he is testing out a model of absolute 
difference that can be put to work and properly justified elsewhere (ie. in DR). 
Moreover, we are faced with two large textual snags which lead right back 
into the depths of the issue of Deleuze's 'problem' of immanence. Firstly, in a 
footnote to DR, Deleuze makes a startling remark: that in Spinoza "no "problem" 
at all appears in the usage of the geometric method" (DR 323/209, translation 
modified). I have explained the importance of problems in Appendix I, and in the 
body of the thesis I explain the centrality of the notion in DR. Now, if Spinoza is 
the focus for the problem of immanence for Deleuze, then how is he to 'divine' 
Spinoza's problem at all if the actual execution of his philosophy contains no 
trace of its problematic? How can the conceptual edifice one creates be so 
removed from its problem? Secondly, in DR, Deleuze conspicuously does 110t use 
the term 'immanence' in relation to Spinoza, instead localising Spinoza's 
achievement to a major advance in the problem of 'the univocity of being', a 
problem Deleuze traces back instead to Aristotle. 55 Moreover, Deleuze also sees 
Nietzsche as the culmination of the history of the problem of univocity, with his 
notion of eternal return. 56 While Spinoza' s absolute reaches a theoretical 
affirmation of univocal being, only Nietzsche's transformation of univocity 
produces a practical affirmation. However, Deleuze does claim that this 'realised' 
univocity of being gives us "the only realised ontology" (DR 303/387). With the 
very large claim involved in this phrase surely we return precisely to the problem 
of immanence as treated in the post -Kantian tradition. 
Deleuze in fact vacillates crucially over the question of whether the 
philosophy of immanence and expression that he wishes to defend, and which we 
Expressionism in Philosophy, 369, n.23, and TVhat is Philosophy? (trans. G. Burchill & H. 
Tomlinson, London: Verso, 1994),207. 
55 It is worth pointing out that DR and Spinoza and the Problem o/Expression were both published 
in the same vear so there is not much time for Deleuze to have changed his mind here. 
56 In an inte;"vie~v from 1988, Deleuze says "J did begin "ith books on the history of philosophy. 
but all the authors I dealt "ith had for me something in common. And it all tended toward the 
great Spinoza-Nietzsche equation" CVegotiations. 135). It must be added. hO\veyer. that this 'great 
equation' is very much in the background of DR., being articulated only "ithin the Kantian 
problematic I "ill be dealing with. One of my aims is to eXl'licate the obscure relation between 
these two strands in DR. 
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have seen projected at the beginning of his career (in which "difference would be 
identical to Being", and through which Hegel's similar philosophy would be 
decisively overcome) is to be identified with Spinozism. We should in fact read 
between the lines of his late full affirmation of Spinoza as the philosopher of 
immanence in What is Philosophy?: 
Spinoza was the philosopher who knew full well that immanence was only 
immanent to itself ... He is therefore the prince of philosophers. Perhaps he is the 
only philosopher never to have compromised with transcendence and to have 
hunted it down everywhere ... He discovered that freedom exists only within 
immanence. He fulfilled philosophy because he satisfied its prephilosophical 
supposition. ... Spinoza is the vertigo of immanence from which so many 
philosophers try in vain to escape. Will we ever be mature enough for a Spinozist 
. . . ?57 InSpIratIOn. 
Two important changes can be found to have taken place, unsignalled, in 
Deleuze's work here, which cast an interesting light on his uncertainty about the 
notion of immanence. Firstly, immanence is now defined predominantly against 
transcendence, whereas before it was defined against systems such as emanation. 
But this notion of transcendence is highly unusual in that it includes not only 
concepts of entities such as God, but even the notions of subject and object. As 
Deleuze elaborates in his last ever published article, the short opuscule entitled 
'Immanence: A Life', both the subject and the object are not transcendental, but 
'transcendent', whereas the field of immanence itself is "an impersonal pre-
reflexive consciousness, a qualitative duration of consciousness without self'. 58 
Here Deleuze in fact appeals to the later Fichte, and he seems very close to the 
philosophy of pre-reflexivity found in Fichte by Dieter Henrich in his seminal 
article 'Fichte's Original Insight'. 59 
The claim that "immanence IS related only to itself', yet must be 
considered to be pre-reflexive, points to the second change indicated in the 
passage quoted above. Immanence has become a pre-philosophical 
presupposition. Now, in this move towards the late Fichte with this affirmation of 
57 What is Philosophy?, 48: italics mine. 
58 'Immanence: A Life', trans. N. Millett, Theory, Culture, Society, vol. 14 (2), 3. 
59 "The possibility of reflection must be understood on the basis of this primordial essence of the 
Self. ... A gap, perhaps even an abyss. opens up between the 'Self' and what makes the Self 
intelligible", Henrich., 'Fichte's Original Insight'. trans. D. Lachtennan (Contemporary German 
Philosoph.v L 1982), 22-3. The texts of Fichte referred to by Deleuze are the post-1800 
Introduction to the Blessed Lifo. and the 1797 Introductions to the Wissenschaftlehre. but Deleuze 
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the pre-philosophical, Deleuze takes two steps. Firstly, he would seem at last to 
fall back into the antinomy of post-Kantianism outlined in Appendix I by 
affirming a featureless form of intellectual intuition. 60 This would also issue in 
major problems for the continuing affirmation of 'difference' and 'multiplicity'. 
Secondly, he can no longer appeal to the metacritical affirmation of the absolute 
that he appears to expound in DR; in particular, he can no longer claim to have 
found "the only realised ontology", because such a philosophy of immanence 
could never be realised; its pre-reflexivity precludes this. Thus we come to the 
conclusion that Deleuze's late affirmation of the notion of immanence occurs at 
the cost of its becoming a pre-philosophical problem. Its completion seems to be 
its negation. But with this late move, his project loses much of its fascination. In 
Spinoza and the Problem of Expression, immanence appears to be a matter of 
philosophical construction. Deleuze's deduction of Spinoza's genesis of absolute 
difference was a model for the construction of immanence itself. All that was 
needed was an account of its metacritical validity in relation to other metacritical 
philosophies: we find the materials for this in DR. But the late Deleuze does not 
return to this project of construction, and never again makes the claim to have 
realised ontology: all Deleuze leaves us with is the "presupposition" of 
immanence. And this surely amounts to a return to Fichte's criterion, that it 
depends on the kind of person one is whether one accepts this version of things. 
All of this indicates that my proposed path, to take Deleuze as the latest 
stage of the post-Kantian metacritical project, in competition with Hegel, will by 
no means be untroubled. We will have to return to and reconstruct Deleuze's 
'problem', and examine whether lie was justified in leaving it behind. I will claim 
that his earlier project still stands a chance of success, if we fasten its roots more 
firmly in its Kantian and post-Kantian soil. If we accept wholeheartedly, in a way 
that Deleuze seemed reluctant to do, the post-Kantian nexus of issues around the 
problem of immanence, then Deleuze's philosophy in DR, and aspects of his tum 
to Spinoza, can be defended. It is not through Spinoza but rather through a return 
to Kant that Deleuze's philosophy of immanence must be approached. 
indicates that he is referring to the Introductions only insofar as they elaborate the "intuition of 
sheer activity: not a matter of existence. but oflife" (6), and thus refers to the post-l 800 Fichte. 
60 In fact there is more to be said about this particular version of this position. especially in its 
form as elaborated by Henrich and Manfred Frank: (see chapter S.4.ii). 
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Chapter One 
The Self-Critique of Reason 
The notion that the Critique of Pure Reason is the enactment of a critique of 
reason by itself has been itself subject to a 'peculiar fate'. On the one hand, it is 
accepted that the self-critique of reason can safely characterise the Kantian 
method of the self-examination of the capacities of human cognition, a self-
examination that delimits the possibility of what we can know, should do and may 
hope (cf CPR A805/B833). Three implications are taken to follow from the idea. 
Firstly, the self-critique of reason entails that the critique be immanent; if reason 
is to fully criticise itself, it can allow nothing beyond itself into the process. 
Secondly, the condition for this immanent self-critique is the discovery and 
elaboration of the ability of reason to be self-reflexive. This is held to be 
connected with Kant's discovery of self-consciousness as the new centre of 
gravity of the 'Copernican tum'. Thus the reflexivity that Kant discovers in the 
'transcendental unity of apperception' is here extended to include, and to be fully 
realised, in reason. Thirdly, as we have seen already, critique itself must somehow 
be internally justified at a metacriticallevel. 
On the other hand, the Kantian articulation of the project of the self-
critique of reason is seen in terms of a discovery, the realisation of which was 
hampered by Kant's execution of it. Kant attempted to examine the limits of 
knowledge, but as he could not account for the kind of knowledge necessary for 
the production of CPR itself, his account of these limits was flawed. From this 
point of view the project of the self-critique of reason is only actually realised in 
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Hegel, after further attempts by Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling. Hegel's 
philosophy of immanence is thus equivalent to the full, thoroughgoing reflexivity 
of reason. 
My claim is that, as the procedure of accounting for the project of critique 
itself came under relentless scrutiny, Kant's own distinctive, if rather baroque. 
approach to the problem was soon forgotten. In this chapter I aim to excavate 
Kant's original ideas concerning the self-critique of reason, in order to attempt to 
hold off the notion that the fate of immanence lies with Hegel. 
What are Hegel's main criticisms of Kant's notion of self-critique? The 
question of metacritique in Hegel is so bound up with the internal details of his 
system that the question cannot be very profitably separated from them, so I will 
only present a brief characterisation here, based around two arguments: Hegel's 
treatments of the problems of self-reference in the critique of knowledge and the 
distinction between reason and the understanding. 
I start with Hegel's famous criticism of the notion that ''we ought ... to 
become acquainted with the instrument [ of knowledge], before we undertake the 
work for which it is to be employed".l Kant's critical project is often held to begin 
with a doubt about the possibility of the correspondence of knowledge with its 
object.2 Hegel takes Kant to reason that ''this evil could be remedied through an 
acquaintance with the way in which the instrument works',3: in Kantian terms, this 
will mean an analysis of the conditions of possible knowledge that will serve as a 
propaedeutic to metaphysics. But Hegel argues that such a propaedeutic will not 
work in the case of knowledge, for it is not possible for knowledge to reflect on its 
own nature and function without already engaging in the attempt to know: "the 
examination of cognition can only be carried out by an act of cognition. To 
examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it".4 This problem 
1 Encyclopedia Logic # 10, 14. 
2 See the famDUS expressiDn Df this in the letter to' Herz Qf 21 February 1772. I attempt to' place this 
letter in a new cO'ntex1 in chapter 3.1. 
3 Phenomenology, 46. 
4 Encyclopedia Logic # 10, 14. Nietzsche, apparently QbliviQUS to' Hegel's critique, e:\:presses the 
same point in the preface to' Da.vbreak (trans. HQllingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1997). # 3: "come to' think Qf it, \vas it nQt sQmewhat peculiar to' demand Qf an instrument 
that it shO'uld criticise its O'wn usefulness and suitability? that the intellect shQuld 'knQW' its m\n 
value. its 0'\\11 capacity, its m\11 limitatiQns? was it nQt even a little absurd?" But cf. the nQte frQm 
1886-7 in The rVi II to Power # 473 (trans. W. Kaufmann.. New Y Drk: Vintage. 1968) \"here 
Nietzsche saYS "the intellect cannQt criticise itself. simply because it cannQt be compared \\ith 
O'ther species' Qf intellect and because its capacity to' knQW WQuld be revealed Dnly in the presence 
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III Kant is taken by Hegel as the springboard for the method laid out in the 
Introduction to the Phenomenology. The consequence of this diagnosis of Kant is 
that knowledge, or cognition, must be taken as reflexive. The knowledge we have 
of an object will always already conform to criteria we have, however implicit, for 
what knowledge and its object should be. Hegel's method at the outset of the 
Phenomenology is to posit a "natural consciousness" in which this cognitive 
reflexivity is presented in its most rudimentary form, 5 and then follow through a 
genesis of gradually more complex criteria for cognitive validity, each set of 
criteria being generated out of the phenomenological enactment and failure of the 
previous set. In this way, the problem of the self-critique of reason becomes 
explicitly a problem of "beginning" in philosophy. Hence for Hegel the self-
critique of reason, as a result of the initial conundrum concerning the self-
reference of the attempt to know knowledge, must be broken up into stages that 
are justified through a combination of phenomenological and genetic grounds, and 
remodelled according to the schema of implicit reflexivity or self-consciousness. 
As well as invoking Hegel's methodological treatment of the issue of the 
self-critique of reason, it is necessary to mention Hegel's treatment of the lOgical 
issue of how reason can criticise itself. One of the 
problems, as we will see, with Kant's conception is that reason is a faculty among 
others, yet is somehow able to criticise the use not only of the other faculties, but 
of itself among these faculties. Hence in Kant reason seems to be subject to a 
potential equivocify. For Hegel, however, reason is redefined as a capacity of 
thought, entitled speculative, that is different in kind from the other faculties, 
which are treated as abstractions of this fundamental speculative power of 
thought.6 Without going into detail, we can at least apprehend how Hegel solves 
the problem of the equivocity of reason here. Hegel supposes that understanding, 
intuition, and imagination are internally or dynamically related to speculati"ve 
reason. They are inadequate abstractions of the full dialectical extent of reason. 
Thus reason can criticise itself in the sense that it criticises part of itself; that is, 
on the condition that it includes the understanding as a merely partial, or abstract 
notion of reason (and the same goes for imagination and sensibility, as ever wider 
of "true reality'." This latter criticism constitutes the cmx of the matter. as "ill be shO\\l1 in what 
follows. 
5 Phenomenology. 49. 
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abstractions with ever diminishing conceptual content). There are thus different 
uses or functions of reaso~ depending on whether it is used speculatively or 
reflectively. For instance, "reason operates as understanding,,7 when it is placed in 
a theoretical framework that expresses certain epistemological and metaphysical 
presuppositions about the oppositional nature of representation and its object. 
However, only speculative philosophy presents a metacritically adequate 
framework for epistemology and metaphysics. 
These distinctions within the notion of reason provide Hegel with the 
materials to sort out the problem of the equivocity of reason in Kant. I will 
suggest (largely implicitly) that Deleuze's account works in the opposite way to 
Hegel's. Deleuze preserves Kant's notion of the faculties and operates a "genesis" 
only of their relations. But by preserving the irreducible distinction of the 
faculties, it follows that the methodological and logical problems of the self-
critique of reason once again swing open. 
In the present chapter I want to show that the Hegelian view of Kant's 
critique is vulnerable to a fallacy. Kant is held to have discovered a particular 
notion - the self-critique of reason - yet at the same time failed to implement it. 
But on such a reading, is there not the possibility that the interpretation of the 
particular notion in question does not accurately represent what Kant had created 
at all, and that what he actually did say may be defensible and open to 
development in another way? The Hegelian reading of the Kantian notion of the 
self-critique of reason has been fateful for the subsequent history of philosophy, 
and particularly for the notion of immanence. But is it the necessary culmination 
of the Kantian immanent critique? I will argue that the notion of immanence can 
be also developed by referring to the alternative route Deleuze takes, one that has 
its roots in the original matrix of Kantian philosophy, and is sensitive to the 
specific tensions and vertigo that are concealed in and secreted by Kant's project. 
But to open up this possible reading, we need to return in detail to Kant, which 
will take up the present and the following chapter. 
6 For instance. cf. Ency/opedia LOgiC. chapter 6, 'Logic further defined and divided', #79f. 
i The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, trans. Cerf and Harris. 
Albany: SUNY 1977), p. 96. Cf. Science of Logic. 61O~12. 
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1 Kant and the Self-Critique of Reason 
What does Kant himself say about immanent critique? Does he have a consistent 
view about the realisation of this critique? Is he in fact as blind to the problems of 
metacritique as those who came after thought? 
The very title of the Critique of Pure Reason is peculiarly opaque. 
Because we are used to a certain reading of the notion of immanent critique, we 
expect the genitive of the title to be double. It is a critique of reason (objective 
genitive) only because it is a critique on the part of reason (subjective genitive). 
But is this what Kant intends by the title? 
We should first note that Kant does not often use the word 'immanence' in 
connection with the problem of critique itself Predominantly, he uses 'immanent' 
in contradistinction to 'transcendent', with reference to the use of the principles of 
pure understanding and the principles of pure reason (cf A297/B313, 
A308/B365). This use of 'immanence' does not directly map onto the issue of the 
immanence of critique itself Kant uses it only after he has shown that the 
possibility of experience is the key to the justification of the pure concepts of the 
understanding and the limitation of the ideas of pure reason. That is, the word 
'immanent' only refers to the correctness of the application of pure concepts and 
ideas; it is not itself a criterion for their discovery or justification. 
This is not to say that Kant is not thoroughly concerned with the problems 
implied in the notion of immanent critique. However, the relation between 
immanence and critique in Kant will be more complicated than might be apparent 
from a Hegelian perspective. In fact, we will see that Kant develops these issues 
in great detail, but his answers are usually to be found at the 'outer limits' of his 
critical writings. I mean this in two senses: firstly, in a straightforward sense, Kant 
deals with metacritical issues in the introductions and, especially, the final stages 
of each of the three critiques. But secondly, these final stages often find Kant 
negotiating with philosophical issues that are on the very borderline between the 
critical and what is misleadingly called 'pre-critical'. It is here that Kant is dealing 
not only with the investigation into the possibility of experience, but also with the 
issue of what 'legitimate' questions and problems of philosophy in general are, 
and how to delimit them; and it is here that Kant investigates the relation of 
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critique and metaphysics. Hence the relevance of these passages for the problem 
of metacritique. 
Our problem will be best posed if we examine the beginning and the end 
of CPR in the light of each other. It is at the beginning that Kant most famously. 
yet it turns out most obscurely, sets the task of the self-critique of reason, but it is 
at the protracted end, at the closing of the first circle of the critical project, that the 
status of critique itself is most extensively broached. 
At the very beginning (as also at the very end, in the 'History of Pure 
Reason') Kant frames the issue historically. But the history invoked is internal to 
philosophy, and in particular to metaphysics itself. The critical project is 
presented as continuous with previous metaphysics, but as a coming to age of the 
problems at stake in metaphysics. It represents a particular moment in the history 
of metaphysics when something very new happens as the result of a growing 
burden of internal problems. In the Preface, he states that in our "age of 
criticism", the ripened power of judgment "demands that reason should take on 
anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge" (A xi). My 
main question over the following pages is: Does this task of self-knowledge 
therefore unproblematically imply a self-reflection, a reflection of reason upon 
itself? I will argue that this interpretation must be held off for a number of 
reasons. 
I shall note some basic points at the outset. Firstly, if the task of the self-
critique of reason were to be modelled on reflection, then surely 'transcendental 
reflection' would be an apt term for it. But we will see that Kant reserves that 
term for the quite specific task of resolving 'amphibolies', that is, the confusion of 
transcendental distinctions such as sensible/intelligible or empirical/transcendental 
(see chapter 3). Secondly, for Kant the reflexivity of consciousness very 
specifically concerns the transcendental grounding of the possibility of knowledge 
(see chapter 5). But it is particularly important not to be myopic when it comes to 
questioning the status of critique itself: the justification of the possibility of 
knowledge is but one part of Kant's system. In the first edition CPR Kant sees 
himself as attempting to justify all apriori principles available to human 
possibility. For instance, one should not forget that Ideas of Pure Reason have 
their own transcendental deduction (A6691B677), which is not directly grounded 
on the reflexivity of consciousness; in fact, far from it, as we will see (chapters 3 
& 5). 
But most crucially, we need only turn to the text itself to see that, if there 
is a reflexivity implied in the self-critique of reason, it is much more elusive and 
quite different to what is implied by the usual model of reflexivity. 8 For what does 
reason do in order to criticise itself? It institutes a court of justice "by which 
reason may secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its groundless 
pretensions" (A xi). Hence what facilitates the self-critique of reason is the setting 
up of a whole court or tribunal, which can only be a complex process by no means 
identifiable with any psychological or epistemological self-examination, and also 
implies the recognition by reason of something else - justice. What this wider 
meaning of the quid juris - of the relative rights of the cognitive faculties - might 
be will be the subject of this chapter. 
There is an aspect of reason's endeavour as described by Kant in the first 
edition preface which should be immediately surprising given the vaunted 
radicality of this self-examination. Immediately after the above citation about 
reason dismissing its own groundless pretensions, Kant adds, "and this not by 
mere decrees but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws". As the text 
goes on, it turns out that reason is only in dissension with itself "in its 
nonexperiential use". It is only at a particular point that reason misunderstands 
itself and this point must be discovered. Furthermore, the critique of reason will 
resolve the outstanding questions to reason's full satisfaction, because "pure 
reason is ... a perfect unity". The final sentence of CPR echoes this claim, this 
time stating that the task is ''to bring human reason to full satisfaction" 
(A855/B883, italics mine). Thus reason's dissension with itself is not yet 
presented as in itself tragic, as in the Hegelian model, but is put immediately in 
the perspective of a greater restoration of pure reason. The antinomies and 
transgressions of reason are only seen as irresolvable conflicts from the 
perspective of illusion; in fact, if only our prejudices and illusions could be put in 
their place, we would see pure reason for what it is. 
8 In the Afetaphysik ,\!rongrovius, Kant says only that the critique of pure reason is "a kind of self-
knowledge" (LM 116: Ak. 29: 756), but he is here distinguishing between ontology which 
concerns the object or "things in general" and transcendental philosophy which is concerned "ith 
the subject. but only in the minimal sense that it is concerned "ith the "concepts through which we 
think things" (LM ll~: Ak. 29: 752), rather than the things in general. 
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In fact, Kant asserts at the outset that reason is already open to an 
immanent survey by the human mind: "I have to do merely with reason itself and 
its pure thinking; to gain exhaustive acquaintance with them I need not seek far 
beyond myself, because it is in myself that I encounter them" (Axiv). But while 
none of these comments so far indicate that Kant thinks that reason's self-
discovery is in itself tragic, there is nevertheless what may be called an epic 
dimension to the Kantian 'know thyself' that comes out in other remarks. In 
particular, at the end of the Metaphysics oj Morals, Kant states that the "first 
command of all duties to oneself' is to "know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself." To 
seek "to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of one's heart which are difficult to 
fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom". He concludes that "only the 
descent into the hell of self-cognition can pave the way to godliness" (PP 562, Ak. 
6:441). While this may be held to apply mainly to moral self-cognition, I will 
argue that, especially given the importance of the systematic hierarchy of morality 
and knowledge in justifying the self-critique of reason, it may be extended to the 
entire project of the critique. The critical project is a voyage through the fogs of 
illusion (cf A2351B295), a journey into the hell of self-knowledge, during which 
the light emanating through the fog is all the time present. In the critical project, 
reason takes on the most difficult of all tasks - self-knowledge; but, in the early 
critical Kant at least, it is reason itself in its eternal and, I will argue, metaphysical 
form, that must somehow undergo the harrowing of hell. Reason must test itself: 
but that can only mean it must test its uses and applications in experience. 
''Reason tests whether it cannot set itself beyond experience on the wings of 
ideas" (LM 116; Ak. 29:756). The critique of pure reason will be the realisation 
of pure reason. 
F or Kant, the voyage of critique is consistently described as a passage 
towards metaphysics. Kant writes to Lambert on 11th September 1770 that he is 
working on a "propaedeutic" to metaphysics (C 108; Ak. 10:98). The status of 
critique as propaedeutic is explicitly reaffirmed in CPR (A111B25, A8411B869). 
However, there is a mediating link between critique and metaphysics: 
transcendental philosophy. 9 The latter is a particular species of metaphysics that 
9 Eckart Forster's important article 'Kant's Notion of Philosophy'. Alonist 72, 1989. was the 
springboard for some of the following ideas. although I differ 'With him on some fundamental ideas 
(in particular those concerning 'real possibility') to be discussed in chapters 2 & 5. 
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governs "the metaphysics of nature" (A8451B873). In the Introduction, Kant says 
"I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects, but 
rather with our apriori concepts of objects in general [Gegenstdnde iiberhauptt 
(A121B26). In the Architectonic, Kant elaborates that "transcendental 
philosophy ... considers only the understanding and reason itself in a system of 
all concepts and principles that are related to objects in general [Gegenstdnde 
iiberhaupt], without assuming objects [Objecte] that would be given (Ontologia)" 
(A8451B873). This distinction between Gegenstand and Object will become 
important later, but for the moment it is enough to concentrate on the fact that 
Kant equates transcendental philosophy with ontology.lo Kant emphasises that 
"this critique is not itself [to be] called transcendental philosophy" and that 
"[t]ranscendental philosophy is here only an idea, for which the critique of pure 
reason is to outline the entire plan architectonicaIIy, ie. from principles" 
(A131B27); the critique will "lay before us a complete enumeration of all the 
ancestral concepts [Stammbegriffe] that comprise the pure cognition in question" 
(ibid). These Stammbegriffe are equivalent to the pure concepts of Gegenstande 
uberhaupt, and are called such because they have their origin in the understanding 
and reason. II 
What is important to see here is that critique and metaphysics are initially 
separated only by the fact that critique is a mere idea of a branch of metaphysics, 
transcendental philosophy. But if this is the case, the status of immanence in this 
critical task surely starts to become obscure. In one of his rare uses of the term 
outside its normal place in the discussion of the immanent/transcendent use of 
principles, Kant writes to IS. Beck on 20th January, 1792 that out of the results of 
the critique, "emerges a whole science of Ontology as immanent thinking, ie. a 
science of things the objective reality of whose concepts can be securely 
established" (C 398; Ak. 11:314). What is interesting for us here is the ascription 
of the notion of immanence to metaphysics (or transcendental philosophy as 
10 The contex1 of this passage suggests that "ontologia" refers to the first clause, not the second It 
should be placed in contex1 ,vith Kant's more famous statement that "the proud name of ontology 
must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of pure understanding" (A2471B303). What 
Kant draws attention to here is the switch from pride to modesty, not necessarily any more 
substantial alterations. 
11 Kant's frequent statements that the apriori concepts ha,'e their origin in the understanding and 
reason are often overlooked, perhaps because such an idea seems unhelpfully metaphorical. 
However. I wiI1 suggest in the nex1 chapter that the notion is essential to understanding the first 
edition CPR 
ontology), rather than critique, as if immanence were not itself a property of the 
self-critique of pure reason, but of what the critique is attempting to reach, of 
what we possess by right, but are occluded from seeing properly. In fact, it is 
metaphysics that, according to the concepts presented in CP~ "is nothing but the 
inventory of all we possess through pure reason, ordered systematically. 
Nothing can escape us, because what reason brings forth entirely out of itself 
cannot be hidden, but is brought to light by reason itself as soon as reason's 
common principle has been discovered" (A xx). Critique involves the discovery of 
this common principle, which will allow the proper construction of metaphysics. 
Kant elaborates on the role of critique in relation to metaphysics in the 
Metaphysik Mrongrovius from 1783, where he suggests that critique forms the 
first part of metaphysics, of which the second part will be "the system of pure 
reason" (LM 117, Ak. 29:753). He further characterises metaphysics as the 
"system of pure cognitions of reason through concepts" (LM 113, Ak. 29:750), 
while specifying that the critique of pure reason simply "investigate[s] the 
possibility of the pure cognitions of reason" (LM 114, Ak. 29:752. Cf A11IB25, 
where critique is "a science of the mere estimation of pure reason"). Further proof 
of this deep dependence of critique on metaphysics is provided by the letters in 
which Kant imagines a metaphysics which would incorporate the results of 
critique in a systematic order (cf C 262; Ak. 10:494 for a plan from 1787). As 
both the plans for a metaphysics outlined in the letters and the metaphysics 
lectures themselves all involve development of the same material as that dealt 
with in the Critique, but in a different order, it seems clear that metaphysics is 
much more intrinsic to Kant's philosophy than is often thought. 12 
Now the notion of immanence could indeed be characterised by the phrase 
from the Preface to CPR mentioned above, "nothing can escape us" (Axx). But on 
the face of it, Kant seems to be allowing from the beginning that reason itself has 
a pure nature that is in principle possessed by human beings. Reason can come to 
know itself, because it alone gives us a light through the fog that is itself never to 
12 Perhaps the reason why Kant never felt it urgent enough to actually write his metaphysics was 
because it was not sufficiently different enough to the Critique itself to merit the labour of "Titing 
at his late age. Furthermore. on this reading, we can perhaps begin to justify Kant' s outrage when 
Fichte (and others) claimed that Kant had written a mere propaedeutic, while Fichte himself had 
written the real thing: "Such an intention could never have occurred to me. since I took the 
completeness of pure philosophy "ithin the Critique of Pure Reason to be the best indication of 
be doubted. It is only its use that is to be doubted. As aforementioned Kant savs 
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that reason is in dissension with itself "in its nonexperiential use" (Axi). As well 
as the notion of use, we should emphasise the paradox that will emerge from this 
phrase: as the principle of justification for human knowledge will be experience. 
transcendental illusion will arise from a certain misuse of ideas which are 
intrinsically nonexperienceable, by attempting to force them into the domain of 
experience. Thus nonexperiential ideas may be in themselves pure and eternal, but 
we should be careful about how we, for whom the principles of the possibility of 
experience are grounding, use and think about them. Kant insists that reason in 
itself is unsullied by the dialectic with which it becomes entangled; he even states 
that "there is properly no antithetic of pure reason at all" (A7431B771) and that all 
the battles of metaphysics mentioned in the preface of CPR are in fact bloodless. 
From "the safe seat of critique", there is no fear of injury from the apparent battle: 
we realise we are in a theatre watching gladiators in bloodless combat 
(A7431B771 & A7471B77S). Thus Kant says that 
the ideas of pure reason can never be dialectical in themselves; rather it is merely 
their misuse which brings it about that a deceptive illusion arises out of them; for 
they are given as problems for us by the nature of our reason, and this highest 
court of appeals for all rights and claims of our speculation cannot possibly 
contain original deceptions and semblances. Presumably, therefore, they have 
their good and purposive vocation in regard to the natural predisposition of our 
reason (A6691B697). 
But if this is so, then we seem to be far from the Hegelian notion that 
reason criticises itself, with the implication that reason's own claims are subject to 
criticism. In fact, reason seems to preserve itself from the hell of self-knowledge, 
in a manner perhaps similar to the way God sends Christ to harrow hell as a 
ransom for man. 
Implied in these passages is the notion of a perspective beyond 
transcendental illusion. The presence of twin perspectives in Kant's philosophy is, 
however, often taken as one of its primary inconsistencies. Thus, for Hegel, the 
appeal to an intellectually intuiting God beyond finite knowledge, the appeal to a 
thing in itself beyond appearance, and the appeal to a pure reason unentangled 
with the travails of dialectical reason, are all isotropic variations of a fundamental 
problem in Kant that will only be resolved by the extension of dialectic to the 
the truth of that work" (,Declaration concerning Fichte's Wissenschaftlehre'. August 7. 1799. C 
absolute. Hegel would thus be saymg that Kant does not recognIse the 
metacritical status of the notion of the self-critique of reaso~ and only such a 
recognition could resolve the problem of how reason can criticise itself without 
already presupposing its own validity. 
However, although Kant does not see the problem in the way Hegel does, 
he is not simply ignorant of issues of metacritical status. As already suggested in 
the Introduction, one of the predominant issues of metacritique concerns the 
relation between critique and philosophy or metaphysics. It can be shown that 
Kant is continually struggling with this question, and that, as the implications of 
the critical project are gradually unfolded, Kant constantly has his eye on the 
resolution, in systematic form, of the relation between critique and metaphysics. 
There are three main historical stages in this struggle, which are structurally 
important for the general thesis I wish to develop.13 
In the first stage, I contend that there are deep continuities runnmg 
between Kant's so-called 'pre-critical' writings and the first edition of CPR~ in 
particular Kant continues to affirm some notion of intelligible access to noumena 
in this period. I argue that Kant's reliance on an architectonic structure of pure 
reason, within which critique finds its place, rests on belief in the possibility of 
noumenal access. Moreover, the overall system is organised according to an 
internal teleology of pure reason. 
In the second stage, Kant begins to work out how such access is possible, 
through the notion of autonomy. The Groundwork is the text which represents the 
transition between first and second stages. However, Kant realises that the 
deduction of freedom in the Groundwork is inadequate, thus precipitating the 
revision of CPR and the writing of the Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR). The 
reasons for this inadequacy are key to this thesis as a whole: they concern the 
constant threat of conflict between claims about both the fundamental practical 
and theoretical aspects of the spontaneous self and the claims put forward in the 
Paralogisms of Pure Reason. One of the effects of this stage is the breakdown of 
the internal teleology of Kant's system of philosophy. But the replacement of this 
560. Ale. 12:371). 
13 Deleuze does not demarcate any such development in his account in KCP. or indeed anywhere 
else. 
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by the Kantian cogito as the central axis of the syste~ itself produces its own 
cnSIs. 
In the third stage, Kant attempts to heal the havoc caused in the central 
doctrines of the critical philosophy by the above problems, by critically 
reconstructing, in the Critique of Judgment (CJ), the systematic teleology with 
which he began. As Deleuze points out, one of the central innovations of this 
work is the production of a genesis of the faculties of mind, an internal teleology 
of the faculties, which now takes the weight from the metaphysical teleology of 
CPR. However, the problems that riddled the notion of the self in the second stage 
continue to persist, and Kant's late, unfinished work, the Opus posthumum is a 
final majestic (but problematic) effort to contain them in a renewed metaphysics. 
The elaboration of the structural problematic that runs through these three 
stages will occupy this thesis as a whole. For the rest of this chapter, I examine the 
notion of the self-critique of reason in the first stage, focussing on the problems 
that arise as the issues of the second stage begin to intrude on Kant.I~ 
2 Critique and the Ends of Reason 
Kant's work was broken into three stages as a response to the emerging problem 
that the notion of an immanent self-critique of reason seems to be inconsistent 
with the notion of 'twin perspectives' on reason, and that if critique becomes too 
embroiled in metaphysics, then it loses its right to be a thoroughgoing critique. To 
explore this problem, we should persist with Kant's early treatment of it, and see 
how Kant first defends the notion that the domain of reason is already secure. 
The notion that the nature of reason is transparent de jure at some point in 
the system is in fact found in Kant's pre-critical writings, for instance, in the 
Inaugural Dissertation, where the claim is couched in strongly rationalist terms. 
Kant argues that in metaphysics, "method precedes all science", 
For, since it is the right use of reason which here sets up the very principles 
themselves and since it is in virtue of the natural character of reason alone that , 
objects and also the axioms, which are to be thought with respect to objects, first 
become known, the exposition of the laws of pure reason is the very genesis of 
1 ~ The following deals with these stages in Kant's project only from the ,iewpoint of the problem 
of the self-critique of reason. In fact. in the ne).1 chapter. it "ill be necessary to dwell on the first 
stage of Kant's project in even greater detail. so as to understand the destination of the project in 
general. 
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science; and the distinguishing of these laws from suppositious laws IS the 
criterion of truth (# 25; TP 406-7; Ak 2:411). 
Given the evidence so far, is this "exposition of the laws of pure reason" so 
very different from the project of critique? The laws of reason remain the 
unquestioned criterion of truth. But how is this possible, within the account of the 
mind developed in CPR? There are two questions here. 
1. What in the mind gives us the right to have access to the laws of pure reason? 
2. Even if our cognition is inherently limited, is it possible to become aware of 
these limitations, thus giving us access to the truth of those limitations? 
I will start by sketching a twofold answer by Kant to the first question, which will 
be greatly elaborated in the following chapters. The first section in particular 
sketches in the barest outline the basic template of my Kant interpretation. 
ia Apriori Cognitions 
There is one fundamental proposition in CPR, concerning the distinction between 
thoughts and intuition: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind" (AS1IB7S). This dictum applies in principle to both finite and 
infinite intuition. IS The problem of CPR is generated by asking the question 
'given a certain kind of intuition, what kind of thought is possible?' 
As regards intellectual intuition, while it is important to point out that 
Kant uses the notions of "intuitive understanding" and "intellectual intuition" 
indiscriminately, it must be acknowledged that both components are nevertheless 
always present. Further, although their precise manner of combination remains 
dark to us, their product is always apriori. 
As regards sensible intuition, the lack of identity between thought and 
intuition opens the possibility of distinctive, synthetic kinds of apriori cognition. 
15 The notion of Gegenstand should again be mentioned It has already been suggested that the 
notions of Gegenstand and 'transcendental philosophy' have initially the same range. It \\ill be 
shown in greater detail in chapter 3 and especially chapter 5.1 that Kant begins the Transcendental 
Analytic "ith a notion of Gegenstand (object) that is much wider in reference than the notion of 
Object. Gegenstand, at least in principle, refers to an.v kind of potential . objective' (in a loose 
sense) reference, and begins much more as a metaphysical than an epistemological notion. I argue 
that this metaphysical emphasis is concealed by the fact that our de facto limitation to fInite 
intuition is stressed by Kant from tlle outset. so the Gegenstdnde he refers to are already conceived 
in temlS of fInite intuition. It is this. I contend that has led to the ongoing confusion concerning 
the nature and relations to each other of the notions of Gegenstand and Object. All this is more 
clearly perceived if sufficient attention is given to Kant" s ·pre-critical'. metaphysical background 
(see chapter 2). 
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Firstly~ while Kant suggests that some apriori concepts may be shared by God and 
man, the question of their relation to sensible intuition concerns only man. 16 Thus 
the categories are apriori cognitions that only a finite being can have. 
Secondly, pure intuitions are possible for finite beings because the 
structure of space and time is uniform and universal. Nevertheless~ pure intuitions 
relate to the structure of passive intuitio~ so are unknown to God. 
Thirdly, man has the ability to encounter Ideas. Ideas are divided into two 
categories: a rational Idea is a concept without a possible intuitio~ while an 
aesthetic Idea is an intuition without a possible concept. But although the 
concept-intuition relation is problematised in Kant's account of Ideas, it is 
nevertheless the thought-intuition relatio~ I contend~ that is the governing relation 
in Kant's critical project. So a rational Idea, as a pure thought, must nevertheless 
have a sense, even if it is not a sense in empirical intuition; while on the other 
hand, an aesthetic Idea, which already has an extremely rich sense (although again 
not as an empirical intuition), must have some relation to thought. Here this can 
only stand as an assertion~ but I will be attempting to understand and defend this 
claim, in its manifold forms~ throughout the thesis. It is, moreover, an important 
aspect of both Hegel's and Deleuze's interpretations of Kant that they exacerbate 
and work through this issue/7 I will show how it achieves some consistency in 
Kant himself 
In essence, the~ the structure of the critical project is concerned, on the 
one hand, with justifying these three finite, synthetic variants of the thought-
16 Cf. the discussion of categories as schematised pure concepts at Al461B185f.: see chapter ,:\.1 
below. 
1 -: In Hegel and Deleuze this concern takes a particular fonn, due to their insistence on the 
correlation between aesthetic Ideas with rational Ideas. Cf. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge: "The 
aesthetic Idea is a representation of the imagination for which no [conceptual] exposition can be 
given: the Idea of Reason is a concept of Reason for which no demonstration can be given -
demonstration in the Kantian sense being the presentation of a concept in intuition. As if the 
aesthetic Idea did not have its exposition in the Idea of Reason, and the Idea of Reason did not 
have its demonstration in beauty. But instead of asking for an intuition of the absolute identity of 
the sensuous and the supersensuous, Kant reverts to what is the yery ground of the mathematical 
antinomies: an intuition for the Idea of Reason in which the Idea would be ex-perienced as purely 
finite and sensuous and simultaneously and contiguously ex-perienced as a supersensuous Beyond 
of experience" (trans. H. S. Harris & W. Cerf. Albany: SUNY, 1977). 87. Deleuze writes that while 
"at first sight an aesthetic Idea is the opposite of a rational Idea ... [the former] 'giyes food for 
thought'. it forces one to think. The aesthetic Idea is really the same thing as the rational Idea: it 
expresses what is inexl'ressible in the latter": Kant's Critical Philosophy (trans. H. Tomlinson. 
London: Athlone. 1984). 57. As I will suggest. Deleuze' s and Hegel's differences concern only the 
particular manner and method by which the correlation between rational and aesthetic Ideas is 
worked out. 
39 
intuition relation, that is, concepts, sensible intuitions and Ideas, in their apriori 
aspects. This justification will take place, as we will see, through three 
transcendental deductions. On the other hand, and at the same time, the project is 
to demonstrate the mutual limitation of these three forms of apriori cognition for 
humans. 
Now it is necessary to clarify here one essential aspect of this account, 
which relates to what has been said so far of 'pure reason'. Ideas in general are 
only possible for humans as a result of the mutual limitation of sensible intuition 
and understanding. While God can plausibly be held to have an intuitive 
understanding, reason (as well as art) is possible only for limited beings. But if 
reason is a projection of the finite being, and has no prima facie connection with 
divine thought, then how can it serve as our guiding light in the project of 
critique? This is indeed the crux of our problem in this chapter. However, the 
problem will be able to be placed in the correct perspective if it is maintained that 
the governing thought-intuition claim requires that Ideas have sense. My claim is 
that Kant comes up with important and often neglected approaches and results 
concerning this problem, which are essential to the metacritical dimension of the 
critical project. It is instructive to tum now to Kant's very first proposal in the 
first -edition CPR. 
ib Noumenal access 
There is one kind of appeal that can be made to an element of reason which is of 
its nature untainted by dubieties of the critique of knowledge: to the notion of 
freedom. 18 Kant's references to noumenal freedom in the first edition CPR are 
notable for their simplicity; they contain none of the agonies that Kant was later to 
bring to the surface in his discussions of transcendental freedom in the 
Grouncru1ork and second Critique. 19 Kant states that 
18 In the following account I wish merely to draw attention to problems of access to a proof of 
noumenal freedom, and how it might be related to the self-critique of reason. Hence my account 
will have a certain provisional character, its validity being conditional on justification by a much 
fuller investigation into the intensely complicated issue of freedom in Kant. 
19 It is also worth recalling that CPR contains no hint that a second critique devoted to practical 
reason is necessary: a 'metaphysics of morals' was to be generated in a future project out of the 
suggestions about freedom made in CPR in a perfectly analogous manner to the generation of a 
'metaphysics of nature' from the lessons about apriori nature. Cf. A8411B869, and his letter to 
Mendelssolm of 16 August 1783, where the writing of his moral philosophy is mentioned in 
40 
the human being, who is otherwise acquainted with the whole of nature solelv 
through sense, knows himself also through pure apperception, and indeed ~ 
actions and inner determinations which cannot be accounted at all among 
impressions of sense; he obviously is in one part phenomenon, but in another 
part, namely in regard to certain faculties, he is a merely intelligible object, 
because the actions of this object cannot at all be ascribed to the receptivity of 
sensibility. We call these faculties Wlderstanding and reason (A546!B574).20 
As Karl Ameriks has argued, such a view can only be explained in terms of a 
persistence of rationalist views that Kant had not got around to submitting to 
critique.21 Kant does not defend the claim that the mere activity of understanding 
and reason gives us access to the mundus intelligibilis; he assumes it. 
Nevertheless, if the first edition CPR was conceived with this kind of access to the 
noumenon in mind, it may explain how reason is seen as sufficiently detached 
from the mundus sensibilis to be able to criticise its own role in it. 
Kant does try to make good his assumption when he attempts III the 
second stage of this thinking the task of providing a critique of the notion of 
freedom. This would seem unpromising from our current avenue of approach, 
because we are looking into freedom as a possible basis from which reason can 
attempt its own critique. However, the Groundwork is a text that lies between the 
first and second Critiques, and while not claiming status as a critique, it does 
attempt a synthetic proof by moving from a negative, merely hypothetical concept 
of freedom to a positive one. In the Groundwork Kant attempts a deduction of 
positive freedom by way of the notion of the moral law, or self-legislation 
according to universal laws. However, he admits that there is a "hidden circle" 
involved in such a deduction (Ak. 4.453, PP. 99). As Ameriks shows, the circle is 
hidden in the attempt to go from a merely negative concept of freedom (some 
form of independence from sensual desires) to the categorical imperative by 
parallel with the plan for a metaphysics (C 203, Ak. 10:346). The Groundwork itself is of course 
far from a critique, but rather an inquiry into the first principles of the metaphysics of morals. 
~o "Sense" is used here to mean 'sensibility', that is. empirical intuition, as is often the case in 
Kant. My distinction between the wider use ofthe term (as in "sense or signification") and merely 
empirical sensibility should be clear in what follows. As suggested in the Introduction. the 
overdetermination of the word Sinn is important precisely in staking out the limits of the 
expression or realisation of concepts and Ideas. 
21 Kant's Theory of A1ind (2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). pp. 21 L 21-1-. My 
reading of transcendental freedom in the nex1 few pages is indebted to Ameriks' reading. 
specifically in the six1h chapter, entitled 'Independence', p.189-233. For a critique by Ameriks of 
another popular reading of Kant on freedom. see his re,iew of Henry Allison's Idealism and 
Freedom in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49. 1999. In chapter 5 I return to debates 
between Ameriks' 'rationalist' reading of Kant with which I have more ~mpathy. and Allison 
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secretly converting negative freedom to autonomous freedoll\ self-legislating 
freedom. Only the latter could ground the moral law. Therefore Kant seeks a third 
term (Ak. 4.448, PP 95) to ground the synthetic move: the notion of membership 
of an intelligible world. The distinction of the "world of sense" and the "world of 
understanding" echoes Kant's cautious use of such a distinction in CPR 
(A2561B312), which in tum echoes the distinction between ''things thought 
sensitively... as they appear, while things which are intellectual are 
representations of things as they are" (TP 384, Ak. 2:392). 
Reason ... shows in what we call 'Ideas' a spontaneity so pure that it thereby goes 
far beyond anything that sensibility can ever afford it, and proves its highest 
occupation in distinguishing the world of sense and the world of understanding 
from each other and thereby marking out limits for the understanding itself (pP 
99, Ak., 4:452). 
At issue again is the claim that we have some apriori access to reason that can 
ground a critical account of the possibility of pure cognitions. But Kant's appeal 
to Ideas here in fact deepens the problem, as Ideas are defined by their 
"problematic" nature: an Idea is a concept that cannot find an intuition (cf 
A2541B310). Now although Kant suggests that Ideas have no sense or 
signification within experience (A2401B299), this is only an abstract definition of 
the Idea, as Kant only gives the name of 'Idea' to certain concepts, which do have 
a sense or signification for us because they provide symbols or images of a 
practical goal. These rational concepts are only Ideas because they mean 
something that goes to the heart of the structure of the subject. This goes for 
aesthetic as well as rational Ideas. However, for 'practical' to mean more than 
-'technical' here, surely it needs to be grounded on a properly secured notion of 
transcendental freedom. But we have just turned to the notion of ideas to help us 
explain such freedom! 
In fact, with his appeal to Ideas Kant achieves the opposite to what he 
seems to have intended: he cuts off the noumenal world, rather than grounds 
access to it. While Ideas do show a spontaneity in their very possibility, this would 
yield no more than the spontaneity we must attribute to the understanding, and 
even, in some measure, to the imagination. That Ideas are spontaneous does not 
tell us much' and what the Idea is about must remain problematic. Our , 
and Pippin' s reading of the centrality of apperception. debates which are intimately related to the 
issues touched on here. 
"membership" of the mU12dus intelligibilis is therefore itself problematic. This 
problematicity then infects the relation between the two mundi, as the intelligible 
Idea is always seen as problematic due to its lack of intuitive presentation.:: 
Kant's need for additional postulates to give sense to the moral law can be seen as 
a further response to this original problem of intelligibilia. 
But what use is the necessary 'third term' if it is only problematic? Kant 
goes on to say it is a task of speculative philosophy to show that there is no 
contradiction between the causally determined and self-determining subject, "and 
to show that both not only can very well coexist but also must be thought as 
necessarily united in the same subject" (Ak. 4:456, PP 102). But a proof of the 
identity of the subject in noumenal and phenomenal realms is as lacking in CPR 
as it is on the model of the Groundwork. Turning to speculative reason will 
provide even less chance of securing the identity of the subject in the two mundi, 
as the relation between the noumenal and the phenomenal is entirely problematic. 
And in this case, the "hidden circle" remains intractable, as freedom is not yet 
demonstrated to be autonomous, because it still has not been demonstrated that 
noumenal freedom has anything to do with us. 
We have seen that whereas in CPR Kant assumes that our "inner 
determinations" are devoid of sensibility, and equates apperception with freedom, 
in the Groundwork, Kant affirms access to intelligibilia while blocking it with the 
other hand by calling intelligibilia 'Ideas'. Kant's revisions in the second edition 
CPR show his unhappiness with these positions, by showing how inner sense 
must depend on outer sense, thus closing off a realm of "inner determinations". 
But these moves parallel his quest for a notion of autonomy, whereby the 
noumenon and phenomenon must be shown to belong to the same subject, without 
begging any critical questions. Kant continues to insist that practical freedom by 
itself is insufficient: it is not enough to act as ifwe are free, when our 'freedom' 
might well in that case be a disguise for our desires. However, Kant gives up on 
the idea of a deduction of freedom, and now describes the moral law as an 
:.::.: It will be \'ery important for this thesis that Kant is so cominced of the importance of Ideas. 
both rational and aesthetic, that he grants them a deductioa eyen though he is himself unsure of 
whether a deduction of freedom is possible, on which he holds their importance to depend 
Deleuze's theory ofIdeas is an implicit attempt to resolYe this paradox by eXl'laining the intrinSIC 
importance of Ideas on their mm tenns. 
"a priori fact of reason". But as we will see, this does not escape the issue that 
even the fact of reason remains problematic if it is to have sense. 23 
ii Culture and Illusion 
I tum now to the second general question concerning Kant's early notion of the 
self-critique of reason. Even keeping in mind the ambiguities of the possible 
routes to pure reason just outlined, and even if it is doubtful how reason can 
transcend its limits in experience, might there not be a way for reason to be able 
to recognise those limits as limits? That is, there may be' no secure mllndus 
intelligibilis to which we can lay claim, but there may be a way of seeing through 
the illusions produced by a misuse of our faculties. If only we can recognise the 
distribution of our faculties, then we can work out de jure how they mutually limit 
each other. 
Now, even if reason in its structure could be called a "perfect unity", this 
perfection would not necessarily for Kant imply tranquillity for the creatures 
subject to it. After all, Spinoza called his monstrous deus sive natura perfect. In 
fact the structural perfection of the Kantian system implies the existential torment 
of its subjects; but it is all the more perfect as it is for their own ultimate good. 
The human subject is intrinsically haunted by certain spectres - the shadow of 
God, the promise of immortality and the 'perplexity' of freedom. What will be 
important just as much as Kant's failure to prove freedom, is his success in 
proving the importance of ideas in self-legislation. From a Deleuzian point of 
view, in fact, the idea of freedom can be seen as an abstract chimera concealing 
the primary power of ideas, of problems. If we appear to be condemned to think 
about freedom, haunted by the possibility of freedom, it is not that we are 
essentially dreaming of autonomy, it is rather that we are beingforced to think by 
a particular problematic structure, which does not allow us to subsist unthinkingly 
within it; for Deleuze, there are many Ideas. 
For Kant too, the spectres of certain problems cluster around the subject, 
feeding it and making it live. And still there is nothing tragic about this, if only we 
realise that we cannot know certain things - they are lived by us as eternal 
:3 I return to the notion of the fact of reason later in this chapter. TIle issues just outlined "ill be 
further elaborated from a more developed perspective in chapter 3. 
problems, which we can only unravel by exposing the structure of reason. The 
first lines of the critique read: 
Human reason has the peculiar fate in one species of its cognitions that it is 
burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as 
problems by the nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer since , 
they transcend every faculty of human reason (A vii; translation modified). 
Humanity is haunted by problems that insist in it and excite it. It is burdened by 
questions, but this is natural to reason itself Kant's suggestion is that even while 
finite beings will never be free of transcendental illusion, we can learn to see 
through it, and see that the illusion is necessary in order for us to strive after 
perfection. Thus the illusion is ultimately not an illusion at all. It only seems like 
an illusion if we treat it as knowledge. The status of this ruse of reason will be 
crucial for resolving the issue of the metacritical status of critique. 
It was mentioned above that critique can be seen as the insight into the 
laws of reason. The discussion has so far been conducted in terms of the 'self-
knowledge' of the rational subject of its own laws. But it is necessary now to re-
introduce the other dimension to the use of 'law' which is so prominent in the 
imagery of CPR. The notion of self-knowledge is after all paralleled by the 
impersonal metaphor of the court of justice. But if the illusions of cognition are 
part of the ruse of reason, then is not Kant disturbing the process of the ruse by 
exposing it? Either the critique is a violation of the providential structure of 
human cognition, or the critique itself must be seen as a new element in that 
structure. I argue the latter alternative is correct. 
It is in fact the cosmo-historical framework within which Kant places the 
critique that finally sheds light on how reason can criticise itself The court of 
justice is distinguished from reason insofar as it is what facilitates the realisation 
of reason. Thus while the court of justice is not itself involved in controversies of 
pure reason, it "is rather set the task of determining and judging what is lawful in 
reason in general in accordance with the principles of its primary institution. 
Without this, reason is as it were in the state of nature" (A7511B779). Thus the 
critique of reason is the founding of an institution which articulates our 
transcendence of the state of nature. But what in tum governs the founding and 
operation of this institution? The nature of reason can only be realised in a 
cosmopolis, a civilised world, but nevertheless the institution itself can only be 
oriented by - the nature of reason. Now the only way to make sense of this 
circularity is by facing the inescapability of a teleological dimension. Thus the 
providential character of the ruse of reason must ultimately originate in the 
teleological structure of reason itself. Reason has a "single supreme and inner end, 
which first makes possible the whole" (A8331B861). Teleology, then, will be the 
ultimate tribunal for the rationale of the self-critique of reason. 
In 'The Architectonic of Pure Reason', Kant says that the "cosmopolitan 
concept" of philosophy is "personified and represented as an archetype in the 
ideal of the philosopher" (A8381B866). Kant presents 'philosophy' as the 
"system of all philosophical cognition" (ibid), while metaphysics is the "name 
[that] can also be given to all of pure philosophy including the critique" 
(A8411B869). But "metaphysics is also the culmination of all culture of human 
reason" (A8511B879). From the "point of view" of this cosmopolitan ideal of the 
philosopher, then, "philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the 
essential ends of human reason" (teleologia ration is humanae) (A8391B867). 
These ends which are essential and natural to human reason, must be realised in 
culture. 
Reason itself has certain ends; humanity is set problems about how to 
realise those ends. This is the teleological structure within which CPR takes place. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to the self-critique of reason, humanity is faced with 
a very special set of problems. The end of reason for humans is to realise 
rationality successfully, and now, in "the age of criticism", the time has come to 
ask how this is possible. But the familiar duplicity in reason that has been noted 
from the start seems to continue to dog this conception. Kant insists that the 
problems set by reason "transcend every faculty of human reason" (Avii): what 
could it mean for the legitimacy of the moment of self-critique, if the nature of 
pure reason itself harboured certain problems which every human faculty was 
unable to solve? If a problem transcends all faculties or capacities (Vermogen), 
this means it transcends the reach or grasp of those faculties. Yet Kant seems to 
insist that the problem can be seen in the right perspective because of the 
distinction between reason in itself and applied reason or human reason in general: 
"All the questions that pure reason lays before us, lie not in experience but 
themselves in tum only in reason, and they must therefore be able to be solved 
and their validity or nullity must be able to be comprehended" (A7631B791). 
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The question of the status of reason in itself and its "essential ends" leads 
to the suspicion that the grandeur of the ruse of reason is really nothing other than 
bootstrapping. We have seen that "the essential ends of reason" must provide the 
basis for the process of civilisation whereby reason becomes capable of being 
criticised, which in tum grounds the very possibility of the self-critique of reason. 
But Kant all too frequently ends up relying on an extenzal teleology, when 
explaining the nature of these ends. This is inevitable due to the structure of 
Kant's system. For, as a result of the critique, reason must speculatively restrict 
itself to a merely regulative use, which is in tum grounded on the validity of its 
practical use. But we have seen that Kant presupposes full access to noumena in 
transcendental freedom, resting practical freedom on a speculative claim about 
transcendental freedom that is not effectively defended, because of a residual 
rationalism; that is, because of a faith in the purity of reason! The ruse of reason 
does indeed begin to look like a hollow ruse. 
Thus, Kant's account of the ends of reason either looks circular or ends up 
at most appealing to an external, metaphysical teleology. For instance, Kant states 
that "in regard to the essential ends of human nature even the highest philosophy 
cannot advance further than the guidance that nature has also conferred on the 
most common understanding" (A831/B859). Such a statement also fits uneasily 
with Kant's insistence that reason must be drawn out of its "state of nature" 
towards "culture". 
We can also observe a circularity in the notion of the "unity of reason". 
Kant states that the unity of reason depends on the pursuit of the highest ends of 
reason: the "striving" of reason will "find peace only in the completion of its 
circle in a self-subsisting systematic whole" (A7971B825). But he then states that 
"these highest ends must, in accordance with the nature of reason, in tum have 
unity, in order to advance, in a united manner, that interest of humanity which is 
subordinated to no higher one" (ibid). But if the highest ends ground unity, how 
can we presume that the highest ends themselves are unified? While Kant says 
that "reason itself (subjectively) is a system" (A7381B766), he seems to be relying 
on a metaphysical teleology, by which the ends which were supposed to be the 
ultimate standard by which critique oriented itself, are nevertheless made exempt 
from critique. This is an example of how circularity can seem to prove a system 
but in fact reduce it to bootstrapping. For the fact that the striving of reason 
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towards unity instantiates the end of reason itself would indeed be virtuously and 
systematically circular if it were not at the same time intended to provide the 
standard by which the self-critique of reason oriented itself. 
In effect Kant presupposes a kind of pre-established harmony between the 
ends of reaso~ and in turn between the human faculties which attempt to orient 
themselves in the light of these ends. Ultimately, the question of a critical notion 
of 'harmony' will become more pressing as Kant works through the paradoxes of 
the second stage of his work. 
3 Reason and its Interests 
Due to the pressure of the issues of the second stage of Kant's reflection (the 
problematisation of inner sense, of autonomy, etc.) Kant turns towards an 
excavation of the human subject, and away from the notion of a teleology and 
culture of reason; or at least he ceases to rely on the latter to ground the very 
notion of the critical project. It is no longer 'reason itself' which holds the key to 
the immanence of critique, but the manifold capabilities of the subject. 
Thus, in CPrR Kant describes the ends of reason as interests of reason. 
The notion of 'interest' undergoes a shift from its role in CPR. In the latter, reason 
was considered to have an interest only in the particular manner in which it 
proceeded with its speculative, regulative use. Thus, it depended on a scientist's 
interest if he favoured the elicitation of the homogeneity or diversification of laws 
in his exploration of nature (cf A6661B694: "it is merely a different interest of 
reason that causes a divorce between ways of thinking,,).24 Kant develops his 
notion of interest in the following important passage, which also points towards 
the third stage of Kant's reflection: 
To every faculty of the mind one can attribute an interest, that is, a principle that 
contains the condition under which alone its exercise is promoted. Reason, as the 
faculty of principles, determines the interest of all the powers of the mind but 
itself determines its own. The interest of its speculative use consists in the 
cognition of the object up to the highest apriori principles; that of its practical use 
consists in the determination of the will with respect to the final and complete 
end. (pP 236, Ak. 5:119-20) 
~~ Again, this shift in the notion of interest is not mentioned by Deleuze in his account of interests. 
Deleuze in fact talks of reason's "positing" of ends and interests (KCP 2), which is an idea that 
Kant only e:-..-plicitIy affirms in the Opus posthumum. Deleuze does indeed mention the latter work 
in connection \\ith the notion of "essential ends" (KCP 1). but could be charged "ith confiating 
different notions in Kant. 1 ha\'e attempted to separate out these notions. 
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The complexity of Kant's position is exhibited here. Kant fIrst says that eve!); 
faculty has an interest, which would include sensibility, imagination, as well as 
understanding and reason. However, an interest is described as a principle, and 
reason is privileged by being the faculty of principles. Kant claims that reason 
itself not only determines the interests of other faculties, but also determines its 
own interests. The possibility of regress is clear, for if we can infer that reason, as 
the faculty of principles, is the faculty of interests, how can it have its own 
interest, without being included in its own class as another faculty among others? 
We will return to this problem. 
Moreover Kant describes reason's interest as itself divided, according to 
practical and speculative uses. Yet in the Groundwork, he says that his ultimate 
aim is to «be able at the same time to present the unity of practical with 
speculative reason in a common principle, since there can, in the end, be only one 
and the same reason, which must be distinguished merely in its application." (PP 
46, Ak. 4:391).25 
But Kant's work displays two tendencies at this point. On the one hand, 
there is the old tendency towards metaphysical systematic unity, But on the other 
hand, the moves towards a complex, and as yet incoherent account of the mutual 
relation of the faculties. To gain clarity about the relation of these two tendencies, 
we should focus again on the purity of reason as we have seen it so far, ignoring 
for a moment the internal problems we have found, in order to examine what role 
reason has from the human perspective, Reason is also a faculty. What is the 
relation between reason as faculty and reason as metaphysical law? 
:5 This latter task of understanding the nature of the unity of reason promised in the passage from 
the Groundwork is essential to understanding post-Kantianism and Hegel's resolution of Kant's 
problematic, Teleology will remain the key: can the unity of reason serve as a ground or is it rather 
an ideal. or end? If Hegel claims that it can in some sense be botlL how does he obtain this 
resolution? In 'Transcendental Arguments, Reason and Scepticism: Contemporary Debates and the 
Origins of Post-Kantianism' (in R. Stem ed, Transcendental Arguments (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 1999), pp, 72-105, Paul Franks discusses Reinhold's and Fichte's reorientation 
of this qu'estion. in relation to this passage in Kant. 
4 Reason as a Human Faculty 
If Kant cannot organise hierarchically the relation of the faculties, he seems to 
face the prospect of a kind of anarchy of the faculties. Thus, on the one hand, 
Kant tries to make reason an overarching faculty that is able both to act as a 
criterion for the correct use of the faculties and to discriminate between these 
uses. Something like this resolution is taken up by Hegel. But on the other hand, 
there are real difficulties with this option within the Kantian system, for each of 
the faculties has a quite distinct nature and function. This is clear in the passage 
quoted above from the second Critique (pP 236, Ak. 5: 120). While each faculty 
has an interest, reason is said to "determine the interest of all the powers of the 
mind", so seems to be the governor of the relation or mutual functioning of the 
faculties; however reason "itself determines its own" interest. Reason is thus 
either a member of its own class and is a faculty that needs to be determined, or is 
itself qualified to legislate over all the faculties, including itself as a faculty, in 
which case reason has a mysterious equivocal function. If reason can do what 
Kant says it can, he needs to explain how. 
In KCP, Deleuze uses a hierarchical model of "subjection" to describe "the 
doctrine of the faculties". In CPR reason delegates the understanding to legislate 
over the other faculties, whereas in CPrR reason itself performs the legislating 
function. In CJ, however, Kant is said to move from the model of subjection to a 
notion of the mutual harmony of the faculties, thus indicating that reason itself, if 
it is a faculty amongst others, cannot simply rule over the other faculties without 
explanation. Deleuze points out that CJ performs a genesis of the relation of the 
faculties, thus finally grounding the model of subjection. For instance, in the 
experience of the sublime, the faculty of imagination exceeds its limit and 
engenders a relation with reason, thus providing an internal relation between these 
two faculties. However, while I think Deleuze is right to look at the notion of 
harmony and genesis in CJ, obviously Kant does not return to the first two 
critiques to rewrite them in genetic terms. 26 The notion of a hierarchy in the first 
two critiques thus still awaits explanation. 
:!6 I suggest in the final Appendix that Deleuze does in effect leave it to the model of genesis to 
ex-plain the objects of the first two critiques. knowledge and morality. For Deleuze, as for Hegel m 
a different way. the genetic model is the only true ground for critique. 
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Kant remains attracted to the possibility of there being one faculty which 
governs the self-critique of reason. When asked in correspondence with Christian 
Garve in mid-l 783 about the status of critique itself, Kant claimed that his task in 
CPR had been to construct a wholly new science, ''the critique of an apriori 
judging reason". Kant emphasises that this "faculty" should be separated from 
other faculties of cognition, and that one can 
deduc[ e] out of its own nature all the objects within its scope, enumerating them, 
and proving their completeness by means of their coherence in a single, complete 
cognitive faculty. Absolutely no other science attempts this, that is, to develop a 
priori out of the mere concept of a cognitive faculty (when that concept is 
precisely defined) all the objects, everything that can be known about them, yes, 
even what one is involuntarily but deceptively constrained to believe about them" 
C 9 Ak 27 ( 1 8; . 10:340). 
However, nothing like such a deduction is present in the Critique itself, indeed it 
seems to have more in common with the plans for a metaphysics that Kant 
outlined. Moreover, the very possibility of such a deduction, even if it were only 
suggested by the given structure of the Critique, seems afflicted by the kind of 
problems we have been dealing with in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, among commentators who, against the post-Kantians, claim 
to be able to uncover in Kant a coherent attempt at answering the problem of 
metacritique, there seems to be one core agreement: as well as Deleuze, L.W. 
Beck and (in a critique of Beck) G.J. Agich take the question of the faculties as 
bedrock for a discussion of the status of the self-critique of reason and 
metacritique in Kant?8 I shall therefore discuss their accounts in detail. 
Beck phrases the metacritical problem as follows: how do we come to 
know of the operations and faculties of the mind?29 He immediately suggests that 
this may seem to beg the question of why there should be faculties at all, but he 
says that the notion of faculty should not be taken straightaway in terms of the 
empirical psychology of the time. He reminds us that the German word for 
faculty, Vermbgen, is the noun form of the infinitive meaning 'to be able'; hence 
27 A similar account is perhaps at the heart of the famous footnote to the preface of the 
]\I!etaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (also 1783) where Kant claims to be able to 
overcome the problems of the Transcendental Deduction by proceeding "almost by a single 
conclusion from the precisely determined definition of a judgment in general"" (Ak. ~:~75). As this 
pulls us towards the issue of the Transcendental Deduction, full discussion will have to wait until 
chapter 5. 
28 L.W. Beck. 'Toward a Meta-Critique of Pure Reason' and GJ. Agich. 'L.W. Beck's Proposal of 
Meta-Critique and the "Critique of Judgment'" (Kant-Studien, 7~, 1983, pp. 261-170). 
:9 Beck, 'Toward a Metacritique', 33. 
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"the discovery and assessment of what one is able to do seem to be a much less 
mysterious process than the discovery and assessment of faculties". 30 Beck makes 
two interrelated suggestions about the status of metacritique. First, that the faculty 
or ability that initiates critique is the 'fact of reason'. Second, that for this 'fact' to 
be other than the "dead, factual stop" it appears to be (thus artificially staunching 
the infinite regress of metacritique), it must be placed in the context of Kant's 
remarks about "the essential ends of reason" that we encountered earlier. 
However, he claims that this entails a final Kantian acceptance of the need for a 
metaphysical account of the mind, which Beck says is provided for in Kant's 
notion of rational physiology, "which did have a functional meaning in Kant's 
time .. , dea1[ing] with organic wholes and functions of parts within wholes". 31 
Rational physiology is thus the proper place to deal with the question of teleology, 
"since all the actions of mind have a bearing upon the whole and upon the final 
end of man" (ibid); a "transcendental physiology" would "give good reasons for 
the otherwise brutely factual attributes of mind which are presupposed without 
argument in the Critique" (ibid). 
In defence of the former argument, Beck quotes the Groundwork, where 
Kant says that "man really finds in himself a faculty by which he distinguishes 
himself from all other things, even from himself so far as he is affected by 
objects" (PP 99; Ak. 4:452). Beck says that this self-awareness is the fact of 
reason, which he identifies with "the fact that there is reason".32 Perhaps here we 
find a privileged instance of the notion of the self-reflexivity of reason? But if this 
is so, then why does Kant never identify apperception or self-consciousness with 
the fact of reason? Moreover, in the light of Kant's more circumspect remarks 
concerning self-awareness in the first Critique and in its revisions concerning 
inner sense, do we really find a reflexive structure in the awareness of the fact of 
reason? Is it necessarily oneself that one is aware of when one apprehends this 
'fact', given the difficulties encountered in self-knowledge in the Paralogisms? 
The apparent capacity to distinguish oneself from one's empirical self, to which 
reason appears to bear witness, may be ill formulated. One may distinguish the 
capacity to think according to reason from one's empirical self, but surely that in 
30 Beck 32. 
31 Beck 35. 
3~ Beck. 31-2. 
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fact problematises the self-identity of that empirical self, by thinking beyond the 
confines of experience. To think of one's self, rather than securing a bridge 
between an intelligible and empirical aspect of oneself: can with equal right be 
seen to problematise the pre-reflexive self-identity assumed by one's empirical 
self 33 So, reflection upon oneself and reflection upon the fact of reason seem 
distinct. 
Moreover, can't the latter be better characterised as the most general (in 
Hegelian terms, most abstract) form of the faculty of Ideas? For the mere fact that 
we can think "logically" is not adequately expressive of what Kant claims for 
reason. Now, while Kant derives the forms of logic from the understanding, 
reason is indeed described as the ability to order judgments in syllogisms. 
Nevertheless its aim is always to seek principles, to seek the unconditioned. And 
far from grounding the project of critique, this is the cause of the quandaries of the 
dialectic of pure reason; hence its 'rationality' is open to question. The mere 
capacity to 'reason' has, therefore (contra Beck), no internal ability to ground the 
possibility of critique; the fact that we can think logically really can be of itself no 
more privileged than the fact that we can imagine. For the fact of reason to ground 
critique it must first become a problem, and it can only do this when the question 
of the sense of its objects (concepts and Ideas) is posed. Rational Ideas, as 
concepts without intuitions, are always tethered to the problematic question of 
their reality, for without this connection, they are without sense; even the 
categorical imperative relies on postulates concerning its possible actualisation to 
give it sense. In this case, we can only describe such an awareness of the fact of 
reason as a problem in the Kantian sense. In effect, as Deleuze will make clear, 
the facuIty of reason is here undergoing a transcendent exercise, whereby it 
encounters itself as a problem (cf DR 138-148). 
Beck's second claim for metacritique, which argues for a recourse to 
rational physiology, has been criticised by G.J. Agich, who points out that to 
appeal to metaphysics as the final grounding of critique, which is intended as the 
propaedeutic to metaphysics, would be viciously circular. 34 This is correct, but not 
simply because metaphysics is being called upon, but rather because rational 
physiology, which Kant says is posterior to transcendental philosophy 
33 I return to these issues in chapter 5. 
34 G.1. Agich. 'L.W. Beck·s Proposal of Meta-Critique'. 265-6. 
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(A8451B873), is being called upon (we have seen that it is not straightforwardly 
illegitimate for Kant to appeal to some form of metaphysics, given his original 
conception of his project). Agich then turns his attention, like Deleuze, to the 
notion of interests of reason and to CJ. In order to provide a metacritical 
grounding of the critical project, Agich suggests that the third Critique provides 
an account of the "systematic unity" of the first two Critiques and their theoretical 
and practical interests respectively; it must show how this systematic unity is 
possible. Agich then infers that the only way this can be done is with reference to 
an "interest of reason in systematic unity which is not as such bound up with any 
particular interest, be it theoretical or practical,,?5 Precisely such a paradoxical 
interest is worked out in the case of aesthetic judgment, which Kant of course 
argues is disinterested.36 The 'feeling' of the harmony of the faculties in the 
appreciation of art expresses the identity of the principle of subjective 
purposiveness with the principle of the systematic arrangement of the faculties. 37 
Agich then refers to Kant's comments about reflective judgment as the "ability to 
compare and combine" (CJ First Introduction 211)?8 As Kant states that the 
critique involved in CJ will be merely subjective, Agich concludes that "to be 
critical simply means that reflection must be turned on the faculty or power of 
pure reason which makes critique possible as reflexive self-examination. The 
principle underlying critical reflection can only be the principle of the purposive 
unity of the faculties of mind". 39 
While this fulfils, against Beck, the criterion that immanent critique not 
refer to anything outside the reach of critique, there are two problems with this 
account. Firstly, like Beck, Agich does not broach Kant's indeterminacy about the 
relation between reason and the faculties. On one page he talks about "reason 
itself, that is, the faculties", and on the next he says that "the one idea under which 
critique operates is simply, Kant says often enough, the concept of the cognitive 
faculty or the concept of pure reason itself,.40 Regardless of the contradiction 
35 ibid 266. 
36 He nonetheless claims that there is an "intellectual interest in the beautiful"; CJ # 42. Deleuze 
calls this "a third interest of reason" (KCP 54). 
r Agich, 268-9. 
38 He does not mention the identity of this discussion of reflection "ith that of the Concepts of 
Reflection chapter in CPR See below, chapter 3. 
39 Agich, ibid 
40 Cf. Kant's remarks in his letter to Gan'e and in the preface to the jletaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science. cited above. 
between the two statements, it is clear that Kant's vacillation about the role of 
reason is not being faced. Secondly, the appeal to the notion of "reflexive self-
examination" is dark. Agich may be right about aesthetic judgment providing a 
ground for the possibility of the relation of the faculties in the critical project (this 
is also Deleuze's line; cf. Kant's Critical Philosophy, 58-60), but that does not 
mean that this ground itself is open to the transparency of self-reflection. Deleuze, 
for instance, argues that aesthetic judgment provides a ground for the relation of 
faculties because it shows how a genesis of the relation of the faculties is possible. 
Thus we need to keep hold of a fine distinction to avoid drifting into the Hegelian 
reading of the self-critique of reason: the grounds of the self-critique of reason are 
not equivalent to the self-grounding of the subject itself. The "hell of self-
knowledge" exemplified in the critical project itself may not be identical to the 
self-examination of the subject. This point can be spelled out by way of a 
summary of the main points of this chapter. 
5 Problems in the Self-Critique of Reason 
We have attempted to make sense of the notion of a self-critique of pure reason, 
using the first edition CPR as our primary text. After encountering briefly Kant's 
account of the origins of apriori cognitions, we were led to his gestures towards 
membership in a mundus intelligibilis in the hope of showing how reason might 
be able to criticise its own functioning. Then we turned to Kant's recourse to 
teleology and culture in the explanation of the notion of the "essential ends of 
reason". What is important is that in each of these possible accounts of immanent 
critique, the capacity for critique is not immanent to the subject, but the 
immanence relates to the procedure carried out by the philosopher himself Thus 
the critique of reason would be immanent if reason were proven to have a 
privileged role by Kant. The fact that we have seen that each of these possible 
procedures is subject to deep problems does not detract from the likelihood that 
such notions were exactly what Kant intended by the self-critique of reason. 
The problems that we have discovered in the account of the self-critique of 
reason can be reduced to two core problematics. 
1. Eq uivocity of reason. If there is to be a self-critique of reason, it would 
seem that the reason that is criticising must be the same reason as reason that is 
being criticised. The subjective and the objective genitive in the 'Critique of Pure 
Reason' must coincide. But how? For instance, how can we make sense of the 
notion that the nature of reason in itself might make it possible to criticise 
reason's role as a faculty (or, we might say, reason for itself). If reason is used 
equivocally in the notion of the self-critique of reason, then it cannot be self-
justifying. What then can be the difference that makes reason able to criticise 
itself? 
2. Unity of reason. Kant expresses the need for reason (and its interests) 
to be unified in one principle. But if reason is so unified, then it would seem to be 
identical to the ultimate Idea in the Kantian system - the Idea of God, taken in its 
speculative sense. But Ideas remain problematic for human beings. Therefore 
reason itself would be problematic, and so would its critique of itself. 
Is there a solution that presents itself within the confines of the discussion 
so far, that is, one that holds on to the distinctive elements of the Kantian system 
as it has been presented, for instance, the concern with the distribution and mutual 
delimitation of apriori cognitions, the distribution and distinction of the faculties 
and of their possible relations to each other, and the conception of ideas as 
problems? Can we outline a solution that does not yet radically reconfigure these 
distinctively Kantian elements, in the way Hegel does, for example? Hegel omits 
the notion of a preliminary examination of the ends of reason, and of the distinct 
relation of the faculties, on the grounds of self-reference that we encountered at 
the start of this chapter. But we have seen that the internality of self-critique in 
Kant is more complicated than Hegel suggests (if not yet more successful). I claim 
that there is a solution that embraces both of the above problems, but it is 
followed by two negative consequences, which are only turned to consistent use 
by Deleuze. 
Solution. If reason is itself a problem, as is suggested in the second core 
problematic, this presents us with the chance to resolve the first issue, for the 
difference between reason as subject and reason as object would be that reason is 
III itself the realm oj problems that are intrinsically bound up with human 
experience, but must transcend human attempts to solve them. 
First consequence. The correct use of reason would seem ultimately to 
become practical or regulative. But this would also make the task of the self-
critique of reason in the first place practical, rather than theoretical. It would put 
the whole weight of the justice of the tribunal on the claims of freedom. While 
this may seem to open a path to a Fichtean solution to metacritique, it would make 
the apparatus of the whole Critique of Pure Reason very shaky: why, for instance, 
should we believe in the distinctions between sensibility and understanding, the 
characterisations of the faculties, etc., if practical reason is serving as the 
criterion? 
Second consequence. We have seen that for Kant the transcendental 
validity of freedom is itself open to doubt. To characterise it as an Idea of reason 
would be circular, as Ideas are only given sense by their regulative use for 
freedom. But even if it does become an apriori fact of reason, it must depend on 
postulates to give it sense. So if freedom becomes an Idea, it collapses, but if 
Ideas depend on freedom, they also collapse. The upshot is that if reason itself is a 
problem for the finite being, then how can it serve as the criterion of critique? 
These are unacceptable consequences to the solution within the confines of 
the Kantian critique. But in DR Deleuze attempts to fashion the solution so that it 
is fully self-consistent, by transforming, subtly but radically, several of the key 
elements in play. Firstly, we saw that the solution identifies reason with the realm 
of problems. Reason, the faculty of Ideas, is the capacity to apprehend problems. 
Now, with regard to the first consequence: if this identification is fully carried 
through, then there is no need to invoke freedom as its ground. A suggestion (and 
only that at this point) can be made that problems are themselves a real 
component of experience. I give an example of this that Deleuze only mentions in 
passing.41 The concept of one's own death is a concept without a possible 
intuition which nevertheless has a sense or meaning in that it is bound up with our 
destination or telos as subjects. Death is therefore a problematic Idea par 
excellence, a problem in which, as finite subjects who ask about the ends of 
41 Kant's Critical Philosophy_ 56. 
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reason, who pose the very question of self-critique, we are necessarily 
entangled. 42 
But this m tum broaches the other issue brought up by the first 
consequence: how is one now to discover and justify the real components and 
apparatus necessary for the critique itself? How is one to justify the distinction of 
the faculties, etc? There are two levels to a Deleuzian answer. Firstly, Deleuze 
elaborates his account of Ideas through the key concepts of difference and 
repetition. Ideas are problematic horizons that are internally differentiated, yet 
cannot be experienced or recognised, only repeated. In chapter 4.3 I explain this 
unusual interpretation of Kantian Ideas, while in chapter 6 and Appendix IV I 
show how Deleuze develops a threefold account of temporal synthesis out of this 
structure of 'repetition of internal difference'. This, I suggest, is how the real 
apparatus of critique itself is generated and demonstrated. Deleuze elaborates the 
second level of his answer by referring to what I called above Kant's third stage 
or period: in CJ, Kant provides a model for the genesis of the relations of the 
faculties, notably in the case of the imagination and reason in the sublime. 
Deleuze develops this model of a free, self-grounding generation of the relations 
of a system of faculties, so that the range and limitations of the faculties are 
discovered in their own exercise, rather than being pre-given (see chapter 6.2). 
The relation of these two levels, the account of Ideas and the genesis of the 
faculties, can be elucidated by reference to Kant. We have suggested that it is 
possible to analyse reason itself into the process of problematisation. But isn't it 
the case that Kant's examples of the genesis of the relation of the faculties 
themselves involve forms of problematisation? For instance, in the main example 
of genesis Kant gives, the experience of the sublime, the imagination is forced to 
~: This, in ex1reme abstraction, is the structure that governs much of the larger argument of 
Heidegger's Being and Time. But from the point of'iew I am developing here, death would be an 
example. among others, of the problematic structure of an idea. Death is an idea because it is a 
future physical event that cannot in principle be experienced (not just because it is in the future). 
but analogously_ birth is a past physical event that too cannot in principle be experienced (not just 
because it is in the past). At the end of the thesis I will allude to suggestions made by the Lacanian 
school that a defining. 'transcendental' feature of certain psychopathologies, such as neurosis. is 
the subject's obsessive questioning of aspects of their OW11 origin. Thus. the neurotic lives "ithin 
the structure ofthe problem or question Am I alive? Similarly, fantasies of the primal scene can be 
seen as the symbolisation of the origin of the indhidual. In chapter 6.3 I "ill suggest that these 
ideas from L~can, Leclaire and Laplanche are giyen their proper theoretical structure by Deleuze' s 
Kantian account of ideas as problems. 
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exceed its own limits by reason.43 In the sublime, "our imagination strives to 
progress toward infinity, while our reason demands absolute totality as a real 
idea" (eJ # 25, Ak S:250f). In thus exceeding its own limits, it paradoxically 
encounters its "vocation" (eJ # 28, Ak 5:262); it could be said to encounter its 
own end or object in problematic form. Imagination is oriented by the violent 
apprehension of its ultimate relation with reason. 
Now if this model of genesis can be extended to the other faculties, then 
each faculty has its own kind of "transcendent exercise".44 Deleuze draws a 
startling conclusion: "The transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable 
43 Deleuze cites another example of genesis that is somewhat submerged in eJ: the genesis of the 
sense of the beautiful. Beauty is provoked by a harmony between objective forms and the 
subjective harmony of the faculties is united; the aprioricity of this synthetic relation between 
objective and subjective can be secured by means of a deduction, which is what Kant proceeds to 
do. However, Deleuze notes that Kant also describes how beauty is related synthetically "ith an 
intellectual, rational interest in the beautiful for the sake of morality. He then claims that "the 
interest with which [the sense of the beautfiul] were united might serve as a principle for a genesis 
of the 'communicability' or universality of this pleasure" (Kant's Critical Philosophy, 52f) 
44 However, an interesting remark in the first introduction to eJ gestures towards an interesting 
development of the possibilities just sketched out. We find Kant in the process of criticising the 
Schwarmerei conjured up by those who let their imagination wander too far from its proper use. It 
is essential, he says, to warn against "empty and fanciful desires", which are nourished by novels 
and "mystical representations, similar to novels, of superhuman perfections and fanatical bliss" 
(el First Intro 231). However, he goes on to say that it is an important problem for anthropology 
"to investigate why it is that nature has given us the predisposition to such fruitless ex-penditure of 
our forces as [we see in] empty wishes and longings (which certainly playa large role in human 
life)." Although Kant has said that this is a task for anthropology, he then goes on to make a 
teleological judgment about the purpose of these longings which has a resonance beyond the 
empirical sphere. He claims that the wisdom of nature is manifest in the emptiness of these 
longings, because if we had to assure ourselves that the objects of our desire were attainable before 
we actually let ourselves desire it. "our forces would presumably remain unused". Hence the very 
recklessness of desire is a condition for the possibility of following a desire and lending force to 
achieve it. Kant then says, in an echo of Spinoza' s dictum that we do not yet know what a body 
can do, "for we usually do not come to know what forces we have except by trying them ouf'. 
Kant then provides a suggestion, and no more, for the implication this has for his theory of 
faculties: 
Nature has bound up the determination of forces with the representation of objects even before we 
have knowledge of our faculties, which are often produced in the fIrst place through this striving, 
which seems like an empty wish to the mind. (my translation) 
Although Deleuze never refers to this passage. it does foreshadow the notion of transcendental 
empiricism. 1bis passage is indeed pregnant with future, as the notion that striving has primacy 
over the faculties and is in'some sense their internaL genetic form, points also towards Fichte and 
Schelling. However, one can instead emphasise the way in which. in straining at the limits of the 
Kantian system. this passage does not primarily point towards a post-Kantian rearticulation of that 
system, but gestures towards a reading of Kant's O\\n metacritical reasoning that displaces reason 
from its hierarchy. Kant says that the exercise of longing produces the faculty in the first place. A 
desire produces ~ new ca~city, or faculty, to do something. Does this mean that we have to pose a 
primacy of inchoate desire at the heart of the faculties? But Kant is gesturing towards something 
else: for it is the wisdom of nature that has so engineered us that our desires are excessiye. A 
teleological reason is once again lurking behind this permission for desires to act blindly. and there 
is only a hair of a difference between ,,,hat could either be a cunning ruse of reason or its 0\\11 
problematisation at the hands of the faculties. 
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from its disjointed, superior or transcendent exercise" (DR 1431186).45 Deleuze 
thus seems to tum the distinction between 'transcendental' and 'transcendent' on 
its head: the very form of the transcendental, which conditions the possibility of 
experience, depends on the violation of the possibility of experience. 
Nevertheless, if we keep in mind that we are concerned with the metacritical issue 
of the justification of critique itself, and if we bear in mind the preceding 
discussions, we can begin to glimpse Deleuze's transformation of Kant in the 
following important passage: 
Transcendent in no way means that the facwty addresses itself to objects outside 
the world but, on the contrary, that it grasps that in the world which concerns it 
exclusively and brings it into the world. The transcendent exercise must not be 
traced from the empirical exercise precisely because it apprehends that which 
cannot be grasped from the point of view of common sense, that which measures 
the empirical operation of all the faculties according to that which pertains to 
each, given the form of their collaboration. That is why the transcendental is 
answerable to a superior empiricism which alone is capable of exploring its 
domain and its regions (DR 143/186). 
As I will show later, Deleuze is very exercised by the problem that the derivation 
of transcendental claims merely echoes their empirical presuppositions, what 
Foucault called the "empirico-transcendental double".46 He is concerned to move 
beyond "conditioning" to the standpoint of "genesis" (cf DR 154/200; Kep 52).47 
But there are in fact two distinct senses of genesis in Deleuze. Firstly, for Deleuze 
(in a way similar to Hegel), 'experience' is never a given but is generated through 
developing and responding to problems. Experience has a problematic ground, 
and should always be seen as emerging from a problematic field. Thus, when 
Deleuze writes that "the condition must be a condition of real experience, not of 
possible experience. It forms an intrinsic genesis, not an extrinsic conditioning" 
(DR 154/200), this "real experience" should be understood as referring to 
45 It is worth pointing out here that the translator of DR mistranslates on a number of occasions 
exercice transcend ant as "transcendental exercise", thus omitting the sense in which Deleuze is 
bending the Kantian notion of "transcendent use" or exercise to his own purposes. Whereyer one 
reads "transcendental exercise" in the English, one should read "transcendent exercise". 
46 Michel Foucault The Order ofT71ings (London: Routledge, 1970). 318t. 
-17 In his 1963 article, 'L'idee de genese dans l'esthetique de Kant' (Revue d'Esthetique 16). 
Deleuze writes "If one considers that Maimon's Transcendental Philosoph:v was published in 
1790. it must be recognised that Kant in part, foresaw the objection of his disciples. The fIrst two 
Critiques invoked facts, searched for the conditions of these facts, and found them in faculties that 
were already formed. They refer themselves to a genesis that they are incapable of assuring for 
themselves. But in the Critique of A esthetic Judgment. Kant poses the problem of the genesis of 
the faculties in their primary free accord He discovers an ultimate foundatioIL which is lacking in 
the other Critiques. Critique in general ceases to be a simple conditioning. to become a 
transcendental FormatioIL a transcendental Culture. a transcendental Genesis" (121). 
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experIence considered as responding to (and generated from) an ideal set of 
problems. The second sense of genesis puts into action the first through the notion 
of transcendent exercise just mentioned. The "common use" of the faculties is 
taken to be itself teleologically and metacritically grounded in the "final", 
transcendent use of the faculties. Deleuze's aim is to rethink the sources and 
relations of the faculties within the composite that is empirical cognition, or 
experience, by untangling its sources, and "follow[ing] each of the 'lines' beyond 
the tum in experience".48 Each faculty can potentially be exercised in the face of 
perplexity over its proper object~ and in this exercise it relates itself freely to the 
other faculties. Deleuze then gives a new universal sense (reflected also at the 
metacriticallevel) to the Kantian notion of an "object = x". The object = x is the 
problematic entity that traverses each of the faculties in their transcendent 
exercIse. 
But a general question remains: if reason is identified with problematicity 
in general, and if each faculty is capable of apprehending a problematic object, of 
its own constitutive passion, what happens to reason as a distinctive faculty? 
Surely there are other aspects of reason that are more important than the 
problematic form it must have for experience: such as its role as faculty of 
principles, of syllogisms, of totality and coherence?49 
But Deleuze's solution involves an analysis of reason that can be 
reconstructed as follows. I will present it very abstractly, in terms of a formalistic 
solution of some of the aporiae of the self-critique of reason which we have 
encountered~ the account will be greatly elaborated in later chapters. Firstly, the 
role or function of reason is indeed to problematise~ this is what reason does. But 
Deleuze's second move is to finally distinguish the nature or structure of reason 
from the faculty that reasons, the move that Kant never makes. In making this 
distinction, Deleuze cuts through the paradoxes that arise from the unifying role 
that reason is given in Kant. 
48 Bergsonism, 28. In Bergson, ex-perience is a composite of perception and recollection. and the 
philosopher must separate these two elements and follow them in their 'ideal' state beyond 
ex-perience. 
49 A passage of Nietzsche's comes to mind on "the misunderstanding of passion and reason. as if 
the latter were an independent entity and not a system of various passions and desires: as if every 
passion did not possess its quantum of reason" (The Will to Pawer # 387). This famous passage 
betrays a circularity that seems relevant here: reason is analysed into a set of passions that are then 
defined as being guided in turn by reason. 
61 
I tum to the question of the faculty of reason first. Deleuze rebaptises this 
faculty simply as "thought" (cf DR chapter 3, 'The Image of Thought'). The 
transcendent exercise of each of the faculties can indeed be translated into 
thought, so that their problematic objects can still be referred to as Ideas. 5o But 
this translation happens so that the finality or destination of problems in the 
faculty of thought is conceived according to the process of genesis: 
Between sensibility and imagination, between imagination and memory, between 
memory and thought ... each disjointed faculty communicates to another the 
violence which carries it to its own limit (DR 145). 
Because of the possibility of this transcendent exercise, thought has no intrinsic 
connection with "common sense" or "recognition" and so is in itself capable of 
dealing with the metacritical problematisation of the faculties, or the task of 
"superior" or "transcendental empiricism". 
But what then of the structure or nature of reason? By converting the 
faculty of reason into mere "thought", Deleuze seems to detach it from its 
traditional connection with ratio: rational thinking, logic, etc. How can reason 
then have a nature if the faculties of the mind lose their intimate connection with 
such a nature, if "the supposed affinity between thought and the True" (DR 
1321172) turns out to be ungrounded? But it is well to recall that Kant himself had 
already begun to tread along this path by situating judgment in the understanding, 
not reason. Moreover, the Kantian tum itself is provoked by the profound 
problematisation of the relation between logic and reality: the notion of 
'experience' becomes the very site of this problematic relation. To deal with this 
issue will take up much of the next chapter. Perhaps a renewed 'Copernican tum' 
is necessary that advances Kant's realisation in his famous 1772 letter to Herz that 
the relation of representation to its object is ungrounded - perhaps it is indeed 
necessary to push Kant's thought further, and ask what grounds ''the supposed 
affinity between thought and the True"? 
The question of the structure of reason can only be posed by returning to 
Kant's question of the relative rights of logical and real forms of differentiation. 
Historically, the first form that this takes for Kant is a renewed investigation into 
Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. I will argue that Deleuze goes back to the 
50 "Ideas .. , [do not] refer to a particuIar facuIty. Ideas occur throughout the facuIties and concern 
them all. According to the place and the existence of a faculty detennined as such. they render 
possible both the differential object and the transcendent exercise of that facuIty" (DR 193/249-50) 
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sources of Kantianism by affirming that the structure or nature of reason is to be 
conceived again in its Leibnizian role as sufficient reason. Thought must attempt 
to find "a truly sufficient reason".51 Deleuze's task is firstly to construct a 
"transcendental genesis, transcendental culture, transcendental formation,,:;2 - a 
new critical teleology - through the discovery of a truly sufficient reason that will 
uncover the internal logic of Ideas in their paradoxically absolute, yet problematic 
status. Secondly, this account of the internal structure of reason is affirmed as 
such - and therefore metacritically - in transcendental empiricism. It is this 
twofold task that comprises, I believe, Deleuze's answer to the problem of 
immanence. 53 
Deleuze's finally Leibnizian reading of Kantian Ideas is what stops the 
account of 'problems' from dissolving into a relativism. 54 On the contrary, we will 
see that Deleuze constructs an Absolute to rival Hegel's. Moreover, as we will see 
in the next chapter, Deleuze's return to Leibniz is also in many ways a repetition 
of the very genesis of the Kantian problematic. 55 I hope to show that Deleuze is 
very much misunderstood in current debates about the "crisis of reason". In an 
interview on the topic of Leibniz, Deleuze remarks how Leibniz (who Deleuze 
calls the philosopher of the "baroque") stands at the moment "theological reason 
breaks down, giving way to human reason pure and simple. The baroque itself 
already marks a crisis in theological reasoning - a final attempt to reconstruct a 
51 Nietzsche and Philosophy 49: cf. DR 57/80, 1541200. 
5~ 'L'idee de genese dans l'esthetique de Kant", 12l. 
53 Deleuze's synthesis of Leibnizianism with themes developed from Kant's third Critique may 
bring out a potential latent in CJ itself, if we are to believe Jean Hy-ppolite. who calls CJ "a 
Leibnizianism of immanence"; Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit 
(Evanston: Northwestern, 1974). 128. 
54 Deleuze rarely comments on the spectre of relath,ism One comment from The Fold: Leibniz 
and the Baroque however, is useful: "For Leibniz, for Nietzsche, for William and Henry James. 
and for Whitehead as well, perspectivism amounts to a relativism, but not the relath ism we take 
for granted It is not a variation of truth according to the subject, but the condition in which the 
truth of a variation appears to the SUbject". p. 20. Such a shift places the clear requirement on 
Deleuze that he provide ontologically or metacritically valid reasons for 'getting underneath· 
relativism in this wav. 
55 As we will see, Deleuze' s Leibnizian reading of the status of ideas can helpfully be contrasted 
formal(v v.ith the Hegelian transformation of Kant's rational ideas. Regarding the comparison 
between Leibniz and Hegel. Jean Hyppolite remarks that "in Hegel there is no method separable 
from the development taken in itself. That is, there is no structure of method anterior to the 
structure of the discourse itself. That is very difficult for the structuralists to conceive of. That is 
why they have more recourse to Leibniz, who is the real father of their thought". 'The Structure of 
Philosophic Language according to the Preface to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit'. in R. 
Macksie & E. Donato eds .. The Structuralist Controversy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. 1970). 183 
I would argue that Deleuze' s recourse to Leibniz precisely overcomes this perceived limitation. 
and thus moves in HegeJ' s direction. 
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world that's falling apart .,. In our attempts to preserve some part of it. or 
reconstruct it, we're seeing a neobaroque, which brings us closer, perhaps to 
Leibniz".56 My claim is that Deleuze's "reconstruction of reason", and his return 
to Leibniz, goes to the heart of the problem of immanence in philosophical 
d . 57 mo ermty. 
The domains and territories staked out in Kant's critical project remam 
surrounded by a deep fog - that of metaphysics itself, past, present, and in its 
uncertain future. The fantastic figures that coalesce in that fog - a motley 
distribution comprising transcendental freedom, monads both physical and 
immaterial, even reason itself - are not mere fantasies, but insistent ghosts bearing 
persistent questions. A dream or Schwarmerei can never be without significance 
for the Kant of the critical period, for their sense is always augmented by the fact 
that Kant at various points believed he could penetrate into and give form to the 
light emanating beyond the fog, and answer these spectral questions. The pre-
critical and critical Kant always remain uneasily bonded. 
56.Yegotiations, 161-2. 
57 My intention in the preceding is to prepare the way for a Deleuzian transfonnation of Kantian 
critique. I want to justify Deleuze's philosophy through showing its power as a reading of Kant's 
philosophy. However, the reason for proceeding in this way is in fact because Deleuze himself 
chooses not to present his project in this manner. Instead. in Kant's Critical Philosophy Deleuze 
presents his interpretation of Kant's philosophy in such a way as not to broach the post-Kantian 
issues that inform and motivate his own project. Thus. Deleuze holds off from presenting his full 
transfonnation of Kantianism until DR where he presents his theories of transcendental 
empiricism, transcendent exercise of the faculties. Ideas as Problems, etc. As a result of this 
restraint Deleuze does not ex-plicitly complete his interpretation of the logic of Kantianism on its 
O\vn terms. Hence Deleuze ends his book on Kant with an appeal to the notion of the ruse of 
reason.. arguably tying Kant' s whole theory into a vicious circle. 
Chapter Two 
Teleology, Rationalism and the Genesis of 
Kantianism 
Kant's philosophy has an intimate relation with teleology throughout all of its 
phases. But it is interesting that from the perspective of teleology, the Kantian 
critique seems to lose some of its distinctiveness, and appears very much as a 
continuation of the preceding philosophical tradition. In the last chapter I 
suggested that it is precisely by showing Kant's philosophy in this light that we 
get the larger perspective on the status and aims of the critical project. In this 
chapter I shall attempt to recast the prehistory of the critical project. It is 
necessary to reorient our understanding of Kant's own project, in order to bring 
out a certain harmony at work in the trajectory we are following. By suggesting 
that the latest destination of the problem of immanence lies with Deleuze, I have 
proposed a general historical movement from Kant to Hege4 and back to a 
transformation of Kantianism in Deleuze' s work. However, there is a prequel to 
this movement that needs to be brought out if we are to understand both Deleuze' s 
approach to philosophical tradition and the general problematic of modem 
philosophy that he has exposed. That is, we need to take account of the role of 
Leibniz and Spinoza in the movement. It will transpire that this is not so much a 
trajectory as an oscillating movement between absolute and finite claims to 
Immanence. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. Firstly, I take a brief look at 
this issue from a Deleuzian perspective. Secondly, in the main body of the chapter 
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I present an assessment of the character of Kant's break with Leibniz. I have 
already argued that Kant's critical project cannot be separated from metacritical 
issues, which in turn find a vexed outlet in teleological issues. Now I argue that 
Kant's critical turn must be understood in relation to its transformation of 
Leibnizian rationalism. This claim will be gradually developed further throughout 
the thesis. On the one hand, I will show how Kant's ideas about the distinction 
between logic and reality give rise to a new conception of the 'object', that will 
form the centre of the new critical philosophy. On the other hand, while this new 
conception displaces Leibnizian ideas about teleology and harmony from the 
centre of Kant's philosophy, this displacement creates its own problems, and 
teleology and harmony return, as Deleuze argues, as the hidden epicentre of the 
critical turn. 
1 Teleology and Modem Philosophy 
The first task is to give some sense of why teleology is a decisive issue in the 
movement of modern philosophy, especially as understood by Deleuze. It is 
interesting that Deleuze devotes major studies to Hume and Leibniz, the two 
precursors of Kantian philosophy. His work on these philosophers sits alongside 
his study of Kant and should be seen as a rearrangement of the constellation that 
gave rise to the critical turn. 1 For Deleuze, all of these philosophers at some point 
in their work fundamentally rest their claims on a teleological vision. The 
standard picture is that Leibniz is thought to be the rationalist who upholds 
teleology, in the form of the pre-established harmony, while Hume is his skeptical 
foe, with Kant emerging out of the profound clash between these two outlooks. I 
have already introduced suggestions as to how Kant rests some of the crucial 
claims for a self-critique of reason upon teleology. However, the standard picture 
changes even further if we find in Hume as well an importance accorded not just 
to teleology, but to the very principle of the pre-established harmony. While the 
latter is not mentioned in the Treatise, it does appear at a crucial juncture in the 
EnqUiry, and it is this moment that is exploited by Deleuze in his 'teleologisation' 
J I am here thinking of the many pages devoted to Leibniz in Difference and Repetition and Logic 
of Sense. as well as Deleuze's 1991 study on Leibniz and the baroque. which I think can be seen as 
a late recapitulation of some of the themes of Deleuze' s earlier writings. 
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of modem philosophy. It occurs as Hume is engaged in justifying the claim that 
the force of custom is sufficient for the "correspondence" of our thoughts and 
conceptions with nature. In the absence of a ground for sufficiency internal to the 
notion of custom, Hume claims that we find "a kind of pre-established harmony 
between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas".2 
Now both Hume and Leibniz are sensitive to the problems of justifying the 
concept of causality. This is in part due to the conjunction of available theories of 
causality in the 18th century: the notion that now strikes us as the most sensible 
approach to causality, that finite substances are responsible for the changes they 
cause in other substances (then called the theory of physical influx), was at the 
time the least popular.3 This was because the only way available to conceive the 
idea that a substance with a set of properties caused a change in another substance 
was through the explanation that there was a transmission of properties from the 
first to the second, which was held to be inconceivable. Therefore, the notions of 
occasionalism 4 and pre-established harmony became popular among philosophers 
as elaborate avoidances of physical influx. 5 Both Leibniz and Hume appealed to a 
form of noncausal correspondence between substances: the reason for the order 
between elements or substances was to be found instead outside the system of 
physical changes. In the case of Leibniz, the order or harmony found in the 
physical world is a result of God's selection of independent 'programmes' or 
series6 that are compatible when realised together. Hume's philosophy can also be 
seen to arise from the failure of the physical influx theory: he can find no evidence 
from the senses of any 'transmission' of properties, given that all the senses 
2 Hume, EnqUiry Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 54-5. The last 
chapter of Deleuze's Empiricism and Subjectivity elaborates on purposiveness in Hume. I will 
deal in greater depth "ith these ideas in Chapter 6.2, where it will be shown that the importance 
Deleuze accords to teleology in Hume is at least in part a result of his reading Kantian concerns 
about 'affinity' back into Hume. 
3 See E. O'NeilL 'Inflilll:US Physicus', in S. Nadler, ed, Causation in Ear~v '\fodern Philosoph.v 
(Penn: Penn. State University, 1993). 
4 Associated "ith Malebranche, who argued that as a result of the inlpossibility of physical 
causation between finite substances, God alone could be considered the real cause of the order in 
the world, of which the particular changes we see are only' occasions' . 
5 The retreat from occasionalism and pre-established harmony back to the rehabilitation of 
physical influx could not have happened without the Kantian idealisation of the issue, where the 
physical transmission of properties is no longer considered as important as the merely law 
governed nature of the change. Arguably. Hume· s theories were not enough to make this paradigm 
shift because of his appeal to the merely psychological nature of connexion. 
6 Cf. N. Rescher. The Philosophy of Leibniz, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 1967) 14-16 on 
'programs': B. RusselL The Philosophy of Leibniz (London: Routledge. 1900) pp. 47f 97f on 
'series' . 
67 
provide us with are distinct impressions. Given a lack of objective ground for the 
order found in the world, Hume turns to custom (and the barest hint of a pre-
established harmony).7 
One of Kant's most celebrated moves in CPR amounts to the construction 
of an abstract formalisation of the problem facing notions such as causality in the 
18th century: the fourfold distinction of analytic/synthetic and aprioriaposteriori. 8 
Very roughly, the former couple concern two general types of connection in a 
judgment, while the latter concerns the modality of such a connection9 - its 
necessity or contingency - in relation to experience. Thus, whereas an analytic 
connection contains its reason solely in the logical explication of the presupposed 
meaning of a concept, a synthetic connection must involve an extralogical reason. 
The concept of a causal relation must be synthetic: Leibniz, Kant, and Hume all 
agree on this, if not in terminology. Furthermore, they agree in principle that the 
problem about causality concerns connections that should be, if they are to exist at 
all, apriori. Kant's notion of the synthetic apriori simply names a problem faced 
by 18th century philosophy - that of how to account for any possible nonlogical 
apriori connections. How is one to synthesise apriori two or more elements, 
whether they be Humean sensations, or Leibnizian perceptions? 
Kant's move, on the basis of his formalisation of the problem, is to search 
for a positive solution to it. Nevertheless, it has already been suggested that Kant's 
solution itself ends up affirming teleology, and thus in effect continuing the lines 
pursued by Leibniz and Hume, despite having brought the problem to a new 
explicitness. Now, Kant's response to the conjuncture of Leibniz and Hume is 
shadowed by another negative solution by a philosopher working within exactly 
the same parameters, but who marks an end rather than a beginning to the 
~ Many commentators on Hume find a problem in his account of causality because the account of 
causality as custom is seen secretly to rely on a naturalistic account of the causality of the 
psychological connections in the mind that go to make up custom (cf. Barry Stroud Hume, 
London: Routledge, 1977, chapters 3-4). From the point of ,iew of the historical controversy 
about physical influx . ., Deleuze' s concentration on pre-established harmony in his interpretation of 
Hume has the merit of botll being implicitly faithful to the historical situation and saYing Hume 
from inunediate contradiction.. by shifting the burden of causality ultimately to purposiveness. 
8 The difference between Kant's formalisation and what is knmm as Hume's fork rests on the fact 
that Kant' s schema is entirely formal and thus prior to the decision as to the legitimacy of any of 
tIle combinations. whereas Hume's disjunction benveen logical truths and matters of fact results 
from arguments that rule out any representatives of what Kant "ill call synthetic apriori truths. 
9 I will deal with tIle Kantian rationale for this distinction in detail later in this chapter. 
68 
problem of the synthetic apriori. 10 By bringing in this philosopher we can better 
frame the extent to which a general structural problem, which is first named 
explicitly by Kant via the notion of the synthetic apriori, in effect hangs in the 
background of the historical course of modem philosophy. Nietzsche in effect 
completes the framewor~ by attempting to actualise one of its most fundamental 
possibilities: he takes the pre-established harmony away from the universe, and 
surrenders synthesis entirely to contingency. A brief look at his liminal position in 
this framework can cast light on the limits of the framework itself. 
On the one hand, Nietzsche fulfils one definition of materialism that Kant 
put forward in an early essay: the view that the world has no rational laws and is 
governed by chance. ll But on the other hand, while his published work appears to 
revel in skepticism, in truths that are only my truths, in the private notes collected 
in The Will to Power, Nietzsche is revealed to be continually at work on a 
philosophical system that will allow him to say what he wants to say consistently. 
He accepts more of Hume' s skepticism than Kant, but still, like Kant, affirms 
something of Leibniz's philosophy, even if it is in the most attenuated form. No 
matter how far Nietzsche seems to want to go towards a godless, subjectless a-
teleological materialistic universe, at the last moment he pulls back and affirms a 
minimal Leibnizian subject - the subject of will to power. How does this happen? 
Nietzsche accepts Humean reservations about causality, but opts to affirm 
utter contingency, without law, whether causal or externally teleological. He starts 
at the epistemological level; whereas Hume suggested that the interpretation of 
order in the world rests on custom (or habit) and ultimately on pre-established 
harmony, for Nietzsche 'custom' itself must be analysed into power relations. 
These themselves can only be thought teleonomically, for even if the will to 
power involves the seeking of nothing other than power, and thus seems 'blind', 
Nietzsche nonetheless emphasises that a being endowed with power always seeks 
its own power. 12 In this way Hume's two claims about custom and teleology 
10 In Trill to Power # 530, Nietzsche lays out the issue of the synthetic apriori "ith reference to 
Kant and Hume. but goes on to criticise Kant' s notion of judgment in the following paragraphs. 
11 Ak. I :225: referred to in K. Ameriks, Kant's Theory of Afind, 27. 
12 "All events that result from intention are reducible to the intention to increase power", Will to 
POli'er # 663. But while self-preservation is reduced to the bare notion of "increasing power". 
Nietzsche also affimls individuation (or "perspectiYism') in "ill to power. cf. Will to Power # 636. 
630. On similar claims in his published writings. cf. the important notion of 'the pathos of 
distance' in The Genealogy ofJlorals (trans. W. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1967). L 2, and 
Antichrist (trans. R. Hollingdale, London: Penguin.. 1968) # 2. 
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appear to be unified. Order is then simply the product of the power of certain ends 
being affirmed over other ends; any phenomenal harmony in the world is a result 
of power. However, through the very deepening of the notion of force, Nietzsche 
ends up violating Hume's own strictures against the notion of force. 13 Nietzsche 
even frequently entertains the notion that there is a "thinking, feeling, willing in 
all living beings".14 He affirms some form of self-directed monad, even if this 
monad has no pre-established programme, but is cast into a universe populated 
with other chaotic forces. I5 If this monad is minimally described in terms of a 
force, it is vital that this force is in some sense able to feel the "pathos" of 
"feeling" or being "affected".16 Hence the minimal requirement of teleology is 
upheld: an internal directedness. 
In Will to Power # 550, there is a passage that expresses in a nutshell the 
tension at work in Nietzsche. Nietzsche notes that "Hume was right" about habit 
but then goes on to gloss this by saying that 
that which gives the extraordinary firmness to our belief in causality is not the 
great habit of seeing one occurrence following another but our inability to 
interpret events otherwise than as events caused by intentions ... the belief that 
every event is a deed, that every deed presupposes a doer, it is a belief in the 
subject. 
While Hume does suggest that our confusion about causality may be the result of 
a need to attribute intentions to events, this is not the main thrust of his argument 
about custom or habit, but merely shows one manifestation by which habit may 
dominate our perceptions. I7 Nietzsche takes himself to be radicalising Humean 
skepticism, by showing how the root of custom or habit is a primal belief that one 
13 Enquiry, 64-67. Cf. 77n. where Hume describes the "feeling of p(m!er" as just that - a mere 
feeling that is not to be "transfer[red] ... to the objects" 
14 The Ifill to POl1'er. # 658; 499. Although, in # 478 Nietzsche says the opposite, precisely by 
implicitly invoking Hume: "eyery successive phenomenon in consciousness is completely 
atomistic - And we have sought to understand the world through the reyerse conception - as if 
nothing were real and effective but thinking, feeling. "illing!". It is tempting to read Nietzsche's 
"we" as referring to himself: this would support my claim that Nietzsche was in permanent 
oscillation between Hume and Leibniz. Further support is found in # 664, where the concept of 
force is explained in Humean terms as a mere habitual conception illegitimately ex1ended. 
15 Leibniz of course also characterised monads in terms of forces, or vis viva. 
16 On pathos. HIli to Power # 635, on feeling and affectiolL cf # 656, 664, 668. Commentators 
who have brought out this Leibnizian aspect to Nietzsche include Wolfgang MUller-Lauter in his 
Xietzsche: His Philosophy o/Contradictions and the Contradictions 0/ his Philosophy (trans. D.l 
Parent. Urbana: University of Illinois. 1999). 21. and (less ex-plicitly) Peter Poellner in .Yietzsche 
and .\letaph.vsics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995). 46-57. As we will see. Deleuze himself implicitly 
affirms this Leibnizianism in Nietzsche. 
Ii Cf Hume's remarks on anthropomorphism and animism in Dialogues Concerning Xatural 
Religion. (ed. 1. GaskilL Oxford: Oxford UniYersity Press. 1993).60-66. 
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is a subject, and that effects in the world should be seen as the result of subjects_ 
But Nietzsche paradoxically uses the primacy of the illusion of the subject as a 
means of reaffirming a Leibnizian account of the subject - in the guise of a 
necessary illusion. This position is intrinsically unstable. For Nietzsche's 
extension of Hume simultaneously depends on the notion of will to power mId 
declares it a necessary illusion. Nietzsche finds himself caught in the same kind of 
dilemma that faces Kant in his effort to balance the Paralogisms with his claims 
about the subject. On the one hand, he affirms the illusion involved in the idea of 
the subj ect, but on the other hand must affirm the necessary structure of that 
illusion as applying to all creatures who take themselves to be subjects. Thus 
apriority - necessity and universality - must be affirmed even in the diagnosis of 
an illusion about apriority. 
A similar problem afflicts the logical structure of Nietzsche's affirmation 
of chance. If chance is to be truly affirmed, then it must involve an affirmation of 
its absolute necessity. 18 This means it must be distributive rather than collective: 
contingency must be located in each vanishing element of chaos for there can be 
no collective law of chaos. Nietzsche puts forward an alternative hypothesis that 
"the [world] has a 'necessary' and 'calculable' course, but not because laws 
prevail in it but because laws are absolutely lacking, and every power draws its 
ultimate consequences every moment".19 But Nietzsche knows that he cannot 
fully affirm this hypothesis as true, because of the problems with the notion of 
will to power just mentioned, so he accepts that "this is only an interpretation ... 
so much the better". 
Nietzsche's embrace of interpretation occurs as a result of his inability to 
solve the issues of metacritique in which he entangled himself 20 Either 
18 On chance and necessity in Nietzsche, see Sietzsche and Philosophy 2-1--3-1-. 
19 Beyond Good and Evi/"(trans. R Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1973) # 22: cf Will to Power # 
634. This hypothesis should be related to some other non-Humean reasons Nietzsche gives for 
denying causality. In The Gay Science (trans. W. Kaufmann, New York: Vintage, 1974) # 112. he 
claims that the notion of causality involves the selection of events out of a continuum. which are 
then simply redescribed. But "in every chemical process, for example, quality appears as a 
. miracle'. as ever: also everY locomotion: nobodv has ·e\.-plained' a push". The argument from 
quality is borrowed from Schopenhauer. The Tforid as Will and Representation (trans. E. Payne. 
New York: Dover, 1969) vol. 1. 97: "the inner nature of forces that thus appear was always bound 
to be left unexplained by etiology, which had to stop at the phenomenon and its arrangement. since 
the law followed by etiology does not go beyond this". Cf. also The Fourfold Root of the Principle 
o/Sufficient Reason (trans. E. Payne. La Salle: Open Court. 1974). 118f. 
~o It is sometimes argued that the fact that Nietzsche presents his philosophy as just another 
interpretation. does not entail that he views his interpretation as equal in value to others. But one 
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Nietzsche's philosophy remams m unstable flux between his published and 
unpublished utterances as a result of his inadequate treatment of metacritical 
issues, or one must grasp the nettle and suggest that Nietzsche was indeed 
attempting to work out a consistent philosophy in his notebooks, and that this 
attempt remained unfinished. The latter is in effect Deleuze's strategy. 
Deleuze presents Nietzsche, like Kant, as tom between Hume and Leibniz. 
Nietzsche's philosophy is still beholden to the Kantian question, "how are 
synthetic apriori claims possible?", because it attempts to find an extralogical 
reason - the will to power - for upholding a virulent skepticism. This is what 
keeps him within the limits of the structural problematic we have been discussing; 
but, as I have claimed, his position is the negative of Kant. Deleuze attempts to 
reconstruct Nietzsche's philosophy through placing it in relation to Kant and the 
post-Kantians.21 Although he follows Nietzsche in claiming to abandon external 
teleology and the ultimate coherence of the world, Deleuze is consciously 
I 
working through some of the difficulties mentioned above concerning the very 
possibility of affirming a-teleological materialism. 
Firstly, as I have suggested, Deleuze explicitly (unlike Nietzsche) accepts 
the necessity for teleology in some form in order to deal with the space opened by 
the problem of the synthetic apriori. Where he thinks Nietzsche improves upon 
the three thinkers who went before him is in his expansion of the self-critique of 
reason to include the question of the value of knowledge and morality as ends. 
The "transcendental culture" that can be found in Kant is deepened in Nietzsche 
to problematise for all beings and cultures the question of their ends or values: 
"culture means training or selection". 22 
Secondly, Deleuze is much more sensitive to the problems of knowledge 
and subjectivity than Nietzsche, who is often happy to violate the genetic fallacy 
cannot appeal to ex1ernal criteria for metacriticaljustification - such as coherence, agreement with 
empirical evidence, completeness, etc. - without appealing to values that Nietzsche' s notion of 
"ill to power aims to undermine. 
21 In fact it sometimes appears that Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche has more in common \\ith 
Solomon Maimon's Kantian theory of differentials than Nietzsche's own statements on "ill to 
power (cf. 51-2, and note 12). Despite Deleuze's reputation, iVietzsche and Philosophy is about as 
profoWldly Wl-'postmodernist' as it is possible for a reading of Nietzsche to be. 
22 Nietzsche and Philosophy 133. Although I will not deal with this aspect here. it can generally be 
placed in relation to Deleuze' s ultimate strategy of analysing ends into 'problems' !Ideas. Deleuze 
presents Nietzsche's philosophy of culture at Xietzsche and Philosophy 133-41. Again, as in Kant. 
the question of the self-critique of reason is given a historical formulation. so that there are three 
stages of culture. the pre-historic, the historic and post-historic. 
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on the question of knowledge. It is important to notice that the paradoxes of truth 
that necessarily accompany Nietzsche's radical affirmation of the truth of 
monadic anarchy are absent from Deleuze's discussion. The problem of self-
reflexivity in Nietzsche does not especially exercise Deleuze, because he is 
already rather Kantian on the questions of truth, reason and the subject, and 
because, I claim, he orients himself in relation to the post-Kantian treatment of 
metacritique. 
Thus for Deleuze, the problematic of the synthetic apriori necessitates 
something more than Nietzsche's attempt to affirm the necessity of a synthesis of 
absolute contingency. This 'something more' will be the attempt to return to the 
sources of the problematic of the synthetic apriori in order adequately to solve it 
on immanent grounds which are nevertheless consistently metacritical. This 
entails for Deleuze the acceptance of certain traditional metaphysical and 
epistemological claims that Nietzsche thought he could do away with. Hence 
Deleuze's return to the forcefield of Kant, Leibniz and Hume, and his attempt to 
show how all three of them shed light on each other. Thus, Deleuze claims that 
even for Hume, knowledge involves some form of what he calls 'transcendence'. 
"What is the fact of knowledge? It is transcendence or going beyond. I affirm 
more than I know; my judgment goes beyond the idea. In other words, I am a 
subject".23 An act of judgment is never a mere (a posteriori) synthesis between 
two particulars; the very act of being able to identify the particulars implies that 
one affirms more than one has before one.24 Deleuze assumes that this fact holds 
for Hume, Leibniz, and Kant, but the way they venture beyond the fact, the 
question quid juris, will be differently answered by all, each appealing in their 
own way to some form of teleology. Nietzsche serves as a focus for Deleuze's 
attempt really because he "problematises" the very question of the whither? of 
teleology. 
However, what is particularly striking about Deleuze's attempt to render 
consistent the tension in Nietzsche's philosophy between the two influences 
23 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, 28. The question of the 'fact of knowledge' fonns a 
central topic of chapter 5 and 6 below. 
2-1 Deleuze is often confused with Foucault on the question of the subject. Foucault claims that the 
problem of escaping the subject was paramount in his generation. Howeyer. Deleuze neyer says 
this. and instead I will take him to be rethinking the subject according to the logic of immanence. 
What Deleuze is against is the recourse to consciousness in defining subjectiyity. So if one is to 
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(Rume and Leibniz) upon the Kantian tum, is what Deleuze actually takes from 
Kant's philosophy. In eschewing apperception, the categories and the apriori 
intuitions, Deleuze would seem to be left with nothing of Kantianism but its 
problem. Nevertheless, Deleuze describes the synthesis of the forces of will to 
power in Kantian terms as "the principle of the synthesis of difference", which is 
temporalised in the eternal return as the "synthesis of time and its dimensions".25 
Moreover, despite claiming that Nietzsche's philosophy is a radicalisation of 
Kant, a "total critique" as opposed to Kant's partial one,26 Deleuze insists upon 
claiming that the latter synthesis "fulfill[s] the requirements of a truly sufficient 
reason".27 The very bizarre thing, unremarked upon by Deleuze, is that the 
radicalisation of Kant undertaken by Nietzsche, according to Deleuze, is in many 
ways a return to the first moments of Kant's tum away from Leibniz. Nothing is 
so close to De1euze's reading of Nietzsche as Kant's 'pre-critical' work, the Nova 
Dilucidatio (New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition) 
from 1755! In that work, as we will see, Kant faces the problem of how, given 
that the mere monadic nature of substances is not enough to explain change, there 
must be "some third thing" (a persistent Kantian phrase) that explains the 
synthesis of real (changing) substances that occurs in relations of force. This 
'third' signifies that the problem of synthesis apriori must have a triangular 
structure if the account of synthesis is to avoid falling into contingency or 
determinism. Therefore, Kant opts, not for a pre-established harmony, but what he 
will call in the Inaugural Dissertation a "generally established harmony" that is 
expressed in the "principles of succession and coexistence". There are no 
categories, no apperception, no pure intuitions at this point in Kant's career; 
however, as we will see, this does not mean (as is sometimes thought), that Kant 
is merely a Leibnizian at this stage. Indeed, Kant too is searching in this period for 
a "truly sufficient reason". We will see that Kant's "generally established 
harmony" develops ontotheological issues in Leibniz's theory of pre-established 
harmony that will deepen and displace the notion of teleology. 
conduct a transcendental analysis, then one must search for the conditions of the subject. which 
even in Kant are not conscious. 
:5 Nietzsche and Philosoph.v 46-9. In DR Deleuze goes on to e~"plicit1y redescribe this process in 
tenus of 'schematism': see chapter ~ below. 
:6 Nietzsche and Phi/osoph.}J, 9Of. 
27 Xietzsche and Philosophy. 49. 
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To conclude: all of Deleuze's works up to Difference and Repetition 
affirm purposiveness as the final tribunal for the coherence of a system. I suggest 
that this rests on an implicit diagnosis of the deep structural problem named by the 
synthetic apriori that runs through modem philosophy. However, in Deleuze's 
major work he finally appears to lift away the structure of purposiveness. All we 
have is a comple~ immanent structure of differences 'repeating' themselves in 
various apriori forms of synthesis. Nevertheless, "a secret subject, the real subject 
of repetition" must be found (DR 23). Furthermore, time itself is read in terms of 
the notion of repetition, which allows us to think "the final end of time" (DR 
94).28 We will be able to chart Deleuze's complex attitude towards teleology as 
we survey certain ontotheological and teleological moves made by Leibniz, 
Spinoza and the early Kant. Deleuze can be seen as actualising a hidden potential 
concealed in the meeting ground of these rationalist philosophies. 
2 The Rationalist Background: Leibniz and Spinoza on God and 
Reality 
The very title of Kant's Physical Monadology suggests a tension that will 
reverberate through Kant's attempts to build a new philosophy. Kant's attempt to 
physicalise Leibniz's immaterial monads arises out of dissatisfaction with what 
was seen amongst scientifically oriented Wolffians as an unacceptable conclusion 
of Leibniz's rationalism: that substances could not interact. Kant breaks from 
Leibniz in three important ways. 
Firstly, we have seen that the conjunction of theories of causality in the 
18th century can be seen as a fundamental condition for Kant's theory of the 
synthetic apriori. In his (so-called) pre-critical writings, Kant attempts to find a 
reconciliation between the theory of physical influx and harmony theory. As we 
will see, he rejects the notion that there must be a transmission of properties in 
causality, but states that substances can interact as forces under general principles 
of succession and coexistence that find their final ground in God. 
28 The abiding feature that Deleuze takes from Nietzsche turns out to be the notion of eternal 
return. It is this latter "end of all things" or end of time that orders all of the lesser ends that 
became problematic in Kant. Far from embracing a relathisation of ends. the eternal return for 
Deleuze is precisely the notion that allows the subject to s£ry the sense of. or to express Being 
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Secondly, Kant's moves concerning change in the physical world imply a 
renovation of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. Kant's insistence riaht 
, b 
from his earliest philosophical writings, that the principle of sufficient reason was 
a fundamentally different kind of principle to the logical principle of identity, and 
involves a fundamentally different form of differentiation, is in my opinion one of 
the main motors of what will become the critical philosophy. In this respect, I 
think that it is misleading to insist on bracketing off Kant's early writings as pre-
critical. I would argue that in fact Kant's critical philosophy cannot be fully 
understood without bearing in mind his early work on the principle of sufficient 
reason.
29 
Thirdly, Kant's investigation into the nature and limits of the principle of 
sufficient reason as an extralogical 'real' principle in Leibnizian philosophy 
intersects with and is crucially constrained by ontotheological issues. I will 
suggest that Kant's work on sufficient reason is mediated through his important 
development of a Leibnizian modal version of the ontological proof for the 
existence of God, which retains a problematic presence throughout Kant's works. 
However, to understand the value of Kant's argument it will be necessary first to 
explore some difficulties in the rationalist ontotheological background. I will 
demonstrate shortly that Leibniz's version of the modal proof was first developed 
itself. For Deleuze, as for Hegel, immanence finds its temporal expression only in a form of 
eternity. 
29 There is evidence that Kant himself did not see the break of 1781 as absolute. Firstly, many 
Rejlexionen from the period leading up to the publication of the Critique shm\' Kant to be 
thoroughly engaged with problems of rationalist metaphysics: some of these will be discussed later 
on. Moreover, as well as his discussions of metaphysics in his lectures, some of his letters from the 
first 'critical' years show that he understood his ,york as continuous with his pre\ious \\ritings. 
When Kant reported to Marcus Herz on May 1. 1781 that he had now finished the Critique, he said 
that "tlns book contains the result of all the varied investigations, which start from the concepts we 
debated together under the heading 'the sensible and intelligible world''', a reference to the full 
title of the Inaugural Dissertation, "Concerning the Form and Principles of the Sensible and 
Intelligible World' (C 179. Ak. 10:266). On August 26, 1783, responding to 10hann Schultz's 
questions about the Critique, Kant directed him back to the Inaugural Dissertation where he says 
Schultz ""may find a clearer prospect here where I have only been able to make out something 
hovering vaguely before me, obscured by fog, as it were" (C 208. Ak. 10:352). Of course the very 
notion that one may perceiw something more clearly when it is in itself more obscure (less 
distinct) is itself thoroughly Leibnizian. Even in 1797 in a letter to Tieftrunk Kant affirms the 
place of the Inaugural Dissertation in his corpus, although he tries to discourage his correspondent 
from initiating the republication of an~thing earlier than that (C 528; Ale. 12:208). Cf. also Kanfs 
letter to 10ha1111 Bernouilli of November 16, 1781. where he repeats the idea. made eleven years 
before in his famous letter to Herz, that the single issue that propelled him away from the ideas of 
the Dissertation was '"the problem of the source o/the intellectual elements in our cognition" (C 
186. Ak. 10:278). That t11is problem is crucial for the critical philosophy in general is not in doubt. 
as I will reinforce over this chapter and the ne~l. It should however. be localised in the shifting 
conte~l of Kant' s ,iews. 
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in close collaboration with Spinoza, and Leibniz's retraction of crucial Spinozist 
elements continues to play a role in Kant's treatment. As well as wishing to 
present historical suggestions about the importance of this ontotheological 
argument, I will attempt to present the structure at work behind this argument for 
the existence of God in a strong form, in order to provide a distinctive 
philosophical contrast to Kant's later critical developments. It will become clear 
that there is another dimension to this treatment, as Deleuze returns to this modal 
proof in Leibniz and Spinoza, in order to pursue "the positing of Being identical 
to difference".3o Hence the assessment of its validity in general, and in particular 
in relation to Kant's later writings, promises to provide an interesting viewpoint 
on the relation of metaphysics and critique that extends into the present day. I will 
claim that Deleuze returns to this proof for good reasons and that Kant 0 s reasons 
for turning away from it are flawed. Deleuze' s own synthesis of Leibniz and Kant 
revolves around the redevelopment of this suppressed ontotheological dimension 
in Kant. 
The Limits of LogiC in Leibniz 
Leibniz was led to the notion of pre-established harmony by a cluster of motives. 
Firstly, the paradox of the interaction of bodies and minds had been a particularly 
vexed issue since Descartes's wranglings with the pineal gland. However, given 
the problems with the notion of physical influx, mind-body interaction can be 
seen as part of a more general problem of substance-substance interaction.31 For 
Leibniz, the problem was exacerbated by the notion that physical interaction 
would seem to be impossible between two bodies due to their actually infinite 
divisibility. 
Due to these problems with physical interaction, Leibniz, unlike 
Descartes, could not move from the apriority of mathematics, logic and geometry 
to their physical instantiation in mechanistic principles. How then could he set 
about applying these apriori truths to the actual world? With Leibniz a problem 
that was to haunt Kant assumes its elemental form: what is the relation between 
30 Deleuze. Reyiew of Hyppolite. 195. 
31 Cf. .-1 Yell'Sllstem ofXature: "[I]t is not possible for the soul or any other true substance to 
receive something from without". Philosophical Essays (ed R. Ariew & D. Garber. Indianapolis: 
Hackett. 1989) 143. 
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logic and nonlogic, between logic and reality? What is the precise way to draw 
the limitations of logic? As we will see later, what 'logic' denotes can more 
generally be said to be anything that is apriori available to the mind, and implies 
no decisions about what there really is. 32 This problem occupies the early Kant 
and even persists through CPR; Leibniz' s attempt to draw the distinction will be 
determining for Kant. 
For Leibniz, there is one principle that is fundamental for rational thought 
in general: the principle of identity, or noncontradiction. Through logical analysis 
we can discover the truth about some concept by simply following the law of 
contradiction. The principle has significance for metaphysics: all entities and their 
relations, both ideal and real, have to be possible, that is, not self-contradictory; 
even God himself is subject to this rule. Leibniz is not prepared to allot this 
principle a merely formal validity, as Kant was to do. Nevertheless, Leibniz 
recognises that most analytic truths have to be merely conditional truths, 
dependent on the validity of the definitions involved. We operate with merely 
nominal definitions of things, while only hoping to generate real definitions. A 
real definition must demonstrate the possibility of something. 33 
There are indeed certain truths that are true by definition and are not 
merely conditionally true. Firstly, there are logical axioms that derive from the 
principle of noncontradiction. But are there other kinds of truths that are 
nonlogical but metaphysical or real, yet which are nonetheless self-evident? 
Leibniz is strict in ruling out as self-evident certain notions that have been taken 
as such by previous philosophers; for instance, he denies the self-evidence of 
Descartes' cogitO. 34 
Leibniz saw that 'real' or physical truths were different in kind to logical 
truths: "in order to proceed from mathematics to natural philosophy, another 
32 At lengtlt I will argue that this distinction is more fundamental for Kant than the distinction 
between subjectivity and objectivity. I suggest in chapter -+ that the shift to the latter distinction 
happens almost imperceptibly with Fichte. But it v,ill be worth holding onto the fonner distinction 
for reasons that "ill become clear. 
33 'Of Universal S'l1thesis and Anah'sis'. Philosophical Trritings (00. G.H.R Parkinson. London: 
Eyeryman. 1973). ·12f. To avoid cotrlusion it should be noted that real definitions. although they 
dem~nstrate the possibility of something, do not have any direct relation "ith 'rear - that is. 
physical or material - truths in the sense I "ill be using the tenn. In the Discourse on jfetaph:vsics. 
Leibniz di,ides real definitions into two kinds: one is causal and describes a method for generating 
the thing, while the other involves finding the primitive notions in a thing through analysis: cf. 
Ariew & Garber. 56-7. 
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principle is required ... I mean the principle of sufficient reason".35 Truths which 
have no purely internal necessity and thus involve some degree of contingency, 
nevertheless require a sufficient reason for their existence and nature. Now 
although for Leibniz the principle of sufficient reason is formally equivalent to the 
law of ground and consequent, the notion of 'sufficiency' is by no means identical 
with causal grounds. Given the problems mentioned concerning causality, Leibniz 
could not simply claim that the principle of sufficient reason causally instantiates 
logical relations in the actual world. To do so would be to equate ratio with causa 
in a way that would beg the question. As we will see, the principle of sufficient 
reason will in tum be grounded through another principle, which is expressed 
through the notion of pre-established harmony: the principle oj the best. The 
distribution of substances in the world will be based on their possible 
compatibility with each other; everything will have its reason because we live in 
the best of all possible worlds. Hence the apparent interaction of substances is 
rather their mutual harmonic functioning. 
However, this notion of 'reality', although crucial to understanding how 
the move is made out of mere analysis,36 is in certain aspects opaque. Leibniz had 
insisted on keeping the principles of identity and sufficient reason separate; 'all 
analytic propositions are true' did not entail that 'all true propositions are analytic' 
because most true propositions are contingent and concern 'reality'. But he cannot 
simply appeal to some brute fact or apprehension of physical reality and derive its 
principle from there. Surely Leibniz, who (as Kant said) 'intellectualised 
appearances', can appeal less than any other philosopher to a pre-given distinction 
between logic and reality. Even if Kant was wrong about this 'intellectualisation' 
in Leibniz, surely the latter still needs some internal, metaphysical account of the 
relation of logical and real truths? 
34 For a discussion of this Leibnizian (and ultimately Deleuzian) attitude to the cogi to, see chapter 
5 below. 
35 2nd letter to Clarke. Ariew & Garber. 321. 
36 When Leibniz opposes synthesis to analysis, he merely differentiates them by their order 
(progressive and regressh-e reasoning: cf 'Universal Synthesis and Analysis', 16). Hmvever he 
does allow that "it is better to produce a synthesis, since that work is of permanent value". But if 
synthesis were merely the inverse of analysis there would be no more pennanence in the one than 
i~ the other. Clearly' Leibniz does want to associate synthesis "ith real definition. but the latter 
only concerns logi~ possibility. AgaiIL Kant' s problem \\ill be to tease out in precisely which 
wa~ synthesis and 'reality' are related. 
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Now, there is one metaphysical truth that is necessary and for which it is 
possible to provide a real definition, but which must also be real, and that is the 
existence of God. The status of this truth in relation to the principle of sufficient 
reason is crucially important, but quite problematic. For, on the one hand, Leibniz 
claims that the ontological proof for existence of God grounds the principle of 
sufficient reason, but, on the other hand, certain aspects of his arguments for 
God's existence depend in turn on that principle.37 
So it will be necessary to isolate the kernel of the ontological argument in 
order to evaluate the validity of the principle of sufficient reason. It will tum out 
that Leibniz's tum to an ontological and teleological view of sufficient reason can 
be seen as a result of his turning away at a crucial moment from Spinoza's 
ontological proof. This topic will prove to be key in the parallel evaluation of 
Kant's move away from Leibniz. 
II God, Perfection and Reality in Leibniz 
The ontological argument is usually presented as follows: 1. God is by definition 
an absolutely perfect being. 2. Existence is a perfection. 3. Therefore, God exists. 
In Leibniz, some of these terms gain quite specific definitions, in particular the 
two key terms, perfection and existence. Now, while the concept of perfection is 
often taken as a merely archaic element in the ontological proof, the use of the 
concept of existence is usually seen to be the important element at work in the 
proof, on which hangs its success or failure. However, a closer examination of 
Leibniz's and Spinoza's actual proofs shows that the reverse of this picture holds. 
In the Monadology the notion of perfection is defined by Leibniz as 
"nothing but the quantity of positive reality taken strictly, when we put aside the 
limits or bounds in the things which are limited",38 while in 1677 he states that 
"perfection is degree or quantity of reality or essence".39 While both definitions 
equate perfection with "reality", the first specifies that reality is to be conceived 
here as positive, that is, unlimited or without negation. This notion of perfection is 
37 His cosmological and teleological proofs certainly depend on it: cf. Alonadologv # 32-9, Ariew 
& Garber. 217-18; the question is whether the ontological proof also does. 
38 Monadologv # 41. 
39 Letter to Arnold Eckard, Summer 1677. (in Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. L. Loemker. 
Dordrecht: D. ReideL 1969. 177. Cf: '"By a perfection I mean every simple quality which is 
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also affirmed by Spinoza, who says "by reality and perfection I understand the 
same thing" (E2D6). Thus, the first premise of the ontological argument for 
Leibniz concerns a being that is comprised, as absolute, of all unlimited reality. It 
is not yet stated how reality is to be internally conceived, for instance, whether it 
is plural or monistic: it could well be plural, as all that is required is that the 
realities in question would not in any way limit each other. 
One of Kant's first innovations is his argument against the ontological 
proof; his criticism first appears in 1763 in The Only Possible Argument in 
Support of a Demonstration for the Existence of God and remains in essence 
unchanged in its later formulation in CPR (TP 117f, Ale 2:72; CPR 
A6001B628f). Kant argues that the ontological proof fails because existence is 
not a perfection, that is a real predicate. Now, it should be noted straightaway that 
in the argument above, perfection is not simply equivalent with 'real predicate'; 
the reality concerned is ontologically quite specific, being unlimited. However, 
his criticism remains relevant as it concerns the special status of existence itself. 
The concept of existence remains external to any definition of a thing, whether 
unlimited or limited, as that thing remains the same in definition (or in its 
predicates) whether existence is attributed to it or not.40 For Kant concepts merely 
concern possible things; a concept tells us nothing of its instantiation. Concepts 
are collective unities of predicates which are only contingently related to things 
(TP 118, Ak. 2: 72-3). From the fact that the concept of something tells nothing of 
its existence, Kant infers that existence is not a predicate like any other. The 'is' 
of predication should be separated from the 'is' of existence, which Kant calls 
'positing' . 
However, if we turn to a text ofLeibniz's from c. 1677, we find that he is 
already fully aware of such a potential objection to predicating existence of God: 
"if existence were anything other than what is demanded by essence (essentiae 
exigentia), it would follow that it itself would have a certain essence, or would 
positive and absolute or which expresses whatever it expresses ,,\'ithout any limits". 'That a Most 
Perfect Being Exists'. Loemker, 167. 
40 In The On/v Possible .-1rgument, Kant suggests that a real definition can be found in the case of 
the eponymo~ argument (cf. TP 126: Ak. 2:81, TP 135, Ak. 2:91). But in CPR Kant suggests that 
real definitions are impossible, because they must depend on merely nominal. conditionally 
analytic definitions of the intension of a concept (cf. A727f.1755f). We ",ill return to Kanfs proof 
for the existence of God later in this chapter. 
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add something new to things". 41 So what is the true nature of Leibniz' s argument 
concerning existence? 
In the text in question, his argument does not look promising. He claims 
that "unless in the very nature of essence there were some inclination to exist 
nothing would exist", and more oddly, that "everything possible demands that it 
should exist" (ibid). However, there is something deeper going on in the text, 
which is suggested by the introduction of the concept of possibility in the second 
proposition. But it should first be noted that Leibniz at least eludes for the 
moment Kant's claim that the ontological argument treats existence as simply 
another perfection to be added to the other perfections in God. Rather, the notion 
that existence is a perfection seems to mean here that existence is included in the 
concept of perfection itself. If ''perfection is ... quantity of essence", existence is 
"essentiae exigentid', a demand of the essence. 42 Thus the focus of the argument 
shifts back to the notion of perfection, and Kant's choice to interpret perfections 
as 'real predicates' now becomes relevant. 
Now, the first premise essentially names God as the collection of all 
unlimited, positive realities. Whatever is the sum of all perfections is to be called 
God. But now Leibniz is claiming that realities or essences, of their nature, 
incline, or tend towards, existence. This is peculiar as it seems almost to state that 
existence is equivalent to essence, that essence essentially exists. But what can 
this 'almost' be? To answer this we have to tum to an argument that Leibniz 
thought was essential to the success of the ontological argument. Famously, 
Leibniz declares that the ontological argument 
is not fallacious, but it is an incomplete demonstration which assumes something 
which should also be proved in order to render the argument mathematically 
evident. The point is that it is tacitly assumed that this idea of a wholly great or 
wholly perfect being is possible and does not imply a contradiction. Even that 
remark enables us to prove something, namely that lfGod is possible he exists - a 
privilege which only the Divinity possesses. 43 
How does Leibniz prove the possibility of the concept of God? The answer is 
surprising, for it shows that this proof, which is usually presented as if it were a 
41 G. VII. 194. cited in the 'Ex1.racts from Leibniz' in B. Russell, The Philosophy oJLeibniz, 296. 
4~ In an early tex1, Leibniz equates existence "ith indi,iduatioIL perfection is equivalent to 
individuated being. Cf. L.B. McCullougll 'Leibniz's Principle of Indi,iduation in his Disputatio 
lIletaphysica de principia individui of 1663' (in K. Barber & 1. Gracia eds. Individuation and 
Identity in Ear~v Alodern Europe. Albany: SUNY. 199~). 202-11. 
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preliminary argument to the ontological proof, is actually part of it. Leibniz' s 
main argument turns out to be an extension of the first premise of the ontological 
proof, and concerns the explication of the notion of unlimited quantities of reality. 
He argues: if a perfection is a simple, positive property, then any plurality of 
perfections are compatible amongst themselves, as they involve no negation. As 
they coexist perfectly consistently with each other, the notion of absolute 
perfection is therefore possible. 44 
Now, this argument is usually referred to as the 'modal proof, but what 
exactly is the role of modality here? Does modality simply refer to the fact that 
the proof shows the logical possibility of God, or to the fact that some form of 
modality - of possibility or necessity is intrinsic to the proof itself? We have seen 
that Leibniz suggests that "everything possible demands that it should exist", but 
in the argument as presented there is as yet no use of the notion of possibility. The 
set of unlimited, perfect realities are simply presented as compatible because of 
their internal unlimitedness. Leibniz does not yet refer to 'all possible 
perfections', nor does the notion that the perfections are compatible yet refer to 
possibility. 
In fact, the issue of modality at this point in Leibniz's argument is very 
thorny, and its solution involves locating the precise point of encounter between 
Leibniz and Spinoza. This encounter can even be historically located, to the day. 
For on his visit to the Hague in 1676, Leibniz presented Spinoza with a version of 
his 'modal proof' for God,45 which on the following day, he altered in crucial 
respects by explicitly bringing out its modal character. What must have happened 
on that fateful night, after his conversation with Spinoza? I will speculate that 
although initially Leibniz presented Spinoza with a proof that was completely in 
line with the latter's thinking,46 and perhaps even improved upon it, Leibniz's 
reservations on the following day mark a crucial moment in the history of 
rationalisIl\ which will have repercussions on the genesis of Kantianism. But first 
43 Sew Essen's on the Human Understanding, (ed P. Remnant & 1. Bennett, Cambridge: 
Cambridge U;Uversity Press, 1996).438: cf. Discourse on Aletaphysics, Ariew & Garber, 137. 
~~ For a formal presentation of the proof. see David Blumenfeld 'Leibniz's ontological and 
cosmological arguments', in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, ed N. Jolley, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) 358f. 
-15 'That a Most Perfect Being Exists', Loemker, 167. 
46 Leibniz remarks that "1 showed this reasoning to Mr. Spinoza when I was in the Hague. He 
thought it sound for when he contradicted it at first, I put it in writing and gave him the paper". 
Loemker. 168. 
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we should present Spinoza's ontological proof, in order to see why Leibniz may 
have retreated from it. 
III God, Perfection and Reality in Spinoza 
The first few propositions of the Ethics involve nominal definitions of substance 
and attribute (D3 and D4), and they are largely accepted from tradition, although 
substance is given a particularly stringent definition. These first propositions aim 
to demonstrate that substances having different attributes must have nothing in 
common with each other, because a substance by definition is conceived through 
itself Now, an attribute is our way of distinguishing a substance from another. 
Each substance must be conceived as having a primary attribute, without which it 
would simply be another substance, or nothing at all. Each attribute allows us to 
perceive its substance according to its particular essence. 47 If an attribute is 
"conceived through itself and in itself', then it is not referred to anything else - it 
is "infinite in its own kind".48 
When we differentiate things, when we make a distinction between 
things, the distinction must either be based upon an attribute or a mode of the 
substance. But a substantial distinction, a distinction that concerns substances 
themselves, cannot be modal, because then we would be distinguishing a 
substance by its modes, and substance is prior in nature to its modes (ElPl). 
Therefore it must be distinguished by attributes. Spinoza concludes that there 
cannot be two substances sharing the same nature. It follows that no substance can 
produce another, because a cause must share something in common with its effect, 
and no two substances share the same attribute. 49 
4" Thus we perceive ex1ended things through the attribute of EX1ension. These ex1ended things are 
modes or affections of that substance; they are dependent on the attribute for their fonn. Thus 
particular thoughts too are modes of the substance conceived under the attribute of Thought. 
48 If we think at this stage in a Cartesian manner. as we are partly being invited to do, then we can 
think of thought and ex1ension as two substances 'which have nothing in common with each other. 
They therefore are not conceived as limiting one another. because ex1ension can only be limited by 
ex1ension. and thought only by thought. But the specificity of the attributes is not essential for the 
Psurpose of Spinoza 's argument in Part One of the Ethics. 
9 Given the title of this chapter. 'Concerning God'. it seems at first bewildering why Spinoza 
should make these hair-splitting constructions the subject of his first six propositions. But 
important work has been done here, without which the eleventh proposition. that "God.. or a 
substance consisting of infinite attributes. each of which ex-presses eterna1 and infinite essence. 
necessarily exists" would not have its peculiar Spinozist force. So what has happened here') 
Firstly. Spinoza has ruled out the notion of an eminent God.. or a God that contains its substances 
only eminently. Each substance must have nothing in common with any other substance. There 
- . 
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The product of these initial arguments is the bare notion of a plurality of 
substances of one attribute each, each of which has nothing to do with the other. 
What it is essential to see is that it would be incoherent to introduce a unifying 
substance 'behind' all of these attributes. Each attribute remains just that - a 
distributive 'each', and it is impossible to attribute sense to a collective totality -
an 'all' - of attributes at this point. Spinoza will argue shortly that there are 
infinite attributes, ie. an absolute infinity comprising infinite attributes each 
infinite in its kind. But for the moment we have a pure disparity of attributes. As 
Deleuze points out at length, the product of these arguments is the construction of 
a rigorous use of the real distinction in metaphysics at the exclusion of the 
numerical distinction. A numerical distinction between attributes would be modal , 
or finite - it would presuppose a division between substances that share 
something in common. And what would be in common would presumably be 
some kind of eminent substance. Hence the notion of substance can only properly 
be articulated through pure real distinction. 50 
I give now the second step of Spinoza's proof according to the 
interpretation given by Deleuze, which is closely related to those of Edwin Curley 
and Martial Gueroult. 51 As we have seen, the first step of the real definition of 
can be no God that unifies its attributes or substances through a principle "hich lies beyond the 
properties of those attributes. Since an attribute is the primary characteristic of a substance. this 
would be an essentially irrational position. Descartes' conception of substance in the Principles of 
Philosophy is one target amongst others here: he maintained that God was an uncreated substance 
responsible for producing what he called 'created substances', ie. human souls and the physical 
world they inhabit (Principles of Philosophy, 1.51-52). Spinoza ridicules the notion of created 
substance (EIP8S2). For Spinoza theology is the scientia dei, the knowledge of God, and should 
remain science, and it pays neither God nor us any respect to attribute to God unknowable or even 
irrational qualities, such as the power to create other substances, or free will, which Spinoza 
dismisses as a fiction. 
50 Again, Spinoza' s target here is Descartes, who conceived of real distinction as invoh ing 
numerical distinction. Thus there were a plurality of substances sharing the same attribute - souls 
- which were vet conceh'ed as reallv distinct - ie thev were classed as substances. But for Spinoza 
-' .. ' ..-
this is to make nonsense of a good concept. 
5! I here give what I think is the strongest interpretation of Spinoza' s proof, which originates in 
Martial Gueroult's close reading of Spinoza's arguments about substance in Spinoza, Vol. 1: Dieu: 
Ethique 1 (Paris: Aubier, 1968). Deleuze wrote a long review of this work when it appeared. 
('Spinoza et la methode generale de M. Gueroult'. Revue de A1etaphysique et .\10rale 74:4. 1969), 
and although his o\\n Spinoza and the Problem of Expression appeared in the same year, it is 
probable that Deleuze had benefitted from Gueroult's teaching. Gueroult's and Deleuze's accounts 
of substance provide a quantum leap fonvard from more traditional accounts which read substance 
as a logical subject. However, another similar version of the proof should also be mentioned 
Pierre Macherey argues for a proof based on a genetic or real definition in the causal sense. which 
is held to ex-press God's efficient cause (see footnote 33 above). God if he is causa sui. is 
conceived as having an internal cause. And as \ve ha\'e seen. God has been genetically detennined 
as a being consisting of an infinity of attributes. of which each one ex-presses an eternal and 
infinite essence (D6). This causal proof has the advantage of helping us to reconceive the status of 
85 
God involves the construction of a plurality of substances with one attribute each. 
If a numerical distinction can never be real, so, says Deleuze, can a real 
distinction never be numerical. The attributes are conceived through themselves. 
as infinitely self-determined. If each attribute is unlimited (or infinite) then it is 
really distinct; it expresses its own affirmative essence, it is not in a negative 
relation with anything other. But we said that this implied that it cannot be 
produced. But this, for Spinoza, is enough to prove its existence, as he states in an 
argument that uses the concept of perfection in an identical manner to Leibniz: 
Whatever perfection substance has is not owed to any external cause. So its 
existence must follow from its nature alone; hence existence is nothing but its 
essence. Perfection, therefore, does not take away the existence of a thing, but on 
the contrary asserts it. (EIPll). 
Elsewhere Spinoza states that "when the definition [of an uncreated being] has 
been given, there must be no room for the question 'Does it exist?",52 The thought 
of the nonexistence, or negation, of these perfections is secondary to their 
internally necessary existence, as negation must involve limitation. Negating is 
ontologically dependent on positing. 53 An Hegelian objection to this can arise, to 
the effect that positing too is not possible without negation, as the positing of 
something as something entails its negative relation to other things, for it would 
not be possible to identify it without such a relation. But the thought of really 
distinct attributes is consistent without yet requiring any identification of what 
they are;54 and if this is so, then the positivity of the attributes, as infinite in their 
own kind, can, and indeed must be thought without negation. 55 
the relation of substance to attribute and mode not as a property relation but causa1. But one 
wonders whether the status of the attributes as really distinct is compromised by attributing them 
the status of collective cause. This model does give us an immediate genesis of God, but at the 
price of stretching the notion of cause. The notion of causa sui, eyen if conceived as immanent. 
reintroduces eminence in that God, as infinity of attributes, is somehow caused b.-v himself See 
Machere\', 'The Problem of the Attributes' (in W. Montag & T. Stolze eds., The Ne1f Spinoza 
(MinneaPolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 77, and compare Spinoza' s Epistle 60. and 
the alternative demonstration to EIPll. 
52 Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (ed. Parkinson, London: Everyman, 1993),254. 
53 In Bergsonism. Deleuze refers to Bergson's argument that although it would appear that the 
thought of the nothingness of the world has priority over its existence, in that nothingness must 
have come before existence, this is a kind of 'transcendental illusion'. as the thought of 
nothingness requires 'more' than the thought of being: it requires positing, plus the negation of 
that positing: Bergsonism, 46-7. Deleuze does not make clear whether he thinks this argument is 
adequate against Hegel. 
5~ The demonstration of God in Spinoza does not in fact rely on any identification of what the 
attributes are. 
55 Fuller evaluation of the comparison of non-negative difference "ith dialectical difference must 
be left until chapters 4 & 6. 
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Now, as Curley puts it, "if each attribute exists III this way, then its 
existence is necessary. But if the existence of each of the attributes is necessary. 
then it is not possible that one of them should exist without the others·,.56 The \-el\ 
independence of the attributes implies that each of the others exists_ However. 
there is a further twist in this explanation of Spinoza's proof, which is particularly 
evident in Deleuze's reading. For in seeking to characterise the coexistence of the 
attributes, Deleuze in fact presents Leibniz's version of the proof, silently 
implying that Leibniz has presented a stronger version of the Spinozist proof: 
it is [the] very disparity [of the attributes] that assures their compatibility (the 
impossibility of their contradiction) ... In the attributes we reach prime and 
substantial elements, irreducible notions of unique substance. There appears the 
idea of a logical constitution of substance, a "composition" in which there is 
nothing physical. The irreducibility of the attributes not only proves, but 
constitutes the nonimpossibility of God as unique substance with all attributes.~~ 
Hence, the real distinction of attributes cannot be conceived as being a plurality of 
attributes belonging to one substance, in the sense that an eminent substance 
would have these attributes. It is rather that the real distinction of attributes, as 
infinite in kind, are affirmed as such of the same substance, which is now taken as 
absolutely infinite. 58 The attributes are univocally affirmed - each attribute has the 
same status; it is not secondary to a higher genus, and it is their univocal 
affirmation which constitutes their status as substance. 59 We are now a long way 
56 Edwin Curley, Beyond the Geometrical Jfelhod (New Jersev: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
... .. ... "" 
30. 
57 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 78-9. 
58 Up until this point Spinoza has been working with substances of one attribute - each substance 
has been distinguished by its primary attribute. in default of it being distinguished by an~thing 
else. But the supposition that a substance is only distinct through its attributes bears \\ith it an 
interesting ambiguity - for it means that the attributes must also have the character of substance. 
that is. they must be "conceived through themselves". So now Spinoza appears to make a purely 
conceptual distinction between substance and the attributes (attributes after all must be attributes 
of something). By appealing to this conceptual distinctio~ Spinoza claims that there is in fact onl~ 
one substance containing these ,·ery attributes. And if this is to be conceived as a substance. then it 
must be unlimited., ie. infinite. So therefore, the attributes which are infinite in their m\11 kind must 
be folded up in an absolute infinity of a single substance, which is now given the name God_ TItis 
move can be perhaps made more comprehensible by referring to our awareness to the fact that we 
hm·e access to at least two attributes. thought and ex1ensio~ both of which seem to ex-press the 
same substance. So it is conceivable that two attributes belong to the same substance (although it 
is important to remember what has been achie,·ed so far - the necessity that these attributes do not 
divide substance). Secondly. we can think of a being \\ith infinite attributes. and this is what is 
often called God. 
59 Jonathan Bennett persists in positing a transattribute identity which is in turn ex-pressed by the 
attributes. Howeyer. this transattribute identity cannot be grasped by the intellect (Bennett .. --1 Study 
of Spinoza 's 'Ethics' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. # 34..2. 14. 1)_ As Curley 
rightly objects. this introduces a new eminence into Spinoza an inex-pressible eminent unity. 
which is what he trying to escape: E. Curley. Beyond the Geometrical.Hethod. 155n_25. 
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away from substance as hypokeimenon, or what Locke called the 'I know not 
what' that underlays a thing's properties. Spinozist substance must be conceived 
as concrete from the start: "When substance is absolutely infinite, when it has an 
infinity of attributes, then, and only then, are its attributes said to express its 
essence, for only then does substance express itself in its attributes".60 Each 
attribute is demonstrated to univocally express the same substance in its own 
way.61 By virtue of the modal proof we can conceive of each aspect of being as 
the immediate expression of God; we are beyond the notion that each attribute and 
mode is immanently caused 'by' God.62 According to Deleuze, "Spinoza seems to 
have gone further than any other along the path of this new logic: a logic of pure 
affirmation, of unlimited quality, and thus of the unconditioned totality that 
possesses all qualities; a logic, that is, of the absolute". 63 For Deleuze, two things 
have been secured at the same time: immanence and a radical theory of difference. 
In fact, he suggests, the one implies the other. Only the real distinction of the 
attributes, taken to infinity, dispels the need for an eminent unity, or spurious 
totality of the component qualities of the absolute. Therefore only this radical 
theory of distinction, a theory of differences without transcendent or eminent 
unity, can fulfil the requirement of immanence. 64 
60Expressionism in Philosophy, 20. Deleuze's presentation of Spinoza's proof as a genetic proof 
clearly implies an objection to Hegel's criticism that Spinoza's substance is a dead presupposition, 
without genesis. Macherey e)l.-plicitly presents his causal-genetic proof as a refutation of Hegel's 
view. The implications of this rehabilitation of Spinoza will become clear in later chapters. 
61 In tum each attribute is divided into modes, conceived by Deleuze as intensive degrees of a 
quality, or as powers or capabilities. But each mode expresses the substance of which it is a part 
immediate~y through the attributes. 
62 Macherey had argued that Gueroult is '\-"rong to suggest that Spinoza returns to "simple 
elements" in order to "reconstruct" substance in a genetic definition (in Leibniz's first sense of a 
real definition); 'The Problem of the Attributes', 85. Deleuze's version, however. mediates 
between Macherey's and Gueroult's (while undoubtedly also, along with Gueroult, secretly 
appealing to Leibniz), by gi'\-ing a modal sense to the genetic definition by which the simple 
elements compose substance; in so doing he avoids Macherey's turn to a causal definition in 
which the real distinction of the attributes is compromised, but stays faithful to the need for a 
genetic real definition. not an analytic one. 
63 Expressionism in Philosophy. 79. 
64 I think these remarks are enough to refute Alain Badiou' s ex1remely flawed reading of Deleuze 
in Deleuze: The Clamour of Being (trans. L. Burchill, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
2000). Badiou reads Deleuze's notion of the univocity of being as a "One-All". or ontological 
holism. which is exactly what Deleuze intends his notion of univocity to struggle against. 
Deleuze's main argume~ts for univocity are carried out in the first 100 pages of his book on 
Spinoza. but Badiou declines to comment at all on that book stating merely that "'his' Spinoza 
was (and still is) for me an unrecognisable creature" (1). Furthermore. Badiou seems oblivious to 
the dialectical problems that arise in Plato's account of the ·one-all'. and which inspire Hegel's 
dialectic. thus opening his account of Deleuze to basic Hegelian criticisms. 
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In the quotation above, Deleuze talks of the 'nonimpossibility' of God, 
which highlights again the question of modality. But is there really any internal 
reference yet to the notion of possibility in the proof? The modality at work here 
really involves necessary existence. Now, although Kant was to define necessity 
as a combination of possibility and existence, the Spinozist-Leibnizian ontological 
proof seems to be without reference to possibility. We can understand the notion 
of necessary existence at work here by referring to Charles Hartshorne's version 
of the 'modal proof for the existence of God, which he also equates with a second 
version of the ontological argument given by Anselm. 65 While the first proof fits 
the classical form mentioned above, the second exploits the fact that the necessary 
existence of God differs in relevance from the existence of contingent things. In 
the second proof, the existence of God is shown to be a very particular case 
among concepts, and it is shown to be absurd to say that the existence of God is a 
contingent matter. If God did not exist, God could not come into existence, 
because God's nature is to be infinite or unlimited. So if God did not exist, its 
existence would have to be impossible and not contingent. Similarly if it existed, 
it could not have come to be, and would therefore have to be necessary. Therefore 
God's existence is either necessary or impossible. But as we have demonstrated 
that its existence is nonimpossible, we conclude that it is necessary. 
The Spinozist-Leibnizian proof says that whatever is that is perfect, IS 
because nothing can stop it. If absolute infinity is referred to, this does not mean 
'all possible attributes/perfections', but simply whatever unlimited 
attributes/perfections there are. In Spinoza's version, and in Deleuze's reading, 
this is presented as a pure upsurge of difference; with no other reason for its 
existence than its own ontological power. The internal rationality or reason of 
Spinoza's absolute is identical to the immanent expression of the essential power 
of being. Our distinction between logic and reality thus collapses as reality 
follows with complete internal necessity from the very thought of God. 
However, it is surely just this conception of reason that caused Leibniz to 
change his mind on that night in 1676. For Spinoza presents a necessary reason 
for the existence of this internally differentiated reality. But to ask for a reason is 
65 Charles Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfoction (La Salle: Open Court 1%2), ch. 2. Cf. also C 
Hartshorne, 'The Necessarily Existent' and 'Nonnan Malcolm's Statement of Anselm's 
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also to ask why something exists and not something else: it is to ask for a 
sufficient reason. Spinoza shows that a perfection will exist because nothing can 
prevent it from existing. But the fact that such perfections can coexist, that they 
are compatible, is itself without explanation. An explanation would require that 
other realities do not exist with the same necessity, because they are not 
compatible with each other; that is, that they are prevented from existing, by some 
other thing. In the note from 2 December 1676, the day after the meeting, Leibniz 
writes: 
My principle, namely, is that whatever can exist and is compatible with other 
things does exist, because the reason for existing in preference to other possibles 
cannot be limited by any other consideration than that not all things are 
compatible. Thus there is no other reason for determining existences than that the 
more perfect shall exist, that is, those things which involve the greatest possible 
1· 66 rea lty. 
But to make this move is to introduce a modal, counterfactual dimension into the 
concept of God itself. For Leibniz now, perfections, considered by themselves, are 
'logical possibilities'. In a passage from 1677, the unlimited perfection that 
necessarily exists is precisely referred to as a "possible [that] demands that it 
should exist". In this latter passage, Leibniz now asks: 
Either all things exist, and then every possible so demands existence that it 
actually exists; or some things do not exist, and then a reason must be given why 
some things exist rather than others. But this cannot be given otherwise than from 
a general reason of essence or possibility, assuming that the possible demands 
existence in its own nature, and indeed in proportion to its possibility or 
according to the degree of its essence. 67 
This adds a sufficient reason to the real definition of God - that things exist or 
don't exist because of their incompatibility with others. The sufficient reason of 
existent reality lies in its 'proportion ofpossibility,:68 this would be the true ratio 
of things. Now the 'modal proof for the possibility of the existence of God 
becomes truly modal. The existence of the sum of all perfection is now dependent 
Ontological Arguments', 148-152. in A Plantinga ed., The OntolOgical Argument (London: 
Macmillan. 1968). 
66 'Two Notations for Discussion with Spinoza', 1676, Loemker, 169. 
67 Russell, The Philosophy of Leibniz. 296. 
68 "If we assume A, B, C. D to be equal as regards essence, ie. equally perfect or equally 
demanding existence, and if we assume that D is incompatible with A and with B, while A is 
compatible v,ith any except D. and similarly as regards B and C; it follows that the combination 
ABC. excluding D. ""ill exist: for if we ",ish D to exist it can only coexist "'ith C. and hence the 
combination CD "ill exist, which is more imperfect than the combination ABC'. It is more 
imperfect because "eveI}1bing possible demands that it should exist ... hence it follows that that 
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on the possibilities that allow it to exist as such. A 'third realm' is found to stop 
the two realms of logic and reality from collapsing into each other. 
Now, Leibniz seems to suggest that it is not possible that all things that are 
possible exist, because the actualisation of some possibilities will necessarily 
exclude each other. But what is the criterion for the first use of 'possible' here') 
Leibniz invents the new category of 'compossibility' to account for this new, real 
dimension to possibility. Compossibility is weaker than logical possibility: 
something is compossible only with something else, and is therefore contingent 
upon which other realities there are. In this way, contingency is introduced into 
the real definition of God. 
iv Reality and Sufficient Reason in Leibniz 
The move away from Spinoza has wide ramifications in Leibniz's philosophy, one 
of which is to produce a permanent ambiguity in his proof for God's existence. 
For instance, in the Monadology, Leibniz presents the classical form of the 
ontological argument (#40-41), then turns to another proof, which states that 
essences must have their basis in God, in order to complete the ontological proof. 
A look at the status of this proof from essences can highlight the problematic 
status of the notion of real possibility just introduced. 
If we take what is given to us by the principle of identity, that there is an 
absolute realm of possible truths, we can call these truths "eternal truths". Such 
truths concern the very possibility or not of something;69 they are truths of reason 
rather than truths of existence or fact,70 that is, ideal essences of which nothing is 
said about their 'reality' or instantiation. Leibniz also claims that these eternal 
truths "are consequences of [God's] understanding, which, assuredly, does not 
depend on his will"; 71 but this claim will be shown to be problematic in a moment. 
He then says 
it is also true that God is not only the source of existences, but also that of 
essences insofar as they are real, that is, or the source of what is real in possibility 
combination of things always exists by which the greatest possible number of things exists". 
Russell. ibid. 
69 Letter to Foucher. 1675. Ariew & Garber. 2. 
70 Cf. Letters to Arnauld. Ariew & Garber. 70. 
71 Discourse on .~1etaphysics. Ariew & Garber. 36. 
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... without him there would be nothing real in possibles, and not only would 
nothing exist, but also nothing would be possible. 72 -
The ideal essences, "insofar as they are real" must be grounded in God. 
God is the source of the real in possibility. He elaborates in the following 
paragraph: 
For if there is reality in essences or possibles, or indeed, in eternal truths, this 
reality must be grounded in something existent and actual, and consequently, it 
must be grounded in the existence of the necessary being, in whom essence 
involves existence, that is, in whom possible being is sufficient for actual being. 73 
In the next paragraph (#45), Leibniz concludes that "Thus God alone (or the 
necessary being) has this privilege, that he must exist if he is possible". He then 
recapitulates his modal proof from perfection. Now this argument introduces a 
circularity that has major consequences for Leibniz's theory. For he states that the 
real in possibility must be grounded in God, who necessarily exists. But the proof 
for his necessary existence is precisely that God is he "in whom possible being is 
sufficient for actual being". But we have seen that God is the sum of possible 
beings which exist because of their compatible reality, their compossibility. The 
only way out of this circle is to identify God tout court with the structure of real 
possibility. But this would introduce contingency into the heart of God. This 
contingency can be ordered according to the principle of sufficient reason 
(according to "the proportion of its possibility"), but how could Leibniz then 
avoid the thought that God is simply the ontological site of reality in which the 
calculus of real possibilities is played out? That, if God's internal possibility "is 
sufficient for actual being", it is because God is another name for the play of real 
possibility? And in fact doesn't Leibniz even raise this scenario in his image of 
the chess game in 'On the Ultimate Origination of Things'? 
As Deleuze says, Leibniz does indeed "discover a play in the creation of 
the world" (DR 51). It is at this point that we find Leibniz, having fled from 
Spinoza, in striking proximity to Nietzsche; for can't we simply say that the 
essentiae exigentia find their reason in the calculus of compossibilities as an 
expression simply of their own power? God does not play dice, but divinity is the 
affirmation of the dicethrow. However, Leibniz gives the impression that he 
discovers a way out of the labyrinth in which he has found himself For he returns 
72 Alonadology #43, Ariew & Garber, 218. 
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to his doctrine of ideal essences, and affirms that God's understanding is identical 
to them, thus splitting God across the two realms of logical and real possibility. In 
this way, Leibniz thinks he can fulfil the principle of sufficient reason - for the 
contingency of compossibles is now no longer simply referred to their own power 
or perfection, but to God's choice: their ratio is now a reflection of God's choice 
of the best of all possible worlds. The contingency of compossibles is related to 
God's freedom. 
But is Leibniz's 'way out' adequate to the rig ours of rationalist theology as 
we have so far seen it? The answer is not clear, and we should focus our attention 
on the philosophical structure that Leibniz leaves us with. There seems to be a 
chasm separating God's intellect and the reality of God. Is the notion of God's 
'will' enough to fill this chasm? If God is real possibility, then how can his will be 
separated from real possibility, simply because there exists a realm of intelligible 
truths (logical possibilities)? Leibniz himself seems to doubt the 
anthropomorphism of this solution. Indeed, when he explains what 'the best' or 
'most perfect' is, he simply states that it is "that combination of things ... by 
which the greatest possible number of things exists".74 We are returned to power, 
to Spinoza and Nietzsche, and to perfection in the Nietzschean sense: "perfection: 
that is the extraordinary expansion of the feeling of power".75 The source of the 
world's perfection is nothing other than the necessary process of its own 
becoming. 
There are then two problems that destabilise Leibniz's position: God 
threatens to tum into Spinozist reality, and the principle of the best is also put in 
doubt by the unstable dichotomy between God's intellect and God's reality. How 
is he to secure the distinction and the movement between logical and real 
possibility, which prevents him from sliding into Spinozism or monism? He 
introduces the possibility of sufficient reason into Spinozism by keeping hold of 
the distinction between logic and reality, which in tum requires a third. Reason 
finds sufficiency only in the calculus of compossibility, the set of real possibilities 
which play on a background of incompossible logical possibilities. 
73 A1onadology #4·t ibid. 
~4 Russell, 296. 
75 Trill to POl.fer # 801. Cf. Twilight of the Idols, ·The Four Great Errors'. 8. on the "innocence of 
becoming" . 
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It was mentioned above that in his first work, Leibniz equated existence 
with individuation.76 Perhaps here we have the suggestion of an answer to the 
question. In a new principle, Leibniz states that there can be no repetition of the 
identical: this is the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. It is important to see 
that this principle only has relevance to the realm of reality. In the logical realm, 
any identity between indiscernibles would produce no difference at all and so is 
not thinkable at all in the first place. Individuation is not relevant in the logical 
realm. But everything that really exists must be individuated, that is, be an 
individual substance or its accident. The principle of identity of indiscernibles 
expresses the difference between logical and real realms. Logically identical 
essences cannot be individualised in two or more substances, says Leibniz, 
without clashing with the principle of sufficient reason. 
However, why is it impossible that two identical things are individuated in 
reality? We cannot anymore appeal to God or teleology to explain this physical or 
real instantiation of the principle of sufficient reason. It must be down to some 
structure of reality itself for which we have not yet accounted. Seeking an escape 
from Spinozism, we must tum to space and time, the forms of real differentiation 
to ground the principle of individuation. Is this Leibniz's last hope? What happens 
if it fails? In the next chapter I return to this issue, and show that while Leibniz' s 
theory of space and time cannot succeed, Deleuze's philosophy in DR can best be 
explained by a return to this moment in Leibniz. But now it is time to return to 
Kant, and to show that his early philosophy too is constructed in the shadow of the 
problems we have just surveyed. 
76 Cf. the 1663 Disputatia metaphysica de principia individui: "we treat of something real and 
what is called a 'physical principle', which would serve as the foundation for the formal n~tion in 
the mind of 'individual', understood as individuation or nwnerical difference", quoted m L.B. 
McCullough. 'Leibniz's Principle of Indiyiduation', 203. Note that 'formal' here is used in its 
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3 Kant and the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
After Leibniz, Wolff attempted to derive the principle of sufficient reason from 
the principle of contradiction, to clear up Leibniz's tangled attempts to create a 
distinction between logic and reality.77 Insofar as pre-Kantian rationalists needed 
the principle of sufficient reason yet were involved in the science of their time, 
they were faced by two directions. If they made it a real or material principle, they 
had to succumb to the question of its teleological character, while if they made it a 
logical principle, they dissolved the need for teleology, but had to reaffirm once 
more an abstract, Cartesian God to explain the 'fit' between the logical and the 
real (and negotiate with Spinozism). This logicising move represents a retreat 
from the question of reality, and is the object of all Kant's criticisms of 
Leibnizianism. Kant's criticisms of Eberhard revolve around the latter's inability 
to realise the gravity of the move from logic to reality. 78 Strangely then, Kant's 
criticisms ofLeibnizianism in fact conceal a return to Leibniz's own problematic, 
away from his contemporary legacy. 
Kant saw that the principle of sufficient reason had to be a 'real' principle 
if it was to function independently of the principle of contradiction; the principle 
that 'everything must have its reason' was, in Kant's terms, synthetic. But Leibniz 
referred the ground of this principle to other synthetic or real principles that we 
have seen have their own deep internal problems. In the light of both Leibniz's 
entanglement and the Wolffian move, it is clear that Kant's rigid distinction 
between analytic and synthetic, when applied to fundamental metaphysical issues, 
might have the virtue of at least classifying the status of principles, the ultimate 
validity and status of which were very murky. Kant's strength at this early point in 
his career is to hold firm to the necessity for an extralogical principle, but not to 
avoid the question of its ultimate ground. 
In the previous chapter I claimed that there are three main phases in Kant's 
development. Now it is necessary to complicate this picture, for of all the stages, 
Scholastic sense. Leibniz is saying that a real kind of indhiduation must underly the 'fonnal' 
individuation we use in kno'wing things. 
77 See H. Allison. The Kant-Eberhard Controversy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University. 1974). 
20. 25f. for background on Wolff's position. 
~i< Cf. Allison. The l.:.ant-Eberhard Controversy. 51f. 
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the first is the most complex, and I suggest that it is itself divided into three 
stages: 
Stage Ia: From 1755-1768, Kant is occupied with the examination of the 
nature and implications of the principle of sufficient reason. 
Stage Ib: In 1768, Kant is forced (for more metaphysical reasons than is 
sometimes thought) to affirm the ideality of space. He attempts to incorporate this 
change within the rubric of the earlier theory in the 1770 Inaugural Dissertation. 
That this proves to be impossible results in a further radical move of splitting 
intellectual activity into noumenal and phenomenal domains. 
Stage Ie: The difficulties of this move are the cause of the 'silent decade' 
that culminates in the 1781 publication of CPR. 
This three phase movement is perhaps better described in terms of a 
continuous development that gets shattered in the middle by transcendental 
idealism. The move towards idealism is discontinuous: first space (1768), then 
time (1770) becomes ideal, finally, the understanding becomes first partially, then 
at last completely ideal (1770 onwards). 
In the first phase, beginning with the New Elucidation of the First 
Principles of Metaphysical Cognition, Kant claims that there are only two purely 
apriori principles, the principle of contradiction and the principle of sufficient 
reason. He renames the principle of sufficient reason the principle of determining 
ground, because, he says, "it is not immediately clear how much is sufficient" (TP 
13, Ak. 1:393).79 The notion of a Grund (reason or ground), according to Kant, is 
"that which establishes a connection and a conjunction (nexum et colligationem) 
between the subject and some predicate or other" (TP 11, Ak. 1 :392). He specifies 
that "a ground ... converts things which are indeterminate into things which are 
determinate" (ibid). He explains the strength of the criterion of determinacy in 
counterfactual terms: "it would be a ground such that, were it not posited, that 
which was determinate would not occur at all" (TP 13, Ak: 1:393). It follows that 
it must "posit in such a way that every opposite is excluded" (ibid). 
79 Kant subdivides his principle into antecedently and consequentially determining grounds. which 
correspond to ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi. Thus, as concerns the latter, "the eclipses of the 
satellites of Jupiter ... fumish the ground a/knOWing that light is propagated successively and with 
a specifiable velocity" (TP 12, Ak. 1:393). Such a ground does not give us the ground of being 
(ratio essendi) for the nature of light. It is thus the antecedently determining ground which has 
metaphysical importance, and which will be examined 
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Kant's early solution to the problem of the principle of sufficient reason 
has three main characteristics. Firstly, Kant has a formal concern. In his early 
works he is investigating the problem of in what sense 'real' physical 
determinations are formally different to logical ones. If the principle of sufficient 
reason cannot be derived from the principle of identity, which grounds logical 
forms, the former principle must have different formal laws. What Kant calls 
determination will no longer depend for its form simply on the forms of logical 
propositions. 
But how exactly does this differ from Leibniz? In Leibniz, the law of 
sufficient reason has the form of the law of ground and consequent. As Kant 
points out, what is sought is the determinate reason for the conjunction between 
subject and predicate, the reason for the connection. We saw that Leibniz relied 
on certain problematic metaphysical principles to specify the range and meaning 
of sufficiency. Kant will often address the situation functionally by simply saying 
that syntheSis requires a third. As Kant says in the Critique, ''where is the third 
thing that is always requisite for a synthetic proposition in order to connect with 
each other concepts that have no logical (analytical) affinity?" (CPR A259). 
Kant's answer as to what this tertium quid is will vary enormously, but the 
'triangular' structure of apriori cognition will remain constant. As we will see, in 
the early writings Kant seeks the third thing between God and world (cf. LM 15, 
Ak. 28:52), whereas later time (AI551B194) and experience in general 
(AI571B196) are said to be third things. One way to chart Kant's progress 
concerning the nature of the third thing is by first understanding this functional, 
abstract notion of the third, and from there, attempting to chart the variables that 
actualise this function. I shall be attempting to do this in general over the rest of 
the chapter. 
A second characteristic is scientific. Kant's leanings towards Newton were 
apparent since 1747 in his first published work, On the True Estimation of Living 
Forces. It is not possible to go into Kant's scientific theory here,80 but essentially 
we can say that Kant wants to harmonise the metaphysical and the physical 
dimensions in the notion of force. Against Leibniz, Kant wants both to affirm 
physical interaction, and also, with Newton, to shift the ground for the 
80 See Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge. Mass: Harvard University 
Press. 1992). ch. 1. 
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determination of forces to the whole field of forces. As we will see shortly, this 
provides the rudiments for a scientific theory that resolves the physical influx 
controversies. 
The last characteristic is ontotheologicaL Kant, like Leibniz, believes that 
the notion of reality is essentially bound up with God's existence, and he attempts 
to clear up Leibniz's problem with 'reality' in The Only Possible Argument. 
While Kant obviously takes this last ontotheological characteristic to be 
fundamental as regards the order of reasons, it is helpful to treat beforehand the 
previous two characteristics of 'reality', and its distinction from logic. 
Formal and Scientific Characteristics of the Difference between Logic and 
Reality 
In the New Elucidation, Kant's attempts to derive the real, synthetic principles of 
succession and coexistence from the principle of determining ground itself, really 
arise out of an original Kantian claim about the irreducibility of change to logic or 
pure ontology. 81 Kant argues that if we simply operate with a bare notion of 
substance in articulating the principle of sufficient reason, we are left with 
substances that have only internal relations. But, Kant says, "a simple substance, 
which is free from every external connection and which is thus abandoned to itself 
and left in isolation, is completely immutable in itself' (TP 37, Ak. 410). Thus 
against Wolff and Baumgarten, Kant argues that it is not enough to say "that a 
simple substance is subject to constant change in virtue of an inner principle of 
activity" (TP 38, Ak. 4: 11, my italic). Kant's argument here is formulated 
conditionally, and is analogous to a transcendental argument: "If the connection of 
substances were cancelled altogether, succession and time would likewise 
disappear" (ibid). We can take this as a regressive argument from the assumption 
of the connection of substances ("[S]uccession is apparent in the universe", ibid). 
Now from this negative argument that isolated substances are not sufficient for 
81 This distinction between logic and reality does not immediately appear as such in Kant's early 
work. In the New Elucidation, Kant appears to derive his principles of succession and coexistence 
from the mere principle of determining ground, because they specify the ontological principle that 
to determine anything, or to ask why it is at is. is equivalent to excluding evel)' opposite. Most of 
the work would seem to be being done by the definition of determination itself But in the Attempt 
to Introduce the Concept of Negative Jvfagnitudes into Philosophy (1763). Kant goes on to 
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change to occur, it follows that if "a change occurs it must be the case that it arises 
from an external connection" (TP 38, Ak. 1:411).82 This "external connection" 
shows that contingency is necessary for substances to be connected, whatever 
their own necessary properties. Kant also takes it that "the real existence of bodies 
... follows with the greatest clarity". 83 
Can reality then be defined III terms of change? Kant argues that 
Leibnizian substances by themselves cannot account for change. But we must 
proceed carefully here, for Kant's introduction of the necessity of external 
connection still respects the inner grounds of substances themselves. We cannot 
simply identify change with external connection. Kant's arguments on this point 
are best presented in the Metaphysik Herder of 1764. As we have seen, all 
relations between substances are contingent, or accidents (in the Scholastic sense). 
Now, Kant states that for a particular determination to occur, it is not enough to 
appeal to an efficiently determining force; the determined substance must also 
possess the capacity to be determined in such a way. ''For example, I hear music: 
that requires the external power of the music, and the distinct representation of the 
notes requires one's own power of hearing" (LM 15, Ak. 28:52). There must be 
both an outer ground and inner ground of any accident. Thus while any inner 
ground (the organs of the ear) requires an outer ground (music) to be effectuated, 
any external cause requires an inner ground. Now, crucially, Kant states that the 
explicitly argue for a preliminary distinction between the logical and real that would seem to have 
priority over the analysis of 'determination' in the earlier work 
82 Kant also provides another argument in the nex1 paragraph. A change involves something 
coming-to-be which previously was not, or becoming the opposite of what it was; but if isolated 
substances are the sole grounds involved, then these same grounds will determine both the first 
state and its opposite, which is absurd (ibid). 
83 Kant says that a much-needed proof against idealism follows from this: 
The soul is subject (in virtue of the inner sense) to inner changes. Since, as we have proved, these 
changes cannot arise from its nature considered in isolation and as disconnected from other things, 
it follows that there must be a number of things present outside the soul with which it stands in a 
reciprocal connection (1P 39, Ak. 2: 411-12) 
The changes that occur in the mind must be caused by something outside it. Paul Guyer suggests 
that this is an anticipation of the Refutation of Idealism in the second edition of the Critique (Kant 
and the Claims of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 12). There is truth 
in this, but what is implied in this early refutation of idealism is something more, based in the first 
instance on Kant's acceptance of the necessity for distinct principles for reality. Hence his 
refutation of idealism was first of all a refutation of a form of idealism that can follow from a 
logicist understanding of Leibniz' s monadism. His claim is that rationalist metaphysics requires 
real existence for determination to take place Cf. Jletaphysik Herder: "An egoist thinks that L who 
am thinking here, anI the only simple being. "ithout connection (nexu) to others. [An] idealist. that 
there is merely a spiritual world Origin of idealism. the truth that the body "ithout thoughts 
constitutes no world" (LM 5. Ak: 28:42). The fundamental thing an idealist denies is thus the 
nexus, the connection between substances. 
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last claim includes any causation initiated by God. "For if, eg., God could produce 
a thought in a soul merely by himself: then God, but not a soul, would have the 
thought: because there would be no connection between them" (ibid). It is clear 
who Kant is arguing against here, for Spinoza's Ethics precisely specifies that 
"the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God. Therefore when we say 
that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God ... 
has this or that idea" (E2P II C). Here begins the attempt to return anew to 
Leibniz's struggle to fend off Spinoza's all-consuming identification of God with 
reality. 
Indeed, this explanation of interaction can be seen as a development of the 
Leibnizian position that "creatures derive their perfections from God's influence 
[influx] but that they derive their imperfections from their own nature, which is 
incapable of being without limits".84 But the behaviour of finite substances is no 
longer simply a result of imperfection, and is explained by the properties of 
changing substances. Thus Kant seems to be emancipating himself from the 
intimacy of the reaVphysical and theological realms in Leibniz. But before 
evaluating whether this is true, it is necessary to elaborate more on the formal and 
physical dimensions of Kant's notion of reality. 
In the Negative Magnitudes essay, Kant makes a distinction preliminary to 
ontological and theological Issues, between logical analysis and real 
determination; firstly in its form, and secondly in its result. In a logical 
contradiction, one thing cancels another because their concepts are incompatible; 
furthermore, "the consequence of the logical contradiction is nothing at aIr' (TP 
211, Ale 2: 171). In a real opposition, the cancellation concerns the states of 
another quantity of reality, and "the consequence is something'. Take two forces 
of equal quantity acting upon each other - they are really opposed, but the result is 
rest, which is not nothing. However, Kant does not simply require there to be 
bodies in order for there to be real opposition. He also uses the examples of debt 
(TP 212, Ak. 2: 173) and pleasure (TP 219, Ak. 2: 180). Suppose somebody to owe 
and be owed identical sums of money; the two quantities cancel each other out, 
but this is no logical contradiction. 85 In these cases, the difference between logical 
84 .\Jonadologv #42. in Ariew & Garber. 218. 
85 Similarly. Kant says. one person may be affected by a certain amount of pleasure at the same 
time as the), are affli~ted by an equal amount of displeasure: the result again (he claims!) is zero. 
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and real opposition can be framed as follows: the former involves an affirmation 
itself being negated, while the latter involves two positivities or affirmations 
cancelling each other out. The result - zero - may look the same in each case, but 
we should in principle be aware that they should not be confused. 
Now, the form that the 'real world' takes for the early Kant is a physical 
monadology. In the work of that title, Kant argues that monads (ie. substances) are 
unextended, yet occupy space in the sense of having the capacity to fill space 
through emanations of their force (TP 55-59, Ak. 1:479-482). It also turns out that 
their impenetrability is not a result of brute matter, but of their repulsive force (TP 
61, Ak. 1:483). This leads to an important physical distinction between internal 
and external determinations, which augments the distinction mentioned earlier 
between inner and outer grounds: 
[I]f one divides space, one divides the extensive quantity of its presence. But, in 
addition to external presence, that is to say, in addition to the relational 
determinations of substance, there are other, internal determinations; if the latter 
did not exist, the former would have no subject in which to inhere. But the 
internal determinations are not in space, precisely because they are internal (TP 
58, Ak. 1:481). 
Hence there will be a different form of differentiation In the case of 
extensive quantities to that of internal determinations. In the Inaugural 
Dissertation Kant will say that "the presence of immaterial things in the corporeal 
world is a virtual not a local presence" (TP 410, Ak. 2:414; italics mine). Even 
later, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant will specify that 
physical relations that are "constructed in a way different from that of the 
extensive quantity of space" are to be called intensive. 86 
Thus the externality involved in the physical monadology is grounded not 
in material particles, but in the system of physical forces. This means that the 
monadic substance is only granted real unity through the emanation of its effects 
throughout the physical field. While the force can be attributed 'virtually' to the 
physical monad, its actual constitution rests on external reasons; it can only be 
determined in its changes through contingent relations. At this point we can start 
to see how all determinations must be referred to the state of the whole, as insisted 
by Newton. To explain the interaction of substances, Kant appeals to universal 
gravitation, and this will remain as the extralogical formal principle for the 
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reciprocal action (succession and coexistence) of his system right up to the 
Inaugural Dissertation. 87 Universal gravitation, as the sphere of nature, is the 
"phenomenal eternity of the general cause" (TP 405; Ale. 2:410). Any determinate 
relation between substances thus depends on the status of the '~or1d-whole". The 
intensive forces of the monad are determined only by its external relations to other 
monads, but these relations are collectively reciprocally determining. The 
principle of real, as opposed to logical, determination has its final ground in the 
whole. It is in this sense that real opposition is finally to be understood; negative 
and positive magnitudes show us the local determination of the state of play 
between real, positive forces. 88 
However, Kant does not see himself as relying on Newtonian science, but 
rather proving its metaphysical truth. If Kant is indeed presenting a new synthesis 
of physical influx and harmony theory, it is a precarious metaphysical balance. 
What are the metaphysical elements of Kant's theory? Firstly, in characterising 
the nature of the interaction between inner nature and external relation, Kant 
introduces a somewhat Spinozist element into this largely Leibnizian discussion. 
He argues that there is an affectivity involved in interacting substances: ''If a 
substance is active by its own power under an outer condition, then it suffers" 
(LM 16, Ale. 28:52). It is the capacity to suffer that holds off both pure efficient 
causality and absolute immersion in God, the two faces of monism. 
Kant now asks '~hat explains this connection? Since one's own power to 
suffer is always required, [physical] influence is impossible" (ibid). Kant argues 
that for any contingent relation between substances, "their existence depends on a 
third" (LM 14, Ak. 28: 51). This "third thing" is the empty function that represents 
the need for any synthesis to have an apriori principle. It can be neither God nor 
finite substances (LM 15, Ak. 28:51); it rather provides the ground 'between' 
these for the correspondence between the inner and outer ground. 89 Kant 
86 Aletaphysical Foundations of.l.Vatural &ience, in Kant, Philosophy of Alate rial Nature (Indiana: 
Hackett, 1985),36, Ak. ~:494. 
87 Cf. J.V Buroker, Space and incongruence (Dordrecht: Reide~ 1981), ~1. M Friedman. Kant 
and the Exact Sciences, ch. 1. 
88 Cf. Kant's question in the essay on Xegative .llagnitudes: how is it that "because something is, 
something else is cancelleel'? (TP 241. Ak. 2:204). He claims that the absolute state of the world 
can be considered as zero, "ith even change involving a compensation elsewhere in the system. 
"Falling [is] 'negative rising', retreat," 'negative advance' .. , falling is just as positive as rising" (TP 
215. Ak. 2:176). 
89 Precisely because the power to suffer depends on the contingent event of connection. God is not 
totally responsible for the accident. If God were, then any principle of harmony would become 
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characterises this third in terms of a "generally established harmony,,;90 it is 
equivalent to the "world-whole". Thus, despite allowing physical interaction, 
Kant's theory is far from being a theory of physical influx. However, all of this 
only makes sense if Kant is still affirming a rationalist notion of substance. But 
what allows Kant to preserve the 'inner nature' of his substances?91 What 
ultimately stops Kant's substances from dissolving into external physical 
relations?92 
In order to deal with this problem, Kant has to plunge himself into the 
same ontotheological problematic that Leibniz (and Spinoza) invoked.93 For only 
if God grounds internal substances, can their relations in external interaction 
conform to a general harmony, which is nothing other than the harmony of inner 
natures with their contingent changes in a whole. As we will see, Kant is 
performing a delicate balancing act: he wants God to serve as a ground for 
'reality', but at the same time wants to limit God's power in reality. He thus wants 
to avoid any monistic identification of logic and reality, whether it involve the 
collapse of reality into apriori logic, or the collapse of logic into reality as 
contingency. So I tum now to Kant's proof for the existence of God, which will 
pre-established again, and Kant's point about the irreducible contingency of change would be 
contradicted. Moreover, Kant says at the end of the manuscript that "this influence is impossible 
even [for] God, because he can never produce the accident in another, except insofar as he is 
ground of the power which produces the accident, eg., regret in the soul" (ibid). Here we can see 
that if it were possible for God to cause an influx, then it would be equivalent to the complete 
determination supposedly involved in pre-established hannony. 
90 In his very informative article, 'Kant's Theory of Physical Influ.x· (Archiv for Geschichte der 
Phi losophie, 77, 1995) Eric Watkins defends the claim that since Kant had rejected pre-established 
harmony and affirmed physical interaction, he must be characterised as defending physical influx 
(without transmission). However, he overstates the case, and quotes too selectively from the 
Metaphysik Herder. Despite Kant having ex-plicitly argued against influx in the passage just 
quoted, Watkins implicitly dismisses this passage, apparently for the following reasons. Firstly, he 
says the difference between pre-established hannony and Kant's version of physical influx can be 
explained in terms of counterfactuals: "for pre-established harmony one substance would run the 
same course even if all other substances were annihilated", whereas the opposite is true for 
physical influx. Secondly. he says that "Kant gives no indication that the harmony God is 
responsible for is pre-established." (299) However, against both of these claims one should point 
out that Watkins has not excluded the notion of generally established harmony, which allows for 
intersubstantial causation and grounds the 'inner ground' that Kant holds necessary to ex-plain 
contingent interaction. 
91 The account of the internality of force is not enough to justify such an affirmation. Indeed in 
CPR, Kant makes a point of sa~ing that forces are merely e~1ernal relations. 
92 The doctrine of the mere formality of logic is not affirmed until CPR, so Kant would still seem 
to hold like Leibniz, tlIat anah1ic truths have metaphysical yaIidity in the sense that they belong to 
the realm of eternal truths. whether they have real validity. howe\"er. is the key question. 
93 Othenyise his account of reality would begin to fragment: tlIere would be a reality based on the 
contingent external relations of the physical field which could only be completed by an account of 
why these substances or forces are originally distributed in a certain way. This wouId be analogous 
to a split between e~1ensive quantiti\"e relations and a set of mysterious qualitati\"e giyens. 
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be treated in parallel to the prevIOus discussions of Leibniz's and Spinoza's 
ontotheology. 
II God, Perfection and Reality in Kant 
Kant takes Up Leibniz's proof for the existence of God by illuminating some of 
the obscurities we found in his real definition of the possibility of God, precisely 
in its dependence on 'reality'. In 1755 Kant's proof is already present (New 
Eludiation, TP 15, Ak. 1 :395) but in the 1763 Only Possible Argument, he 
presents the first full version of the argument. Kant begins with a version of his 
famous analysis of the concept of existence (TP 117[, Ak. 2:72), the crux of 
which was mentioned above. 94 However, what I want to focus on now is the 
purely modal definition of existence that Kant goes on to give in the core of his 
proof for God's existence. Firstly, he unfolds the implications that we have 
already glimpsed in Leibniz's references to real possibility. However, he suggests, 
moving towards the Spinozist line, that possibility itself must depend on some 
prior given reality. 
Possibility [itself] disappears not only when an internal contradiction, as the 
logical element of impossibility, is present, but also when there exists no material 
element, no datum, to be thought. For then nothing is given which can be thought 
(TP 123, Ak. 2:78). 
Kant fills out this argument in the earlier New Elucidation: 
Possibility is only defmable in terms of there not being a conflict between certain 
combined concepts; thus the concept of possibility is the product of a 
comparison. But in every comparison the things which are to be compared must 
be available for comparison, and where nothing at all is given there is no room 
for either comparison or, corresponding to it, for the concept of possibility (TP 
15, Ak. 1:395). 
94 Kant deals in detail with other contemporary notions of existence, which he also finds prone to 
his argument: Wolff and Baumgarten both hold versions of the claim that existence is a 
completion of the detennination of a possible substance, while Crusius argues that existence is 
equivalent to the fact of something being "somewhere and somewhen", ie. spatiotemporally 
localised. Kant argues against all of these that it is still logically possible to think all these 
predicates and for a thing still not to exist. There is always something 'more' involved in the 
existence of something over its mere possibility, but how are we to think this 'more'? Kant 
professes that it is impossible to adequately analyse existence: all we can say is that "existence is 
the absolute positing of a thing ... the concept of positing or setting (Position oder Setzung) is 
perfectly simple: it is identical with the concept of being in general" (TP 119. Ak. 2:73). But, as 
Kant himself seems to say the concept of existence is really a riddle. he seems to confess he is no 
closer to understanding it with this defmition. However, as we "ill see now, another purely modal 
definition of existence is nevertheless presented alongside tlllS discussion. 
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This is the "real element of possibility" (TP 123). Kant then makes a startling 
argument: that it is absolutely impossible for nothing to exist, for in that case all 
possibility would be cancelled. Kant is in effect deriving existence from the 
impossibility that nothing is possible. He goes on to fill in this notion: 'There is a 
certain reality, the cancellation of which would cancel all internal possibility 
whatever" (TP 127, Ak. 2:83). But this reality must be absolutely necessary to 
avoid the contradiction concerning possibility. "It is apparent that the existence of 
one or more things itself lies at the foundation of all possibility" (ibid). This 
modal derivation of existence crucially qualifies the need for an unanalysable 
notion of 'existence' or 'reality'. Kant goes on to argue that this necessary being 
is unique and simple because it contains the real ground of all other possibilities: 
"it follows that every other thing is possible only insofar as it is given through the 
necessary being as its ground" (TP 128, Ak. 2:83). Since every possibility 
presupposes this existence, "it follows that no other mode of its existence is 
possible. That is to say: the necessary being cannot exist in a variety of ways ... It 
is, therefore, not possible in any other way than as it really exists" (TP 129, Ak. 
2: 85). The fact that it cannot be changed indicates that it is eternal. 
Now Kant never explicitly retracts this thesis, and his 'Critique of 
Speculative Theology' in which he attacks the three main types of theological 
argument (ontological, cosmological, physico-theological) does not include his 
own earlier argument.95 If we spell out the implications of the proof for Kant's 
early theory, we can see how the proof might come to assume a subterranean 
status in Kant's work. 
What is apparent is how close to a Spinozist proof for God this is. God is 
defined first of all in terms of the existence of a necessary reality which cannot be 
otherwise. This means that Kant has transformed a Leibnizian proof into its 
Spinozist nemesis by following out its implications. Leibniz attempted to avoid 
Spinoza's God by holding onto the distinction between logical and real 
possibility. He wanted God to be able to choose which possibilities become real. 
But if God himself depends on a prior reality, this would not be possible. Kant, 
95 See Mark Fisher & Eric Watkins, 'The Material Ground of Possibility' (Review ojJletaph.ysics. 
52, 1998): Eckart Forster, Kant's Final Synthesis (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 2000) 77-101: 
Dieter Henrich. Die Ontolog;sche Gottesbe·weis (ftibingen: lCB. Mohr, 1960). 185-7. All three 
cite similar reasons why this proof appears to disappear underground in Kant focussing on the 
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however, follows the Leibnizian concern for the difference between logical and 
real possibility, yet in effect makes the logical dependent on real possibility. The 
logically possible has its index in reality.96 But then surely this destroys the notion 
of possibility, and leads our triangular structure to collapse into a monism of the 
real. But we should keep hold of the peculiar internal relation between logic and 
reality in Kant's argument. The logically possible has its index in reality, but 
reality in tum cannot have its own principle without relating to the structure of 
possibility. De facto reality is only differentiated by being related to a halo of 
unrealised elements, some of which will be incompossible with the established set 
of elements. It seems hard not to use the notion 'possibility' to describe this 
'halo'. But we can already see, though, that the very notion of 'real possibility' is 
quite opaque: what is the precise modal status of this notion? For both Kant and 
Hegel the notion remains awkward, but essential, and arguably Deleuze's task is 
to work through the status of this notion. 97 While on the one hand, real possibility 
must be other than logical possibility, its real status threatens to destroy its modal 
status altogether. I will suggest that this so-called pre-critical problematic is at the 
root of De leuze's philosophy, and inspires his theory of Ideas or problems, as welI 
as, paradoxically, his decision to subordinate the abstract couple 'possible/real' to 
'virtual/actual'. Deleuze's solution is to reconceive real possibility as 'virtuality', 
as this term would negate the abstract, logically based status of the notion of 
possibility, and preserve the sense in which the halo of unrealised elements that 
surround a set of reals is rooted in and conditioned by that particular set of reals. 
For Deleuze, to speak of possibility apart from virtuality is an abstraction. But 
until DeIeuze's position can be developed more adequately, it should simply be 
kept in mind that real possibility, as it stands, remains a problematic notion. 
regulative nature of Ideas. I comment further on Kant's later attitude to the proof with reference to 
their interpretations in chapter 3.3.ii. 
96 It is sometimes claimed that it was the post-Kantians who effected the dependence of the logical 
principle of identity on the real identity of the subject. For instance, in 'The Two Logics and their 
Relation', in Experience and its Systematisation (The Hague: .Martinus Nijhoff, 1972). Nathan 
Rotenstreich argues that Reinhold and Maimon begin this process. But Kant in effect had also 
initiated this process in his argument about rea] possibility. However. he retreats from it shortly by 
saving logic by making it entirely formal~ see chapter 3 below. 
97 Hegel's chapter on modality in The Science of Logic is one of the most crucial. yet it contains 
material that he continued to rework until his death. See Gabriella Baptist. 'Ways and Loci of 
Modality. TIle Chapter "Actuality" in the Science of Logic between its Absence in Jena and its 
Disappearance in Berlin' (in G. di Giovanni. Essays on Hegel's Logic. Albany: SUNY 1990). 
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There is an important weakness in Kant's proof that does not occur in 
Spinoza's. Kant's inference that the necessary existence of some reality must be 
unique does not follow. In defending this thesis, Kant appeals to the principle of 
determining ground. But this is circular as the validity of the principle is itself 
dependent on the necessary existence of reality. While the reality Kant discovers 
at the heart of possibility may indeed tum out to be 'unique' in Spinoza's sense 
(cf. E1P14), he has not ruled out that it is simply a plurality or infinity of really 
distinct perfections. Kant needs reality to be unique in the sense of 'unified', 
because he needs the ontological reality he has discovered to ground the 
substances in 'one world'. But this unity cannot be presumed. In fact, Kant's 
failure on this point sends us back to Leibniz, whose account of sufficient reason 
in absolute reality provided a rational 'calculus of compossibilities' which 
explained the structure of reality. Far from simply excluding a plurality of 
perfections, the thought of such a plurality is structurally necessary for Leibniz's 
account. On the other hand, Leibniz's restriction of the influx of that plurality into 
the single, created world is of course conducted by appealing to the problematic 
notion of the best of all possible worlds. 
We can proceed further with the continuing paradox of 'reality'. If one 
makes the definition of God revolve around 'reality' then one subordinates God to 
reality. As even logical possibility is ontologically subordinated to real possibility, 
there is no escape for God from the realm of the real. This reality indeed provides 
the 'inner grounds' that form the inner nature of substances. Kant has also taken 
pains to separate these inner natures from the external interaction that determines 
their changes, so this Deus sive Realitas has no power over the interactions 
themselves. But in this case we must finally ask, why is the traditional notion of 
God necessary at all? 
However, as with Leibniz, the intelligible aspect of God is entirely central 
to Kant's system right up to 1770. There is a "schema" in the divine intellect that 
must order the physical relations of the universe (TP 42, Ak. 1:414). As Kant is 
reported to say in the Metaphysik Herder, ''No perfection can be thought, even 
according to the common concept, without relation to a thinking and rational 
being: a relation to rational beings required of it". The note ends with the phrase, 
"an uninhabited palace" (LM 13, Ak. 28: 50). This image of nature as an 
uninhabited palace is a haunting symbol that can serve as the problem or Idea that 
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is motivating Kant in these early discussions. But we have already seen that it is 
far from the case that "perfection ... according to the common concept" of itself 
requires an intelligent deity. As Spinoza and Leibniz tend to agree, perfection, as 
completeness, is equivalent to nothing other than reality. 98 
The mind of God does not seem necessary for interaction. Now isn't the 
relation of essences and real interactions between them already suffiCient to 
compose a world, or to determine a world? What Kant already has is sufficient for 
perfection and some kind of order, and perhaps beauty is merely a quality 
pleasing to certain species, as Spinoza would say. In this way, a fully individuated 
reality can be affirmed through the spatiotemporal framework of the world-whole. 
However, there are further implications to Kant's arguments as they stand, 
especially when put in the Spinozist and Leibnizian context constructed earlier. 
Ifwe recall the larger picture of Kant's earlier work, it will be recalled that 
Kant is seeking 'a third thing' to ground synthesis, specifically to ground the 
connection between inner substances and external interaction. This can also be 
thought of as a third thing between God's influence and the contingent power of 
finite substances. It is the discovery of this third thing that will enable him to 
escape from Leibniz's fragmentary account of the triangular structure of sufficient 
reason, whereby God is miraculously given the power to 'choose' from all the 
98 Kant's arguments "that the necessary being is a mind" are yery unconvincing (TP l31-2, Ak. 
2:87-88). Firstly, if God is identical to the greatest possible reality_ then understanding and will 
must coexist with this reality. But, given the priority of reality in possibility, Kant cannot therefore 
meaningfully talk about the "greatest possible reality". Possibility is relatiye to reality first of all: 
logical possibility is now strictly identical to real possibility; it is not abstract. Furthermore, if 
understanding and will are indeed "true realities" there is nothing inherently necessary about their 
reality, which means they could be merely contingent. Or, as Spinoza simply says, "Man thinks" 
(E2A2). 
Kant's second argument revolves around the irreducibility of understanding and will to 
other real properties. However, this could be incorporated into a Spinozist argument about the 
equal necessity of thought and extension. It does not prmide any way understanding can be seen 
to order the rest of reality, which is what Kant needs God to do. 
The last proof is as follows: "Thirdly, order, beauty and perfection in all that is possible 
presuppose either a being, in the properties of which these relations are grounded or at least. a 
being through which, as from a principal ground, things agreeing with these relations are possible" 
(TP l32, Ak. 2:88). We need only pay attention to the clause following "at least". Kant argues that 
the necessary being is the ground for all other beings. "It follows that the necessary being "ill 
possess that property, in \1rtue of which eyerything else, apart from itself, is able to become real in 
agreement \\ith these relations". This in itself does not follow, so Kant adds a semi-transcendental 
argument that "the ground of the ex1ernal possibility of order, beauty and perfection. is not 
sufficient unless a \\ill in agreement \\1th the understanding is presupposed" (ibid) But this claim 
would seem to be a petitio as it is precisely its sufficiency that is in question. 
Furthermore, the weakness of Kant's arguments for the mind of God are in effect 
admitted insofar as the rest of the book proceeds at great length to proyide empirical teleological 
examples for the governance of God. 
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logically intelligible possibilities the best way to organise substances. Now for 
Kant, we have seen that this third thing is simply to be called 'world'. The 
explicitly teleological character of Leibniz's system is devolved in Kant into a 
metaphysics of 'general harmony' based on an ontotheology structured around the 
notion of 'real possibility'. For Kant, there is no selective God; rather God 
provides the infinite set of realities, while compossibility is reduced to the set of 
relations in the world according to physically contingent interactions. Thus 
sufficient reason is grounded in the conjunction of God and world, in the relation 
between inner, intensive essence, and external interaction; the "world-whole" can 
still nevertheless be thought according to a calculus of real possibility. However, 
given the problems we have seen with the metaphysical side of this account, in 
particular with his account of the inner natures of substances, what happens to the 
'world' Kant has discovered? It has just been suggested that Kant did not succeed 
in securing the unity of ontological reality. What then in fact results from Kant's 
arguments? The real possibility of a plurality of worlds: this thought haunts Kant 
throughout his philosophy.99 As we will see, he attempts to phenomenalise the 
problem in his work from 1770, but the problem keeps returning, even as late as 
the Opus Posthumum. 100 It shows that he has not entirely escaped from the 
Leibnizian position in which God must 'choose' between worlds; on Leibniz's 
model, what is a world but a selection of compossible substances? If Kant cannot 
guarantee the unity of one world, then, like Leibniz he can only affirm "a play in 
the creation of the world" (DR 51). His account of coherent individuation then 
also disappears. Such a situation would be more than Spinoza's infinite upsurge of 
perfections, but only in that it structurally introduces a counterfactual rationality 
into the heart of the absolute. 
To sum up this first phase of Kant's early philosophy, we can see that 
Kant seems to be caught in an oscillation between two poles. On the one hand, if 
Kant loses individual substances, all would be contingency, as really substances 
could be merely relative, or enduring composites. Furthermore, in the early Kant, 
99 See Aletaph.:Vsik Herder from 1764, (LM .. k Ale. 28:-1-1) and Kant's attempt to deal "ith .the 
problem in the Inaugural Dissertation (TP 380, Ale. 390f). and his admission later that "'if a 
number of necessary causes were to be admitted"·. then a plurality of worlds would be possi ble (TP 
403, Ak. 2:408). 
100 Opus Posthumum (trans. E. Forster & M. Rosen. Cambridge University Press. 1995: hereafter 
OP). 205. Ak. 22:125: 219, Ak 21:10. See chapter 3 below. and K. Ameriks. Kant's Theory of 
.\find. 95-9. 
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time and space are relative, so their structure would not help to organise the 
composition of the universe. Hence physical laws would be entirely arbitrary or 
only necessary in Spinoza' s sense~ 101 they would lack the counterfactual element 
necessary for sufficient reason So Kant must somehow ground real individual 
essences or substances in necessity. 
On the other hand, if Kant loses external interaction, he is back with the 
problems he diagnosed in Leibnizianism: change is not thinkable for pure 
substances. So Kant must ground real substances in extenJaI contingent 
. . 102 
mteractlOn. 
Kant confesses the oscillation in a passage from the New Elucidation: 
For this reason, one is equally justified both in saying that external changes may 
be produced in this way by means of efficient causes, and also in saying that the 
changes which occur within the substance are ascribed to an internal force of the 
substance, although the natural power of this force to produce an effect rests, no 
less than the foundation of the external relations just mentioned, on divine 
support (TP 44, Ak. 1:415; italics mine). 
This passage illustrates the problems of Kant's thesis. For not only does he say 
here that God causes both internal and external relations, but he says that one is 
"equally justified" in describing causal change as due to external efficient causes 
or to internal determination. It is again as if there is a Nietzschean echo from the 
future: that it is simply an interpretation whether one describes change as efficient 
causation, or in terms of internal forces. 103 As I suggested at the beginning of this 
chapter, Nietzsche's resolution is in fact also a vacillation between the two 
possibilities~ the notion of will to power is really more of a question mark set over 
the problem of synthesis. And we see this same question mark appearing in Kant's 
project. 
There IS also a finite dimension at the centre of Kant's oscillating 
metaphysical tendencies. Kant cannot give in completely to pre-established 
harmony theory on the one hand, or Spinozist determinism, as in each case this 
101 "A thing's existence follows necessarily either from its essence and definition or from a given 
efficient cause .... A thing is called contingent only because of a defect in our knowledge" 
(EIP33S1). Kant briefly discusses chance and necessity in Spinoza in l\letaphysik Herder (LM .. L 
Ak. 28:41), where he says "the destiny of Spinoza .. , has perhaps not been rightly understood". But 
he does not go into the crucial difference between Spinoza and Leibniz on sufficient reason. 
10~ 'This oscillation could be given the fonn of an antinomy. The Kantian way out of an antinomy is 
to point to an ambiguity in the alternatives. Here, the ambiguity would be the notion of 'ground': 
we cannot adequately define ground because we cannot decide from its concept whether grounds 
might not be fully internal or ex1emal, or ifbotlt how this is possible. 
103 Cf Beyond Good and Evil, # 22. 
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would be to gIve God too much, to rob finite beings of any independence 
whatsoever. It has been shown that Kant's middle way between physical influx 
and harmony goes by way of an emphasis of the "power to suffer". From a finite 
perspective, the suffering substance is the core of the problem: it both has an 
internal essence, but is subjected to external forces. In a sense, it is the very locus 
of the synthetic apriori in the early Kant: the power to suffer is the locus of the 
"third thing"; but here again we hear Nietzsche's pathos in the will to power. 
We can also, however, begin to glimpse the Deleuzian horizon from here. 
Like Leibniz, Kant thinks of internally determined substances in terms of "series": 
compossible substances can be called convergent series, and incompossible ones 
divergent. We have seen that the series that can be affirmed of God are not 
necessarily subject to organisation in the mind of God, nor can their "generally 
established harmony" guarantee one world only can be selected from the sum of 
reality. In fact, we have no criterion for compossibility at all. God, the principle of 
the best, the world-whole - are these anything other than phantoms or mirages in 
"the play in the creation of the world"? If there is the possibility of a 'divine 
choice', perhaps it can only be found from a perspective in reality itself. Perhaps 
in that case the notion of world is relative, and the only 'absolute' that can be 
affirmed is not a cosmos or world of convergent series, but a 'chaosmos' of 
convergent and divergent series (DR 57/80, 69/95). The ideal horizon that Kant 
will ultimately seek as the guarantee of the world will be precisely and correctly 
described as 'problematic'; but Deleuze will push Kant's position further so that it 
reconnects with his original position as we have seen it here: the very criterion for 
the calculus of compossibilities will be problematic, indeed absolutely 
problematic. Deleuze then looks further back in the past than Kant and Leibniz in 
his pursuit of a model of harmony adequate to this ontological situation. He 
alights upon Giordano Bruno's notion of the complication of all series in the 
absolute. The philosopher can only explicate what is profoundly implicated in an 
.. I fu . f 104 ongma con stOn 0 essences. 
104 See for instance Bruno, Cause, Principle and [/nity (trans. R Lucca, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1998), 66: "Every potency. every act which, in the principle, is (so to speak) 
enfolded [or implicatedJ. tmited and tmique, is unfolded dispersed and multiplied in other things. 
The universe. which is the great simulacrum. the great image and sole-begotten nature. is also all 
that it can be .... But it is also not all that it can be, because of its very differences. its particulars. 
its modes and its indiyiduals". On Bruno and 'complication'. see Deleuze. Proust and Signs (trans. 
11 I 
Further, if a principle cannot be found to ground individuation in reality. 
might this not be because the play of real possibilities is pre-individual? In this 
way, Deleuze effects a strange union of Kant and Leibniz. For while Deleuze 
accepts Kant's move to relate all logical possibilities back to real possibilities, he 
at the same time affirms the formal aspect of Leibniz's logical realm, that it is 
without individuation: the virtual realm of complication is composed of 
interrelated "pre-individual singularities", whose spatio-temporal actualisation is 
conducted under the horizon of the problematic relations of these singularities. If 
all this produces a harmony in the spatio-temporal realm, it will not necessarily be 
a harmony we recognise or desire, but it will be in a sense a "universal harmony". 
Because of the absence of the mind of God, can we really persist in thinking that 
the universe is an "uninhabited palace"? If there are harmonies to be found in the 
cosmos, does this imply someone knew how to produce them? Must a musician 
intelligibly know the laws of harmony for her notes to sound their harmonies? 
Deleuze is in effect patiently following Leibniz's and Kant's moves to ground the 
principle of reality in teleological and harmonic principles, only to critically 
discard the inadequate moments of these moves (such as the appeal to the mind of 
God and the unity of the world), in order finally to unveil the true structure of 
compossibility that lies waiting and hidden. 
4 From Ontological Reality to Transcendental Ideality: The Retreat of 
the Noumenon 
Kant's early metaphysics attempts to ground metaphysical cognition by working 
out the nature of the 'real'. But he is tom in two directions: towards Spinozism, 
and away from it in recoil, towards harmony theory. 'Reality' is the locus of this 
tension, which is played out in the attempt to balance between the activity and 
passivity of substances. In a sense, whether they dissolve on the one side into 
God, or on the other into external interactions is all the same: Spinozism would be 
affirmed in either case: DeliS sive Natura. Kant, like Leibniz, searches for a 'third' 
that will relate but distinguish both sides, that will provide a metaphysically 
R. Howard London: Athlone. 2000). 45; DR 1231161; Deleuze. The Fold: Leibniz and the 
Baroque (trans. T. Conley. MiImeapolis: University of Minnesota. 1993). 23~ 
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grounded account of sufficient reason; but for both thinkers, the results remain 
problematic. 
In 1768, III Concerning the Ultimate Ground oj the Differentiation oj 
Directions in Space, Kant takes a new step towards a solution. Kant's problem 
was that metaphysically he had not adequately grounded the unification of the 
spatiotemporal field. The principles of succession and coexistence by themselves 
could not ground an absolutely unified field, because they were to be derived from 
Kant's new version of sufficient reason, which is internally problematic. Kant's 
move in 1768 is to absolutise space, in order to provide a better ground for the 
unity of coexistence, and to provide the unity he is lacking in principle. The 
structure of space itself will be the new principle of coexistence. 
Absolute, Real Space 
Paradoxically, Kant constructs his argument for absolute space against Leibniz's 
account of spatiotemporal individuation, which was itself meant to provide a 
positive ground for individuation in reality. Kant's main weapon is the argument 
from incongruent counterparts. lOS Briefly, it states that certain spatial properties, 
such as leftness, rightness, etc., cannot be reduced to internal properties of 
substances, because there is nothing conceptual distinguishing them. Hence, 
spatial content differs in kind from conceptual content. Again, Kant's discovery of 
an extralogical principle is based. on his testing of the limits of logical analysis, 
the limit between logic and reality. The apriority of spatial relations is the latest 
example of the possibility of an apriori extralogical principle. Kant is still 
attempting to exclude the dispersal of internal differences of substances into the 
contingent external world. 
So why did Kant soon deny the reality of absolute space, and affirm its 
ideality? In CPR he gives two arguments against the reality of space. Firstly, the 
Newtonians create an absurd proliferation of entities when they think of real 
things coexisting with an "eternal and infinite self-subsisting nonentity, which 
exist[s], (yet without there being anything real)" (A391B56). Secondly, geometry 
is threatened by the reality of space, as its apriority would no longer be 
105 1 shall examine this argument in some detail in chapter ~.2. 
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immediately guaranteed. But there is a clue from a late set of lectures on 
metaphysics that Kant has another anxiety. 
If we consider space as real, we assume Spinoza's system. He believed only in 
one su~sta~ce, and all the substances in the world he held for its divinely inhering 
determmatlOns (he called space the phenomenon of the divine omnipresence). 
(LM 368,28:666). 
The last phrase is added in the margins so is of doubtful provenance, but two 
things suggest that Kant is behind it. Firstly, this is certainly not a characterisation 
one finds in Spinoza himself, and secondly, it is very reminiscent of Kant's own 
thoughts - but of 20 years previously, in the Inaugural Dissertation, where he 
says that space is "the phenomenal omnipresence" of the divine cause (TP 404; 
Ak. 2:410).106 But why should the reality of space entail Spinoza's system if the 
Newtonians had affirmed it without being Spinozists?107 To make space real may 
seem like an initially attractive way to harmonise substances, but it has another 
pernicious effect that may explain why Kant dropped the notion so soon. For if 
space is real, then it is infinitely divisible. Kant's insistence on the absurdity of the 
Newtonian conception of two coexisting substances leaves only one option. If 
relations of substances can only be determined in space, the result must be the 
occlusion altogether of inner essences; no conceptual determination can 
adequately distinguish real substances themselves anymore; inner substances are 
eroded, and Spinozist monism beckons. 
There is another point that follows from Kant's position on absolute, real 
space, which will become important later. With the autonomy of space from its 
contents, there is now no longer in principle a straightforward one-to-one relation 
between internal properties and their external expression, as the paradox of 
incongruent counterparts shows. Kant now has to solve the problem of what the 
nature of the connection can be between intelligible substance and the apriori 
manifold of space and time. If the manifold of space is apriori, and there is no 
one-to-one relation between substances and their spatiotemporal appearance, then 
106 The fact that in the Dissertation Kant nevertheless affinned the ideality, not the reality of space 
and time seems at first peculiar. but this later statement in the lectures perhaps represents an 
implicit criticism of his earlier, more simplistic account of the relation of noumenon and 
phenomenon, which we will visit in more detail in a moment. K Ameriks discusses this passage in 
'The Critique of Metaphysics: Kant and Traditional Ontology', in P. Guyer (The Cambridge 
Companion to Kant, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 268f 
107 However. the famous defender of Ne,,\10n against Leibniz, Samuel Clarke. who put fom"ard the 
thesis in A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God that absolute space is part of God. 
was criticised for his Spinozist tendencies on this point. 
114 
the possibility of relation between the two no longer can devolve simply on the 
relation of forces described above. The argument from incongruence, however, by 
itself logically suggests two possibilities: on the one hand, if space is real, inner 
substances would not themselves be all conceptually discernible; but on the other 
hand, if space is made ideal, inner substances cease to become spatial at all. As 
will be shown in chapter 4, Deleuze can be understood as affirming the former 
possibility, against Kant's turn to the latter. So what the argument from 
incongruent counterparts will really show for Deleuze is that the inner nature of 
things, their 'internal difference' cannot be thought according to concepts. 
II Absolute, Ideal Space and Time 
In the Inaugural Dissertation Kant moves from the affirmation of the 
absoluteness and reality of space to its absoluteness and ideality. However, as 
space is now the ground of the universal coexistence of real entities, Kant must 
also continue to carry out the transformation with regard to the principle of 
succession - thus time too is made ideal. What does ideality at first signify here? 
Kant appears to ground the ideality on the fact that space is merely relational, 
which is a return to a Leibnizian thesis. Thus it may appear that Kant is returning 
to the Leibnizian thesis that motion is merely a well founded phenomenon, and is 
nothing real; but at the same time he is affirming the absoluteness of space, contra 
Leibniz. 
But if space and time are merely ideal, then of what value is the proof of 
their apriority in grounding real interaction? At this point, we should remember, 
the theses concerning space and time are ontolOgical; the epistemic status is a 
product of CPR. 108 Thus, Kant cannot appeal to 'the possibility of experience' to 
ground the validity and reality of spatiotemporal relations. Although it is tempting 
to read Kant's critical moves back into the Inaugural Dissertation, this should be 
resisted. Kant asks in that essay what the apriori forms are, by virtue of which 
there is a world, not by virtue of which there is experience. 109 Now, if these forms 
108 We are still revolving in a Leibnizian orbit: the account of ideality emerges from Leibnizian 
theses about the ideality of relations, hence is not originally an epistemological matter. 
109 In # 13 Kant says that "the principle of the fornI of the sensible world is that which contains the 
ground of the universal connection of all things, insofar as they are phenomena" (fP 391. Ak. 
2:398). and he goes on to specify that these conditions, which ground uni'ersal succession and 
coexistence are the "schemata and conditions of eYel!thing sensitive in human cognition". Any 
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are merely ideal, then how can the ontological apriority of space have any effect 
in the world? The focus of Kant's whole effort up until now has been to provide 
apriori grounds for a real world of forces. lID Force was the locus of the encounter 
between inner and external grounds, or substances and their interaction. As such, 
it was the centre of the problem concerning 'reality'. But force is now displaced 
from the centre of Kant's project. Whereas it was the locus of the 'third thing' in 
Kant's early writings, it is now demoted to merely empirical status; it will only be 
developed in the Metaphysical Foundations o/Natural Science. Kant must make a 
fundamental move: with the apriori absence of force, succession and coexistence 
must now be governed merely by external relations in the spatiotemporal field. 
That is, the interaction of substances will now be reduced to their extensive 
relations. III But again, what happens in this case to the intensive, the inner 
grounds of substances? How are we to think of the internal nature of substances? 
iii Logic and Reality in the Inaugural Dissertation 
In the Dissertation, the ontological concept of reality now refers to the substances 
themselves, while the coordination of interactions that is the universe will be 
'ideal'. The 'intelligible object' (in the sense of Gegenstand) of the mind is real, 
while the sensible object is ideal. Kant's resolution here involves a splitting up 
and distribution of the notion of substance into noumenal and phenomenal 
aspects. This division will last into the critical period, and keeping our eye on it 
will be important as it represents not just a trace of Kant's 'pre-critical' period, 
but the product of a tension that will continue throughout the critical project. 1l2 As 
far as the notion of force is concerned, this distribution effectively ends the 
similarity between this and the theories of the Critique is overshadowed by the fact that it turns out 
that the 'mutual organisation of space and time are all that is necessary for a worl¢ there is no 
reference to categories in the Dissertation. These conditions are all that coordinate the world and 
make it a unity. 
110 Now that the notion of ideality comes to assume importance in Kant, it must henceforth be kept 
in mind that reality was primarily meant to be opposed to logic, not to appearance or ideality as 
such. There will indeed be a shift in Kant's concept of reality but it must be charted carefully. See 
footnote 83 above on the role of idealism in the early Kant. 
111 In CPR, intensity will be restricted to the degree of any ex1ensive intuition: thus the 
Anticipations of Per~ption are subordinated to the Axioms of Intuition. 
11: This will be discussed in the nex1 chapter. See M. Radner. 'Substance and Phenomenal 
Substance: Kant's Individuation of Things in Themselves and Appearances'. (in Barber & Gracia. 
Individuation and Identitv in Early Alodern Philosophy) and K. Ameriks. Kant's Theory of;\!ind. 
67. 145, for a discussion ~fthis ~ role of substance in CPR 
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ontological role of intensive factors in the 'world', as they become unknowable. 
Intensive relations can only be thought, whereas extensive magnitudes are the 
object of measurement, but these are only ideal. In effect, by idealising space and 
time and noumenalising substance, Kant has shifted all determination into the 
phenomenal realm. All order will be intra-phenomenal, that is, relative to sensible 
experience. The noumenal realm is barely conceivable, and while it remains 
necessary to think it, the ways in which it can be thought seem to be very 
problematic. We should look briefly at the two aspects of cognition, intellectual 
and sensible, in order to pursue our question about the inner nature of substances. 
A. Pure Concepts. Kant does allot a role to the "pure forms of the 
understanding" in the Dissertation, even though they are not yet clues to the 
categories. He says that "things which are thought sensitively are representations 
of things as they appear, while things which are intellectual are representations of 
things as they are" (TP 384, Ak. 2:392). The understanding is said to have two 
uses: the logical and the real. These familiar terms appear to have a new function 
here. We have just seen that space and time, as ideal, now replace the ontological 
structure of what has been called up to now 'reality'. So of what real use can the 
understanding be? Kant defines the logical use of the understanding in terms of 
abstraction and reflection on what is given to sensibility, and says that the real use 
concerns concepts which have their origin in the understanding itself (TP 385, Ak. 
2:393). Kant's use of the term 'real' here indicates that it is the objects of the 
understanding - intelligible substances - that are being classed as real. 113 The real 
use of the understanding has two "ends": to keep separate sensibility from 
understanding (the role of 'transcendental reflection' in CPR), and the dogmatic 
113 Paul Guyer also argues that the objects of pure understanding in the Dissertation are conceived 
in tenns of rationalist ontology. However, he goes too far in suggesting that sensibility and the 
pure understanding "furnish representations of quite distinct sets of objects" (Kant and the Claims 
of Knowledge, 1-1-); in the contex1 of Kanfs earlier work, their relation can remain grounded by the 
ontotheological account of real possibility. Guyer is perhaps too in the thrall of a commonsense 
modem "iew that any concept of 'reality' (cf. -1-). or the in-itself must refer to some kind of 
'matter' behind the appearances: but among rationalist philosophers the thought of the in-itself 
was quite naturally conceived in terms of monadic intelligibility rather than some sort of matter. 
For a particularly powerful statement of this. see the Groundwork, where Kant goes so far as to 
say '·even the most common understanding ... as is well known. is very much inclined to ex-pect 
behind the objects of the senses something else in,isible and active of itself - but it spoils this 
again by quickly making this invisible something sensible in tum that is. wanting to make it an 
object of intuition. so that it does not thereby become any the "iser" (pP 99: Ak. -1-:~52). One 
could argue that it is one of the ',isionary' characteristics of 'revisionary metaphysicians·. 
amongst "hom I would include Kant HegeL Deleuze as well as Leibniz. to take nothing about the 
'in itself for granted. 
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end of providing "a common measure for all other things insofar as they are 
realities. This paradigm is NOUMENAL PERFECTION" (TP 388, Ak. 2:396). In 
a theoretical sense, this concerns "the Supreme Being, GOD". So Kant is still in 
principle affirming his ontological proof 114 
So while the real use of the understanding may seem to anticipate the 
categories - "to this genus belong possibility, existence, necessity, substance. 
cause, etc." TP 388, Ak. 2:396) - for Kant these concepts originate in the apriori 
capacity of the mind to think intelligibilia. 115 Indeed, while the understanding 
does playa role in coordinating experience, this is restricted to its logical use: 
That which precedes the logical use of the understanding is called appearance, 
while the reflective cognition, which arises when several appearances are 
compared by the understanding, is called experience. Thus, there is no way from 
appearance to experience except by reflection in accordance with the logical use 
of the understanding (TP 386, Ak. 2:394). 
What is striking here is that the role of experience is unessential at this point to 
Kant's longtime goal of providing apriori principles for the coordination of 
physical beings. Experience is defined in terms of the logical use of the 
understanding. 116 Indeed, Kant even warns against "subreptively" taking concepts 
derived from sensitive cognition for "the condition of the possibility itself of the 
object" (TP 409, Ak. 2:413); this thesis runs in the opposite direction to CPR. 
Indeed Kant's formulation of the problem of subreption in the Dissertation is 
quite extreme. He even states that "the very principle of contradiction itself 
presupposes the concept of time and bases itself on it as its condition. For A and 
not-A are not inconsistent unless they are thought Simultaneously (that is to say, at 
the same time)" (TP 394; Ak. 2:401). Kant in effect insists that we should not 
presume that God or intelligibilia conform to the principle of contradiction. 
But in this case, what possible idea of intelligibilia or of God can we have 
without the principle of contradiction? Thus, while Kant seems to affirm access to 
114 However, it cannot be denied that Kant has attenuated the ontological role of God here. God is 
discussed as a "paradigm" and "common measure", and only in the last sentence to this section 
(#9), does Kant add: "But although GocL as the ideal of perfection. is the principle of cognising. 
He is also, at the same time, insofar as He really exists, the principle of the coming into being of 
all perfection whatsoever" (ibid). 
\15 Kant states that, far from being 'distinct', "representations which belong to the understanding 
can be ex1remely confused" (TP 387, Ak. 2:395), which shows how differently pure concepts are 
conceived to CPR at this period 
116 That is, what Kant "ill later call the 'empirical use of the understanding' is here identified "ith 
its logical use. 
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intelligibilia, and to refer to his ontotheological proof, these objects seem to have 
become rather problematic, to use a later Kantian term. 
B. Sensibility. The emphasis on sensibility is new in 1770. However, for 
Kant at this stage, it is becoming increasingly problematic to relate the data of 
sensibility to real substances (intensively considered). 'Sensitivity' is affection by 
a substance: this remains thinkable only if we keep in mind the rationalist notion 
of the intensive nature of force, or the inner natures of substance. 117 But there is a 
deeper reason at work behind Kant's tum to the ideality of sensibility. We saw 
that for Kant concepts are merely possible unities in the mind, and something 
'more' is needed to instantiate a concept: existence. But existence had remained a 
riddle; Kant had ultimately only given it rational content by relating it to the 
"absolute positing" of God in his modal argument from real possibility. However, 
with the introduction of sensibility, Kant can retreat from the complications in this 
view, and fulfil the criterion of the notion of existence that concept instantiation 
depend on something 'more', by simply connecting it with the 'given' of sensible 
intuition. This is the simplified path he takes in CPR; but it is not without its own 
metaphysical difficulties, as we will see in the next chapter. 
In conclusion, the import for us of the two main developments in the 
Dissertation should be spelled out. Firstly, the effects of the introduction of 
ideality into Kant's search for an adequate principle of sufficient reason, 
strengthened by the new critical notion of subreption, now problematises the 
ontological notion of the 'real', in effect distorting the old distinction of 
logic/reality. Secondly, the tum to sensibility introduces a new criterion for 
existence. This latter principle also dislodges the logic/reality distinction, as 
existence and reality lose their equivalence: something can fulfil the criterion of 
existence, even while remaining 'unreal' or ideal. 
But these developments should be placed into the context that has emerged 
in this chapter. Paradoxically by idealising the extenzal spatiotemporal relations of 
substances, Kant shores up the real possibility of internal substantial attributes. By 
117 The notion of affection will only become a problem in CPR when causality becomes a 
detennining category: the question of how things in themselves could affect. that is, cause 
appearances became a dominant one in the early reception of the critique. Jacobi's famous 
problem with things in themselves can be seen to arise out of it. Nevertheless. if we keep in m~d 
the notion of force as it becomes submerged in Kant's mitings. then an answer to JacobI s 
problem remains available and une~l'lored as we will see in chapter 4. My turn to early Kantian 
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making the coordination of the universe ideal, Kant avoids the Spinozism that 
would return if he were to make space real. More generally, he continues his aim 
to preserve, against the powerful ontological pull of Spinozism, the noumenal 
realm from dissolution into contingency, or absolute necessity. But the problem is 
that the tum to ideality makes intelligible substances retreat beyond the veil of 
phenomena. 118 Kant's achilles heel will from now on be the reality of the 
noumenon. What can the noumenon consist of? Given the fact that experience is 
composed of ideal laws, one is always caught in a situation where one says too 
much or too little of the noumenon. 119 In CPR, Kant begins to explicitly designate 
it as 'problematic'. But the noumenon will not only be liminal for experience, but 
will be the problematic horizon which is nonetheless necessary for critique to take 
place. 
In the next part of this thesis, I propose to show the persistence of 'pre-critical' 
metaphysical issues throughout various aspects of Kant's 'critical' philosophy. It 
is organised into two sets of two chapters, with each set describing a fundamental 
juncture in Kant's project. The first chapter of each pair will deal with Kant's 
argument, and the second with Deleuze's transformation of the problems that arise 
from it. The first pair will develop the relations between critique and idealism and 
will show that it is important for both Kant and Deleuze not to dissolve noumena 
entirely into phenomena. The second pair will concern the importance of the 
concept of transcendental deduction in Kant and its apparent lack of importance in 
Deleuze. It will mostly focus on the first edition CPR, but it will also examine 
Kant's development of the notion of the subject in the second edition CPR, and 
Deleuze's account of the 'fractured 1'. 
The twofold structure will reflect my aIm to displace critical and 
metacritical weight from the Transcendental Analytic. The first pair of chapters 
will focus on the relation of Aesthetic (in the CPR sense) to Dialectical issues, 
whereas the second pair will focus on the relation of Analytic to Dialectical 
issues. In so doing I will also be taking up Deleuze's structure in DR, which he 
rationalism in such disputes should be seen in the light of the post-Kantians' general neglect of 
Kant's early writings. 
118 If we forget this pre-critical story, then we forget why Kant needed things in themselves. and 
see e\"el!1hing from the point of "iew ofpost-Kantianism. 
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calls "an exploration of the two halves of difference, the dialectical half and the 
aesthetic half' (DR 2211285). 
119 Cf K Ameriks. 'The Critique of Metaphysics: Kant and Traditional Ontology' on this tension 
in the development of Kant' s metaphysics. 
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Part Two 
Kant and Deleuze 
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Chapter Three 
The Sense of the Noumenon: Kant 
1 The Object = x 
The breakthrough in the critical project is usually taken to be outlined in Kant's letter 
of 21 February 1772 to Marcus Herz, where Kant realises that he has no justification 
for assuming that the pure concepts of the understanding used by the intellect have 
any relation at all to the given in sensibility. "Our understanding, through its 
representations, is neither the cause of the object (save in the case of moral ends), nor 
is the object the cause of our intellectual representations in the real sense (in sensu 
reali) ... [But] if such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity, 
whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects?" (C 133, 
Ak. 10: 130).1 He concludes that '1he key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure 
metaphysics" is the answer to the question "what is the ground of the relation of that 
1 This question is often seen in tenns of Hume's problem about causality, although there is no 
reference to Hume in the letter, which continues to breathe the atmosphere of continental rationalism. 
Kant frames the dilemma in tenns of occasionalism ("Hyperphysical Influx Theory") and "Pre-
established Intellectual Hannony Theory" (C 134. Ak. 10:131): he does not mention the possibility of 
simple physical influx, probably because this is seen (by Kant as well as others) as the least hopeful 
option. While Kant's retrospective remark in 1783 that it was Hume who awoke him from his 
dogmatic slumbers does verify the role of Humean skepticism in Kant's critical tum, it is important 
nevertheless to realise that given the development described thus far. the internal problems in 
rationalism conceming sufficient reason are enough to produce and to make palpable to Kant the 
problem delineated in the letter. As argued at the beginning of this chapter, Hume' s contribution can 
be seen in temlS of an exacerbation of a problematic about concepts such as causality that was 
affecting 18th century philosophy in general. 
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in us which we call 'representation' to the object [GegenstandJ?" (ibid). The purely 
passive reception of appearances does not account for the apriori intellectual 
elements of knowledge, nor can the intellect delve behind the sensible curtain of the 
object in an act of intellectual intuition, and identify the thought of noumenal 
substance with its appearance.2 Hence the pure understanding and the object cannot 
be causally related to each other, or more simply, cannot affect each other. Here the 
stage for the transcendental deduction is clearly being set. As Wolfgang Carl says, 
"the deduction must explain a non-causal relation between representations and their 
objects .,. the special case in which the understanding may form for itself concepts of 
things completely apriori, with which concepts of things must necessarily agree".3 
But while Carl has argued that in the 1772 letter Kant is referring to the critical 
problem of the relation of pure concepts to the sensible world, L. W. Beck has rightly 
pointed out that the issue of the letter is not yet that of the applicability of apriori 
concepts to sensible objects, but "the problem of how there can be apriori knowledge 
of intelligibilia without intellectual intuition".4 The Gegenstdnde of pure 
understanding are the thoughts of such entities as noumenal substances and God, the 
'proper objects' of the understanding. In a Rejlexion from the late 1770's, Kant is still 
writing that "noumenon properly signifies something which is always the same, 
namely the transcendental object of sensible intuition".5 Kant needs something that 
concepts are about but he still thinks it must be noumena. 
The notion of object (Gegenstand) only becomes the site of a problem when 
the burden for determination is shifted onto sensible experience. But the problem is 
not yet that of the right of the understanding to think Gegenstdnde apriori. It is rather 
how to relate the Gegenstdnde given by right to the understanding with the 
appearances given in sensible cognition to each other. If the Gegenstdnde of the pure 
understanding are thought to be what is behind sensible affection, how is this 
2 As suggested in chapter one, the problem with intellectual intuition is that it combines two facu1~es 
t11at are incompatible in the case of human beings. Howeyer, as long as the intellectl~derstanding 
does not claim to intuit, it does have some rights (due to the apriori cognitions haying therr sources 111 
the understanding). 
3 CarL 'Kant's First Drafts of the Deduction of the Categories' (in E. Forster ed. Kant's 
Transcendental Deductions, Stanford: Stanford Uniyersity Press, 1989). 5: italics mine. 
4 Beck, 'Kant's Letter to Hen', in E. Forster ed., Kant's Transcendental Deductions, 22. 
5 Reflexion 5554 (1778-81), cited in Guyer & Wood eds., Kant, CPR 732. 
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connection to be established? What can assure token identity between noumenal and 
phenomenal substances? 
Kant marks this problematic site with a new concept that at this point can only 
be defined negatively. The problem is designated by the formula or function "object = 
x". This new term - Object - does not yet exist in the Inaugural Dissertation, and has 
nothing to do with the common sense of the word 'object'. The notions of "object = 
x" and "relation to an object" are equivalent and denote the transcendental function of 
possible experience. This will be the new form of the "third thing" that relates 
affection or interaction with a notion of the ground of affection. 6 
Kant elaborates in a Rejlexion on how an 'object' can be formed by the union 
of concepts and intuition in a judgment: 
Every object is known only through predicates which we think or assert of it. Before 
this, any representations that may be found in us are to be regarded only as material 
for cognition, not as themselves cognitions. An object, therefore, is only a something 
in general which we think to ourselves through certain predicates which constitute.its 
concept. Every judgment contains two predicates which we compare with one 
another. One of these, which constitutes the given knowledge of the object, is called 
the logical subject; the other, which is compared with it, is called the predicate. 7 
In any judgment, we have an object = x, which we designate by a subject term 
(S), and of which we predicate an attribute (P). Kant says that through predication, a 
judgment can either express what is already present in the ~oncept S (analytic) or it 
can express something else in the object = x that is not present in S (synthetic). In 
both cases, both Sand P are predicates; it is just that in analysis the reference to the 
object is redundant, but that does not mean that it is not also essential to any 
determination of an object. 8 Likewise, in synthesis, the subject concept identifies the 
object, but it is no more intrinsically related to it than the predicate. In a synthetic 
judgment the predicate concept is predicated of the intuited object = x, not directly of 
6 Henceforth 1 will refer to Object as 'object', and where Gegenstand is referred to 1 "ill cite the 
Gennan. 
7 Reflexion 4634, quoted in H. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism (New Hayen: Yale. 1983), 70-
1. 
8 This is to sa" that the anal\1ic/synthetic distinction is not equivalent to a distinction between logical 
and real use. Rather both lo~cal "and real predication can be anal~1ic or S) nthetic. In the former case 
the distinction is used to assess the fonnal status of the judgment while in the latter. to assess whether 
a genuine determination (Bestimmung) of the object has been made (in which case it is S)nthetic) or 
not (anal~1ic) (cf Logic, trans. R Hartman & W. Schwarz. New York: Dover. 1974. # 36. 118) 
12." 
the subject concept. The latter is determined, or made "distinct"; as Allison says, it 
"therefore is the outcome rather than the starting point of such a judgment".9 
Throughout, it remains "a concept of a possible object", and is open to revision in 
each synthetic judgment. 
Kant substitutes the form "to every x to which appertains the concept of body 
(a + b), appertains also attraction (c)", for subject-predicate logic in the case of 
objects. 10 It seems that here Kant's logic is very close to modem logic, but there is an 
important difference, due to the unusual status of the object. For Kant the object = x 
is itself neither defined extensionally nor intensionally. Despite having been 
described as what is determined, as what undergoes the process of determination, as 
the object that is being "related" to, it is always "still undetermined" (A691B94).1l In 
another Rejlexion from the 1770's, Kant says that the "x is therefore the determinable 
(object) that I think through the concept a, and b is its determination or the way it is 
determined". With the identification of the object with the determinable we make 
some progress in deciphering the status of the object. Kant uses this schema of 
undetermined/ determinable/determination to specify his difference from a 'logicised' 
Leibnizianism, and to underscore the difference between logic and reality. He 
specifies that matter and form "are two concepts that ground all other reflection, so 
inseparably are they bound up with every use of the understanding. The former 
signifies the determinable in general, the latter the determination" (A2661B322). Kant 
goes on to explain that these have crucially different functions in logical and real 
determinations. In logic, "the universal is the matter, and the specific difference the 
form"; thus matter precedes form in logic. But Kant now criticises 'intellectualist' 
metaphysics, for confusing this logical function with metaphysical or extralogical 
functions. In what seems to be as much a self-criticism as a criticism of Leibniz, he 
objects that "unbounded reality is regarded as the matter of all possibility, but its 
limitation (negation) as th[e] form". Kant argues against Leibniz that form in 
metaphysics is prior to matter, due to the priority of the forms of space and time over 
9 Allison The Kant-Eberhard Controversv. 62. 
10 Kant, Logic, # 36, 118.' . 
II "Concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, are related to some representatIOn of a still 
undetennined object" (A691B94). 
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their contents. "[S]o far is it from being the case that the matter (or the things 
themselves, which appear) ought to be the ground (as one would have to judge 
according to mere concepts), that rather their possibility presupposes a formal 
intuition (of space and time) as given" (A2681B324). Space and time thus 'prepare' 
an item for determination by making it determinable. The object is an affecting thing 
that has been made determinable. Thus, it is not merely that the object is 
distinguished from the thing itself in the Lockean sense that it is "modified" by the 
sensibility of the subject (cf. TP 384, Ak. 2:393). The forms of intuition are prior 
conditions of determinability in general. 
The examination of the notion of object is vital to grasping Kant's break from 
Leibnizianism, for which the real use of judgments is formally reducible to the logical 
subject-predicate relation. If the judgment is merely logical, the predicate would be 
contained in the subject. But the object cannot be identified with the logical subject of 
the judgment, because it contains intuitive components which are not of the same 
character as concepts. They do not possess an internal unity in the sense that concepts 
do - their only unity is in the spatiotemporal field. 12 A 'unity' of immediacy and 
singularity may be attributed to them, but again this is dependent on the 
differentiation of the manifold of the spatiotemporal field in relation to the subject. 
But Kant's identification of what it is in the object = x that allows us to 
determine the subject-concept is problematic. It is synthesis that determines the 
object, but how does this work? Rejlexion 4634 (cited above) emphasises that the 
possible object is identified with a subject concept only through "the given knowledge 
of the object", but in the Logic Kant emphasises that, as a determination, synthesis 
involves "making a distinct concept", which he identifies with the making distinct of 
objects; 13 the obscure object that is made distinct is thus the "something in general" 
referred to in the Rejlexion above. So what is it in the object that grounds the relation 
of subject and predicate? Kant seems to vacillate between attributing the ground to 
12 This also rules out the object being referred to ,·aguely as some kind of intentional cOIT~I~te to 
judging consciousness, as while the object can only be identified as such by a concept. It IS Its 
elusiveness to the concept that is at issue in the notion of an 'object = x'. 
13 Logic, 70. 
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the subject-concept or the intuited object. 14 This ambiguity can be traced to Kant's 
uncertainty about the representational status of the intuition. The only thing that 
would warrant the subject concept is an intuition. It follows that in this case the , 
intuition would then be part of the concept,15 and itself an objective cognition. But 
surely Kant's whole effort is to show how different intuitions are from concepts, and 
thus to distinguish himself on this point from Leibniz: a subject concept cannot be 
justified in identifying an intuition, without unifying "many possible cognitions ... 
into one" (A691B94). As Pippin points out, the attribution of semantic status to 
intuition goes against Kant's insistence on the exclusion of direct experience of 
individuals. 16 
Now, the only time Kant seems explicitly to say that the intuition is itself an 
objective cognition is in his classification of the species of the genus of 
representation at A3201B377. 17 Here all the major species of representation in CPR 
are classed as "representations with consciousness (perceptio)". I suggest that there is 
a tension in Kant's account at this point, which we can pinpoint under the concept of 
representation. We have just seen that Kant vacillates about the status of the subj ect-
concept in a judgment because he cannot warrant its objectivity without attributing a 
direct relation between it and the object = x in the intuition. There seem to be two 
ways out of this: either affirm that intuition does have semantic value, or objective 
meaning as a representation, or affirm that the object = x, as "a possible object", must 
be thought as a problematic concept,18 or a task. I shall argue that Kant does treat 
seriously this latter option, which involves finding some kind of internal relation 
14 In this section of tIle Logic, Kant stipulates iliat in making a distinct concept one moves from ilie 
part to ilie whole. In detennining the object, "there are as yet no marks present - I obtain them first by 
syniliesis" (ibid). When ilie matIlematician and philosopher of nature attempt to determine an object. 
they must appeal to intuition. But how could the subject-concept be related to the object at all wiiliout 
anv marks? 
15 'Allison bases his interpretation of the semantic content of an intuition on Molte Gram's theory in 
Kant, Ontology and the A Priori (Evanston: Noriliwestem, 1968). In The Kant-Eberhard Controversy 
he discusses it at length (67-75). and continues to affirm it in a low key way in Kant's Transcendental 
Idealism: cf. 341-2. n. 19. 
16 Pippin, Kant's Theory of Form (New Haven: Yale, 1982), 141. Pippin criticises Gram's theory. and 
implicitly Allison's. 
17 "An objective perception is a cognition. The latter is eiilier an intuition or a concept". . 
18 After quoting the above Rejlexion. Allison goes on to ex-plicate ilie concept of the object by refernng 
to a passage from B 141 concerning the unity of apperception. despite having opened up the 
perspective iliat an object is "a someiliing in general". 
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between the transcendental object and the noumenon, so that he can indeed continue 
to affirm that "noumenon properly signifies something which is always the same. 
namely the transcendental object of sensible intuition".19 Henry Allison has argued 
that Kant has two notions of the transcendental object, one noumenal and one 
properly transcendental, that should be distinguished. 20 But if we keep sight of the 
present problematic, it may be possible to see how Kant's various accounts of a 
transcendental object may be consistent after all. 
More generally, I want to draw attention to a structural ambiguity in Kant 
about the notion of representation, which it will be left to Deleuze to explore, as will 
be seen in subsequent chapters. On the one hand, we seem to be far away from a 
representational model of knowledge whereby an intuition is subsumed under a 
concept. Firstly, sensations themselves are not representational in the sense that they 
intelligibly portray their content - they are simply the immediate matter of 
expenence. Secondly, concepts are not 'representational' in a direct sense but 
represent only the ability to classify and discriminate the matter of sensation. Thirdly, 
the object = x of experience is presented as indeterminate and problematic, thus 
differentiating Kant's philosophy from Leibnizian rationalism. 
But on the other hand, all of these tendencies are countered by others which 
return to intellectualist accounts of representation. Kant's project is riven between a 
radical anti-representationalism and an inability to sustain this radicality; 
Leibnizianism, whether in its logicising or realising tendencies, is never far away. 
The Deleuzian solution of this tension will emphasise the nonrepresentational aspects 
of sensibility and reason which are already at hand but underdeployed in Kant. 
2 Logic and Reality in The Critique of Pure Reason 
In CPR the logic/reality distinction undergoes a further diversification, leading off 
from the moves made in the Dissertation. Logic is now purely formal, and no longer 
relates to any object (GegenstmuJ). However, logic must gain sense through reference 
19 Ref/exion 5554. op. cit. 
:0 Allison. 'Kant's Concept of the Transcendental Object' (Kanl-Sludien 59. 1968). 165. 
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to something outside logic. In the Dissertation, the notion of reality as an ontological 
category was split into phenomenal ideality/noumenal reality, while the notion of a 
logical and real use of the understanding lived on. In CPR this ontological split is 
deepened, so that, as a result of existential import now being considered functionally 
equivalent to relation to a possible intuition, Kant grasps the nettle and calls the 
phenomenal realm empirical reality. However, what prevents Kant's ascription of 
empirical reality to phenomena here from being equivalent to phenomenalism is the 
fact that it is redeemed and justified through an account of its transcendental ideality: 
that the very possibility of empirical reality has necessary conditions. 
The use of the understanding is transformed accordingly. Firstly, if the 
understanding can have a logical use, this can only be formal, so a new notion of use 
must be found to describe the role of understanding in experience: there will now be 
an empirical use of the understanding, in which the understanding is always used in 
conjunction with a possible intuition. But this will be contrasted with a 
transcendental use, in which the intuition is not just lacking but impossible. 
Now while it would appear that the logic/reality distinction has been 
swallowed up in the new structure of CPR, in fact, it is possible to argue that it is still 
doing subterranean work. It has already been glimpsed that the notion of the problem 
has power only because it occupies a line between logic and the real, which in its 
importance for critique itself, is more general than the new distinctions just outlined. I 
shall argue that the phenomenalnoumena distinction is the key to the structure and 
metacritical claim to legitimacy of CPR, and that the Analytic of Concepts in 
important ways depends on it. For if, in the case of humans, the apriori forms of 
intuition and the categories apply only to the sensible manifold, and their apriori 
validity depends on this restriction, then the project of limitation or making 
boundaries is indeed the methodologically prior component of critique. The main 
question that will dominate this chapter will concern how Kant maintains an apriori 
reference to the noumenon, while simultaneously restricting the intellect to 
sensibility. I will argue that this is accomplished through the account of Ideas, which 
both can and must be thought, thus giving problematic sense to the noumenon. 
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If this complex project of delimitation is indeed the pnor component of 
critique, it will be seen why Kant maintained in 1783 that in the Dissertation one 
could "find a clearer prospect" of the aims of CPR despite the relative obscurity of 
the former (August 26, 1783, to Johann Schultz, C 208, Ak 10:352). In the 
Dissertation, Kant laid the blame for the failures of metaphysics with "subreptions", 
by which sensible cognition overreached its limits. But in CPR, really the same 
diagnosis prevails, although hidden in the vastly more elaborate structure. The 
problems of the Transcendental Dialectic all arise as a result of subreption, of the 
transgression of the distinction between phenomena and noumena. The three 
transcendental Ideas, of self, world and God, are all forms of this fundamental 
subreption, which in the Analytic, is given the name of 'amphiboly'. One of the 
clearest statements of this general position is given at the end of the first edition 
Paralogisms, where Kant states that "one can place all illusion in the taking of a 
subjective condition of thinking for the cognition of an objectD(A396). 
Thus the staking out of limits is the preliminary procedure of critique, and 
carries on in fundamental ways the goals of the 'pre-critical' period. This procedure is 
divided into two moments, which are mixed together in CPR. 
1. an investigation into the internal limits of the understanding and 
sensibility. 
2. an account of how these two forms of cognition and differentiation relate 
to each other. 
If we keep this twofold activity in focus, then the continuity in Kant's project is 
visible, underlying both the 'pre-critical' and the critical project; the innovation of 
CPR largely concerns the second moment. But we must start by approaching the 
meaning of Kant' stiistinction between phenomena and noumena. We will see in the 
next section that this distinction is by no means transparent in CPR, as it relies on 
getting right the parallel distinction between the rights and limits of the understanding 
and sensibility. The 'problem of noumena' only exists at all because the 
understanding is no longer unproblematically allowed to affirm "things as they are" 
(TP 384, Ak. 2:392). 
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3 The Problem of Noumenal Reality 
The Logical Possibility of Noumena 
It is possible to find a connection between Kant's unstable position on noumena in 
1770 and his important decision, expressed at the start of CPR, to make logic purely 
formal. In CPR, analytic truths, along with their highest principle, that of 
contradiction, are finally divested of any metaphysical validity. We saw in the last 
chapter that our inability to use the principle of contradiction in thinking of noumena 
(and God, as the principle of noumenal perfection), makes it problematic how we are 
to think of the noumenal at all. By completely depriving the principle of contradiction 
of any metaphysical import, Kant now makes it nevertheless possible at least to 
consistently think about noumena. The concept of noumena can therefore be clarified 
in a preliminary way by appealing to the distinction between logical possibility and 
real possibility.21 Noumena must be unconditioned and completely determinate, in a 
sense that appearances cannot be, as they are always conditioned. So while Kant 
insists that it is not possible to conceive of what a noumenon is like as it lacks 
intuitive content, the concept has logical possibility. Something is really possible in 
Kant's terms if it has some significance within the framework of experience. It 
becomes pre-eminently possible to logically think noumena - the notions of God, 
world and self are all logically consistent thoughts - but their reality cannot be 
known. Kant calls such concepts "problematic" (A2541B31 0).22 As Kant says, even 
though empirical intuitions and matter are merely relational, "through mere concepts, 
of course, I cannot think of something external without anything inner, for the very 
reason that relational concepts absolutely presuppose given things and are not 
possible without these" (A2841B340). But what significance does this merely formal 
21 Cf. R.M. Adams, 'Things in Themselves', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LVII, 
no. 4, December 1997. As will be explained later, I follow Adams' dissolution of the distinction 
between things in themselves and noumena. 
22 Adams, 'Things in Themselves', 810-11. Similarly Kant allows the concepts with which noumenal 
reality is described to have logical sense, such as noumenal causality. Adams writes that Kant has a 
special tenn - problematic concept - which concerns an object of which "it is only the real possibility 
of such an object that is tmknown to us ... [T]he concept of noumenal causality should be \iewed as a 
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possibility have if we are restricted in knowledge to intuition? Why does Kant also 
insist that noumena must be thought? 
II The Necessity of Thinking about Noumena 
Kant insists that it is necessary to think such boundaries in order properly to limit the 
domain of what can be known. That is, the thought of noumena is essential to any 
critical procedures of the mind. Kant gives a rather obscure, yet crucial account in the 
'Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in General [Gegenstande iiberhaupt] into 
Phenomena and Noumena'. He suggests that "we have an understanding that extends 
farther than sensibility" (A255). As no intuition can be given to such an extension of 
the understanding, he calls the concept of a noumenon "problematic", and a 
"boundary concept" (ibid);23 but this concept "is nevertheless not invented arbitrarily, 
but is rather connected with the limitation of sensibility" (ibid). Put this way, it looks 
like Kant is introducing a teleological explanation about why understanding must 
overstep itself - it must overstep itself in order to limit itself. But why must it limit 
itself? For whom is the concept of noumenon necessary? Must all human beings 
recognise this 'necessity', or only the transcendental philosopher? Two passages 
show that Kant opts for the latter: 
The understanding [which] is occupied merely with its empirical use, which does not 
reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may get along very well, but cannot 
accomplish one thing, namely, detennining for itself the boundaries of its use and 
knowing what may lie within and what without its whole sphere (A2381B297). 
In all the tasks that may come before us in the field of experience, we treat those 
appearances as objects in themselves, without worrying ourselves about the primary 
ground of their possibility (as appearances). But if we go beyond their boundary, then 
the concept of a transcendental object [Gegenstand] becomes necessary (A393). 
In both passages, Kant suggests that the ordinary use of the understanding does not 
need to "worry" about any critical procedure or apprehension of its limits. However, 
Kantian problematic concept, and can appropriately be used in any contex1 in which noumena are 
rightly spoken of at all" (Adams, 816,820). 
23 "I call a concept problematic that contains no contradiction but that is also. as a boundary for giyen 
concepts. connected with other cognitions. the objectiYe reality of which can in no way be cognised" 
(A25~1B31O). 
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the first passage talks of a 'self-determination' of boundaries, while the latter talks as 
if this transgression (and discovery) of boundaries happens without design and only 
then produces an object that must be described, upon examination, as problematic. 
While Kant seems to leave this alternative open, finding an answer to it surely is 
essential to the problem of the self-critique of reason. This issue will become more 
pressing as this chapter proceeds, but for the moment a further anomaly in the chapter 
under discussion should be pointed out. 
Kant states that the concept of the noumenon "is not only inadmissable, but 
unavoidable, as a concept setting limits to sensibility" (A2561B311). He then stresses 
that it is not, as might be thought, sensibility that limits the understanding, but "the 
understanding acquires a negative expansion ... and rather limits it [ sensibility] by 
calling things in themselves (not considered as appearances) noumena". He adds that, 
as well as "warning sensibility" (A2881B345), the understanding "also immediately 
sets boundaries for itself' (A2561B312). 
Why does the understanding limit sensibility and not vice versa? Firstly, the 
notion that the 'proper object' of the understanding is ''things as they are" seems still 
to be doing some work. Space and time, as the forms of sensibility, cannot reach 
things as they really are - the former involve purely external relations and are to be 
conceived as ideal, infinite, immediately given forms (A25), cast over noumena in 
order to differentiate them for finite minds. Sensible concepts cannot pretend to 
adequately conceive of completely determined noumenal substances. 
But secondly, this should be counterposed with Kant's fundamental 
proposition that concepts and intuitions require each other (even God requires some 
form of intelligence that would include both). Kant explicitly states, against his 
earlier writings, that the noumenon "is not a special intelligible object [GegenstandJ 
for our understanding" (ibid). If the noumenon can be thought at all, it must be 
thought problematically, not purely intellectually (this is surely a rectification of the 
inconsistencies in Kant's position on intelligibilia in the Dissertation). If a concept 
must be accompanied by some kind of intuition, the noumenon cannot simply be the 
thOUght of a mllndlls illte/ligibilis, but implies equally an (impossible for us) intuition 
accompanying that thought; it is the thought of both of these together that is 
'problematic'. It is this problematic composite that ultimately "limits sensibility" and 
itself. 
However, then Kant states that "an understanding to which [a concept of the 
noumenon] would belong is itself a problem, namely that of cognising its object not 
discursively through categories but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition" (ibid, 
italics mine). But he has just suggested that we "unavoidably" must think the concept 
of the noumenon and indeed goes on to say that it is through this thOUght of a 
problematic use of the understanding that "our understanding requires a negative 
expansion". How is the claim that the noumenal use of the understanding would have 
to involve an (intellectual) intuition to be squared with the fact that this problematic 
use must be thought by us? How is this "negative expansion" to be thought by liS? It 
is not hard to hear an echo of the structure of "negative pleasure" in CJ, whereby 
although a faculty "finds nothing beyond the sensible that could support it, this very 
removal of its barriers also makes it feel unbounded, so that its separation [from the 
sensible] is an exhibition of the infinite" (CJ 274). Thus, some kind of content seems 
to be necessary for the problematic thought, even though no knowledge is gained. In 
a sense, Kant's repartition of the Latinate 'intellect' of the Dissertation into 
'understanding' and 'reason' is a function of this problem; for God, whether 
conceived as "intellectual intuition" or "intuitive understanding" is never held to be 
capable of reason. Reason itself is the effect of the problematisation of the 
understanding by finitude; but paradoxically it is only reason that can think this 
problematisation, through the manipulation of the content given to the understanding. 
After CPR, Kant continually suggests more and more ways in which "rational Ideas" 
can somehow be "presented" to the subject, whether through their moral significance, 
by analogy in symbolic "aesthetic Ideas", or through the "ethico-theological" 
significance of the whole of cognition. I suggest that these attempts to clarify the 
problematic activity of reason must be seen as attempts towards the resolution of 
Kant's final problem, the metacritical status of critique itself, the problem of 
immanence. But before such suggestions can be explicated, we should tum to two 
other ways in which Kant deals with the present problem in CPR itself: firstly 
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'transcendental reflection', and secondly, the issue of the internal characteristics of 
space and time themselves. 
III Transcendental Reflection 
Now, while Kant says the understanding is not worried about limitation until it 
undergoes this negative expansion, he does also provide a "static" account of the 
distinction between understanding and sensibility in the Amphiboly of the Concepts 
of Reflection, which would seem to provide a "systematic" resolution to these 
''worries''. However, this section is peculiar in many regards. It is here that Kant 
expounds the crucial notion of transcendental reflection, yet it is placed in a mere 
appendix, and moreover under a heading that expresses its content only negatively -
as the amphiboly, or misuse of the concepts of reflection.24 Kant states that 
"reflection ... is the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out the 
subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts" (A2601B316; my 
italics). Such an act would seem to be vital to the preliminary orientation of critique, 
so why has it been left until this point? He goes on: 
The action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with 
the cognitive power in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish 
whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to the pure 
understanding or pure intuition, I call transcendental reflection. (A26lIB317). 
Thus, there is not only a special act of the mind, "prior to all objective judgments" 
(A2621B318) by which the distinction between sources of the mind is made, but it is a 
transcendental act. Now, the very ability to detect amphibolies of reflection, whereby 
certain concepts are treated intellectually, which should be treated sensibly, is surely 
at the very root of the problem of the synthetic aprion. For synthetic judgments are 
judgments that are apriori yet not merely analytic, and thus presuppose some relation 
24 As was pointed out by Hegel, Kant not only draws attention to the incompleteness of his account of 
the pure concepts, but eXlJresses the problem inherent in the formalist distinction and relation of 
concepts and intuitions by providing what Hegel calls "a treatise on the concepts of reflection - a 
sphere lying between intuition and the understanding or being and the .votion" (Science of Logic 586). 
Hegel arguably developed his central account of the Logic of Essence out of this hiatus in Kant. The 
problematic dialectic between positing reflection and ex1emal reflection is solved by what Hegel calls 
'determining reflection', which can be seen to amount to a deliberate conflation by Hegel of what 
remains separate in Kant, categories which detennine and the ambiguous acti\ity of reflection. 
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to extralogical reality. The distinction that lies at the ground of this root is Kant's 
oldest distinction, between logic and reality; and it is to this that Kant now returns: 
~ ... the quest~on is not about the l~gical form, but about the content of the concepts, 
Ie. whethe~ thmgs ar~ themselves Identical or different, in agreement or opposition, 
etc, then smce .t~~ thmgs can have a twofold relation to our faculty of knowledge, 
namely to senslbihty and to understanding, it is the place to which they belong in this 
regard that determines the mode in which they belong to one another (A2621B318). ~~ 
This is all very reminiscent of Kant's pre-critical account of intelligible and 
phenomenal forms of differentiation. The "place to which [the objects/Gegenstdnde] 
belong" determines how they will be differentiated. Transcendental reflection is thus 
equated with a kind of 'transcendental topology' (cf A2681B325). All Kant's older 
notions of 10gicaVreal opposition~ inner/outer, etc. find a new place here?6 He 
continues: 
For this reason the interrelations of given representations can be determined only 
through transcendental reflection, that is through [consciousness of] their relation to 
one or other of the two kinds of knowledge. Whether things are identical or different, 
in agreement or in opposition, etc., cannot be established at once from the concepts 
themselves by mere comparison, but solely by means of transcendental reflection, 
through distinction of the cognitive faculty to which they belong (ibid). 
Later he states that "if I apply these concepts to an object in general (in the 
transcendental sense), without further determining whether this is an object of 
sensible or intellectual intuition, then limitations ... immediately show up which 
pervert all empirical use of them" (A279/B335). But although this 'prior 
determination' by transcendental reflection seems crucial, Kant never really states 
what it involves. 27 By which source of the mind is this act carried out? Kant 
~5 For this and the fo1Jowing quotation from this paragraph I have used Kemp Smith's translatio~ as 
Guyer's & Wood's is unintelligible. 
26 Thus at A2651B321 and A2731B329, Kant distinguishes between the fonn of differentiation 
involved in logical opposition as contradiction (which results in nothing), and that involved in real 
opposition as cance1Jation (which does result in something, for instance, rest). Each involves a 
different conception of 'zero'. 
27 It will be suggested that the notion of transcendental reflection is developed in C1: there. its 
"subjective" status, its 'preliminary' role as the foundation of the critical thought of limits. its claim to 
ground the distinction between cognitive capacities, all reappear within a new, more 'metacritical' 
context. Thus Kant does make a "subjective tum" after the publication of the first edition CPR and the 
issue of the origins of apriori cognitions begins to be displaced into a logical reading of apperception. 
combined \vith further recourse to the doctrine of the faculties (in particular imagination). However. 
due to problems in the new account. in C1 Kant once again considers it necessary to develop the notion 
of reflection, which is accompanied by a development of the problem of the distinction and relation of 
the faculties. 
unfortunately provides no answer to this.28 In the present context, this absence of an 
explanation can only be because he thinks his accounts of understanding and 
sensibility are already adequately differentiated. That IS, the ability to 
transcendentally reflect on the sources of cognition in effect devolves upon the latest 
incarnation of Kant's metaphysical distinction between the logical and the 
extralogical, or real. The limitation of the understanding to appearances would thus 
seem to depend on the kinds of analyses of 'forms of differentiation' examined in the 
last chapter. 
iv Intuitive Reality 
But here we come up against a different kind of tension that appears in Kant's CPR 
project. On the one hand, Kant needs to positively distinguish spatiotemporal 
intuition from conceptuality as such. But on the other hand, he must relate them 
internally by means of the transcendental deduction. But the distinguishing, or the 
ascertainment of limits, must logically precede the relating, as the justification of the 
correct kind of relating (in the deduction) depends on the prior establishment of 
limits. 
Kant himself seems to be tom in two directions, as is indicated by his 
vacillation over the notion of 'formal intuition' (B160-1n.). Light can be shed on the 
controversy concerning this term by referring to an earlier use of it in the Amphiboly. 
There, Kant states that "multiplicity and numerical difference are already given by 
space itself as the condition of outer appearances" (A2641B320), and that the 
possibility of appearances thus "presupposes a formal intuition (of space and time) as 
givenJ\(A2681B324). But formal intuition is here used in precisely the opposite sense 
to the famous footnote at B 160, where Kant says that a formal intuition is a 
conceptualised representation of space and time (unified by the understanding), 
28 But it cannot be apperception (at least in the first edition), because apperception itself is described as 
a faculty of the understanding. Why should apperception by itself be able to make a de jure distinction 
between itself and intuition? Moreover. in the first edition apperception is only called upon ill the 
subjective deduction, whereas the objective deduction is occupied with the issue of apriori "origins" or 
"sources". for which apperception is not yet relevant. 
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which must be opposed to the mere "forms of intuition", that is. space and time 
considered as apriori 'structures' for intuition. 
It would seem that Kant's later move has to be the correct one, for the reason 
that our notions of space and time must always already be subject to 
conceptualisation.
29 
But Kant's earlier argument that "multiplicity ... is already given 
by space itself' should be taken seriously, for to lose this notion and give way to the 
other viewpoint leads ultimately to the Hegelian denial that intuition has any internal 
difference of its own, separate from the rights of the concept. 
It is as if there are two notions of time and space in Kant, causing a potential 
split in the Kantian system. On the one hand, Kant has discovered a peculiar, 
vectorial structure of space through the incongruent counterparts argument. As 
regards time, Kant seems to be playing on the Cartesian notion that time is 
intrinsically not a logical relation; but time also has a vectorial structure, being one-
dimensional and uni-directional. It is also claimed that the infinity of space and time 
differentiate them from concepts.30 These characteristics may account for Kant's 
statement that multiplicity is already inherent in space itself 31 But how does Kant 
move from this apriori characterisation of space, to the coordinated numerical and 
extensive magnitudes that he needs to ground the coherence of the world, or from the 
vectoriality of time to its extensive seriality? In the early Kant, this problem did not 
arise, as the internal, intensive nature of forces was in direct relation with their 
extensive coordination in the world. Or in other terms, the inner noumenal essence, 
which could be theoretically described through concepts, was actualised by its 
29 Robert Pippin has taken the note at B160 as a move towards the Hegelian problematic: cf. Hegel's 
Idealism. 130. 
30 Firstly. Kant argues that space is not a discursive concept, as it contains its components within it 
rather than under it. The components of space are parts "ithin wholes, rather than species "ithin 
genera. However, what is the justification for this? It rests ultimately on one particular property of 
space: that it is infinitely diyisible and e;x1endable, as geometry teaches us. But for Kant concepts 
cmmot have an infInite intension: they must contain a fInite. though indefinite amount of predicates: 
therefore space cannot be a co~cepi. The intension of concepts is to be distinguished from their 
e:\1ension in the following way for Kant. A concept may contain a potentially infinite amount of 
concepts. in the sense of lower genera, under it but can only contain within it (in its definition) a finite 
amount.. Cf. M. Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, 66-70. and M Radner. 'Substance and 
Phenomenal Substance'. 253f. 
31 It is often noted that Kant proves nothing yery concrete about space itself in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic. Far from being necessarily Ne\\10nian. it is pointed out that Kant allows for non-EuclIdean 
geometries as well. 
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contingent real interaction. But due to the changes in the formal structure in Kant's 
system, he now faces a problem in relating intuitive manifolds to their conceptual 
form.
32 
The theories of both space and time pull in two directions: towards a 
nonlogical, original, nonrepresentational form, and towards numerical, coordinate 
extension. Later I will show in detail how this very problem will be decisive for 
Deleuze's system. However, the internal tension caused by this problem in Kant 
obviously does nothing to help us discover a coherent ground for the distinction 
between sensibility and understanding. 
4 Noumena and the Self-Critique of Reason 
Transcendental and Absolute Conditions 
"One can place all illusion in the taking of a subjective condition for the cognition of 
an object" (A396). This passage was cited above at the outset of our investigation 
into the distinction between noumena and phenomena, and should now be placed 
back into its context. For there, we find a different light thrown upon our problem, 
one which again echoes Kant's early metaphysics, but arguably integrates it most 
successfully with the thrust of the critical project. 
Kant explains how "the dialectical illusion of pure reason ... must have to do 
with the universal conditions of thinking", of which there are three forms: 
1. The synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general. 
2. The synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking. 
3. The synthesis of the conditions of pure thinking (A397). 
In each of these cases, "pure reason is concerned merely with the absolute totality of 
this synthesis, ie. with that condition that is itself unconditioned" (ibid). Each of these 
notions of an absolute totality finds itself expressed in a particular "putative science 
... transcendental psychology, cosmology and theology" (ibid). The objects of these 
32 My characterisation of this problem is historical(v problematic, because Kant does state in the 
passage in question that "multiplicity and numerical difference" are present in space. whereas I want to 
suggest that there is a distinction bv right between on the one hand the characteristics of vectoriality 
and actual infinity which are not' intrinsicallY numerical and the notion of ex1ensive. numerical 
magnitudes on th~ ·other. which Kant does indeed in CPR describe as conceptual (in the A~oms of 
Intuition). 
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sciences are respectively, a pure unconditioned self an unconditioned account of the 
world, and an unconditioned metaphysical account of God. Now, as expressed in the 
above citation, these three cases express succinctly the variables of Kant's early 
search for a new well-grounded notion of sufficient reason. The "conditions of a 
thought in general" are equivalent to the apriori laws of logic, or what is by right 
available to the mind; while the "conditions of empirical thinking" and of "pure 
thinking", that is, world and God (or phenomenal ideality and intelligible, noumenal 
reality), are the elements that Kant was attempting to balance in his new investigation 
of sufficient reason. Throughout the earlier writings, these three elements have been 
present in a triangular structure that was intended to give an exhaustive account of 
metaphysical cognition, and to ground what Kant was later to call the problem of the 
synthetic apriori, but earlier expressed in terms of the relation between logic and 
reality, necessity and contingency, etc. 
Now, Kant still thinks each of the elements of this triangular structure of 
logical thinking - world - God, has an internal fonn that has apriori validity. 
"Thought in general" refers to the logical use of the understanding; "empirical 
thinking" to empirical use of the understanding in conjunction with sensibility; "pure 
thinking" refers to pure reason. This general account of internal form is present 
throughout all of Kant's writings. But these internal forms are now seen as 
intrinsically problematic, due to the new foregrounding of the second procedure of 
critique, the project ofjustijicatioll (the quidjuris). While "thought in general" can be 
justified through a 'metaphysical deduction' from the logical forms ofjudgment,33 the 
latter two must be given a 'transcendental deduction' - of pure concepts and of Ideas 
respectively. 34 
33 The centrality of the table of judgments is disputed among adherents to a patchwork theory of CPR. 
Thus Paul Guyer claims that the table is a last minute addition to the project of the Critique, which 
distorts the n~in motor of the account of experience: the forms of time-detennination. See Kant and 
the Claims of Know/edge, 98-99. I would agree ,\ith the negative aspect of Guyer's claim but my 
positi,'e account will focus on the persistence of metaphysical themes in CPR. 
34 I shall begin to discuss Kant's vacillation concerning the latter deduction shortly, It may seem 
peculiar that I have omitted to mention the transcendental deduction of space and time. Ho\\e,'er, in 
chapter 5 I show how the notion that space and time require a deduction is only affirmed by Kant 
retrospective/v "'hen the need for a transcendental deduction of pure concepts becomes clear (see 
A881B120). Hence Kant's reluctance to use the notion of deduction in the Transcendental Aesthetic. I 
suggest that the presentation of the apriori forms of space and time retain the ontological "alue they 
had in the Dissertation up to this point. at which they are specified as belonging to the structure of 
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We have seen that all thoughts require intuitions and vice versa. The middle 
form of 'empirical thinking' becomes prioritised if this mutual requirement is 
specified to the relation of concepts to intuitions. Just as the use of pure concepts 
must limit itself by restricting itself to finite intuitions (although we are not yet sure 
how), so must the structure of finite intuition - time and space - be shown to require 
the pure concepts in order to be possible. The pure concepts of the understanding are 
deemed to have 'real' significance if their necessity can be demonstrated for 
sensibility. The demonstration of this reciprocal (but asymmetrical) limitation is the 
task of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, and as many commentators 
agree, this task continues past the Deduction itself through the Schematism and into 
the Principles of Pure Understanding. 35 The notion of 'real possibility' thus seems to 
gain a more restricted, 'critical' significance; here it essentially signifies the ability to 
schematise the pure concepts according to the pure forms of sensibility, time and 
space.36 The Schematism can be seen as a demonstration, after the transcendental 
deduction had proved the validity of pure concepts for the forms of intuition, of how 
intuitions themselves are capable of subsumption under concepts. Thus, if everything 
in the manifold of intuition is temporal, then one is permitted to search for temporal 
functions that can be isolated in order to relate them to pure concepts. 
The result of the mutual determination of sensibility and the understanding is 
'knowledge' or 'experience'. Thus, in CPR Kant's position seems to be that the new 
"third thing" is possible experience. So surely Kant's early problems of sufficient 
reason, real possibility and the search for a third thing are resolved by the notion of 
experience, and the demonstration of its necessity. At the end of the' Analogies', 
'transcendental philosophy'. TItis again fits \\ith my thesis that the mutual delintitation of kinds of 
cognition and differentiation is the key to the structure of Kant's philosophy: the significance of the 
structure of space and time only becomes clear ·when it is related to and delimited by the pure concepts 
of the understanding. Accordingly, I think it is justified to continue to talk of 'empirical thinking' as a 
unified structure, even though that structure comprises a specific union between the disparate elements 
of sensible intuition and pure concepts. 
35 Cf H. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, Inf; P. Guyer. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. 
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36 Kant had used the word 'schema' since his early "Titings. but usually in relation to the relation of 
substances. In the New Elucidation and the Dissertation. the essences of the dhine intellect are 
schematised by being related to a world (TP 42. Ak. 1 :414: TP 391, Ak 2:398). The Platonic 
connotations are still strong here; see N. Rotenstreich. Experience and its s.vstematisation. 28-32. 
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Kant indicates that the unfolding of the synthetic apriori rules for all possible 
experience is the answer to his earlier problems with sufficient reason: 
In the absence of this method, and in the delusion of wanting to prove dogmatically 
synthetic propositions that the empirical use of the understanding recommends as it-s 
principles, a proof of the principle of sufficient reason was sought, but always in 
vain. (A2171B265). 
It is the priority of experience that precludes an absolute condition to be found for a 
self, a world and God. Because they cannot be 'known', these three limits of the 
triangular relation must become mere Ideas. However, a troubling ambiguity remains. 
We have seen how the second "universal condition of thinking" is called the 
"synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking". But if the conditions for the 
possibility of all experience are firstly the conditions oj synthesis and secondly can be 
demonstrated to be such synthetically apriori (in the Transcendental Deduction of the 
Categories), surely they could indeed be called "the synthesis of the conditions of 
empirical thinking". Why does Kant use such an ambiguously similar vocabulary in 
the first edition? I will show that there remains an inevitable proximity between these 
Ideas ("universal conditions of thinking") and the possibility of experience, precisely 
because of Kant's awareness of metacritical issues, not because of his lack of them. 
The problematicity of Kant's attempts to deal with these issues is not a sign of his 
obliviousness to metacritical issues, but results from a sincere attempt to provide a 
complete justification and demonstration of his system. 
On the one hand, 'experience' or knowledge is to be taken as the third thing 
that will ground metaphysics; but on the other hand, knowledge is just one part of a 
wider structure of 'real' possibility. This can be seen in three related ways. Firstly, 
what if the two kinds of conditions, transcendental and absolute, don't match up, or 
are not harmonious? Surely Kant is claiming that the transcendental conditions have 
some kind of 'absolute' status, if only for the realm of possibility restricted to 
sensible intuition? If these conditions are not secure, would they then undergo 
deviations during humanity'S journey towards the regulative ideal? But such a 
deviation would entail the distortion of Kant's whole apparatus, so that the whole 
concept of a regulative ideal would be put in doubt. Hence to avoid any potential 
discrepancy between 'constitutive' and 'regulative' demonstrations, Kant must find 
l·n 
some kind of further validity for his account of empirical thinking. It is because Kant 
is well aware of this need that he does not fall so easily into what Foucault calls the 
'empirico-transcendental' doublet, whereby any account of conditions is always 
undermined by the partiality of its empirical starting point. 
Secondly, the problem is paralleled in Kant's account of 'appearance'. In the 
second edition preface to CPR Kant says, "even if we cannot cognise these same 
objects [Gegenstiinde] as things in themselves, we at least must be able to think them 
as things in themselves. For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that 
there is appearance without anything that appears" (Bxxvii). There must be an 
essential moment of non-appearance for something to be able to appear as such. 
Once again, something 'absolute' peers through the structure of finite knowledge. 
But, thirdly, this requirement holds as much for the possibility of critique 
itself as for experience. The problem of noumena is intimately related to the problem 
of critique itself. I have persisted in suggesting that if the critical procedure of 
delimitation was not first possible, there could be no transcendental justifications of 
the possible relations to one another of understanding and intuition. In the present 
context, this means that the distinction between phenomena and noumena must have 
an 'absolute' validity?7 The only way to secure this without illegitimately penetrating 
the veil of phenomena would seem to be to claim that an adequate demonstration of 
this account for transcendental philosophy implies a higher account~ perhaps one 
which is metaphysical, but one that can be defended metacritically.38 
3: James van Cleve presents a more abstract version of this same point: "If there were no things in 
themselves, everything would be a virtual object - that is to say, everything would owe its existence to 
being apprehended by a mind, or at least by a cognitive act (if one countenances the possibility of acts 
without agents). But what about these minds or acts? Do they owe their existence to being 
apprehended? Presun13bly not. since in that case, there would be either an absurd infinite regress to 
eyer higher acts or else ~ impossible feat of existential bootstrapping, some items pulling themselyes 
into existence by virtue of their own self-apprehension. Even if literal self-apprehension were deemed 
possible (as in some Indian philosophies), we would have to accord to 'both' tenns of the relation the 
status of existence an sich, for a mere content cannot do any apprehending", Problems from Kant 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), 137. This problem \\ith Kant's theory was one of the first to 
be raised by Reinhold and Aenesidemus, but became submerged following Fichte's innovations. 
38 This can be shown in another wav. We have seen that in Kant's early work the 'world' signified the 
system of interacting forces in a ~tiotemporal field But due to the increased emphasis on restriction 
to appearances in CPR the notion of force has to be thoroughly phenomenalised. In the Afetaph.vsical 
Foundations a/Natural Science physical impenetrability is related back to the phenomenal experience 
of resistance. But at the same time Kant argues that the inner or intensive nature of physical things is 
force. As force accounts for resistance. Kant can ruJe out the notion of brute 'matter'. But how can 
But there is nevertheless a sense that all metaphilosophical attempts to 
provide such an account involve a characteristic violence that is signalled in the very 
concept of 'problematicity'. While, for instance, the transcendental use of the 
understanding is "a mere mistake of the faculty of judgment"(A2961B352), Kant also 
states that the real confusion involved in the delimitation of boundaries cannot be 
corrected de jure in any transcendental reflection initiated by the philosopher. There 
are certain transcendent principles "that actually incite us to tear down all those 
boundary posts and to lay claim to a wholly new territory that recognises no 
demarcations anywhere" (ibid). It transpires that these transcendent principles arise 
out of the "transcendental use of pure reason" (A3191B376; italic mine). This 
transcendental use - of reason - cannot be resolved by mere reflection (transcendental 
or otherwise), because reflection is of course an activity of reason itself. This is why 
transcendental illusion is so serious. The fact that the activity of reflection itself is 
perverted by a transcendental use means that any appeal to reason by the 
understanding in the process of transcendental reflection will merely shift the 
question of the validity of its use onto reason. 
Thus the problem is this: we are drawn to think about noumena by a 
transcendental illusion inherent in reason itself, but we have seen that the 
transcendent use or exercise of empirical cognition implied in the transcendental use 
of reason, is itself necessary in order to carry out the project of delimitation necessary 
for the critique itself. The project of delimitation requires some kind of apprehension 
of noumena; this apprehension must somehow be absolute and problematic at the 
same time. So what is the final criterion for saying whether such a transcendent use is 
an illusion or not - empirical cognition itself or the proposed metacritical grounding 
of empirical cognition? Such a riddle could in principle be clarified if there were 
something in reason itself which allowed us to distinguish the kinds of sense the 
problematic use of reason might have, in order to play its liminal role in the critical 
project. 
Kant continue to affinn that the world is organised as a structure of interacting forces? Again. such an 
ii The Third Thing and Ideas 
The very notion of an 'Idea' can only have sense because it does have some positive 
relation to our finite situation. Kant insists that for something to be thinkable, it is not 
enough for it to be simply logically possible, but it must have some kind of real sense 
or meaning. 39 Moreover, it has been repeatedly pointed out that Kant does allow the 
possibility of a transcendental deduction for Ideas; Ideas do have an apriori 
justification. Therefore problematic concepts must have some 'real' content, whether 
it be symbolic (the boundaries of knowledge imagined as fogs and icebergs; 
A2351B294), or, more importantly, what Kant later calls 'ethico-theological' (these 
boundaries mean something only because, by our nature, we seek the unconditioned; 
they mean we must find other ways than knowledge to find God and be good). The 
problematic conception of the Idea thus marks the primal meeting point of mere logic 
with reality. Problems must delineate the dimensions of reality. For, on the one hand, 
we could not know what knowledge is without encountering what cannot be known; 
only in this way do we discover the necessary fact that knowledge is conditioned, and 
what those conditions might be. Thus while Kant seems to define empirical reality in 
terms of the mere indexical presence of a sensible intuition,4O the concept of such a 
kind of reality is only delineated through questioning the limits of real significance. 
But in that case, on the other hand, the limits of real significance and the questioning 
of these limits are themselves prior to the transcendental analysis of the form of 
empirical reality. Just because God cannot be known, does not mean that he is not 
real; the question of God's reality may instead be approached in other ways (practical 
or aesthetic). Rational Ideas may thus ultimately depend on a kind of 'semi-divine' 
presentation in aesthetic Ideas. 
Now, R.M. Adams argues that problematic concepts do indeed gain a sense or 
significance when they are applied in their proper domain - the practical domain. 
affinnation can only depend on the intimacy of transcendental philosophy \lith metaphysics. 
39 "It is also requisite for one to make an abstract concept sensible, ie. display the object that 
corresponds to it in intuition, since without this the concept would remain (as one says) "ithout sense. 
ie. without significance" (A2401B299). 
40 In accordance with the move in the Dissertation mentioned above concerning the dependence of 
existential claims on intuition. 
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Thus the noumenal Idea of freedom or of God attains a kind of analogy to objective 
significance when it is taken as a practical object. It is as if a substitute for intuitive 
content is given to these problematic noumena, which fulfils the quantifying role of 
intuitions. Adams thus argues that the real possibility of no urn en a is in fact practically 
grounded in the objectivity of freedom. The concept of noumenal causality has 
significance or application because "through 'the fact of pure reason' we know what 
it is like to be free".41 Thus problematic concepts are only problematic when 
mistakenly applied in the theoretical real~ and not seen in their proper nature as 
practical concepts. Adams quotes the second Critique on this point: in the case of 
Ideas of immortality and God "their possibility, which was hitherto only a problem, 
here becomes an assertion" (pP 140, Ak. 5:5). 
This reading has many merits in the context of the ongomg dispute over 
things in themselves. Adams reverses the common idea that the thing in itself is the 
thing behind material appearances. For while Kant often argues that the affecting 
thing must be the referential object of an intuition,42 at the same time he withholds 
from specifying the relation between the thing and the intuition, and from 
characterising the individuation of things themselves. "The transcendental object 
that grounds both outer appearances and inner intuition is neither matter nor a 
thinking being in itself, but rather an unknown ground of those appearances that 
supply us with our empirical concepts of the former as well as the latter" (A380). 
That is, it must be borne in mind that in CPR Kant insists that not only space and 
time, but matter itself, are subject only to phenomenal, nonlogical differentiation. As 
"substantia phaenomenon" (A2771B333), matter is infinitely divisible in itself (cf 
d 43 S . A359); hence there can be no longer be any physical mona s. 0 as matter IS a 
merely phenomenal notion, there is no sense in which it could have content in another 
world than the spatiotemporal. "What matter is, as a thing in itself (transcendental 
41 Adams, '1bings in Themselves'. 816. 
42 Cf. Bx~:vii. A6961B72~. 
-13 See K. Ameriks. Kant's Theory of Jlind. 35. 83. In the Physical j\lonadololf!. Kant affinned 
physical force of the monads themselves despite describing their presence as \ utual. rather than 
lOCalised. 
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object), is of course entirely unknown to us" (A366).44 In other words, it has 110 ideal, 
or problematic status. Now, if the affecting thing has retreated behind the veil of 
phenomena, what kind of identity can the thing in itself have with its appearance? It 
cannot have type-identity, because the numerical differentiation of phenomenal 
beings must be different in kind from noumenal being; we cannot know that or how 
they map on to each other,45 but also token-identity is utterly problematic. Kant 
himself recognises this in entirely restricting his criteria for identification to 
appearances. 46 Therefore, there may indeed be many noumenal grounds for one body, 
just as much as there may be one noumenal ground for all bodies.47 
However, on the other hand, the concept of the self does have potential 
applicability beyond empirical intuition because of its problematic freedom, (or, on 
our reading, at least its ability to think problems). Hence Kant instead devoted his 
energies with regard to the issue of the thing in itself to securing one-to-one 
correspondence between the empirical person and their noumenal will. Even in the 
event of the failure of this project, the noumenon can still only be thought of as an 
immaterial substrate to appearances, and Kant's dedication to attempting to think 
through the way in which the self, world, and God can shape for thought this 
problematic realm continues through the investigations of the supersensible substrate 
of nature in CJ and into the Opus posthumum . 
This identification of things in themselves with noumena thus can be placed in 
opposition to Henry Allison's interpretation, in which things in themselves are simply 
the logical subjects of affection when considered separately from the conditions 
under which we know them. For Allison, things in themselves play one important 
role: to distinguish transcendental realism from transcendental idealism, or to provide 
a different viewpoint (a "double aspect") on the problem of knowledge. Thus things 
in themselves are restricted to their merely negative meaning. But we have just seen 
that the token-identity of material appearances with things in themselves is the most 
44 TItis sentence contains one of Kant's most e.x-plicit identifications of thing in itself and 
transcendental object. 
~5 On a Discovery, 125. Cf. Ameriks. Kant's Theory ofJJ;nd. 57. and note 77. . 
46 All reidentification takes place within the framework of apperception in the fonn of reproductIOn 
and recognition. See chapter 4. 
~7 Ameriks. Kant's Theory ojAJind, pp. 97L 149. 
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doubtful of all the noumenal correlations and Kant would seem, then, to haye 
intended the destiny of things in themselves to be realised in the practical sphere (or 
at least, the problematic realm). Hence to understand the notion of thing in itself as 
the material thing "considered" in itself, is ultimately incoherent for Kant. 48 The 
reference to noumena then, as the inner reason of things, is to the supersensible 
substrate, the true moral significance of the entities found in the world. There is a 
discrepancy between free subjects in their noumenal and phenomenal guises, which 
can be overcome by entering the (problematic) field of action. Thus within the 
teleology of reason, as especially spelled out in CJ, the noumenal realm is conceived 
as consisting of 'free' beings resisting and struggling against matter in an ethico-
teleological hierarchy. 
Two criticisms of Adams' account may serve to go on to produce a 
connection between this reading of noumena and the problem of immanent critique. 
Firstly, Adams avoids the question of what constitutes the 'real' in real possibility. 
He notes that the real possibility of God, on which Kant based the existence of God in 
The Only Possible Argument, becomes merely an Idea in CPR49 . But this conversion 
is left unexplained. How can the reality of a possibility be ideal? Surely Kant's earlier 
notion of real possibility is intended to secure something more than ideality? This 
complex question must await development until later. Secondly, as we have already 
had cause to doubt Kant's 'fact of reason' and his notion of freedom, can sense be 
48 Viewing the situation in these tenus also problematises what Allison calls the "neglected 
alternative" in Kant's discussion of the ideality or reality of time (Kant's Transcendental idealism 
lIlt). It is argued that time could Yen' well be ideal, but also reality itself could reflect this ideality. so 
Kant cannot assert that things in the~selves are non spatial and nontemporal; he should instead have 
regarded it as an open question. But to affiml this hypothesis would destroy Kant's reasons for ideality 
in the fIrst place. Kant has argued that another form of differentiation is necessary to discuss 
nonlogical entities. He has claimed that it is not possible for spatiotemporal differentiation to coexist as 
such with inner essences. because to affiml this lead to what he thinks is Spinoza' s 'spatial realism'. 
Also. due to his critical ~onception of matter. things in themselves cannot be spatially and temporally 
differentiated in themselves (cf. B308, where Kant talks of the impossibility of encountering spatial 
and temporal unity in the noumenon). The ideality argument arises because things in themselves must 
in prinCiple be different from spatiotemporal differences. As essences that can only be problematically 
conceived., they are precisely unactualisable in spatiotemporal e.\:perience. So the alternative is not 
neglected - in the terms of Kant's metaphysics, it is self-contradictory. (Thus while Allison argues 
against the neglected alternative from the strict phenomenality of space. I agree "ith Ameriks' 
insistence on the immateriality of the noumenon. Cf. also his 'Kant and Mind: Mere Immaterialism'. 
postscript to Kant's Theory ojJfind). 
~9 Adams, 'Things in Themselves', 819: cf. CPR A5771B605. 
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made of the above suggestions about the sense of noumenal concepts without these 
two notions? 
Ideas are problems because they are unexperienceable. "I understand by Idea 
a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense 
experience" (A327/B383-4). Nonetheless, Kant does suggest that there is a 
transcendental deduction of the Ideas, with a concomitant schematisation to fill in 
their sense (A669/B698f). Kant's notion that Ideas too have schemata remains rather 
undeveloped, and it will be shown later that Novalis is the contemporary of Kant who 
takes this possibility forward; it is also taken up by Deleuze. On Adams' reading, it 
would be difficult to understand how Ideas could have their own schemata because , 
schematisation, as the demonstration of real possibility, for him can only concern 
empirical reality. This is exactly what cannot be possible for Ideas. But if Ideas are 
read as primary problems which denote a 'reality', which may exist even though 
nothing is determined about it for knowledge, then the notion of 'real possibility' may 
be wider than merely empirical experience. 
The "negativity" of no urn en a (A252, B309), the negativity which makes Ideas 
problematic, is in fact quite specific. 50 Firstly, the goal of complete determination of 
Ideas is logically consistent, and is not itself negative. Secondly, if the noumenon is 
the object of problematic reference, it is negative insofar as it is problematic for 
knowledge. More specifically, its negativity lies in its problematicity concerning type-
and token-identity with phenomena, and in the difficulty of individuating the 
noumenon. 51 As a consequence of this negativity, the notion of objective reference 
must instead be determined by the categories (which will ground the determinate 
meaning of 'relation to an object'). But that does not mean that there is not a pressing 
sense in which Ideas must themselves, for various reasons that we have seen (and for 
more to come in the next chapters) be crucial for the critical delimitation of 
experience itself 
50 The distinction between negative and positive notions of the nownenon only really comes t~ the fore 
in the second edition. Although Kant says in the first edition that the concept of a noumenon IS "n~t at 
all positive" (A252). he means by this that nothing is "determined" with it. But the fact that It IS 
undetermined (in the specific Kantian sense of the word) for knowledge, does not stop It hanng a 
~omewhat "positive" role for thought. 
)1 Deleuze will take up this problem: see chapter~. 
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Arguably though, Kant himself does not come to a stable account of the 
relation of noumena and Ideas. Kant's late attempt at a "system of experience" (CJ 
First Intro 209) moves inexorably, but perilously, in the direction of further 
specifying the power of Ideas; Kant now tentatively attempts to understand "the 
concept of experience as a system in terms oj empirical laws ... Unless this is 
presupposed, particular experiences cannot have thoroughly lawful coherence, ie. 
empirical unity" (CJ First Intro 203). But such a "system" would surely somehow 
render accessible the "absolute condition" of "empirical thinking" that Kant 
previously said could only be regulative. In the Opus Posthumum, Kant not only 
begins to give a primacy to Ideas, but grants them "constitutive" validity, in what he 
calls a "system of transcendental idealism". He appeals to the notion of an omnitudo 
realitatis, as a collective (not merely distributive) system which would provide an 
"absolute condition" of empirical synthesis, and gives it constitutive value. 52 
Experience is grounded by its relation to a given spatiotemporal totality. ''What 
contains the possibility of physics as a whole cannot be a fragmentary aggregate; for 
as a whole given apriori, it must necessarily be a system which is capable neither of 
increase nor of diminution. Regulative principles which are also constitutive" (OP 57, 
Ak. 22:241). 
As Eckart Forster has shown, there is a return in these late moves to the 
structure of Kant's 1763 proof of the existence of God, as the real element of 
possibility. 53 It has been suggested that the main reason Kant overlooks this argument 
in CPR is because the thought of God can now only have a regulative validity; it 
cannot itself be known, but it can guide knowledge as a thought. 54 But that proviso 
52 "Whatever agrees with collective unity is actual (existentia est omnimoda determinatio, as ontology 
has it); but to achieve this thoroughgoing detennination empirically (as is envisaged in the transition 
from the metaphysical foundations to physics) is utterly impossible. It is possible, however, in relation 
to the absolute unity of possible experience ill general, insofar as the object of this concept contains the 
One and All of outer sense-objects" (OP 93: Ak. 21 :586). 
53 E. Forster, Kant's Final SyntheSis. 77f 
54 Dieter Henrich claims that the old proof is rejected because of the "subjectivisation of the concept of 
absolute necessity" (Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis. 187), while M. Fisher & E. Watkins claim that 
"ultimately, Kant's justification for claiming that God can be established only as a regulative principle 
is based on his distinction between reason and the understanding. Both faculties are principles of unity. 
However, they apply to different objects and the resulting unity is different in each case ... Reason does 
not constitute the object, but rather regulates the understanding" (,Kant on the Material Ground of 
Possibility'. 393). As far as they go, these claims are correct but they do not take into account Kant's 
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seems to be lifted in OP. A material or real condition for the unity of possible 
experience is now once again presupposed, the only difference being that Kant no 
longer characterises this fundamental reality as God, but as ether. However, while 
Forster is right, Kant does not return to the most distinctive aspects of his earlier 
proof, but resurrects the proof in the guise of a straight ontological argument, about 
the necessity for the existence of the sum of all predicates. 
Nevertheless, OP in general indeed involves a return to importance of the 
triangular structure of self, world and "God. They are no longer merely regulative, but 
now ''the universal conditions of thinking" are held to have an internal and 
constitutive relation with the grounding of experience. The experiencing subject is 
now explicitly grounded on its "self-positing" within an Idea of the world. As we will 
see in the next chapter, this self-positing arises out of Kant's elaboration of the 
"paradox of inner sense": Kant will hold that "positing and perception, spontaneity 
and receptivity, the objective and the subjective relation, are simultaneous because 
they are identical as to time, as appearances of how the subject is affected - they are 
given apriori in the same actus" (OP 132, Ak. 22:466). For the moment, we should 
recall how similar this idea is to Kant's early emphasis on "power to suffer" in his 
pre-critical writings. Again, the locus of the "third thing" is shrunk to the moment of 
relation between inner and outer, which itself depends for its coherence on the other 
element of the triangle, God. But in Kant's final work, all the elements of the self-
world-God triangle become mutually determining in a dynamic relation. The "power 
to suffer" the effects of the empirical world depends on the insertion of an "actus" of 
self-constitution by the subject in the world,55 but which itself depends on the 
"projection" of Ideas by reason. ''Reason precedes, with the projection of its forms" 
(OP 222, Ak. 21: 15); "Ideas precede appearances in space and time" (OP 252, Ak. 
21: 88). 
These notions will be expanded upon in our tum to an epistemological 
account of the relation of the subject and Ideas in chapter 5 and Appendix III. But one 
increasing awareness of the systematic importance of Ideas, and their possible role in the metacritical 
justification of the Kantian project as a whole; hence the reason for the submerging of the old proof is 
by no means straightforward 
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extraordinary final passage from OP should be mentioned, which crystallises the 
enormous pressure of different forces acting on Kant's attempt to complete his 
system: after remarking again on the "actus of cognition" necessary in order to know 
inner and outer objects, Kant states that "the spirit of man is Spinoza's God (so far as 
the formal element of all sense-objects is concerned) and transcendental idealism is 
realism in an absolute sense" (OP 255, Ak. 21:99). Nor is this affirmative reference to 
Spinoza a freak occurrence in OP. Kant talks of the abovementioned Ideas as 
"archetypes (prototypa) , by which Spinoza thought all things had to be seen, 
according to their forms, in God: that is, in what is formal in the elements out of 
which we make God for ourselves" (OP 242, Ak. 21:51); such notions are repeated. 56 
In both passages, Kant maintains that he is interpreting Spinozist intellectual intuition 
merely "formally", but nevertheless the status of these Ideas is held to be "absolute". 
But in that case, noumena would finally somehow be realised: Ideas, rather than 
being indirect signs and symbols of noumena, would be identified with them. 
Complete determination, therefore, would no longer be problematic. 
But it remains uncertain what the final character is of this late return on 
Kant's part to his earlier metaphysics: is it finally metacritical, or just metaphysical?57 
How can the collective unity be said to be constitutive without being a transcendental 
illusion? It seems that the horizon of totality, an Idea, is no more than a postulate to 
guarantee the coherence of experience. There is no synthetic demonstration linking 
empirical cognition and the system of the world; Kant seems to be claiming that their 
unity is analytic. Kant's final "system of transcendental idealism" in fact seems to be 
strangely uncritical. After having spent so long trying to keep the gap between logic 
55 "We can know no objects, either in us or as lying outside us, except insofar as we insert in ourselves 
the actus of cognition, according to certain laws" (OP 255, Ak. 21:99). 
56 Cf. Jeffrey Edwards, 'Spinozism, Freedom, and Transcendental Dynamics in Kant's Final System of 
Transcendental Idealism', in Sally Sedgwick (ed), The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 71n.2 for references. 
57 Burkhardt Tuschlillg has suggested that "in many respects during the period of more than 15 years 
spent on the so-called Opus posthumum Kant returns to his beginnings, from Hume and Locke back to 
Newton and, in particular, to Leibniz", 'The Concept of Transcendental Idealism in Kant's Opus 
posthumum'. in RM Dancy ed, Kant and Critique (Kluwer: Dordrecht, 1993), 155. 
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and reality open, by trying to find synthetic apriori principles, Kant's appeal to 
collective unity finally seems to close the gap between logic and reality. 58 
What I will suggest in the following chapter is that Deleuze in effect returns to 
the pre-critical issue of ontotheology, and to a renewed engagement with the 
problematic of real possibility (which Kant overlooked when returning in OP to his 
earlier proof), in order to attempt to resolve the problems we have encountered 
concerning the relation of noumena and Ideas. Ironically, it will tum out that Deleuze 
is ultimately less of a Spinozist than the late Kant seems to have become, precisely by 
holding onto the problematicity of Ideas. If Ideas are real possibilities, they are so 
only as the problematic locus of a calculus of compossibilities. Paradoxically, it is the 
recourse to Leibniz that will allow Deleuze's transformation of the Kantian problem 
of immanence to remain critical. The question will be whether Deleuze's delicate 
balancing of rationalist metaphysics and critique is as precarious as Kant's. 
58 Cf. B. Tuschling: "Kant found himselfthro~n back on the beginnings of his undertaking - indeed to 
the point of identifying synthetic and anal)1ic unity. the logical and the real relationship between 
ground and consequence; 'Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of 
Matter in Kant's Opus posthumum', in E. Forster ed., Kant's Transcendental Deductions. 214. 
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Chapter Four 
The Sense of the Noumenon: Deleuze 
Deleuze treads a fine line between Kant and Hegel regarding the status of the 
noumenon. On the one hand, like Hegel, he believes that Kant necessarily affirms 
some access to noumena (however, Deleuze does not maintain, as Hegel does, 
that Kant's affirmation is covert and self-contradictory). On the other hand, while 
De1euze contends that noumena can indeed be identified with Ideas, he avoids 
Hegel's move to identify the noumenal ( or absolute) Idea with the concept 
(however speculatively conceived).l For Deleuze, the noumenon can indeed be 
accessed by thought, but this thought is not to be conceived using the terms and 
means of conceptual recognition. Deleuze therefore fashions an unusual route out 
of the Kantian problem. He endeavours to construct a speculative philosophy that 
demotes conceptual recognition (the theme of the Kantian Analytic) from its 
central position, and instead demonstrates and justifies a transcendental 
connection between Ideas (Dialectic) and sensible intuition, or what he will call 
"intensity" (Aesthetic). He makes an attempt to achieve a philosophy of 
immanence close to Hegel's by alternative means. Being will say its own sense, 
the self-differentiation of Being will express itself without metaphysical 
remainder, through the construction of an internal relation between Ideas and 
I Hegel writes that "plurality belongs to being; the indiViduality, in positing itself as determinate. 
posits itself not in an e.-dernal difference, but in t1le difference of the Concept" (Science of Logic. 
622. trans. modified). Deleuze would agree "ith all of this, except for the use of the term 
'concept'. 
155 
intensities. Deleuze thus describes his task as "an exploration of the two halves of 
difference, the dialectical half and the aesthetic half' (DR 221/285).2 
For reasons that will only gradually become clear, the movement of self-
differentiation will be understood in terms of repetition. "The only realised 
Ontology - in other words, the univocity of being - is repetition" (DR 303/387). 
With the notion of 'realisation', as with his references to 'expression', Deleuze is 
implicitly moving in the atmosphere of the analogous Hegelian realisation or 
immanent expression of difference. But for Deleuze, internal noumenal difference 
will be expressed by being repeated. This will no doubt sound obscure. But 
Deleuze turns to the notion of repetition precisely because repetition is taken to 
signify difference without a concept. If one takes this signification literally, one is 
faced with the formal possibility that Ideas (and noumena), if considered as 
ordered in a way different in nature to concepts (according to a model of complete 
determination), may precisely be said to differ without a concept, that is, to 
"repeat" their differences beneath, or outside, the representational concept. This 
possibility is doubtless abstract at the moment. However, we will see that 
Deleuze's peculiar model of difference and repetition can in fact be unfolded into 
a powerful speculative system that combines and resolves in a new way 
speculative and metaphysical issues that have persisted from Leibniz, through 
Kant, to Hegel. 
The structure of DR is complex and hermetic. In this chapter I begin my 
attempt to introduce and expound Deleuze's theory by interpreting it in the light 
of the problematic of Kantianism. In so doing, I will be developing the problems 
which we have so far encountered in Kant's theory; in particular this chapter will 
develop the problems that were met in the last chapter. First I explain the 
motivation behind Deleuze's critique of representation. Then I begin to develop 
the two aspects of Deleuze' s theory of nonconceptual differentation. Firstly I turn 
to Aesthetic issues, such as space and intensity, and secondly, to Dialectical 
issues, in particular the nature of Ideas as problems. Finally, I develop Deleuze' s 
model of difference and repetition as an account of the self-differentiating 
2 It is worth noting here, as an aid to deciphering certain passages that will be cited that Deleuze 
coins a shorthand by which dialectical difference is referred to as "differentiation". and aesthetic 
differentiation as "differenciation" (cf DR 207/267). 
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movement of the Absolute Idea, explaining how it actualises neglected potentials 
in Kant's philosophy (in its pre-critical and critical stages). 
1 Beyond Representation 
It has been noted that an ambiguity runs through Kant's philosophy concerning 
the notion of representation. In their own ways, both Deleuze and Hegel attempt 
to resolve this ambiguity through an explicit critique of the concept of 
representation itself; they both claim to overcome representation. Hegel can firstly 
be seen as making a rationalist point against philosophies which give priority to 
Vorstellung: they accept what is given empirically as an adequate ground for 
making distinctions in philosophy;3 this reliance on "representations" hinders the 
attainment of adequate notions of things. 4 But, Hegel says, this dependence on 
what is given to the 'mind' itself presupposes, more profoundly, an implicit 
structure of "reflection", whereby, in the case of Kant for instance, the unity of the 
concept is treated as strictly opposed to the given manifold of intuition. Hegel 
suggests that Kant's philosophy remains not so different to Locke's undertaking 
of "a survey" of "the capacities of our understanding", an "examin[ ation] of our 
own powers".5 A philosophy of representation in general, then, presupposes that, 
on the one side the elements of the given, and on the other side the cognitive 
ordering and relation of those elements, can and must be separated and isolated 
from each other. "Mere representational thinking, for which abstraction has 
isolated them, is capable of holding the universal, particular and individual 
3 Encyclopedia Logic, # 1-3, 3-7. "Vorstellung" is rendered as "mental pictures" in Wallace's 
translation. 
4 Ibid. Cf Spinoza, EIIP28: "The ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are 
related to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused"; cf scholium: they "are like 
conclusions without premises". There is a strong rationalist strain in the Encyclopedia Logic. 
e,idenced in echoes of notions of necessity, real definition, and ex-pression from Spinoza and 
Leibniz. Hegel also argues that "thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing the 
necessity of its facts, of demonstrating the existence of its objects, as well as their nature and 
qualities" (# 1, 3): this necessity is secured by a Hegelian transformation of the rationalist notion 
of 'real definition': "the defect of the empirical method is that a notion is not defined as it is in and 
for itself' (#24Z, 40; cf. #160Z, 223fand #213,275: "the definitioIL which declares the absolute to 
be the Idea, is itself absolute. All former definitions come back to this"). Such a procedure is 
discussed in terms of the expression of the absolute (thus, Kant's "categories are no fit terms to 
eXl'ress the absolute" #44, 72) . 
.5 HegeL Faith and Knowledge (trans. H.S. Harris & W. Cerf. Albany: SUNY, 1977). 68f. 
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apart".6 Speculative thinking can overcome the structure of reflection, and by 
opening up the necessity of a purely "logical" dimension, force us to move 
beyond representation. For Hegel, representation and reflection are tied up with a 
"subjectivist" model of thought, but this model nevertheless must itself be 
incorporated as a necessary moment in the wider speculative structure of thought. 
Deleuze's attempt to 'go beyond' representation is somewhat different and 
will revolve around two main strategies. Firstly, like Hegel, he performs a genetic 
transformation of Kant's system of cognition, and by giving increased emphasis to 
the nonrepresentational aspects of Ideas and intuitions, puts representation in a 
new context; but unlike Hegel (a), his notion of ideal genesis will not be modelled 
on the concept, and (b), he retains the structure of the faculties, and applies a 
genetic procedure to the relations of the faculties themselves. Secondly, like 
Hegel, Deleuze enacts a new analysis of the de jure limits of conceptual 
representation, but unlike Hegel he does not see conceptual representation as a 
'necessary stage', but rather as a 'perversion' ofa deeper structure of thought that 
is more truly adequate to Being. For reasons that will shortly become clear, a 
detailed discussion of a part of De leuze's first strategy, the genesis of the relations 
of the faculties, will have to wait until chapter 6.2 (and Appendix V), while the 
other part, the genetic account of Ideas, will be encountered when we tum to 
Deleuze's theory of Ideas (section 3 below). I will deal with the second strategy in 
this section. 
First, though, a working definition of the notion of representation in 
Deleuze should be provided. In D~ he appears at the outset to present quite a 
crude notion of representation, a kind of amalgam of very general aspects of 
Kantian, Hegelian and Aristotelian notions. 'Representation' appears to be not so 
much a notion as a general framework, or what Foucault calls an episteme, 
composed of certain elements and conditions. In fact, as the term does not play an 
important role in Deleuze's work before D~7 it seems reasonable to assume that 
he is decisively influenced by Foucault's 1966 discussion of "the classical world 
6 Science of Logic, 620. On 'reflection', cf. Hegel, The Difference between Hchte's and 
Schelling's System of Philosophy, 94-8. 
7 In Proust and Signs, Deleuze criticises what he calls "the natural direction of perception or of 
representation" because of its "objectivism" (29). But this account is structured, as in Kant's 
Cri tical Philosophy. in tenns of a "common sense" use of the faculties, not yet ex.l'licitly in tenus 
of a critique of representation itself. 
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of representation" in The Order of Things. 8 There Foucault presents a very 
different account of the nature of representation from Hegel's, with its emphasis 
on its "subjectivist" character. As is clarified by the French title of that work, Les 
Mots et les Chases, Foucault's task is to present a historical account of three 
stages or epochs (renaissance, classical and modern), each of which express a 
different structure governing the relation of words and things. In the first epoch, 
"it is the thing itself which appears, in its own characteristics", articulated as a 
symbol or sign, through its resemblance to other things.9 In the classical world, 
the structure of representation dominates, in which "what has become important is 
no longer resemblances, but identities and differences"; 10 its most general form is 
an articulated system of a mathesis, a taxonomia, and a genetic analysis. The 
sciences always carry within themselves the project, however remote it may be, 
of an exhaustive ordering of the world: they are always directed too, towards the 
discovery of simple elements and their progressive combination; and at their 
centre they form a table on which knowledge is displayed as a system. 11 
Although Foucault does not mention it, such a system is perhaps perfectly 
encapsulated in Leibniz's text 'Of Universal Synthesis and Analysis', where the 
analysis into primary truths is paralleled by the project of a synthetic progressive 
combination in a "universal characteristic". 12 Now, Deleuze argues that 
representation can be expressed in terms of a "vulgarised Leibnizianism" (DR 
11/21). Deleuze thus can be seen as isolating the philosophical structure of this 
episteme when he claims that representation is defined by four elements: identity 
of the concept, opposition of the predicate, analogy of judgment, and resemblance 
of perception (DR 29/44,262/337). Again, as with Foucault, representation is not 
primarily treated in epistemological terms as involving an emphasis on 
subjectivity. However, Deleuze never says why these four elements define 
representation, and arguably, if Deleuze's account is treated as a more 
'philosophical' version of Foucault's, then both theories can be criticised for 
8 Deleuze in fact refers to Foucault in this regard at DR 2621337. 
9 The Order a/Things, 130, 17f. 
10 ibid 50. 
Ii ibid, N-5. 
i2 'Of Universal Synthesis and Analysis", in Parkinson ed, Philosophical Writings, lOf. Leibniz's 
early tex1s on the Universal Characteristic are perhaps perfect models for Foucault's point here. 
Cf. 'Of an Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking', 'An Introduction to a Secret Encyclopedia'. 'Of 
Universal Synthesis and Analysis'. in Parkinson. However. Leibniz is in fact a problematic figure 
for Foucault's model. as hi~ roots in neo-Platonism ~d Renaissance philosophy have been 
increasingly emphasis~d of late~ cf. G. MacDonald Ross, 'Leibniz and Renaissance Neoplatonism' 
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providing a merely abstract set of conditions, for which no account is provided of 
their necessity, nor a demonstration of their validity with any metacritical 
. 13 
necessIty. 
However, unlike Foucault, Deleuze presents his theory of representation 
not as a historical framework, but as a framework which expresses a certain deep 
structure into which all philosophical thought has had a tendency to fall. 14 But on 
the face of it, it seems doubtful that such a 'philosophical' episteme of 
representation would have any bite unless it could be demonstrably related to 
particular epistemological theories that are held to instantiate it. However it is 
evident throughout DR that Deleuze not only intends this structure to apply to 
Kant, but generates the sense of the above four elements from his reading of Kant. 
No doubt Deleuze wishes his theory to apply beyond Kantian epistemology to 
Hegelian, Aristotelian, etc. accounts of knowledge; but since his theory is so 
Kantian in other respects, it seems a good idea to attach the notion of 
representation to Kant. I suggest now that Deleuze has two main arguments about 
representation, the first epistemological, and the second concerning the limits and 
rights of the concept of representation, and indeed of conceptuality itself. 
The Epistemology of Representation 
In fact, there are four other crucial terms providing the real background to 
Deleuze's account of representation: generality, mediation, reflection and 
recognition. Representation is firstly general, and is opposed to the apprehension 
of singularity. A generality entails a mediation of an individual through some 
'third' medium. Whether this third is a concept or a perceived resemblance is not 
specified at this point. However, Deleuze seems to accept that a general 
representation of something implies mediation in reflection. This takes him up to 
Kantian and Hegelian requirements for representation, and allows us to give a 
(Studia Leibnitiana, supplementa 23, 1983), A Coudert, 'Leibniz and the Kabbalah', (in A 
Coudert, R Popkin, G. Weiner eels., Leibniz, A1ysticism and Religion, Dordrecht: Kluwer. 1998). 
13 Indeed it seems that Foucault's own account falls into the problem of the "empirico-
transcendental doublet" he so accurately diagnoses later in The Order of Things, whereby the 
determination of a set of conditions is shm,m always to presuppose the ex1raction of the relevant 
details from the empirical manifold in the first place, thus giving rise to a vicious circle: cf. 3l8f. 
14 Deleuze makes a gesture towards a Heideggerian kind of historical account when he claims that 
"it is ... a question of determining a propitious moment - the Greek propitious moment - at which 
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minimal sense, as Kant does, to conceptuality as suc~ as a mediating act 
committed in the space of reflection. 15 It thus finally implies an act of recognition: 
"the identity of the unspecified concept constitutes the form of the same with 
regard to recognition" (DR 137/180). It is this latter set of four terms that seems to 
be doing the work of accounting for the function of representation, as opposed to 
merely delineating its abstract conditions. Moreover, the first set (identity, 
opposition, analogy, resemblance) only seems adequately specifiable once we 
have explained the functioning of representation. For instance, Deleuze' s idea that 
'identity' is a function of the concept is only explicable if we already take identity 
to mean identification in some form of cognitive act. 16 Hence for Deleuze' s theory 
to work, it must rely on some very general notion of representational cognition, 
which is indeed delineated across the text, if never explicitly. This very general 
notion of a "standard picture" of representation would be uninteresting if it were 
not grounded in an elaborate and unusual account of nonrepresentational 
cognition. 
Now, although DR uses a new theory of the faculties in order to criticise 
representation, it is interesting that in Kant's Critical Philosophy (1963) Deleuze 
in fact first gives content to the notion of faculty precisely through a division of 
the possible relations of representation. Any representation, he states, must be 
related to a subject or an object; Deleuze's organisation of Kantian representation 
can be tabulated as follows: 
- Knowledge is relation of representation to the object in terms of agreement. 
- Desire is relation of representation to object in terms of causality by subject. 
- Pleasurelpain is the relation of representation to the subject "insofar as it 
affects the subject by intensifying or weakening its vital force". 17 
However, Deleuze goes on to claim that there is a second sense of the word 
'faculty' in Kant, whereby it denotes a "kind of representation", and, in particular, 
"a specific source of representations". This is divided as follows: 
-Intuition: immediate presentational relation; source = sensibility. 
- Concept: mediate representational relation; source = understanding 
-Idea: concept that can be neither presented nor represented; source = reason. IS 
difference is, as it were, reconciled with the concept" (DR 29/45). But this remains only a gesture. 
and no interesting historical structure emerges in the book. 
15 Cf CPR A681B93. and chapter 5 below. 
16 As we will see Deleuze cannot mean to subsume identity in the sense of strict ontological 
identity under 're~resentation', as the analysis of strict ontolo~cal identity is one of the ways he 
gains access to the notion of 'repetition'. which he counterposes to representation. 
17 Kant's Critical Philosophy, 4. Cf Proust and Signs, 85 for a similar treatment. 
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What is striking in this table is that only the concept is strictly speaking a 
representation. Firstly intuitions, Deleuze says, whether empirical or apri ori , by 
their very immediacy are not re-presentations. 19 Secondly, in describing the Idea, 
Deleuze paraphrases A3201B377 where Kant says that an Idea is "a concept made 
up of notions which go beyond the possibility of experience". However
o 
this 
description occurs in Kant's own classification of "the genus of representation". 
In paraphrasing it, Deleuze avoids any mention of representation, implying that 
the Idea cannot be a species of representation, if representation comes to be 
defined in terms of knowledge or experience. 
Thus the traditional concept of representation implied in the first concept 
of faculty is grounded, but also potentially undermined, by the second notion of 
faculty, which delineates what Kant would call the "subjective" aspects of 
cognition. If a genesis of these subjective aspects can be produced, then this 
second sense of faculty may begin to gain its own autonomy from the first. If each 
faculty can be shown to have its own kind of "object", then the notion of 
representation as Vorstellung can be analysed into a system of the destination of 
the faculties, and their possible relations to each other. So, in the 1963 account, 
representation is therefore limited to the 'faculty of concepts', while in D~ 
conceptual representation is further reduced to a particular arrangement of the 
faculties of sense, imagination and memory. This is one part of Deleuze's 
strategy. 
However, Deleuze also wants to criticise the assumption behind Kant's 
classification of intuitions, concepts and Ideas as species of representation at 
A3201B377. Here a different, more Wolffian, 'intellectualist' notion of 
representation is at work. Kant envisages a complete determination of concepts 
that, while it reproduces in Idea only the Leibnizian universe of all possible 
18 Kant's Critical Philosophy, 8. 
19 Cf DR 56/79. However, Deleuze seems to rely on an inadequate translation here bec~use 
Vorste/lung does not imply any 're-', or 'taking up again': in fact, for Kant intuitions are precIsely 
vor uns, in that the subject is affected by them. However, Deleuze has a point as sensible 
1 "orste/lung is indeed better described as 'presentation': the 'object' of mere intuition is scarcely 
an object at all, it is only distinguished in subject/object terms once the understanding is ~e~ 
account of. As Deleuze puts it "in Kant, phenomenon means not appearance. but appeanng 
(Kant's Critical Philosophy, 8). It is after all, immediate; the sensible is the spatiotemporal eyent 
of appearing. The notion of sensible 'presentation' is analogous to what Nietzsche saId of 
lightning: there is no doer behind the deed. The inference to behind the deed needs some other 
ex-planation ("relation to an Object"). 
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detennination, nevertheless stipulates that each individual can in principle be 
treated as a conceptual representation. Therefore, instead of beginning DR with a 
critique of the representational aspects of experience, Deleuze begins rather with 
the outer limits of representation, and the theme of complete determination that 
Kant inherits from Leibniz. In effect, he subjects this 'background' notion of 
representation to a critique that Kant had left undone: to what extent can 
experience be considered to begin with de jure in tenns of "representation"? What 
are the limits of representation itself? It is because of the priority of this question 
that the theory of faculties outlined above must be left until chapter 6. The critique 
of representation itself will provide us with reasons for turning ultimately to the 
variable relations of the faculties in order to generate an account of experience. 
II The Limits of Conceptual Representation 
The rationale for DeIeuze's concepts of difference and repetition is provided first 
of all in the introductory chapter of DR, where we can find an implicit critique of 
Kant's utilisation of the distinction between the logical and real use of concepts. 
In effect, Deleuze returns to Kant's 'pre-critical' emphasis on this distinction, in 
order to subject it to a critique that did not occur in Kant. What are the limits of 
the real use of concepts? I have suggested above that many of Kant's 'pre-critical' 
concepts find their place in the critical project at the edges of CPR, whether in the 
Amphiboly, or in the Transcendental Ideal and Ideas. In a sense, part ofDeleuze's 
strategy concerning Kant is to draw attention to the weight the Kantian project 
actually leans on its outer limits. When Deleuze criticises ''the so-called 
Copernican revolution", it is really these limit and background concepts that 
Deleuze is exposing. Much of the intrinsic interest of Deleuze's project is in the 
question of whether he can return to these persistent 'metaphysical' issues in Kant 
and still retain a 'critical' perspective himself Such a project cannot occur 
without putting in question what critique itself is or can be. 
Deleuze begins his highly abstract treatment of logic and reality in 
representationalist philosophy by discussing the background assumptions about 
concepts that are shared by Leibniz and Kant. Representational theories for which 
difference is conceptual difference, or difference involves mediation, are held to 
share three formal principles: "a principle of difference, that every determination 
16~ 
is conceptual in the last instance" (DR 11-12/21), a principle of sufficient reason 
("one concept per particular thing"), and a reciprocal principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles ("one thing per concept"). Now while Deleuze himself admits that 
this is a "vulgarised Leibnizianism", there are two senses in which this picture has 
validity. Firstly, it can be seen, in terms congruent with my position so far, as a 
minimal characterisation of the logicised version of Leibnizian rationalism. We 
have seen that both Kant and Leibniz himself attempt to resist this logicisation, 
and their resistance to it can be seen as the epicentre of their projects to find a 
principle of sufficient reason. It has also been seen that this project met with 
uncertain success, and so Deleuze's characterisation of a logicised-Leibnizian 
framework of representation, in which logic and reality are only minimally 
distinguished, can serve as a return to the zero point from which to begin once 
again to make investigations into the limitations of logic and the rights of reality. 
For Deleuze, the innovation of post-Kantian philosophy, and the 
decisiveness of its distinction between logic and reality, lies in its 
problematisation of the determinability of concepts and Ideas in experience. In a 
passage from the B-paralogisms, Kant presents the distinction between what IS 
available to mere thought and what is not in terms of the rights of the 'I think': 
Thinking, taken in itself, is merely the logical function and hence the sheer 
spontaneity of combining the manifold of a merely possible intuition; and in no 
way does it present the subject of consciousness as appearance, merely because it 
takes no account at all of the kind of intuition, whether it is sensible or 
intellectual. ... fu the consciousness of myself in mere thinking I am the being 
itself, although nothing in myself is thereby given to me for thinking" (B428-9). 
Even in the case of myself, there is, contra Descartes, no immediate way of 
making the leap from the merely logical validity of thought to any claim about the 
bearer of that thought. De1euze says, in commentary on this passage, 
Kant therefore adds a third logical value: the determinable, or rather the form in 
which the undetermined is determinable (by the determination). This third value 
suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of 
Difference - no longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but 
in the form of an internal Difference which establishes an apriori relation 
between thought and being. Kant's answer is well known: the form under which 
undetermined existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time (DR 86). 
Hence for Deleuze the locus of the distinction between logic and reality, the place 
of the 'transcendental' in Kant, lies in the foregrounding of the specificity of the 
question of determinability. I will comment on the pecularities of the above 
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passage in chapter 6.3, but for the moment it suffices to suggest that even in Kant 
and Hegel, although the emphasis falls on the role of experience and 
determinability, there remains a logical background theory of an 'ideal' world of 
determinations in which everything has its concept. Thus in Kant, there is a 
"transcendental ideal" of complete determination, while Hegel's theories of 
judgment and the syllogism in the Doctrine of the Notion in the Science of Logic 
also provide an ultimate theory of the necessary possibility of complete 
determination. In both of these cases, a finite subject, or even community of 
subjects, cannot fulfil this ideal (because of the limits of determinability), but 
nevertheless the ideal is necessary to the system both metacritically and for the 
purpose of the coherence of the concepts that are known and used by 
experiencing subjects. 2o Both empirical and transcendental concepts, in their real 
use, point towards complete determination. The unity of the act of 
conceptualisation is oriented by the projected unity of the intensional parts 
(representations) of the concept itself. 
Deleuze's question will be: what is the relation between the ideal world of 
representation and determinability? He will push this point in particular with 
regard to his insistence that the domain of the determinable is composed of certain 
non-representational components. More generally, what is the relation between 
the logical value of Ideas and their real status and value? If Ideas are problematic 
concepts for knowledge, yet necessary for thought, then shouldn't their status 
beyond knowledge be explored as such? For Kant, problems cease to be such 
when they are put in the correct perspective, ie. practical reason. For Deleuze, the 
correct, transcendental perspective for problems is to see them as problems in 
themselves, while Kant, when talking of problems, tends to see them in terms of 
an overlapping between logic and empirical reality. But to see their 'reality' in 
terms of their being problems in themselves entails working out a rational, but 
nonlogical structure of the determinability of Ideas. It is precisely this that 
constitutes Deleuze's carrying through of the Copernican revolution. 
20 This will no doubt provoke unease in the reader that I am missing what is most distinctive in 
Kant and Hegel's theories of conceptualisation and mediation. Kanfs theory at least WIll .be 
eXl'lored at some length in tlIe next chapter. The virtue of 'starting at the end' "i~ these ~eones 
of the concept is to underline how rationalist representational notions still undergrrd KantIan and 
Hegelian philosophy (among others). 
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But first we need to examine how Deleuze demonstrates the limits of the 
concept in the framework of representation, at DR 11-15/21-25. Logically, a 
concept has a comprehension (or intension) and an extensio~ which are correlated 
in an inverse relatio~ so that the more the concept comprehends, the less it 
extends over a variety of differing instances. 21 Now how are logical and real uses 
distinguished by Deleuze in this framework? "The concept is thus constituted in 
such a fashion that, in its real use, its comprehension extends to infinity, but in its 
logical use, this comprehension is always liable to an artificial blockage" (DR 
12/21). Thus, the "real use" simply denotes the full metaphysical extension of this 
rationalist picture, in which everything has its own individual concept, whereas 
the logical use concerns the procedure of stopping to analyse formal connections, 
and comparing concepts in general. As for Kant in the Inaugural Dissertation (#5, 
TP 385, Ak. 2:393), it is the lOgical use of concepts that is the index of finitude, as 
the procedure of analysis presupposes that one does not have infinite and 
instantaneous access to the contents of all concepts. But what does Deleuze mean 
by "artificial blockage"? 
Every predicate in a concept must be specified by other predicates, 
because, for instance, "animal becomes something other in man and in horse ... a 
predicate must remain fixed in the concept while becoming something other in the 
thing" (DR 12/21). Because of this becoming-other, the predicate itself must 
become the object of another predicate. Thus in principle, the specification of 
predicates in a concept extends to infinity.22 However, in order to logically 
analyse and define a concept, it is necessary to order its comprehension in a 
hierarchy of higher and lower concepts, and not to follow the infinite specification 
of each component predicate. Thus the concept is blocked from flowing into its 
fuII metaphysically infinite comprehension. In this case, however, it follows that 
when a concept is treated purely logically, the concept, because it has been 
logically limited, can in principle apply to more than one thing, or have a greater 
extension; thus "no existing individual eml correspond to it hic et nunc" (ibid). 
21 In Deleuze's treatment of this aspect of the concept, he is not yet treating the concept as rule. but 
~!mply "ith regard to its anal}1ic content. .. . 
~- This could be said to apply in principle to Kant's notion that concepts are r~resentatl?ns .?f 
representations" (A681B93), as well as, say. Lacan's notion of a sig;ni.f)'ing cham. ill which a 
signifier is that which represents a subject for another signifier" (The Four Fundamental c..0nceprs 
of PsychoanaZvsis, London: Penguin 1979, 207; cf. Ecrits, London: Ta,istock. 1977. 1~0). But 
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This is the reason for the "rule of the inverse relation of comprehension and 
extension". So artificial blockage is built into the use of concepts, as they 
presuppose an ideal fixity in order to ensure the possibility of definition. Even in 
the Wolffian 'logicising' picture of representation, then, real and logical use are 
perpetually in tension with each other. 
The classical question of the relative importance of real and nominal 
definition can be seen as intrinsically connected to this tension. Howevec this 
question also requires that the concept no longer be treated in such a pure 
metaphysical way, and that the issue of analysis and definition be related to the 
use of signs. Because we think in words, we can only dream of such a logicising 
calculus of infinite concepts. 23 Words have a finite comprehension: "we have here 
a reason why the comprehension of the concept cannot extend to infinity: we 
define a word by only a finite number of words" (DR 13/22). That is, because a 
language is composed of a finite amount of words, any word must be defined by a 
finite amount of words. Now this means that any word will apply to things that in 
themselves may be different, but this difference will be excluded not just from the 
logical, but also the real use of the concept as word. Thus while the concept as 
word would simply be repeated, the signified would differ without a concept. 
Deleuze insists that to speak of language at this stage is to introduce 
something extraneous to the pure logic of conceptual representation. The kind of 
blockage evidenced in words is a "natural blockage" (DR 12/22). Deleuze then 
crucially calls up again the Kantian distinction: artificial blockage "refers to logic 
pure and simple, but the other refers to a transcendental logic or a dialectic of 
existence" (ibid). Here, Deleuze is in effect providing the simplest formal 
example of the limitation of logic, or the delineation of the' outside' of logic. It is 
all the more appropriate in that we tend to use words in the very articulation of 
logical concepts. What is important here is that, rather than presupposing that 
either of these conceptions by themselves remains representational unless the issue of 
determinability is eXl'Iicitly broached. 
23 In 17th century philosophy this distinction was important and while rationalists and emp~cists 
emphasised one side of the distinction or the other, they both never lost sight of the neceSSIty of 
both logical and linguistic treatments of the concept; thus, despite devoting a substantial part of the 
Essav to 'words'. Locke did not doubt that the real essence of things had to be considered as well 
as the nominal (ct. Essay III.Yi.6). Similarly, Leibniz devoted much attention to the possibilities of 
language and its adequacy to logical determination. The turning point is often seen to be K~l 
who comes to define concepts as rules. or cognitive acts. But it is vital to Kant to keep the notIon 
of complete determination. 
167 
there just is something irreducible to the concept, and therefore 'real', as Kant 
came to do more and more in his critical writings (while his pre-critical writings 
are more attentive, more critical, concerning this question), Deleuze is 
demonstrating the necessity of an outside to the concept through its own 
limitations. Furthermore, by using this method, he may be able to show that, eYen 
within the framework of representation, there may be different kinds or senses of 
reality lying outside the concept, but which are nevertheless necessary for the 
concept. Or, in other words, there may be different ways in which things repeat. 
And this indeed turns out to be the case. Deleuze names three main types 
of natural blockage or repetition within the schema of representation. Nominal 
concepts, or words, is the first case; there are two others: what Deleuze calls, 
consciously (though obscurely) echoing Kant, concepts of nature and concepts of 
freedom. In CJ Kant suggests that concepts of nature and freedom are two 
fundamental transcendental domains, which are separated by "an immense gulf' 
(CJ 175). But here Deleuze seems to be 'deducing' that the realm of 
representation is intrinsically bounded by intrusions of the need for nominal 
concepts, and nature and freedom. The latter are, at this point in Del euze' s 
analysis, uncovered as necessary limitations of the ideal world of representation 
presupposed by Kant. 
Whereas nominal concepts are defined by their finite comprehension, 
natural concepts are defined by their indefinite comprehension: "however far one 
pursues that comprehension, one can always think that it subsumes perfectly 
identical objects" (DR 13/23).24 Deleuze gives the example of Kant's incongruent 
counterparts, as "objects endowed with only an indefinite specification, and 
purely spatio-temporal or oppositional, non-conceptual determinations" (ibid). He 
goes on to state that such objects seem to testify to a "real opposition", thus 
recalling Kant's attempt to distinguish logic and reality by delineating two forms 
of opposition. 25 However, Deleuze then adds that real opposition should not be 
seen as "a maximum of difference, but [ as] a minimum of repetition ... space and 
~4 Hence Deleuze already rules out a preliminary opposition between infInite and finite in locating 
~e limitations of logic and reality. . ' 
_5 Kant restricted his notion of real opposition to the argument recounted ill chapter 2.3J. 
concerning the nature of zero; however. the attention paid to the yectorial character of s~ce 111 
Directions in Space must be kept in mind as another component of Kant's project to detennme the 
spatial form of real differentiation. 
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time are themselves repetitive milieux" (ibid). I will return to this suagestion in 
0...., 
much greater detail shortly. 
Deleuze then abruptly generalises his suggestion about instances of 
repetition in nature by turning to a brief quasi-Hegelian characterisation of nature 
as "external to itself'. If repetitions appear to be found in nature, this is not 
because in themselves they repeat - rather the repetition requires a mind to 
apprehend it. Concepts of nature "are always in something else: they are not in 
Nature but in the mind which contemplates it or observes it, and represents it to 
itself That is why it is said that Nature is alienated mind, or alienated concept, or 
opposed to itself' (DR 14/24)?6 It is difficult at this stage to see the connection 
between the move to relate real opposition in space to repetition and this 
suggestion of nature's self-opposition, but Deleuze seems to suggest that the latter 
will also profitably be treated as a repetition, which becomes 'for-itself only in a 
mind that discerns it. 
Concepts of freedom can only be outlined at this stage, as the discussion 
presupposes that certain other parts of DR have been made clear. There is a third 
possibility for natural blockage, Deleuze says: an individual notion which does 
indeed have infinite comprehension, but for which the correct faculties for its 
cognition are not all present. Thus, it may be possible to synthesise the elements 
of this representation in memory, but the crucial capacity of self-consciousness is 
lacking. "What is missing ... for a determinate natural reason, is the for-itself of 
consciousness or recognition" (DR 14/24). In this case, Deleuze suggests, what 
we have is an unconscious representation.27 And indeed, he appeals to Freud to 
explain how this representation functions: "it is ... repeated, enacted, instead of 
26 Cf. Hegel: "Nature has presented itself as the Idea in the form of otherness. Since therefore the 
Idea is the negative of itself, or is external to itself Nature is not merely external in relation to this 
Idea ... the truth is rather that externality constitutes the specific character in which Nature. as 
Nature exists", Encyclopedia Philosophy of Nature (trans. A V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1970). # 247, 13f.; however in the nex1 paragraph Hegel suggests that this intrinsic 
eX1ernality only has "the Schein of an indifferent subsistence and isolation" (17). In the remark .he 
adds "in itself, in the Idea, Nature is divine; but as it is, the being of Nature does not accord \Hth 
its Notion: rather is Nature the unresolved contradiction" (ibid). However, the fact that even the 
being of brute matter exhibits spatiotemporal form, leads Hegel on the path of discerning greater 
developments of this initial contradiction between the Idea and the being of nature. In a different 
way_ Deleuze's earlY work is also committed to hierarchy in nature. 
:; Deleuze' s discus~ion is made highly peculiar by his insistence that such a concept must have 
infinite comprehension, considering he has already shown that beings who use words for concepts 
camot have such concepts. Why doesn't he allow the concept to be merely nominaP This would 
open the way for a plausible account of the unconscious. rather than a completely metaphYSIcal 
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, k ,,28 B h h h' bemg nown. ut w at as t IS to do with a 'concept of freedom'') 
Frustratingly, no argument or claim is made, and the phrase may be ironic. 
pointing to the Spinozist notion that we believe we are most free when we are 
least aware of what is determining us. Nevertheless if such ignorance can be seen 
to have constitutive power, then this domain of concepts may still retain some 
peculiar sense of their own, In fact, once we move out of the register of 
representation, Deleuze indeed places great ethical weight on the notion of 
unconscious repetition. 
We have glimpsed that Deleuze's three suggestions about extralogical (or 
real) determinability all essentially involve the notion of repetition. We must now 
begin the task of making sense of this obscure notion, which Deleuze opposes 
throughout DR to representation. The account so far has merely suggested a sense 
in which the 'outside' of the concept can be understood through the notion of 
repetition, as "difference without a concept". But this is merely a negative 
understanding of repetition. We still have no way of thinking for itself this 
difference without a concept implied in the notion of repetition. With such a 
negative explanation, "no doubt the formal identity which corresponds to simple 
logical blockage may be opposed to real identity (the Same) as this appears in 
natural blockage" (DR 16/26). Repetition is still thought in relation to the 
concept. In fact, from now on, in line with Leibniz's and Kant's search for an 
extralogical principle of reality, the situation must be reversed: "natural blockage 
itself requires a positive supraconceptual force capable of explaining it, and of 
thereby explaining repetition" (ibid). 
The exposition of the notion of repetition will be distributed over the 
whole chapter, as it will involve considerable detours into Deleuze's notions of 
intensity, Ideas and structures, all of which are for him eminently 
nonrepresentational forms. We will start by returning to the notion of "concepts of 
one. However, it must be kept in mind that the goal of his discussion is to find the de jure limits to 
the structure of representation. 
~8 It may immediately be objected that memory without self-consciousness is inconceiyable. but 
Deleuze is insistent throughout his work that memory must in fundamental ways be thou.ght as 
outside consciousness. In Nietzsche and Philosophy he cites Freud's claims that "our memones ar~ 
by nature unconscious", and "consciousness is born at the point where the mnemonic trace stops 
(Nietzsche and Philosophy, 112). As we will see in chapter 6 and Appendix IV. Deleuze has a \'ery 
restrictive account of what 'consciousness' is. putting the weight of the syntheses of the mmd 
elsewhere, in the passive syntheses of habit and memol}·. However. it will be shown that Deleuze 
is really developing Kant's A-Deduction on these points. 
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nature", specifically to the example of space. Deleuze will be seen as providing a 
parallel account to Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, which further pinpoints the 
notion of 'reality' or the extralogical for transcendental philosophy. Howe\'er, 
through returning to the rationalist roots of Kant's Aesthetic, he also radically 
transforms its function with regard to the critical project as a whole. Kant's 
problem will be shifted away from that of how to relate concepts to intuition, to 
the internal relation of Ideas with intuition. The domain of extralogical 
determinability, whose essence is to be thought as repetition, will thus tum around 
the correlation of aesthetic (intensive) differentiation with dialectical (ideal) 
differentiation. If these are the "two halves of difference" (DR 2211285), then the 
'whole' of difference will amount to a complete account of the forms of real 
differentiation. For Deleuze this will mean a complete account of the relations of 
difference and repetition. 
2 Aesthetic Difference: Space, Repetition and Intensity 
We have just seen that Deleuze's discussion of concepts of nature takes Kant's 
notion of space as its immediate example. Kant's example from Directions ill 
Space and the Prolegomena is intended as a kind of shock to thought, or to the 
possibility of full conceptual determination: imagine a pair of hands which are 
entirely identical in terms of their qualities. What constitutes the difference 
between left and right? We cannot attribute this difference to the hands 
themselves because the spatial difference does not belong to them: it cannot be 
found in them. Only the presupposition of a spatial framework can give content to 
these differences. The qualities of space belong to space alone, and immediately 
impose themselves on anything in space. Left and right, up and down, are 
differences that are external to the concept. Deleuze follows Kant in saying that 
although these differences are external to the concept, from the point of view of 
intuition, they should be treated as internal differences, a form of difference 
internal to intuition. 29 The example is vital as it allows us to determine the 
::9 "Here then is an internal difference ... this difference our understanding cannot show to be 
internal but only manifests itself by e:-..1emal relations in space", Kant Prolegomena, 30, Ak. 
~:286. 
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peculiar characteristics of space, apart from the logic of conceptual 
differentiation.30 
Firstly, space is so organised that every part of this infinite given whole 
has a left, right, up and down, depth and surface. Secondly, Kant is very much 
concerned in Directions in Space with the directional or vectorial character of 
space. 31 The differences that are irreducible to the concept concern left and right, 
and so on. Now, if space has directions which can be conceived as planes 
intersecting each other at right angles, 
it is only insofar as they stand in relation to ourselves that we have any cognition 
of them by means of the senses at all. It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
ultimate ground, on the basis of which we fonn our concept of directions in 
space, derives from the relation of these intersecting planes to our bodies. (TP 
366, Ak. 2: 378). 
Kant emphasises that "this relation to absolute space, however, cannot itself be 
immediately perceived" (TP 369, Ak. 2:381), although the differences between 
the bodies themselves which find their reason in absolute space can be perceived. 
As well as the hands, Kant chooses examples of spirals in natural formations such 
as shells and hops, or "the thread of a screw which winds round its pin from left to 
right [that] will never fit a nut of which the thread runs from right to left" (ibid). 
These vectorial and asymmetrical relations resist the concept for another reason. 
As Bertrand Russell pointed out, Kant is to be credited with discovering here the 
importance of nontransitive relations, and their irreducibility to subject-predicate 
logic. 32 For Russell, the criterion for any order or serial relation is that it be 
asymmetrical. But whereas Russell takes such spatial differences as a cue for 
radicalising Leibnizianism and dissolving intuitive differences once more by way 
of a new logic that can account for relations, Deleuze opts to steer a path between 
Kant and Russell. While he calls the chapter on sensibility in DR 'Asymmetrical 
Synthesis of the Sensible', and emphasises the importance of asymmetrical and 
30 e.G. Vaught attempts a critique of Hegel on the basis of the irreducibility of nonconceptual 
spatial difference in 'Hegel and the Problem of Difference', in W. Desmond, ed., Hegel and his 
Critics (Albany: SUNY, 1989). He criticises Hegel's arguments concerning spatial mediation in 
the 'Sense-Certainty' chapter of the Phenomenology (cf. 60-65) by pointing out that "space must 
be presupposed as the non-dialectical contex1 in which I turn around" (37). He takes this to 
indicate that "difference is not always reducible to negation" (38). The aim and conclusion of 
Vaught's argmnent are similar to Deleuze's, but their ways of getting there are quite different. 
31 TItis side ofthe discussion is suppressed in the Prolegomena. 
32 Russell, The Principles ofAlathematics (London: Routledge, 1992), # 217, 227. 
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vectorial relations for maintaining order in the physical world, he stays with Kant 
on the irreducibility of sensibility or intuition to conceptual relations. 
We will see the justice of this shortly, but for the moment we should stay 
with the two aspects of Kant's discovery: nonconceptuality and asymmetry. We 
have before us a non conceptual difference. Now, for Leibniz such a difference 
would be per impossibile a repetition, or an indiscernible. Why does Deleuze 
retain the term repetition when Kant has precisely specified the difference 
between the left and right hands, thus ruling out that they are repetitions in 
themselves? 
The Kantian philosophy of space needs to be taken a step further. Kant 
emphasises that space is a whole. In the Directions essay he states that far from 
space being a consequence of the relative determinations of the parts of matter, 
the latter is a consequence of the former: "Our considerations ... make it clear that 
differences, and true differences at that, can be found in the constitution of bodies; 
these differences relate exclusively to absolute and original space; for it is only in 
virtue of absolute and original space that the relation of physical things to each 
other is possible" (TP 371, Ak. 2:383). Now, even if Kant will say in CPR that 
space is only experienced in parts, according to the Axioms of Intuition, the 
nature of space is determined firstly as a whole: as Deleuze says, "space and time 
are not presented as they are represented" (DR 231/298)?3 Space is presented as 
internally qualified by certain vectorical and asymmetrical relations: "a dynamic 
space must be defined from the point of view of the observer tied to that space, 
not from an external viewpoint" (DR 26/139) So while in Kant's critical 
discussions about space as a form of intuition, his main concern is always its 
geometrical apriority, he has in effect argued for more than this. In the Directions 
essay and in the Inaugural Dissertation Kant argues for the ontological, not 
merely epistemological and mathematical priority of space?4 Given his early 
recognition of the importance of the position of the lived body in space as the 
condition for vectorial relations, can't the nature of the internal determination of 
33 This whole paragraph, buried at the end of the book, is essential for understanding 'what Deleuze 
is doing with the notion of repetitioIL particularly in relation to Kant and Leibniz. 
34 It may be argued that the tum to the idealisation of space as a fonn of intuition effectively 
precludes this ontological dimension. But, as we have seen (chapter 3.3.i.). if Kant accepts the 
need for a minimal recognition of metacritica1 issues (which I have argued he undoubtedly does). 
then he firstly must also accept that the forms of intuition are required for finite beings, and 
secondly it fo11ows that his account of ideality must haye some ontological status. 
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spatial relations be further pursued? Deleuze remarks that ''while he refuses a 
logical extension to space and time, Kant's mistake [in CPR] is to maintain a 
geometrical extension for it" (DR 231/298)?5 
We may start to glimpse how space may be conceived in itself according 
to the notion of repetition. Space is internally differentiated so that each part of 
space has a left and right, and that things which are identical in every other respect 
can nevertheless be incongruent. In the case of the incongruent counterparts, each 
hand repeats the other, although they will never be identical. This positing of a 
conceptually identical thing in space allows us to determine the action of space 
itself in its pure ("internal") form. This notion of space in itself, according to its 
own topological matrix, must be internally divided into left and right, and is 
nothing in itselfwithout this internal division. There is no "middle"; all of space is 
articulated according to this structure. Moreover, left and right are obviously 
reciprocally determined; one without the other is inconceivable. For Deleuze, this 
is therefore a perfect example of an "intensive" relation. For something to be 
spatialised in three-dimensional space involves a repetition of an Idea of space, 
according to differential relations which can only be considered as intensive. 
These latter two conceptions should now be further expounded. 
In search of an account of the internal determination of space, Deleuze 
goes on to attempt a complex mediation between Leibniz and Kant.36 Both Kant 
and Leibniz share a concern with grounding the continuity of space. While Kant 
too holds that space must be continuous, it is Leibniz of all philosophers who is 
35 Another argument could be provided in support of this suggestion. Kant had long recognised the 
possibility of non-Euclidean geometrical frameworks. So his acceptance of Ne\\10nian space is 
open to the charge of contingency. But, as ""'ill be seen, these non-Euclidean possible spaces could 
precisely be detemrined in a general or absolute theory of space. through the vectorial and 
intensive considerations Kant comes to suppress. 
36 Leibniz does indeed recognise the importance of repetition for the ex-planation of the 
phenomenal, physical world For Leibniz extension is merely the repetition of similar substances. 
"Extension is a repetition or diffusion of a prior nature" (Letters to De VoIder, Loemker, 536, 
519). Ex1ension is in fact abstraction from differing qualities, or "repetition of things insofar as 
they are indiscernible" (Russell. The Philosophy of Lei bniz. 103). If there is a real basis for matter, 
- . 
it lies only in the monad's potential for confused perceptions, or its passivity (cf. Donald 
Rutherford Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge Urriversity Press, 
1995, 255, 248). A5 Deleuze says "With Leibniz. the affirrity between exirinsic differences and 
intrinsic conceptual differences already appealed to the internal process of a continua repetitio, 
grounded on an intensive differential element which enacts the synthesis of continuity in the point 
in order to engender space from "ithin" (DR 26/40. translation modified). 
174 
most concerned with "the labyrinth of the continuum".37 On the one hand if , 
continuity is taken as basic (eg. in Descartes' concept of extension), then there 
seems to be no way to account for discrete objects, but on the other hand, if atoms 
are taken as basic, then their composition into continuous wholes is a mystery. 
Leibniz's solution is to treat indivisibles as monads which can be represented as 
metaphysical points with a certain force, but also as infinitesimal mathematical 
points, able to engage in mathematical relations of continuity. 
Now, spatial relations themselves are not divisible, but rather ideal. These 
ideal relations are not logical, but intensive relations of distance. Distances have 
no extensive parts, because they are mere relations. As Russell clarifies, extensive 
and intensive magnitudes have entirely different principles: whereas extensive 
magnitudes are composed of actual parts, and depend on the quantity of parts 
contained, "intensive quantities, on the contrary, do not in any way presuppose the 
existence of smaller quantities of the same kind".38 Although their quantities 
cannot be extensively measured according to the criteria of magnitude provided 
by actual parts, they can be related to each other in terms of greater or less, etc?9 
What is important is to recognise the nonextensive, purely relative nature of the 
magnitude in the first place: the magnitude concerns only the relation between the 
points concerned.40 While extensive relations must take place in a coordinated, 
representational field, intensive relations are prior to such a common space, as the 
relations that compose them are entirely singular: they can be "divided only by 
37 In Russell's opinion, this is the "most distinctive feature of Leibniz's thought .,. To find a thread 
through this labyrinth was one main purpose of the doctrine of monads" (The Philosophy of 
Leibniz, lOO). 
38 Russell, Philosophy of Leibniz, 114. Whereas Deleuze does not refer to this book in DR, he does 
refer to the chapter on distance in The Principles of Mathematics, where similar ideas are 
eX'Pressed. 
39 As Leibniz says to Clarke: "Order also has its quantity: there is in it that which goes before, and 
that which follows; there is distance or interval. Relative things have their quantity, as well as 
absolute ones. For instance, ratios or proportions in mathematics" (Ariew & Garber, 341). Russell 
says: "Those mathematicians who are accustomed to an exclusive emphasis on numbers, will think 
that not much can be said '\-lrjth definiteness concerning magnitudes incapable of measurement. 
This, however, is by no means the case. The immediate judgments of equality, upon which ... all 
measurements depend, are still possible, as are also the immediate judgments of greater and less"", 
Russell, The Principles ofl0athematics, # 171, 182-3. 
40 As Deleuze points out it is this kind of magnitude that concerns continuous, as opposed to 
discrete "multiplicities" or manifolds: the latter "contain the principle of their O\\TI metrics (the 
measure of one of their parts being given by the number of elements they contain)"", while the 
former "found a metrical principle in something else, even if only in phenomena unfolding in them 
or in the forces acting in them": cf. Bergsonism, 39: DR 182/236. Deleuze turns to the 
mathematician Riemann for the modem mathematical ex 'Pression of this distinction. 
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changing in kind".41 This will become clearer when we turn to Deleuze's theory 
of differentials. 
Now the relational theory of space must be taken as ideal, otherwise one 
gets lost in the labyrinth of the continuum. Considering he was Kant's target in 
'-
the Amphiboly, it is ironic that in effect Leibniz's analysis rests on a diagnosis of 
the labyrinth as a kind of amphiboly, a confusion of the ideal and the reaL 
Leibniz's conception of the distinction between material extensive and ideal 
intensive relations is essential to his account of space. 
However, this ideal nature of intensity is the subject of dispute between 
Russell and Martial Gueroult, and this controversy is in the background of DR. 
For Leibniz, the only unity that we find in the real world is due to the mind itself 
and its perception of the external world as "well-founded phenomena"; in 
themselves, the monads have no intrinsic relation to each other. But if both space 
and extension be entirely ideal and subjective, how, demands Russell, can the 
relations exhibited between phenomena be ''well-founded".42 Leibniz's insistence 
upon the relational view of space is finally unsustainable, as it must presuppose an 
existing world of substances prior to, and somehow grounding, the relations. On 
the other hand, Martial Gueroult argues that what "contributed to Russell's 
confusion is the wish to consider at all cost that space ought also be as subjective 
as extension ... a bias of Kantian origin".43 Firstly, the subjectivity of the monads 
is not primarily meant to be epistemological, but ontological; furthermore, and 
crucially for us, there is a sense in which Leibniz, through the very account of 
intensive relations, affirms an absolute character of space, which is not simply 
reduced to the relations between extensities, no more than it is merely subjectively 
-11 Bergsonism, 40. To take another example of an intensive relation: the notion of whole is not 
composed of extensive parts. A whole contains intensiYe relations that are entirely related to the 
coordinates of that whole; if one element changes, then all the intensities change. This Leibnizian 
notion is very important to Bergson, another philosopher related to Deleuze. In chapter 1 of Time 
and Free Will (trans. F. Pogson, London: Allen and Unwin, 1910), Bergson argues against the 
notion of 'intensity' by suggesting that sensations should not be treated as psychophysical quanta 
which are ex1emally added to each other. If one adds increasingly pressure to one's hand with a 
needle, the sensations of pain are not simply quantitiyely added to each other, but constantly 
augment each other as a whole. But it can be argued that Bergson has mistaken 'intensity' for 
ex1ensive magnitude, and is in effect using the notion of an intensive relation to argue against 
what he calls intensity. The discrepancy between Leibniz and Bergson is thus terminological. 
Bergson also suggests that durational relations are wholes (organised intensively in our sense). 
Leibniz is most definitely in the background: cf Time and Free Will, 8-18, 129-139. 
42 Russell, Philosophy oJLeibniz, 122-128. 
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ideal. There is a real sense in which the set of all possible distances, as valid for 
God as well, can be said to fonn an absolute intensive space. Gueroult uses 
Leibniz's word spatium to distinguish this intensive space from geometrical or 
phenomenological space. This intensive spatium, as the set of all possible 
distances, is moreover not confined to the particular spatial framework which the 
actual world happens to incarnate.44 
I suggest that this dispute perhaps revolves around a rather narrow image 
of Kant, who, as we have seen, emphasises (at different stages, according to 
different degrees) the very same problems as Leibniz: the ideality of pure 
relations, the ontological and even absolute nature of space, and the difficulty of 
relating things in themselves to ideal spatial relations. So if Leibniz does indeed 
affirm an absolute spatium, then where lies the real difference between his view 
and Kant's different, but mutually consistent, suggestions about vectoriality and 
internal difference in space? There is real overlap between the two positions, as 
Deleuze remarks: "the opposition between Kant and Leibniz seems much less 
strong to the extent that one takes account of the dynamic factors present in the 
two doctrines" (DR 26/40).45 
Now if the subterranean Kantian idea of space is transformed via reference 
to the Leibnizian spatium, the field of intensive differentiation of space is in 
principle expanded: spatial determination is reducible to intensive differentiation, 
in such a way that an internal genesis of intensities can take place as a result of the 
implication that vectorial relations are always defined in relation to a possible 
perceiver. On the one hand, one may now detennine say, a Mobius strip, 
according to its own spatial (or topological) field. On the other hand, it is also 
possible to detennine kinds of space according to the experience of that space.46 
Thus, for instance, the experience of depth becomes the index of a truly intensive 
distance; spatial magnitudes are not exclusively, or even primarily composed of 
43 Gueroult. 'Space, Point and Void in Leibniz's Philosophy' (in M. Hooker, ed., Leibniz: Critical 
and Interpretative Essays, Manchester University Press, 1982), 298 (italics mine). Deleuze refers 
to this article at DR 331/306, but it is behind the whole discussion of space as intensiYe spatium. 
44 Gueroult, 286. 
45 Deleuze understates the case by emphasising dynamics. The similarities are also metaphysical 
and ontological. 
46 "It is depth which e~"plicates itself as right and left in the first dimension, as high and low in the 
second and as figure and ground in the homogenised third Ex1ensity does not develop or appear 
\\ithout presenting a left and a right. a high and a low, an above and a below, which are like the 
dissymmetrical marks of its own origin. The relativity of these determinations, morem·er, is further 
testimony to the absolute from which they come" (DR 2291295-6). 
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extensive relations. In sum, this is the alternative to geometry that Deleuze is 
concerned to spell out in his search for a real principle. "Space as pure intuition or 
spatium is an intensive quantity, and intensity as a transcendental principle is not 
merely the anticipation of perception" (DR 231/298).47 
But the two positions of Leibniz and Kant are ultimately not compatible. 
For Leibniz, the absolute character of space is gained through the God's eye view 
of all possible relations. For Kant, however, if space is absolute, this is only for 
finite beings. Kant in effect abandons things in themselves to nonspatiality, 
leaving them without a discernible theoretical mode of individuation. It was seen 
in the last chapter that Kant does tend to think that intuitions themselves are 
representational, but he cannot say what it is in the affection that belongs to the 
thing in itself, as the spatiotemporal coordinates of the intuition, its quantity and 
quality, are purely ideal (the problem of token-identity). 
Nevertheless our comparison of Kant and Leibniz has yielded up a new 
possibility. For alongside the distinction between noumena and phenomena, a new 
distinction has sprouted up between intensity and extensity. As extension or 
matter for Leibniz is only a ''well-founded phenomenon", "what is exhibited 
extensively and mechanically in the phenomena is, concentratedly and vitally, in 
monads".48 This notion that intensity is the "inner" of extensity returns us to 
Kant's early notion of force, in which the intrinsic relation between the affection 
and the affecting substance is still thought intensively, so that intensity serves as 
4i It must be admitted that Deleuze takes advantage of the semantic overdetennination of the idea 
of intensity in the history of philosophy. The adjective 'intensive' can refer to three different 
things, which are related yet distinct. 
1. the intension of a concept, used to describe the noumenal essence of a substance. 
2. intensive relations or magnitudes we were just discussing. such as distance; cf. also change in 
temperature, tonal relations. 
3. a 'real', or sensible quantum, for instance, an excitation in the face of a sensation of depth: cf. 
intense feelings. 
However, Deleuze's exploitation of this ambiguity may indeed reveal a hidden ground as the 
above suggestions show a common locus for the intemal, vectOrial, and local characteristics of 
space. 
48 Briefivechsel zwischen Leibniz und Christian r,voif.{ (ed. c.l. Gerhardt, Halle: H. W. Schmidt 
1860), 138-9; quoted in D. Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, 255. The 
distinction runs parallel with Leibniz's epistemological distinction between distinct and clear 
perception. For Leibniz these apply to different kinds of 'perception', and have different forms of 
differentiation: the latter concerns the recognition of a familiar form; the former concerns the 
apprehending in thought of its internal qualities. Deleuze takes up this distinction: "a clear Idea is 
in itself confused; it is confused insofar as it is clear ... Singularities condense to determine J 
threshold of consciousness in relation to our bodies, a threshold of differenciation on the basis of 
which the little perceptions are actualised but actualised in an apperception which in tum is only 
clear and confused" (DR 213/275-6). 
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the inner of affection. Deleuze's moves to create a new "science of the sensible" 
(DR 56/79) should be seen partly as a return to this rationalist position. As we will 
see at the end of this chapter, Deleuze proposes that intensities should indeed be 
considered to have noumenal significance; moreover, he will propose a startling 
solution to the problem of token-identity. But in order to proceed further, we need 
to tum now to the ideal form of differentiation that grounds intensive relations. I 
suggested above that vectorial relations (such as left-right) were intensive 
incarnations of an Idea of space. In order to comprehend further Deleuze's 
Aesthetic, we must now tum to his Dialectic. 
In fact, this genealogy of Deleuze's philosophy, through Kantianism and 
Leibnizianism, is so far partial. After his 1967 lecture to the Societe jrancaise de 
Philosophie, 'The Method of Dramatisation', Deleuze was asked about the 
influences of post-Kantianism on the lecture, an earlier version of parts of DR. He 
replied, perhaps misleadingly but nonetheless informatively, "of course Maimon, 
and certain aspects ofNovalis".49 Now, in the immediate wake of Kant, Solomon 
Maimon attempted to justify a return to a Leibnizian account of space, time and 
intensity which develops in crucial ways the account so far unravelled, by way of 
a return to Leibnizian differential calculus. Deleuze borrows heavily from him, 
and I shall devote the next subsection to a brief account of Maimon's position. 
Maimon's theory is useful for us because it makes a first and relatively 
straightforward attempt to effect a transition between aesthetic and dialectical 
difference. This will provide us with the grounding to begin to understand 
Deleuze's account of the nature and relation of Ideas and intensities. With regard 
to Novalis, Deleuze makes one brief reference in DR: "Novalis, with his 
tourmaline, is closer to the conditions of the sensible than Kant, with space and 
time" (DR 222/287).50 Novalis had a vivid apprehension that the Kantian 
schematism could be reworked to demonstrate the temporalisation and 
spatialisation of Ideas, so that minerals, fossils and living creatures all 
demonstrate the unfolding of an Idea in time; I suggest in Appendix II that 
Deleuze finds inspiration in Novalis' writings on this point. Deleuze's account of 
49 'La methode de dramatisation', Bulletin de la Societe francaise de Philosophie, tome LXII. 
1967, seance du samedi 28 janvier 1967, 116. 
50 There is a brief reference in Logic of Sense, 53, to Novalis' distinction between "ideal 
Protestantism and real Lutheranism", which provides an instance of Novalis' account of the 
relation of the ideal and the actual. 
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dialectical and aesthetic difference thus stages an innovative encounter between 
these two post-Kantians and the rationalist tradition. 
In the second part of the following section I proceed to introduce 
Deleuze's peculiar take on Kant's notion of Ideas. In the third subsection, I argue 
that Deleuze' s turn to structuralist theory to expound the notion of Ideas should be 
seen as a unification and potentiation of his interpretation of Kant and Leibniz on 
noumenal difference. After exploring the structure of Ideas it will then be possible 
to return to spatiotemporal reality by suggesting it be rethought in terms of the 
actualisation of these Ideas. 
3 Dialectical Difference: Deleuze's Theory of Ideas as Problems 
Maimon's Theory of Differentials 
For Deleuze, Maimon is the post-Kantian who first sketches out an answer to the 
problem that will come to be Deleuze's: how to connect intensities and Ideas. 
Deleuze explicitly sets up Maimon's philosophy as an alternative to Hegel's: "Just 
as we oppose difference in itself to negativity, so we oppose dx to not-~ the 
symbol of difference (DiJferenzphilosophie) to that of contradiction" (DR 
170/221). We can understand Maimon's tum to differential calculus precisely by 
continuing the path we have so far taken, in pursuit of aesthetic difference. 
For Maimon, Kant's notion of the forms of intuition, space and time, is 
incomplete. Space and time are not absolute, ideal forms, but really should be 
considered as forms of diJferentiation necessary for finite beings. 51 There are two 
steps to this argument. Firstly, Maimon argues that to conceive of a pure 
continuous and homogeneous spatial intuition (say a pure intuition of a colour) 
devoid of difference would not actually be spatial at all, as there would be no 
means at all to distinguish any coexistent points within it from one another. 52 
Therefore space cannot be understood as the form of all intuition (as spaceless 
51 Solomon Maimon Versuch fiber die Transcendentalphilosophie (Essai sur fa Philosophie 
Transcendentale, ~s. I-B. Scherrer, Paris: J. Vrin, 1989), 15-22. I have used the French 
translation of this work, and refer to the German pagination that is also referenced in the 
translation. 
52 "The representation of the relation of a sensible object to other sensible objects at the same tinle 
is space insofar as it is an intuition. If we were to have a mere uniform intuitiOIt we would not 
have a concept of space. nor even an intuition of space", ibid 18. See F. Beiser. The Fate of 
Reason. 300f for a concise statement of Maimon' s theory of intuition. 
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intuitions are possible); it must rather be seen as a form of the differentiation of 
intuition. Space is really the form by which discreteness is represented to a finite 
intellect, while time is the way successiveness must be represented. 53 But both of 
these forms of differentiation are mutually dependent. Discreteness requires 
successive synthesis, in order to be more than a mere abstract unity, while 
succession requires coexistence in order to retain continuity with itself. 'Space' as 
such exists no more than does 'time': separately they are both entia imaginarium, 
or limit-cases, and are only conceivable together. 
The second step is to relate this move back to what he sees as the essential 
task of transcendental philosophy, to account for synthetic judgments. Synthetic 
judgments are judgments for which no logical identity has been discerned; 
therefore the rules of synthesis must present the fundamental ways in which 
difference is nonanalytically thought and unified. 54 Space and time thus become 
two forms of differentiation ( among others) for a finite being. 
By reducing space and time to forms of difference for a finite intellect, 
Maimon returns to the Leibnizian idea that sensation is an obscure form of a more 
fundamental kind of differentiation that can only be adequately perceived by an 
infinite intellect.55 Synthesis is seen as a lack compared to infinite analysis, which 
is now more conceivable than on Kant's model, because space and time are forms 
of difference in general, not of all possible givenness (or appearance) as such for 
finite beings. Spatiotemporal intuition is then itself a kind of schema, "a sensible 
image of the differences of things".56 Maimon nevertheless insists that real 
"differences of things" must be conceived, prior to sensible differentiation, as 
their positive ground. In this way he attempts to overcome the obscurities in 
Kant's account concerning the nature of the material manifold, where the final 
ground for difference is the mere givenness of sensible 'qualities'. For Maimon it 
is possible to find a method to treat what is given in sensation as the object of an 
53 As C. Katzoff notes, for Maimon, "not all thought takes place in time. For example, a line is 
drawn out in time, but the relationship of the form of a triangle to its lines is thought 
instantaneously", 'Solomon Maimon's Critique of Kant's Theory of Consciousness' (Zeitschrijt 
for Philosophische Forschung, 35, 1981), 192. 
)4 Ibid, 4. Cf 21: "synthesis in general is unity in diversity". 
55Cf G.H.R. Parkinson's defence of Leibniz against Kant's Amphiboly, 'Kant as Critic of Leibniz: 
The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection' (Revue lnternationale de Philosophie, 35, 1981); he 
shows how for Leibniz sensation is an obscure form of 'perception', in Leibniz' s use of that temL 
rather than thought, as Kant has it. 
56 Maimon, f"ersuch, 346. For a discussion of Maimon on schemata see S.H. Bergmann. The 
Philosophy a/Solomon JvJaimon (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1967),39,46. 
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ongomg progressive determination, so that the real differences of things are 
reconstituted. This method involves a reduction of the sensible given to an 
abstract form, which can then be related to other such forms through differential 
equations: 
All sensible representation, considered in itself as quality, should be abstracted 
from all quantity, both extensive and intensive. The representation of the colour 
red, for example, should be thought without finite extension, not however as a 
mathematical point, but as a physical point or as the differential of an extension. 57 
Through differentiation and integration of the mutual relations of these ideal 
objects, we set out on the path of complete determination. Maimon calls the 
objects of this genetic method "Ideas of the understanding", but their form would 
no longer be conceptual, but ultimately expressed according to an ideal 
differential calculus. 
Now in the Anticipations of Perception Kant himself opened up a way in 
which these differentials could be directly related to sensible qualities in the form 
of intensive magnitudes. In order to understand Maimon, it is useful to look at his 
criticism of Kant's restriction of the principle of intensities. This section of CPR is 
doubly interesting for us because it is there that the notion of 'reality' finally finds 
its explicit place in the critical project, where it is now dealt with in terms of the 
categories of quality. Kant says "that which corresponds to the sensation is reality 
(realitas phaenomenon); that which corresponds to its absence is negation = o. 
Now, however, every sensation is capable of a diminution, so that it can decrease 
and gradually disappear" (CPR A1681B21 0). There are two important points to be 
made about this moment in Kant. Firstly, this index of reality surely seems to 
provide the closest potential correlation to the problematic 'thing' behind the 
affection. Kant's use of the term 'reality' here seems even to hark back to his 
earlier 'pre-critical' use of it. Now, if such a theoretical possibility is to be 
developed, then we must look at the form by which such an affection is 
determined to provide us a clue to a possible correlation; this leads us to our 
second point. 'Reality' is intrinsically differentiated according to a possible 
infinity of intensive degrees. This return to an earlier notion of intensity seems to 
give further plausibility to a possible correlation to noumena. While I will return 
to this larger issue later in this chapter, we can at least see now how this possibly 
), Maimon. Versuch.27-8. 
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noumenal dimension to the notion of intensive magnitude might be formally 
developed. 
Now, unlike the discrete, extensive magnitudes of the Axioms of Intuition, 
intensities are continuous magnitudes, and are hence in close correlation with the 
internally and externally boundless and continuous nature of space and time 
themselves. However, for Kant, this kind of magnitude is not encountered in 
apprehension or synthesis itself; it merely represents the degree of sensation itself, 
which Kant measures against zero, which is postulated as the point of nothingness 
at the base of a continuous scale of reality. 58 Thus Kant here delineates the 
possibility of indeterminate infinitesimals, as vanishing intensive quantities, 
determined only in relation to zero. Maimon's move is to take up Kant's 
suggestion and use it to determine sensible qualities themselves. For Kant, the 
vanishing point of a reality, say a colour sensation, is unknown. But because such 
realities are continuous, reasons Maimon, their intensive magnitudes can only be 
purely relational: they can only be determined as greater or less than another 
such sensation. Maimon seizes on this necessity of relative determination in order 
to redefine Kant's notion of zero. Kant is criticised for stating that degrees are 
determined in "relation to zero"; rather the magnitudes can only be determined in 
relation to each other. Moreover, it is impossible to determine an intensive 
quantity in relation to itself; infinitesimals can only be determined in relation to 
another infinitesimal. Thus the zero expresses a peculiar character of differentials, 
not an (actual or potential) infinite quantity. By itself, the reality or element is 
simply dx = 0, but in relation, it not only determines itself, but also that to which it 
is related, in a reciprocal determination: dx/dy. Dx = ° rather represents x in an 
ideal undetermined form outside of its determinable reality. 59 
But crucially, whereas Kant restricts intensive magnitudes to degrees of 
the same reality, given the combination of the notion of intensive magnitude that 
S8 In 'Kant and the Provocations of Matter' (in A Rehberg & R Jones, The c\fatter of Critique, 
Manchester: Clinarnen. 20(0). M.l. Bowles conducts an interesting e>..-ploration ofKanfs theory of 
intensive magnitudes. In opposition to him I think it is important to emphasise that although Kant 
describes the frrst two Principles, the Axioms and Anticipations, in tenns of a synthesis of 
intuition. he does not require here a synthesis in the sense of an unijving act of the mind TIlis 
would lead to the absurd notion that the mind was continual/v sYnthesising intensities from zero. 
The Principles here merely demonstrate for the philosoph~r the schematic harmony between 
numerical concepts and the intuitive manifold 
59 Cf. DR 171-21221-3 for Deleuze' s account of the reinterpretation of zero in the history of 
differential calculus. 
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we have been developing and Maimon' s interpretation of zero, it is an account of 
intensive difference that is really opened up. In principle one can also extend this 
differential conception of intensity to spatial forms, distances, tones, and other 
relations in which reciprocal determination is important. 
Now Maimon suggests that through the integration of these reciprocal 
determinations, it is ideally possible to progressively construct the complete 
determination of these differentials: such would be the "Ideas of the 
understanding". However, Deleuze moves beyond Maimon in suggesting that the 
"Ideas" do not belong to the understanding, but, due to their "sub-representative" 
nature, must be called Ideas in the strict Kantian sense. 60 If Ideas are determined 
only through reciprocal and complete determination, their determination is not 
going to be able to proceed through concepts of the understanding, which by their 
nature are general, and could only nominally describe such determination. We 
need therefore to elaborate Deleuze's development of Maim on's account through 
returning to Kant's notion of Idea. 
1/ Deleuze on Kantian Ideas 
Maimon has found a way to conceIve complete determination but has let his 
conception down by conceiving Ideas according to the understanding. Arguably 
Kant too is pulled in two different directions with his theory of Ideas. It is worth 
quoting at length a passage from CPR on "systematic unity", as on the one hand it 
expresses perfectly how Kant envisages the coextensivity of the notions of system 
and representation (a pure logical world of complete representation), while on the 
other hand, at the level of metaphor, it gestures towards Leibniz's, Maimon's and 
Deleuze's notions of a calculus of concepts or Ideas, ie. a specific theory of the 
form of complete determination: 
One can regard every concept as a point, which, as the standpoint of an observer, 
has its horizon, ie. a multiplicity of things that can be represented and surveyed, 
60 In Mainlon' s first letter to Kant (7 April 1789). he writes "1 define a new class of Ideas that I 
call Ideas a/the understanding which signify material totality, just as your Ideas of Reason signify 
formal totality. I believe I have opened the way to a ne\-y means of answering the ... Quid Juris 
question" (C 294~ Ak. 11 :16-17). We will see that Deleuze will take up the sense in which Ideas 
provide a "material" - in the sense of "real" - principle of determination, but at the same time will 
move back towards Kant in retaining the "problematic" status of Ideas of reason. Moreover. as 
will become clear at the end of this chapter (and as I "ill attempt to justify in the follo"ing 
chapter), there is indeed a sense in which Maimon's hope that the question qUid juris may be 
solved by a new conception of Ideas is well founded. 
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as it were, from it. Within this horizon a multiplicity of points must be able to be 
given to infinity, each of which in tum has its narrower field of view, ie. 
specification, and the logical horizon consists only of smaller horizons 
(subspecies), but not of points that have no domain (individuals). But different 
horizons, ie. genera, which are determined from just as many concepts, one can 
think as drawn out into a common horizon, which one can survey collectively 
from its middle point, which is the higher genus, until finally the highest genus is 
the universal and true horizon, determined from the standpoint of the highest 
concept and comprehending all manifoldness, as genera, and subspecies under 
itself (A6591B68 7). 
It is clear how the geometrical model of this passage might be synthesised with 
Maimon's theory of differentials. But the most crucial aspect of Deleuze's 
development of the Kantian notion of Idea is his literal reading of Kant's 
statement that Ideas are "problematic". An Idea, says Kant, is a "focus 
imaginarius" (A6441B672). The collective unity of any concept would be a 
complete determinatioI\ but completion is not possible for a finite being; it cannot 
be experienced. Deleuze would argue that if Ideas are complete determinations, 
but concepts are general, then it would seem that the reason Ideas are problematic 
is precisely because they cannot be generalised. But nevertheless, they are in 
principle open to thought, as the horizon of complete determination. It is precisely 
the status of Ideas as problematic for experience that gives them the role as 
"horizon" for experience or knowledge. In some very important pages on Kant's 
notion of Idea in D~ Deleuze points out that while understanding by itself does 
not motivate knowledge, problems do. 
The fact is that [reason] alone is capable of drawing together the procedures of 
the understanding with regard to a set of objects. The understanding by itself 
would remain entangled in its separate and divided procedures, a prisoner of 
partial empirical enquiries or researches in regard to this or that object, never 
raising itself to the level of a 'problem' capable of providing a systematic unity 
for all its operations .. , [it] would never constitute a 'solution'. For every solution 
presupposes a problem (DR 168/218-9). 
In geometrical language echoing the passage from Kant just quoted, Deleuze 
claims that in Kant the concepts of the understanding only attain their "full 
experimental use ... by being arranged upon lines which converge upon an ideal 
focus which lies outside the bounds of experience" (DR 169/219), or being 
organised at the limit by a "common horizon" (God). In fact (as will be reinforced 
in the next chapter when we tum to Kant's account of concepts), Deleuze's claim 
is not strong enough; for would the understanding be able even to orchestrate 
"partial empirical enquiries or researches in regard to this or that object" without 
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the conditions of a subjective goal and a conceptualisation carried out in the light 
of an Idea? Deleuze could have recalled Kant's theme in the Preface to the second 
edition CPR that 
reason ... compel[s] nature to answer its questions ... Reason, in order to be taught 
by nature, must approach nature with its principles in one hand, according to 
which alone the agreement among appearances can count as laws, and in the 
other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these principles 
(Bxiv). 
Knowledge itself is preceded by the posing of questions, that is, by thought.61 
Knowledge should not be thought as simply involving descriptions of states of 
affairs according to rules; rather knowledge concerns solutions to problems. In 
chapter 5 I will show in detail how knowledge is subordinated to Ideas even in 
Kant. Here, I want to introduce the basic points of Deleuze's moves concerning 
Ideas. It is important to sketch out two more basic elements of Deleuze's 
interpretation. 
It has been suggested that these ideal foci and horizons are strictly 
speaking not intuited or experienced at all due to their problematic status. But if 
empirical cognition is' the locus of "unification" through concepts, then the 
projected unity of Ideas is presupposed only as a telos from the standpoint of 
knowledge, that is, from representation. Hence in Kant the power of Ideas is 
subordinated to representation, which implies that the world of Ideas is organised 
intrinsically according to a purely logical calculus that reflects and expands upon 
our already established concepts. This explains why Kant reduced the Ideas to 
three, by identifying them with the three ''universal conditions of thinking" we 
encountered in the last chapter, so that they correspond to three basic forms of 
complete determination. Kant in fact specifies that the tripartite structure of Ideas 
is derived from the three kinds of syllogism (categorical for the Self, hypothetical 
for the World, disjunctive for God; A577/605).62 
However, if Ideas are to be thought primarily as problems (according to 
Deleuze's literal reading), this implies that they must already have their own 
consistency and form as problems that stand structurally outside achieved 
61 Deleuze continually emphasises the Kantian distinction between thought and knowledge: cf. 
Proust and Signs, 97; Nietzsche and Philosophy, 93, 172-3. 
6: Deleuze remarks on this derivation in Kant's Critical Philosophy. 19. Else\vhere he creates 
mischief "itl} the correlation of the Idea of God with the disjWlctive syllogism by arguing that it 
effectively makes Kant's theological proof a diabolical proof~ 'Klossowski or Bodies-Language'. 
reprinted as an Appendix to Logic o/Sense. 2%. 
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empirical knowledge, "feeding" and even conditioning knowledge. By stating that 
Ideas are unknowable, Kant 
does not mean that Ideas are necessarily false problems and thus insoluble but on 
the contrary, that true problems are Ideas, and that these Ideas do not disap~ear 
with 'their' solutions, since they are indispensable conditions without which no 
solution would ever exist (DR 168/219). 
For Deleuze, this means that Ideas can be conceived as already possessing the 
power to synthesise difference in themselves. As we will see, complete 
determination is rethought in Deleuze as the ideal, complete determination proper 
to a problematic field. Ideas can be considered as completely determined, but not 
according to concepts. Rather, their complete determination is envisaged 
according to the rule of their own differential determinations, which are precisely 
problematic in that they can't be reduced to empirical cognition through concepts 
and representations. In this case, the straightforward attribution of 'unity' to the 
Ideas no longer holds; the consistency of the Ideas instead obeys a different order, 
the order of the problematic. Reason can no longer be immediately considered to 
"seek unity"; from the ideal notion of collective unity we move to a permanently 
distributive structure of reason. It follows that Deleuze's move here is really to 
invert Kant: it is not so much that the empirical use of Ideas is a transcendental 
illusion; rather our attempts to apply the rules of conceptual representation to 
problems and Ideas is the real transcendental illusion. For here, representation 
transgresses its own limits, and treats problems as concepts. 
A final consequence of Deleuze' s reading of Kant's notion of Idea should 
be mentioned which will achieve its full extension at the end of this chapter. If , 
Ideas are to be determined as problems in themselves, it follows that they lose 
some of their merely subjective status, as conceived on the Kantian model. 
Although Deleuze retains the term 'Idea', as problems, Ideas are no longer 
entirely dependent on the experiencing subject. Deleuze now has to perform a 
delicate operation, because on the one hand, he will insist that 
problems have an objective value ... 'Problematic' does not m~n ?~ly a 
particularly important species of subjective acts, but a dimension of ObjectIVIty as 
such which is occupied by these acts. An object outside experience can be 
represented only in problematic form; this does not mean th~t Ideas have no real 
object, but that problems qua problems are the real objects of Ideas (DR 
169/219). 
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But on the other hand, this 'reality' cannot be objective in a Kantian empirical 
realist sense, or for that matter in any commonsense realist sense. So Deleuze will 
retain the connection of Ideas to a 'subject' (however that subject might be 
conceived), by saying that Ideas are "necessarily unconscious" (DR 192/249). 
"Ideas .. , express that extra-propositional or sub-representative problematic 
instance: the presentation of the unconscious, not the representation of 
consciousness" (DR 1921248). As will be seen in chapter 6 and Appendix IV, 
Deleuze's notion of the unconscious will be expounded through an account of the 
passive syntheses of habit and memory. The unconscious, moreover, will be 
defined by its virtuality. Now, crucially, Deleuze nevertheless insists that 
the virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fullv real 
insofar as it is virtual... fudeed the virtual must be defmed as strictly a part~ofthe 
real object - as though the object had one part of itself in the virtual into which it 
plunged as though into an objective dimension (DR 208-9/269). 
With this in mind, it is now possible to develop further suggestions in chapter 2 
that Deleuze's notion of 'virtuality' is related to a transformation of the project to 
discover the principles of 'real possibility'. 
iii Leibniz, Kant and Structuralism 
Deleuze emphasises that there must be a distinction between the differential 
relations themselves, and the actual values of these relations as incarnated in the 
physical world. As with Leibniz's own understanding of the calculus, the 
differential relations themselves refer only to a set of virtualities.63 In chapter 2 
the notion of a calculus of 'real possibilities' was suggested, and in this chapter 
we have constructed the possibility of a pure spatium as a space of possibilities. It 
now appears that the continuity that we sought in spatial relations really belongs 
to this ideal space, which will tum out to be the matrix of 'real possibility', and 
which now should be rigorously distinguished from extensive space.64 It is 
63 On Leibniz' s use of the notion of virtuality, see G. Tonelli, 'Early Reactions to the Publication 
of Leibniz's Nouveaux Essais (1765)" in L.W. Beck ed, Proceedings of the Third International 
Kant Congress. 
64 "Continuousness truly belongs to the realm of Ideas only to the ex1ent that an ideal cause of 
continuity is determined. Taken together with its cause, continuity forms the pure element of 
quantitability, which must be distinguished both from the fixed quantities of intuition (quantum) 
and from variable quantities in the form of concepts of the understanding. (qua~ti~as)" (DR 
I 71/222). Continuity refers to "the set of relations between changes in the ... \"an~bles : It re~ers to 
the ideal state of complete determination, which can only subsist outside any partIcular SItuatIon of 
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necessary to separate this 'pure spatium of Ideas', composed of virtual differential 
relations, in its state of sheer virtuality, from the determinations themselves that 
particularise and incarnate these various real possibilities. That is, we must now 
begin to make a rigorous distinction between ideal relations and intensive 
relations, at exactly the moment we have secured their formal correlation. I now 
tum to dialectical difference considered in itself, as apart from its aesthetic , 
intensive actualisation. 
We have to conceive an ideal spatium for all Ideas, not just for what we 
ordinarily call space.65 It is here that we should introduce one of Deleuze' s other 
names for the notion of Idea; as well as "virtual" and "problematic", he calls Ideas 
"structural". "The reality of the virtual is structure" (DR 209/270).66 It is with his 
tum to structuralism that Deleuze finds the decisive means to mediate between 
Leibniz and Kant. "Structuralism cannot be separated from a new transcendental 
philosophy,,;67 but at the same time, it cannot be separated from a return to 
Leibnizian conceptions of the differential calculus. The novelty and power of 
Deleuze's philosophy can only be appreciated if we keep in mind this essential 
problematic nexus of Leibniz, Kant and structuralism. If we perceive this nexus 
correctly, we can understand the changes that Deleuze effects on each of its three 
elements. 
For Deleuze, an Idea as such would. consist of two elements: on the one 
hand, "the set of differential relations between elements stripped of sensible form 
and function, which only exist through their reciprocal determination", to which 
correspond, on the other hand, "distributions of 'singularities', repartitions of 
actual detennination, as the latter can only exist by selecting certain ("compossible") relations 
from the ideal set. The elements of these relations can also be defined in tenns of this ideal 
continuity: "the elements reciprocally detennined by these relations [are] elements which cannot 
change unless the multiplicity changes its order and its metric" (DR 182-31237). As we \\ill see 
shortly, Ideas, considered as problematic multiplicities, are precisely open to such differential 
changes in order. 
65 "It is not a matter of a location in a real spatial expanse, nor of sites in imaginary ex1ensions, but 
rather of places and sites in a properly structural space, that is, a topological space. Space is what 
is structural but an unextended, preex1ensive space, pure spatium constituted bit by bit as an order 
of proximity, in which the notion of proximity first of all has precisely an ordinal sense and not a 
signification in ex1ension", Deleuze, 'How do we Recognise Structuralism?', in C. Stivak The 
Twofold Thought of De leuze and Guattari (New York: Guilford Press, 1998),262. . 
66 In Logic of Sense, Deleuze concedes that "the parallel [of structuralism] with differentlal 
calculus may seem both arbitrarv and old-fashioned But what is old-fashioned is only the infinitist 
interpretati~n of the calculus. Already at the end of the ninteenth century, Weierstrass gave a finite 
interpretation, ordinal and static, very close to a mathematical structuralism", 339. This remark 
relates to the interpretation of zero, as recounted above. 
67 'How do we Recognise Structuralism', 263. 
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distinctive and ordinary points".68 A singularity would thus represent the point at 
which something "distinctive" occurred on a differential curve. However. 
crucially, Deleuze argues for the ontological priority of singularities over their 
differential relations. For in the mutual determination of singularities according to 
differential relations, nothing is yet decided about whether they converge or not 
with other singularities, that is, whether they are compossible or incompossible. 
It is necessary to return to Leibniz at this point. It is as if we are faced with 
the set of all logically possible series (combinations of singularities), with no 
"real" criterion to decide which are "convergent", and which are "divergent". 
Deleuze's model is crucially shorn of the presupposition of a God who orders 
possible series, that is, who presides over the calculus of real possibilities or 
compossibilities by appealing to the criterion of the best. But if there is no built-in 
convergence to the series on this model, how are they organised at all? In fact, it is 
as if Leibniz's system not only survives, but even only comes to bloom, after the 
death of God.69 Even for Leibniz, God is not responsible for the sinning of Adam; 
rather, God selects the world in which Adam sins. But in another possible world, 
Adam does not sin. Prior to the determination of compossibility (according to the 
law of the best), Leibniz not only presupposes a distribution of logically possible 
series, but can be seen, according to Deleuze, as presupposing a distribution of the 
"singularities" which compose each possible series, and which can be ordered 
according to a calculus of real possibility. In the case of Adam, such singularities 
would include: to be the first man, to live in paradise, to give birth to a woman 
from himself, to sin, to resist temptation. These singularities must be said in 
themselves to be "pre-individual". If we take the last two singularities, then it is 
logically possible for Adam either to sin or to resist temptation, but the two 
together are not compossible: this much can be determined. Therefore if the set of 
differential relations between a set of singularities can be reciprocally determined 
according to a calculus of real possibilities, we have something we can call, in an 
68 'La methode de dramatisation'. 97. Cf. DR 181/234. and DR chapter -+ passim. 
69 In DR, Deleuze tends to emphasise his criticism ~of Leibniz's account of compossibility: .. It 
seems to us that compossibility consists uniquely in the following: the condition of a maXImum of 
continuitv for a maximum of difference - in other words, a condition of convergence of 
establish~d series around the singularities of the continuum. Conversely. the incompossibility of 
worlds is decided in the vicinity of those singularities which give rise to divergent senes between 
themselves. In short, representation may well become infinite: it nevertheless doe~ not. aC9uire.lhe 
power to affirm either divergence or decentering" (DR 263/339). But despite this cnUCIsm. It IS 
clear that Leibniz has furnished the conceptual means for Deleuze . s account. 
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absolute sense, "the problem of Adam". The dialectic of problems thus gives us a 
'-' 
'semi-divine' power to ask: ''what shall Adam be?,,70 As Deleuze says, this 
"vague Adam, a vagabond, a nomad, an Adam = x", would be "common to 
several worlds",71 being composed of several singularities whose relation has not 
been actually determined. 
Leibniz's principle of the best should thus be put in its place: it is merely 
another possible solution nestled within the primary ontological matrix of 
problems. The "selection" of series should instead be considered minimally in 
terms of solutions to problems. Deleuze thus goes beyond Kant's conception of 
Ideas as problems here. These Ideas are problematic first of all because their 
organisation of singularities has not been decided. It is their virtual state of 
implication that is the true cause of their problematicity in two senses. Firstly, the 
criterion for their actualisation is itself problematic and depends on a finite being 
fashioning a solution. Secondly, Ideas could not in any case all be actualised at 
once, because, as problematic, they contain divergent series alongside convergent 
ones. Ideas therefore testify to an original "play in the creation of the world" (DR 
51172); as Deleuze says elsewhere, "there is no longer any originary reality". 72 
Deleuze concludes that 
we are no longer faced with an individuated world constituted by means of 
already fixed singularities, organised into convergent series, nor are we faced 
with determined individuals which express this world. We are now faced with the 
aleatory point of singular points, ... which holds good for many of these worlds, 
or in the last analysis, for all worlds, despite their divergences and the individuals 
which inhabit them. 73 
It is our goal to understand how this aleatory point, which Deleuze usually calls 
the "object = x", may hold throughout all divergent series, for it is here that 
Deleuze's synthesis of Kantianism and rationalism reaches its highest point. 
"Incompossible worlds ... have something in common: ... the genetic element in 
relation to which several worlds appear as instances of solution for one and the 
same problem".74 This problematic "common element", so understood, is in effect 
a higher potentiation of the Kantian "object = x", in such a way that the entire 
70 Deleuze remarks suggestively. "true freedom lies in the power to decide. to constitute problems 
themselves. And this 'semi-divine' power entails the disappearance of false problems as much as 
!he creative upsurge of true ones": Bergsonism, 15. 
,] Logic a/Sense. 11-+. Cf. also The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. 60-61. 
"2 'Klossowski or Bodies-Language', 296. 
73 LogiC a/Sense, 11-+. 
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issue of Kantian transcendence is transformed. It is our ability to pose problems 
that both grounds representation, which really is nothing but the realm of 
established solutions, and which also allows us to 'transcend' representation, and 
seek its conditions. '''Solvability' must depend on an internal characteristic: it 
must be determined by the conditions of the problem, engendered in and by the 
problem along with the real solutions. Without this reversal, the famous 
Copernican Revolution amounts to nothing" (DR 162/210). We should now tum 
to Deleuze's crystallisation of these Leibnizian and Kantian elements in the 
T 
contemporary theory of structuralism. :> 
The structuralist interpretation of an "object = x" traversing the series can 
be introduced by reference to a text that lies at the very origin of structuralism, 
Levi-Strauss's Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss, where he explicitly 
relates his new theory of exchange to Kantianism. 76 The text is instructive, as the 
links between Kant and structuralism are often misunderstood, weight being 
unduly placed on the analogy of categories to structures, when, as Deleuze shows 
at length, the analogy should really be with Kantian Ideas. 77 Levi-Strauss 
74 Logic of Sense , 114. 
75 It is true that De1euze's interpretation of the "series", which for Leibniz were intelligible 
monads, but are for Deleuze broken up counterfactually into "pure" sets of singularities and 
possible relations, makes sense as a renewal of the rationalist account of essences. But at the same 
time, this fragmentation into pre-individual singularities radically breaks apart the Platonic sense 
of ideal unity involved in the notion of essence. De1euze makes a point of saying that Ideas should 
be understood in terms of structure, which "has nothing to do with essence for it is a matter of a 
combinatory formula supporting formal elements that by themselves have neither form nor 
signification, nor representation .,. nor intelligibility behind appearances"; 'How do we Recognise 
Structuralism', 261. It can also be seen, if we refer back to the issues raised in chapter 2, that the 
reasons why Deleuze does not affirm an intelligible essence behind appearance themsehes flow 
from his interpretation of rationalist theological arguments (ie. the notion ofunivocity). 
76 Deleuze refers in detail to this work in Logic of Sense, 48-50. 
77 Kant's categories of the understanding are often referred to as 'structures' that order ex-perience. 
and in tum structures are sometimes called 'conditions for the possibility' of psychic or social life, 
etc. However, for Kant himself, as we will see in chapter 5, the categories themselves have no 
value or application by themselves - they are not conditions for the possibility of ex-perience -
unless they are justified by something else that is truly necessary for ex-perience: apperception. As 
Kant crucially says at CPR A901B 123, "appearances could after all be so constituted that the 
understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity. and eveI}1hing 
would then lie in such confusion that, ego in the succession of appearances nothing would offer 
itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis". Apperception is therefore absolutely necessary as an 
independent mediating premise in ~rder to avoid this scenario; any "conditions of the possibility of 
experience" are sterile without it. We wi11 discuss the notion of apperception at length 111 the nex1 
chapter, but it can be noted here that the premise of apperception would be clearly inco~patible 
with many accounts of structuralism, which is often considered as a definitive break mth 'the 
philosoph)' of consciousness'. Clearly apperception cannot be necessary for a structuralist, but nor 
can it be presunled as a logical requirement for the capacity to judge, given the priority accorded to 
unconscious structures. Hence. the identification of structure with the categones of the 
understanding CarolOt stand S~ when Le'i-Strauss says that structuralism can pro"ide a ne" 
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announces obscurely that "we set ourselves on a path closely parallel to that of 
Mauss when he invoked the notion of mana as grounding certain apriori synthetic 
judgments".78 Now, Mauss cites mana as a word used by certain Polynesian tribes 
to denote the power possessed by gifts in the cycle of exchange. For Levi-Strauss, 
it is an example of a "floating signifier", a signifier without meaning in itself, but 
which conditions the possibility of the actualisation of a structural network, 
whether it be an exchange system or language itself. Any culture must be founded 
on a signifying system; but because such systems can only be understood 
synchronically (they appear to come into being all at once), this always produces a 
"non-equivalence" concerning the relation to the signified. "The moment the 
universe became significant, it was none the better known for being SO".79 Even 
though "a shift occurred from a stage when nothing had a meaning to another 
stage where everything had meaning", it entails the passage of great periods of 
time "to identify certain aspects of the signifier and certain aspects of the 
signified", that is to know the world. Hence, "there is always a non-equivalence or 
'inadequation' between the [totality of signifiers and totality of signifieds], a non-
fit and overspill which divine understanding alone can soak Up".80 In Deleuzian 
terms, there is always a surfeit of virtual differential connections that haunts our 
movements in actuality, which expresses itself in this ''floating signifier, which is 
the disability of all finite thought (but also the surety of all art, all poetry, every 
mythic and aesthetic invention).,,81 For Deleuze, the notion that the system of 
exchange is "a synthesis immediately given to, and given by, symbolic thought,,82 
which nevertheless depends on the movement of an 'object = x' traversing all the 
series, is fundamental to what he calls the "ideal synthesis of difference". 83 There 
is a "static genesis" of combinations in an ideal spatium, which must nevertheless 
synthetic apriori, is he merely using an unfortunate metaphor, and purloining a Kantian notio~ of 
universality in order to spuriously ground structuralism? It is Deleuze who has 'st~ structuralism 
on its feet' by establishing the correlation bet\.veen structure and the Kantian Idea: It IS not the pure 
concept that is the structure, but the Idea. The pure concept or category is a unive~1 rule f?r any 
subject engaging in the act of knowledge. Structuralism as a whole does not conce~ It~lhn~ the 
act of knowledge, but with areas of ex-perience where the consciousness of the subject IS margmal. 
78 Le\i-Strauss, Introduction to the rVork of Alarcel "Hauss, trans. F. Baker (London: Routledge. 
1987).56. 
79 Ibid. 60. 
80 Ibid. 62. 
81 Ibid. 63. 
82 Ibid. 58. . 
n The correct French title oftlle fourth chapter of DR. The notion that S)'flthesis can occur III Ideas 
themselves is crucial. 
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pass through actuality in order for the structure to be determined, in order for 
singularities to be found. 
Deleuze is outlining a general metatheory of structures, so what exactly 
the "elements" involved in the differential relations are remains undetermined. 
But again, if we keep in mind Deleuze's general reliance on rationalism, we can 
recall that in Leibniz all elements do not finally come to rest in some sort of 
elementary points, rather the 'substance' of a thing is its monadological structure 
of sufficient reason.84 However, Deleuze gives some helpful examples of types of 
elements from structural linguistics and structural anthropology. lakobson and 
Halle describe the building blocks of language, phonemes, as distinguished by 
certain 'distinctive features', which delineate the fundamental types of voicing 
and combination that firstly are possible for the speech apparatus itself, and 
secondly that are, as it were, compossible according to the capabilities of that 
apparatus (the combination of certain phonemes being difficult to pronounce).85 
The words bill and pill are distinguished only by this fundamental opposition 
between the different speech units band p. But "a distinctive feature is a relational 
property so that the 'minimum same' of a feature in its combination with various 
other concurrent or successive features lies in the essentially identical relation 
between the two opposite alternatives".86 This fits neatly with Deleuze's account 
of a differential relation: "phonemes do not exist independently of the relations 
into which they enter and through which they reciprocally determine each 
other".87 So the "element" in the differential structure of linguistics can be thought 
of as Virtually "implicating" these "differential relations among phonemes [which] 
assign singularities within language".88 But the determination of which relations 
are 'compossible' and which 'incompossible' depends on an ideal 
84 Deleuze writes that "Ideas are multiplicities .... 'Multiplicity' ... is the true substantive. 
substance itself Even1hing is a multiplicity insofar as it incarnates an Idea" (DR 182/236). 
85 R. Jakobson & M. 'Halle, Fundamentals' of Language (Mouton & Co: 'S-Gravenhage, 1956), 4-
5. 
86 Ibid.. 14. 
87 Deleuze, 'How do we Recognise Structuralism?', 264. Cf: "The linguistic Idea certainly has all 
the characteristics of a structure: the presence of differential elements, called p~o~emes, e\.1racted 
from the continuous sonorous flux: the existence of differential relations (distmctlve features) 
which reciprocally and completely determine these elements: the value of singular points assume 
by the phonemes in that detemlination ... " (DR 203/262). 
88 LogiC afSense, 150. 
problematisation that can only be carried out through experimental actualisations 
89 
of the element. 
iv Conclusion: The Virtual and the Actual 
The distinction between virtual and actual has been repeatedly mentioned. In 
order to expound this distinctio~ it will be helpful to relate it to four problems 
that we have been encountering in our examination of the limits of transcendental 
philosophy. 1. the logic/reality distinction; 2. the problem of existence; 3. the 
status of possibility in transcendental philosophy itself; 4. the problem of 
individuation. Deleuze's innovation is to unite these separate problems into one 
consistent thread. 
1. Logic/reality. In my opinio~ the distinction between the virtual and actual in 
, 
the light of the preceding, transforms and solves the rationalist and Kantian 
problem of the relation between real and logical possibility. "The only 
danger," writes Deleuze, "is that the virtual could be confused with the 
possible" (DR 2111272). The danger is double. Firstly, Deleuze criticises the 
notion of logical possibility for being abstract (in the Hegelian sense). The 
problem is that it depends in a hidden way on the current reservoir of concepts 
available to the mind. 90 The criterion for what is logically possible depends on 
89 Deleuze also refers us to Levi-Strauss' notion that there are "my themes" analogous to 
phonemes. For instance, Levi-Strauss takes the Oedipus myth and finds four separate types of 
event that recur in it. (c. Levi-Strauss, 'The Structural Study of Myth', in Structural 
Anthropology, voL 1 (London: Penguin, 1968). 214f For Deleuze's brief reference, see 'How do 
we Recognise Structuralism?', 266.) The first group is comprised of events such as Oedipus 
marrying his mother, and Antigone bUI)'ing her brother despite di,ine prohibition. They all 
involve "overvaluation of kinship relations'", and are counterposed to the second group, in "hich 
Oedipus kills his father and Eteocles kills his brother, which indicate "undervaluation of kinship 
relations". The other couple concerns the affirmation or negation of the notion of autocthonous 
origin, but we can focus on the first couple. In this case, a set of singularities is traced which leads 
us back to the virtual structure that delineates the unresolved problem of kinship relations for the 
ancient Greeks. The myth plays out various "limit situations", or singularities, and sen·es. says 
Le,i-Strauss, as a kind of "logical tool" by which various combinations are put into play (ibid 
216). As regards the my themes in these relations, Levi-Strauss remarks they on~v have content 
insofar as they are engaged in actual relations, so that "it is as though a phoneme were always 
made up of its variants" (ibid, 212). It is possible to pronounce a phoneme independently. but a 
my theme not only coexists virtually with its other combinations. but can only be actualised With 
otller combinations. So. with both of these cases, linguistic and anthropological. we find to varyIng 
degrees that the elements must be considered in their virtual character. 
90 With the notion of possibility, "difference can no longer be anything but the negative 
detemlined by the concept: either the limitation imposed by possibles upon each other in order to 
be realised or the opposition of the possible to the reality of the rear (DR 2111273). 
the distribution of already established concepts (whose implications are 
analytically implied in each other).91 However, as we have seen with the early 
Kant, this network must ultimately depend rather on a notion of real 
possibility. This leads to the second danger, that the true analogy between 
logic/reality and actuality/virtuality be presented in inverted form. Far from 
being identified with the logical, the virtual is in fact identified with the real. 
In fact, Deleuze completes the movement of Leibniz and Kant towards 
subordinating logical to real possibility, but at the same time, precisely with 
the notion of the virtual, avoids the threatened conclusion that everything 
would collapse into the bare givenness of reality. 
For Deleuze, the locus of real possibility lies in Ideas. The set of virtual 
relations between singularities must be considered as prior to, and different in 
kind from, any actual organisation of compossible series, as the only criterion 
of compossibility is problematised in the absence of an intelligent God: hence 
the "play in the creation of the world" (DR 51172). The virtual thus assumes 
its own consistency, its own ''truly sufficient reason", to which actuality is 
subordinated. But actuality in no way "resembles" the virtual, in the way that 
logical possibility resembles or repeats the rea1. 92 Therefore the problem of the 
mutual collapse of logic into reality, or vice versa, is no longer a threat. The 
actual/virtual distinction is thus a more powerful, internally dynamic version 
of the logic/reality distinction. 
2. Existence. We have seen that Kant's solution in CPR to the problem of 
'reality' was to identify it with mere existence as the presence of an intuition; 
we also saw what the effects of this identification were in Kant's notions of 
idealism and noumena. For Deleuze 
9] I belie,'e it is for related reasons that Deleuze claims in his re\iew of Hyppolite that 
"contradiction [is the] merely phenomenal aspect of difference" (195). However. whether such a 
~int could have any mileage in an argument against Hegel is another ~tter. . . . 
9. "Actualisation breaks "ith resemblance as a process no less than It does "1th Idenl1~' as a 
principle. Actual tenus never resemble the singularities they incarnate. In this sense. actualIsatlOn 
or differenciation is always a genuine creation. It does not result from any limit~tion of a pre-
existing possibility" (DR 212/273). Deleuze' s critique of resemblance here IS difficult to 
understand unless placed in the contex1 of the problem of monism as encountered ~ c~pter 2: 
monism threatens either to swallow up logic in reality. or ,ice versa. Deleuze must a\'o]~ tIus at all 
costs if he is to resolve the problem of real possibility. as well as ultimately sustaIn his own 
philosophy of difference. 
1% 
Every time we pose the question in tenns of the possible and the real ~ d . f' , we are l~rce to conceIve 0 eXIstence as a brut~ eruption or a pure act or leap '" \\bat 
dIfference can there be between the eXIstent and the non-existent if the _ 
. . 1 d 'bI I non 
eXIstent I~ ~ rea y POSSI e, a ready inclu~ed in the concept and having all the 
charactenstIcs that the concept confers on It as a possibility (DR 211/273). 
On these terms, "existence is therefore supposed to occur in space and time" 
(ibid), which, as in Kant, provide the index for the reduction of 'realitv' to 
empirical reality. But Deleuze writes that in Kant space and time "are 
understood as indifferent milieux instead of the production of existence 
occuring in a characteristic space and time" (ibid). Now, space and time are 
indeed to be understood as other to the concept in Kantian terms, but 
nevertheless, they are not other to the Idea.93 ''While space may be irreducible 
to concepts, its affinity with Ideas cannot nevertheless be denied - in other 
words, its capacity (as intensive spatium) to determine in extensity the 
actualisation of ideal connections (as differential relations contained in the 
Idea)" (DR 2311298-9). 
So what we have called up until now the set of real possibilities can be 
determined ideally according to differential relations, while the singularities of 
these relations are defined by certain values in those relations. Deleuze's 
account thus allows for actualisation to be 'built in' to the determination of the 
virtual. The continuity implied in relations of distance and the notion of 
intensity mirrors an "ideal continuity" at the level of Ideas. Deleuze is in effect 
bypassing Kant's account of the concept to engineer an internal relation 
between Ideas and the spatiotemporal field. He goes on to suggest that, ''when 
one makes a system of spatiotemporal determinations correspond to a concept, 
it seems to me that one substitutes a drama for a logos, one establishes a 
drama of this logos ... Pure spatiotemporal dynamisms have their power of 
dramatising concepts, because first of all they actualise, or incarnate Ideas,,9~ 
This notion of dramatisation will be returned to shortly. 
3. Possibility in Transcendental Philosophy. It is in the current context that we 
find grounds for Deleuze's transformation of Kantian "conditioning" into 
93 "WIllie it is true that continuousness must be related to Ideas and to their problematic use. thIS is 
on condition that it be no longer defined by characteristics borrowed from sensible or even 
geometric intuition" (DR 1711222). 
94Deleuze. 'La methode'. 107. 96. 
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"genesis": "The condition must be a condition of real expenence, not of 
possible experience. It forms an intrinsic genesis, not an extrinsic 
conditioning. In every respect truth is a matter of production, not of 
adequation" (DR 154/200). These statements may perhaps be less obscure in 
the current context. It can prima facie seem that Deleuze is simply abandoning 
Kantianism for materialism by appealing to "real conditions". However the 
, 
point is that Kant's critical interpretation of the 'third thing', as the set of 
conditions of possible experience, equivocates crucially over the problematic 
distinction between logical possibility and real possibility and betrays the 
sense in which the transcendental must be extralogical. The notion of possible 
experience by itself, without a proper account of the distinctive structure of 
real possibility for itself, lends itself to the charge that the conditions of 
possibility are extracted from the presence of already established empirical 
concepts. Thus "Kant traces the so-called transcendental structures from the 
empirical acts of a psychological consciousness" (DR 13511 76-7) 95 We have 
seen that the structure of what we previously called 'real possibility', but is 
now denoted by the term 'virtuality' extends into the sub-representative level 
of Ideas. We also encountered arguments from Maimon and Deleuze to the 
effect that while the 'extensive' form of differentiation provided conditions for 
. conscious differentiation, these conditions were themselves conditioned by 
sub-representative differential Ideas. While these claims about the limits of 
consciousness must be defended in greater detail in chapter 6 and Appendix 
IV, which will take into account the necessary starting point of consciousness 
(and so-called 'empirical reality'), we can at least see formally how a genesis 
which traces the actualisation of virtual structures might be sufficiently 
independent of the array of actual, conventional concepts. The "real 
conditions" Deleuze has in mind are by no means empirical particularities or 
'material conditions', but are precisely the ideal structures we have been 
exploring, that form the problematic ground for the actualised 'solutions' 
found in external reality. "This is a radical reversal in the problem-solution 
95 Hegel too can be seen to be concerned O\·er this. and moyes towards a genetic account of 
. . . f th ·bl b t bey a new speculatIyc conditIOns which are no longer llilderstood m temlS 0 e poSS} e. U 0 . 
logic of t11e absolute (that is. of reality). 
relation, a more considerable revolution that the Copernican" (DR 180/233).96 
We will see in Appendix IV how Deleuze manages to hold onto the 
transcendental dimension through his account of the constitution of the subject 
through the passive syntheses of habit and memory: these provide the human 
being with the access to the 'virtual' necessary in order to "reconstruct" the 
genesis of Ideas. 97 Again, it is quite clear that Deleuze is committed to 
transcendental philosophy and is no materialist. 
4. Individuation. Deleuze in effect bypasses the Kantian problem of relating 
concept to intuition by finding at the extremes of ideality a means to connect 
up with the extreme of spatiotemporal individuation. Given the account of 
relative and complete determination it is finally possible to envisage how 
Deleuze intends intensive relations to do the work of individuation in the 
manifold. "The individual is no more an infima species than it is composed of 
parts" (DR 247/318). Deleuze redefines individuality according to the 
96 Deleuze in fact says this about the mathematician N.H. Abel, who produces a formal theory of 
problems and differentials in which Deleuze finds inspiration for his own theory. 
97 However, in his 1956 study of Bergson, Deleuze's claims about the relation of 'experience' to 
transcendental philosophy are rather more problematic. He describes Bergson's method as "more 
than a description of experience and less (in appearance) than a transcendental analysis. It certainly 
raises itself to the conditions of the given, but these conditions are tendency-subjects, they 
themselves are given in a certain way, they are lived. Moreover they are at the same time the pure 
and the lived, the living and the lived, the absolute and the lived The essential thing is that the 
foundation be a foundation, but that it is nevertheless experienced" ('Bergson's Concept of 
Difference', in 1. Mullarkey ed., The New Bergson, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999,46). He then appeals to Schelling's conception of 'superior empiricism'. However, on these 
terms, it is almost impossible to conceive how such a method could be carried out. In 1961, 
Deleuze publishes 'De Sacher-Masoch au Masochisme' (Arguments 15, 1961, pp. 40-6). an 
astonishing text, uncommented upon as far as I know, which offers a full-blown affinuation of 
Jungian psychology. Depth-psychological access to the unconscious is affinued through the 
apprehension of archetypes in regressive experiences ("all is symbol in the unconscious", 46). 
Deleuze talks darkly of "the alliance of consciousness with superficial levels of the unconscious, 
which hold in check the more profound unconscious that encircles us through a line of blood" 
(43). It is tempting to read the earlier account of Bergson in these tenus (as no other kind of access 
to the conditions of experience is suggested). In the essay on Bergson, Deleuze also writes that 
"consciousness already existed, with in and in difference itself. Duration by itself is consciousness, 
life by itself is consciousness, but it is so by right ... Consciousness in Bergson is not at all 
historical, history is just the only point where consciousness re-emerges, having traversed matter ... 
This identity in principle of difference and the consciousness of difference is memory" (52). This 
clearly resonates with a Jungian reading of the relation of phylogenesis and memory. It is only 
finally with his theory of Ideas that Deleuze escapes from the obscurities of this earlier account. In 
'How do we Recognise Structuralism?', he takes up Levi-Strauss's criticism of Jung for not seeing 
that archetypes can only be structural. To attribute meaning to archetypes is, says Levi-Strauss. 
"comparable to the long-supported error that a sound may possess a certain affinity with a 
meaning" (Structural Anthropology, yoI. 1. 208). Deleuze also alludes to Lacan' s criticism of 
Jung's archetypes as merely imaginary, rather than truly symbolic in the Lacanian sense (,How do 
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intensive relations that have gone into the spatiotemporal constitution of an 
entity; individuation occurs in an "intense field" and always ideally relates to 
certain "pre-individual singularities" that provide the distinctive points in its 
constitution or formation (DR 246/317). "It is because of the action of the 
field of individuation that such and such differential relations and such and 
such distinctive points (pre-individual fields) are actualised - in other words, 
organised within intuition" (DR 247/318). 
These suggestions are no doubt very incomplete at this point, and will be further 
developed and made concrete in the final chapter. However, two things can be 
noted immediately. Firstly, if what Deleuze has performed here is valid, then 
hasn't he in effect overcome the need for a Transcendental Deduction of the 
Categories, as the locus for a demonstration and justification of the apriori 
relation between rational determination and the sensible manifold? If such a move 
were to be possible, it would need to be specified and defended in much greater 
detail; this will be attempted in the final chapter. But there is indeed a sense in 
which Deleuze, in his exploration of the "two halves of difference ... dialectical 
Ideas [and] ... aesthetic actualisation" is explicitly calling into question the need 
for a Transcendental Analytic as Kant envisages it. Secondly and relatedly, we 
should draw attention to Deleuze's remark that "that which we call drama 
particularly resembles the Kantian schema '" In a certain manner, all of post-
Kantianism has tended to elucidate the mystery of this hidden art".98 
Deleuze rechristens the schematism a "dramatisation" of the Idea. 
Dramatisations "create or trace a space corresponding to the differential relations 
and to the singularities to be actualised" (DR 216/279). For instance, the 
we Recognise Structuralism?', 269). Thus the notion of the 'symbol' in Deleuze undergoes a 
radical, but secret transfonnation. 
98 'La 'methode', 96. In this same passage, Deleuze points out that certain post-Kantians have 
indicated the direction that he is taking, but does not give their names. However, Novalis' 
"magical idealism" seems to be the main reference for Deleuze on this point, and comprehension 
of Deleuze's notion of the spatiotemporal actualisation of Ideas may be aided at this point by a 
discussion of some of N ovahs 's fragments. The reader may therefore "'ish to turn to Appendix IT 
on 'Novalis and the Schematism'. In DR Deleuze writes that "The Kantian theory of schematism 
points beyond itself in two directions: towards the dialectical Idea, which is its own schema and 
which ensures the specification of the concept (Critique of Pure Reason, 'The Final Aim of the 
Natural Dialectic of Human Reason'), and towards the aesthetic Idea., which makes schemata serve 
the more complex and comprehensive process of symbolism (Critique of Judgment # 49,59)" (DR 
328/282). The relation between schematism and symbolism "'ill be touched on in chapter 5.3.i. 
below. Cf. also chapter 6.2.ii, footnote 33 for further discussion of the schematism in Deleuze. 
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topological actualisation of genetic elements in an egg determines the individual 
form of a living being.99 But also "the times of differenciation incarnate the time 
of the structure, the time of progressive determination" (DR 217/280), so that the 
actualisation of genetic structures occurs according to certain speeds allowed by 
the spatiotemporal milieu. Developmental times will obviously be crucial if the 
structure of genes are conceived according to differential relations, as they may 
allow different singularities latent in the structure to emerge. Deleuze's "science 
of the sensible" takes up the principle of intensity to create a new notion of 
"spatiotemporal dynamisms", in which space and time are no longer abstract 
forms, but can be distributed and ordered in particular ways depending on the 
system in which they are incarnated (eg. physical, biological, psychological). The 
static genesis of an Idea is mirrored in the genesis of a particular form of space-
time. If the world seems to cohere in what Kant called a "generally established 
harmony", that is because of a deeper, distributive structure that is virtually 
present beneath the interaction of distinct intensive fields developing according to 
their own spatiotemporal laws. 100 In a sense this continues the Leibnizian 
argument that the extensive relations that we experience conceal a reality that is 
ordered fundamentally differently. Thus for Deleuze extensive relations may seem 
to be ordered according to reciprocal physical determination, but the reality of 
these relations is ordered according to a metamorphosis in the old notion of 
"harmony,,/Ol according to what Leibniz might have called the "secret theatre" of 
intensities. 102 As we will now see, this at least creates the possibility of a 
99 Deleuze writes, at first perplexingly, that "the destiny and achievement of the embryo is to live 
the unlivable, to sustain forced movements of a scope which would break any skeleton or tear 
I igaments (DR 215/277). He argues that an embryo is a kind of "larval subject". But 'life' should 
be considered as quite separate from consciousness, spatiotemporal actualisation having its own 
coherence and distributive unification, prior to its emergence above the "threshold of 
consciousness" (DR 2131275). 
100 Thus it would not be adequate to claim that Deleuze's and Novalis's spatiotemporal dynamisms 
simply represent different tempi and rates of change in a general framework of space and time. 
This would be to pri\ilege the extensive, abstract model of space and time for no other reason than 
that it is possible to measure the contents of the world on a single scale of measurement. But this is 
merely a logical possibility, and requires a real definition, which is what is supplied by the 
intensive model of an absolute spatium. 
101 Deleuze remains very close to Leibniz, as we can see if we reexamine now a passage from the 
letters to De VoIder: "matter and motion are not substances or things as much as they are the 
phenomena of the perceivers, the reality of which is situated in the harmony of the perceivers with 
themselves (at different times) and with ot1ler perceivers", Ariew & Garber, 181. 
IO~ Leibniz sometimes uses the term "theatre" to describe the movements of metamorphosis in 
bodies. which continue into the "greater theatre" of t1le relations of the Elect in heaven 
C\1onadology # 75). Cf. the other passages where Leibniz describes his notion of metamorphosis 
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transformation of Kant's distinction between the ideal form of space and the 
unknown 'reality' of noumena into a distinction between the extensive and 
intensive aspects of space, on condition that other metaphysical and 
epistemological aspects of the notion of noumena can be dealt with. 
4 Self-differentiation as Repetition 
Identity and Repetition 
We saw at the beginning of this chapter how Deleuze demonstrates the limitations 
of conceptual representation by showing how at a certain point concepts are left to 
repeat themselves, and miss the differences outside the concept. This was merely 
a negative demonstration of the importance of repetition; "natural blockage itself 
requires a positive supra-conceptual force capable of explaining it, and of thereby 
explaining repetition" (DR 16/26). Now, in the process of expounding 
nonconceptual determination, we have in fact ended up with two forms of 
nonconceptual differentiation: Ideas and intensities, the dialectical and aesthetic 
"halves of difference". We also have glimpsed how Ideas are incarnated by 
intensities, or, what amounts to the same, intensities have an ideal correlate in the 
problematic field according to which they act. With this doubling of 
nonconceptuality, we can now proceed to give repetition a positive content. 
But first it is necessary to notice a major paradox in Deleuze's theory of 
difference and repetiton. Deleuze actually begins his account of repetition (DR 
If17f) by asking the question of how (not even whether) strict or 'substantial' 
identity, that is, strictly identical particulars which exactly repeat the nature of 
other particulars, is possible.103 Let us take what Frege calls 'Leibniz's law' of 
identity: "those things are identical of which one can be substituted for the other 
without loss of truth". 104 Identity = substitutability. Deleuze in effect intensifies 
the rationalist notion that identity could only be possible through a substitution 
as a "metaschematism", whicll is to be counterposed to metempsychosis; Letters to Arnauld 
Ariew & Garber. 78, Theodicy (trans. E. Huggard, La Salle: Open Court, 1985), 78, 169. 
103 In a footnote on Gabriel Tarde, Deleuze actually equates identity with repetition, while arguing 
that resemblance occludes such identity (DR 307/39). 
104 Frege, 'Meaning and Reference' (in M. Beaney ed., The Frege Reader, Oxford: Blackwell. 
1997), 158~ Frege's source is 'Non inelegans specimen demonstrandi in abstractis'. Erdmann ed, 
Opera Philosophica, 1. 
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that is strictly not conceivable under any form of generality (whether it be 
resemblance, concept, or analogy). But by this insistence, Deleuze forces us to 
ask, then how could it be possible? Identity seems unthinkable according to any 
rule, and merely forms a kind of limit concept. Nevertheless, it has been 
repeatedly pointed out that Deleuze is in pursuit of a "truly sufficient reason". But 
what could sufficient reason mean but that everything finds its own differentiation 
adequate to demarcate it from others? In other words, the "internal difference" of 
something must surely express its own identity? 
For Leibniz, identity cannot be demonstrated within a system, only 
presupposed, for the reason that something can only be identical to itself. This is 
why the principle of identity serves as the absolutely fundamental principle of all 
rational thought. But although it is prior to the agonistics about what constitutes 
the form of reality, it remains not just logically valid, but metaphysically valid. 
Now we traced Kant's movements beyond Leibniz on this point. In the 
Dissertation, Kant is forced to face the implications of making the principle of 
identity metaphysical. Such a metaphysics of identity cannot be separated from 
questions of 'reality'; it too has to be subject to the critique's search for real 
forms. Kant argued that the principle of identity or contradiction depended on 
time, which was merely a phenomenal condition; therefore self-identity could not 
be presupposed in the noumenal realm, and was merely a condition for 
experience. As we saw, this once again produced the effect of collapsing logic 
into reality. Therefore Kant's next move, in CPR was to backtrack and instead 
give logic a purely formal status. However, the result of this formalisation of logic 
is that logic, without metaphysical or phenomenal index, becomes entirely open to 
being axiomatised. Logic becomes in principle entirely free-floating and abstract, 
and now tells us strictly nothing about things in themselves. 
Nevertheless, for Kant in CPR all analysis presupposes a real synthesis; 
logic is insufficient for determination. If Kant continues to maintain that logical 
concepts such as identity continue to structure the pure concepts of the 
understanding, and give us clues to the categories, this is because the real burden 
of the notion of identity rests on experience: Kant's effort is therefore precisely to 
find a way of demonstrating self-identity. Something is only identical to itself 
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when its properties are unified in a concept according to the synthesis made 
possible by the categories; that is, identity is always reidentification. 105 
So identity seems to be caught in a kind of antinomy. On the one hand, it 
seems that strict self-identity cannot be purely logical without either depending on 
metaphysics or yielding to formal axiomatisation, while on the other hand identity 
can only be saved in the form of general reidentification according to the 
conditions of the concept in real experience. Is there a hidden middle ground? 
Deleuze in effect occupies a highly unusual middle position between 
Leibniz and Kant. Deleuze argues in 1955 that it is only by "determining the 
differences in nature between things" "that we will be able to 'return to things 
themselves' ... If philosophy is to have a positive and direct relation with things, it 
is only to the extent that it claims to grasp the thing itself in what it is, in its 
difference from all that it is not, which is to say in its internal difference". 106 The 
context of this statement shows that by "returning to things themselves", Deleuze 
is by no means echoing the trusted phenomenological maxim: on the contrary, he 
means to resurrect the rationalist project of returning to noumena. A "truly 
sufficient reason" will enable us to determine things in themselves. 
Deleuze's move is to suggest that strict identity can be thought as long as 
it is thought as repetition, as long as repetition is understood as difference without 
a concept. Repetition can be pure if it is not subordinated to the concept, which 
can only involve generality. The identical element that is repeated, is indeed 
noumenal, but this noumenon must rather be thought essentially as an Idea. 
This admittedly abstract position can be better explained if we return first 
to Deleuze's early work, where it assumes a more avowedly rationalist shape. In 
Proust and Signs, Deleuze expounds an extreme rationalist view of noumenal 
essence, modulated through a high aestheticism. The notion of "internal 
difference" is almost orthodoxly Leibnizian, referring to the essence of an 
internally qualified monad. ''Essence implicates, envelops, wraps itself up in the 
105 This is perhaps why Kant's adherence to traditional forms of judgment seemed so scandalous to 
Russell and the pioneers of the new logic. There was no longer any reason why logic could not be 
formally axiomatised, without regard to metaphysical assumptions about subjects, predicates. and 
their unity in judgments. The notion of intension is discarded and logic becomes purely 
eX1ensional. Correlatively. the 'act of unity' involved in the use of concepts seems to gain a 
'merely psychological' l~~e, whereas for Kant, it continued somehow to reflect the structure of 
logical judgment itself. 
106 'Bergson's Conception of Difference'. 42. 
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subject ... Essence is not only individual, it individualises,.107 Essence is thus 
conceived as an original organisation of a possible series, a perfect monad. 
"Essence is in itself difference. But it does not have the power to diversify, to 
diversify itself, without also having the power to repeat itself, identical to itself 
What can one do with essence, which is ultimate difference, except to repeat it, 
because it is irreplaceable, and because nothing can be substituted for it?,,108 
This passage reveals the deep rationalist background of Deleuze's theory 
of difference and repetition. The first sentence of DR tells us that "repetition is not 
generality". In what follows Deleuze counterposes what appears to be a model of 
strict self-identity or nonsubstitutability, with the identity which is achieved by 
general concepts, that is identity as reidentification, or recognition. Essence must 
be conceived initially as the ideal correlate of complete and adequate 
determination, beyond the inadequate determinations of general concepts, which 
can always be applied to more than one thing. 
Moving away from Leibniz now, Deleuze says that only in art do 
"difference and repetition, the two powers of essence" achieve a "perfect 
adequation", a completely expressive being.109 Only in art do we come close to a 
completely determined essence, in which all the elements are reciprocally 
determined, and which cannot be duplicated or exchanged according to the 
common currency of the con~ept. However, the more that generality and the 
common or recognisable forms of the material world interfere with the "ductile 
substances" of art, the more "repetition testifies to a discrepancy, an inadequation 
of consciousness and idea. ,,110 
Furthermore, if the ideal form of repetition, the creation of art, always 
involves the explication of our own monadic essence, Deleuze's model also 
adheres in general to Leibniz's notion that to apprehend, know or think anything 
involves unravelling our own relations to it. For Leibniz, all knowing is a self-
knowing. To the extent that we do not manage to express ourselves artistically we 
are condemned in all our actions to repeat aspects of our own essence 
unconsciously - the repetition will no longer be a transparent expression, but a 
107 P dS· 43 roust an I~I1S. . 
108 Ibid -1-9. c 
109 Ibid 67. 50. 
110 Ibid 68. 
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pathos: "We repeat .,. all the more in that [the essence] escapes us and in fact 
. ." III 
remaIns unconscIOUS . 
Now, for Leibniz, our explication of our own essence only corresponds to 
the other essences in the world, because God has chosen an entirely convergent 
set of series. We have seen that Deleuze's model displaces these presuppositions. 
The essence, or individual difference, therefore, cannot be conceived as itself by 
right initially convergent with other such differences. So metaphysically we are 
faced with the set of all logically possible series, without the criterion for their 
organisation according to the principle of the best. Il2 As well as merely 
expressing our own essence, our own monad exists in "complication" with other 
monads, differently organised, with not necessarily convergent series. "Our only 
windows, our only doors, are entirely spiritual"; we can in fact communicate with 
other monads, through bearing witness to their own artistic expressions; to be a 
spectator of art is to penetrate someone else's essence, to explicate their individual 
difference. Deleuze says "there is no intersubjectivity except an artistic one".l13 
The conventional use of signs will tell us nothing about another monad. 
Deleuze's theory of difference and repetition in this version seems to be 
entirely rationalist: finitude is a result of imperfection, the fact that we must trade 
with general ideas, crude confused ideas. However, if we follow the development 
of this account of essential 'internal difference' in DR, then we find the 
Leibnizian account of essence unravelling into the account of singularities and 
differential relations outlined above. If the combination of these singularities is 
not itself subject to the rule of God, then this "complication" can be pursued 
further. Essence can no longer be said to "individualise" at all; rather, the 
existence of singularities must be said to be "pre-individual". But in this case, 
"essence" is no longer an appropriate term, as it merely serves to conceal the 
question of why certain singularities find themselves actualised alongside others. 
Essences are replaced by a more problematic successor, the Idea. An essence can 
III Ibid. 
112 Deleuze quotes a passage from Proust about music which beautifully illustrates this Leibnizian 
picture, in which "the world enveloped by essence is always a beginning of the World in general. a 
beginning of the universe, an absolute, radical beginning: 'At first the piano alone complained 
like a bird abandoned in its countryside: the violin heard replied from a neighbouring tree. It was 
like the begiruung of the world, as if there had been, as yet, only two of them on Earth. or rather in 
tlUs world closed to all the rest. constructed by the logic of a creator in such a way that only the 
two of them would ever exist: the sonata "': ibid 44. 
113 Ibid. 42. 
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only ever be problematic, and by itself it has no power to individualise - on the 
contrary, it testifies to an original pre-individual state of the complication of 
differential relations. Deleuze's account of internal difference is played out 
according to the movement of this logic, in which Leibnizian rationalism extends 
into a philosophy of immanence, devoid of theological transcendence, and 
terminates in the account of difference affirmed in DR. 
Given this shift, it may seem peculiar that Deleuze retains his theory of 
"difference and repetition", as these are said in Proust and Signs to be the two 
powers of an irreplaceable essence. If the essence is dissolved into problematic 
relations, what is there to repeat? All that is left is the notion of "inadequate" or 
"imperfect" repetition - finite repetition. But if Ideas themselves are intrinsically 
"complicated" within one another, according to differential relations ordered 
around singularities, this "inadequation" is surely intrinsic to Ideas themselves so 
conceived. An ideal essence could never be actualised as such (neither by God nor 
artist) because Ideas intrinsically exist only as problems - but only for beings 
open to them as problems, that is, only for finite beings. Furthermore, it follows 
that, if Ideas are multiplicities, there can be no such thing as "an" internal 
difference, despite what Deleuze's early work tends to suggest. Internal difference 
is not an essence, but a set of differences related together under an Idea or 
problem. 
So when Deleuze says that we must find the "secret subject, the real 
subject of repetition, which repeats itself through [discrete elements]" (DR 23/36), 
it is the problematic Idea that is referred to.114 "Variations do not come from 
without ... [they] express, rather, the differential mechanisms which belong to the 
essence and origin of that which is repeated" (DR 17/28). The variations in an 
intensive actualisation of an Idea do not alter the pure Idea considered in its own 
internal differential relations and singularities, but at the same time no element of 
114 What is repeated, for instance, in the case of space, is the Idea itself, in its intensive incarnation. 
according to which the differential relations and singularities of the Idea are actualised according 
to particular values. Deleuze's example of learning to s\vim is apposite on this point (and is 
perhaps a Deleuzian echo of Hegel's analogy of Kant's critique of knowledge to a reluctance to 
jwup into the water before having learned how to swim). One orientates oneself using the signs 
made by the teacher, but does not imitate them: "when a body combines some of its own 
distinctive points without those of a wave. it espouses the principle of a repetition which is no 
longer that of the Same, but involves the Other - involves difference, from one wave and one 
gesture to another. and carries that difference through the repetitive space thereby constituted. To 
learn is indeed to constitute this space of an encounter "ith signs, in which the distinctive points 
renew themselves in each other, and repetition takes shape while disguising itself' (DR 23/35). 
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'identity' is presupposed in a structure; far from it. Structures "imply no prior 
identity, no positing of a something that could be called one and the same" (DR 
183/237). In topology, one conceives shapes not in terms of their extensive 
coordinates, but in terms of their possible transformations. A geometrical figure, 
for instance, may have its dimensions varied, while the same shape is preserved; 
then it may have its angles varied while parallels and straight lines are 
conserved.1l5 The invariant of such a group of transformations is not conceived as 
an identical 'element' somehow contained in the figure itself, but is purely a 
function of the transformations themselves. So it is with Ideas. Similarly, a word 
is repeated in contexts that disguise, but also develop the range and context of its 
meaning 'in itself. Furthermore, if we follow through Deleuze's composition of 
structures out of differential relations, then we must finally admit that even the 
invariants of these structures are secondary to the set of differential relations and 
their corresponding singularities, which are always ideally prior to any particular 
group of transformations. Hence the notion of difference and the notion of a 
"transcendental topology" are inextricably linked. 1l6 
Sufficient reason is achieved, at the price of logical and real conceptions 
of identity. So, to return to the starting point of this section, it is not really that 
repetition shows the possibility of strict identity. It is the other way around: we 
should say that strict identity is an amphibolous notion of repetition. Repetition is 
the 'real' meaning of strict identity as internal difference. Whereas we might not 
be able to see how strict identity could include difference, we can see how 
repetition can do SO.117 Ideas are intrinsically differential, and they are expressed 
in a repetition that must include difference, as actualisation is governed by 
115 See 1. Piaget, Structuralism, 20-22. 
116 Deleuze is referring to Lacan: "one could not say more clearly that empirical psychology is not 
only founded on, but determined by, a transcendental topology", 'How do we Recognise 
Structuralism?', 263. 
117 Deleuze's philosophy of difference is therefore by no means nominalist, but answers to a 
deeper, quasi-rationalist set of arguments about difference. The nominalist cannot even think the 
possibility of substitution that Deleuze takes as his starting point from the rationalist tradition. 
Thus Hume says that all identities are only resemblances, while Leibniz states that each thing must 
have its own concept, by the law of sufficient reason (tins concept may be comprised of plenty of 
other concepts univocally identical to those of other things, on the condition that some of its 
concepts are dissin1ilar)~ For tile nonlinalist, even though an original state of difference is 
empirically presupposed, things are only difforentiated ,ia their varying degrees of resemblance 
with each other (and contiguity). There is an important distinction to be made here between those 
'philosophies of difference' that are grounded on nominalism, and Deleuze's, which is not. Thus. 
Adorno's notion of difference ultimately rests on a nominalism of the kind affirmed by Nietzsche 
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problems, which are always immersed in a virtual field of differences. The notion 
of repetition gains autonomy when it is rooted in a specific order beyond the 
concept. Underneath the identity of any concept there will be a problematic Idea 
motivating it. 
II The Absolute Idea in Deleuze 
With this in mind, it is now possible at least to begin to see the range of De leuze's 
contention that there is such a thing as "difference in itself' without identity. 
Deleuze remarks that difference is above all to be considered in terms of a thing's 
difference-from-itself, or self-differentiation, which brings him close to Hegel, 
who also emphasises the primacy of self-differentiation In the discussion of 
identity and difference. Both Deleuze and Hegel share, In different ways, a 
commitment to the attainment of an ontological discourse in which "the external, 
empirical difference of thought and being has given way to the difference 
identical with Being, to the difference internal to the Being which thinks itself'. 118 
However, Deleuze argues for the primacy of difference-in-itself over identity. I 
suggest we now have the means not only to make sense of this notion, but to grasp 
its full range, and at least sketch out the possibility of a Deleuzian argument 
against the Hegelian account of difference. 
Deleuze writes that in Bergson, "thanks to the notion of the virtual, the 
thing differs from itself in the first place, immediately. According to Hegel, the 
thing differs from itself because it differs in the first place from all that it is not, 
such that difference goes to the point of contradiction.,,1l9 The basic Hegelian 
response to this would surely be that difference cannot be said to differ from itself 
if no identity is thought alongside it: "Difference in itself is self-related difference; 
as such, it is the negativity of itself, the difference not of an other, but of itself 
from itself, it is not itself but its other. But that which is difference from difference 
is identity".12o Although this argument is purely categorical, rather than being 
in 'On Truth and L~ing in an Ultramoral Sense', a tex1 that Deleuze never refers to in his own 
Nietzsche interpretation. 
118 Deleuze. Review of Hyppolite, 194. 
119 'B . C fD;~ ,-.., ergson's oncept 0 ll1erence, '.1. 
120 HegeL Science of Logic. 417. 
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about 'things', the argument is pertinent: in order to differ from itself, difference 
C'. ·d· 121 must reler to an 1 entIty. 
Now, although the early passage from Deleuze just quoted does not 
disengage this objection, Deleuze's more sophisticated account of the 'ideal 
synthesis of difference' may be strong enough to deal with it. We have seen that 
the notion of identity is finally subordinated to a prior account of the differential 
relations and singularities in a problematic Idea. Secondly, it was argued in 
Chapter Two that an appeal to arguments from Spinoza and Leibniz could give a 
new sense to the notion of the 'univocity of being', which would emphasise that 
Being could only express itself as pure difference. This latter argument, in the 
order of reasons of Deleuze's philosophy, should be seen as an extension to the 
absolute of the former argument. Deleuze's account of problems as 'real' must be 
extended to the absolute, in order to achieve ''the only realised Ontology". But in 
order to facilitate this extension, and to understand how Deleuze, like Hegel but in 
competition with him, attempts to move towards an absolute and beyond the 
Kantian dualism between phenomena and noumena, we should return one final 
time to the motives behind Kant's notion of noumena. In distinction to Hegel, 
Deleuze's account of dialectical difference will be absolute precisely through 
holding onto elements in Kant's notion ofnoumena. 
Kant's first move regarding the absolutisation of space provided a way to 
determine the apriority of geometry. However, due to his need to preserve some 
sense of the dignity of the noumenal, Kant felt it necessary to idealise space to 
avoid ontological Spinozism. During the silent decade, Kant realised that this very 
ideality of space and time provided him with all the materials to produce a new 
account of experience that would be apriori, because synthetic apriori judgments 
could be made about the relations between apriori ideal concepts and apriori ideal 
intuitions. Noumena were saved only to close them off from any kind of real 
determination; in this state they were preserved, to languish in a secret chaos. 
Now, Kant's early account of force perhaps could have obviated 
difficulties in relating the inner and outer in the later Kant, but again incipient 
Spinozism ruled it out. Deleuze in effect enacts a retrieval of certain elements 
1~1 For Hegel identity and difference are exhaustively bound up "ith each other. Identity is always 
identification as something. ie. under a differentiated concept while difference can only be 
difference from others and from itself. implying identity in both cases. 
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from the pre-critical Kant, such as the notion of intensive difference and virtuality, 
in order to "go back to the things themselves". The thing in itself, as the source of 
affection, is thus simply the Idea that is progressively determined by its intensive 
relations. In this way, in principle we can potentially fulfil, or at least give 
meaning to, two criteria for a noumenon: complete determination and regulative 
content. 
However, it was shown that Kant himself was content to leave the 
'noumenal' state of things in themselves to this indeterminate relation, in which 
there can be no one-to-one correspondence. He argues in the Amphiboly that there 
is no need for anything 'beyond' appearances to individuate those appearances. 
Kant instead does attempt to sustain contact with the noumenal world through his 
account of the supersensible. Thus, the inner reason of things can only be the 
supersensible substrate, which forms the true significance of the world. The 
practical teleology of reason reveals a problematic structure to the noumenal 
world that cannot be known, but must be thought. The noumenal realm thus 
consists of a providential structure of free beings resisting and struggling against 
matter in an ethico-teleological hierarchy. 
However, with Deleuze's model, the relation to the supersensible is 
already present in the relation to Ideas. The relation of the supersensible to the 
sensible should rather be thought as the problematic relation of Ideas to their 
spatiotemporal intensive schematisation. All the materials are present by which 
Ideas can be generated in a way that is apriori. But we may now legitimately ask 
whether we have sufficient means to determine noumena purely as problematic 
Ideas that are incarnated in intensive relations. In Kant, problematicity occurs 
only as a result of the limitations provided by the ideal status of space and time. In 
Deleuze, noumena remain problematic because they are nonrepresentable Ideas 
which cannot be known but only delineated by thought through a genesis which as 
such we can never experience. For instance, we can never experience the internal 
presentation of space. 
For Deleuze, Kant's notion that 'noumena are problematic' should be read 
as a statement of equivalence. Kant, on this reading, had discovered the nature of 
Ideas as problematic, but had not realised that problematicity itself was a 
sufficient criterion for noumenal being. There are no things in themselves or 
noumena apart from problem-Ideas: "an object outside experience can be 
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represented only in problematic form; this does not mean that Ideas have no real 
object, but that problems qua problems are the real objects of Ideas" (DR 
169/219). It is this that is the crux of his originality in the debate between 
Kantians and post-Kantians. For while Kantians hold absolute Ideas to be merely 
problematic, post-Kantians hold the absolute Ideas to have real existence. 
Deleuze's solution is antinomical in character: yes, problematic Ideas have real 
existence. This is why Deleuze can say that they are "at once both immanent and 
transcendent" (ibid). They are transcendent to empirical cognition, but immanent 
de jure to problematic cognition, to thought. 
But with this, Deleuze has provided a new realisation of the early Kantian 
project to expound forms of real differentiation different in kind from logical 
differentiation. The inner nature of things that Kant sought to preserve in 
noumena turns out to be a reified effect of the fact that the profound structural, 
intensive and durational nature of Ideas that works away under the external 
envelope of abstract extensive space and time cannot be experienced in empirical 
cognition and eludes one-to-one identity with the phenomenal world. For Deleuze, 
it is in fact necessary to abandon substances in order to save noumena. A ''truly 
sufficient reason" is therefore achieved, but precisely at the price of both 
substances and token-identity between noumena and phenomena. Deleuze has 
reawoken rationalism, or rather enacted a crucial transformation of the rationalist 
project so that sufficient reason gives way to "multiple reason" (DR 57/80). The 
self-identity of the noumenal substance is abandoned precisely in order to save 
reason. It is replaced by the principle of nonconceptual repetition as the form by 
which Ideas are incarnated. 
With this formal theory in place, Deleuze now thinks he can account for 
the limitations of empirical cognition from within it. ''When we discover the 
literal interior of repetition, we have the means not only to understand the outer 
repetition as a cover, but also to recapture the order of generality ... It is the 
inadequation between difference and repetition which gives rise to the order of 
generality" (DR 25/38). In order to assess this possibility, in the following two 
chapters we return to the perspective of experience, and the central and familiar 
Kantian territory of knowledge. 
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Chapter Five 
QUid Facti and Quid Juris: Kant 
1 Transcendental Deductions 
Objective and Subjective Deductions 
In spite of the image of the court of justice at the beginning of CP~ it is some 
way in before Kant introduces his famous distinction between questions of fact 
and of right - quid facti and quid juris. Thus the beginning of the Transcendental 
Deduction of the Categories states that questions concerning the validity of 
apriori concepts can only be solved with a deduction. Kant counterposes the mere 
possession of an apriori concept with the entitlement to its use (A84/B 117). This 
relatively late stipulation poses a number of metacritical issues: if the question of 
right is only now posed with the introduction of the notion of deduction, then 
what is the status of what has gone before? Secondly, how is it possible to simply 
possess an apriori concept without having a right to it? Surely, to possess such a 
concept without right does not amount to much. 
Kant makes a remark in the discussion of deductions in general that sheds 
light on the peculiar structure of CPR. He suggests that the transcendental 
deduction of space as a pure form of intuition is only retrospectively made 
necessary by the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. The pure form of 
space is made use of in geometry and empirical intuition, but this of itself does not 
require a distinct justification of the concept of space. "With the pure concepts of 
the understanding, however, there first arises the unavoidable need to search for 
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the transcendental deduction not only of them but also of space" (A881B 120, 
italics mine). 
We have seen that for Kant the pure concepts of the understanding in some 
sense 'belong' in the understanding: they have their origin in the understanding 
itself. They are the pure thought of objects in general (Gegenstande iiberhaupt), 
and as such represent apure content of the understanding (A561B80). At this level 
of discussion, Kant is still close to his pre-critical writings: there is no distinction 
yet between 'thought', 'understanding' or 'intellect'. The pure concepts of the 
understanding (whatever they may be), in their 'pre-schematised' form, apply in 
principle to all forms of thought and are related to intuition in general. "Pure 
content" as yet implies nothing actual, although it must imply some relation to an 
intuition. Hence the relation of the understanding to the kind of intuition it is 
bound up with must be clarified. 1 Thus Kant says that "[the pure concepts of the 
understanding] not only arouse suspicion about the objective validity and limits of 
their use but also make the concept of space ambiguous by inclining us to use it 
beyond the conditions of sensible intuition, on which account a transcendental 
deduction of it was also needed above" (A881B120, italics mine).2 
As we have already seen, there is a 'metaphysical' distinction between 
thought and intuition that is prior to the issue of epistemology, or the possibility of 
knowledge. Why does the issue of deductions in general arise specifically when 
dealing with pure thought? Why not first present another metaphysical 
'exposition' of pure concepts in our 'possession'? Kant in fact introduces the 
deduction with the thought that spatiotemporal "appearances could after all be so 
constituted that the understanding not find them in accord with the conditions of 
unity", thus presenting a mere "rhapsody" of intuitions (A901B 123). So nothing 
about the relation between intuition and thinking, on either side, is presupposed. 
Now if we turn to the 'second' deduction itself, we find that it is split into two (in 
the first edition): Objective and Subjective Deductions. In the Preface (Axvii), 
Kant specifies that the Objective Deduction takes place at A92-3. There, Kant 
gives a simple argument that depends on the exhaustive distinction between 
: See above, chapter 1.2.i.a. . . 
- In the 'Discipline of Pure Reason', Kant says "From whence the concepts of space and tIme mth 
which they [mathematicians] busy themselves (as the only original quanta) might be denved they 
have nev~r concerned themselves, and likewise it seems to them to be useless to investigate the 
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intuition and thought. He states that, once one has analysed what an intuition is 
, 
intellectual form is the only possibility left that allows one to fonn a Gegenstand 
uberhaupt. This, then, would indeed seem to be an exposition, not necessarily a 
deduction. 
The mystery is heightened when Kant proceeds to spend most of his time 
on a Subjective Deduction, which he states in the Preface is not "essential to my 
ends" (Axvi). However, the crucial paragraph is at A96-7, where Kant first 
mentions what has been achieved by the Objective Deduction: 
Now these concepts, which contain apriori the pure thinking in every experience, 
we fmd in the categories, and it is already sufficient deduction of them and 
justification of their objective validity if we can prove that by means of them 
alone an object [GegenstandJ can be thought. But since in such a thought there is 
more at work than the single faculty of thinking, namely the understanding, and 
the understanding itself, as a faculty of cognition that is to be related to objects 
[Objecte], also requires an elucidation of the possibility of this relation, we must 
first assess not the empirical but the transcendental constitution of the subjective 
sources that comprise the apriori foundations of the possibility of experience 
[italics mine]. 
A distinction is made here between what can be said of ''the single facuIty of 
thinking, namely the understanding", and the understanding as a facuIty of 
cognition, that involves relation to objects. 3 Here the Gegenstand/Object 
distinction comes to our aid. The implication is that the Objective 
[Gegenstandlich] Deduction applies to all Gegenstdnde in general, hence all 
objects considered metaphysically. But if that was so, then surely God would also 
be subject to such a Deduction? However as the analysis of intuition has shown us 
that space and time,4 the forms of intuition, are transcendentally ideal and belong 
only to finite creatures, the need for a deduction (of both pure concepts and pure 
intuition) is specifically provoked by the question that then emerges concerning 
the relation of pure thinking to instantiation in finite intuition. Conversely, the 
concept of space only becomes an issue when the problem of its compatibility (ie. 
origin of pure concepts of the understanding and the scope of their validity; rather, they merely use 
them" (A725fB753). 
3 Admittedly, the use of the phrase "single faculty of thinking" is far from decish'e by itself. du~ to 
the malleability of Kant's talk of faculties; but I think the current conte).t plus the metaphysIcal 
background already e~:plored adds strength to this interpretation. . 
4 It is interesting that Kant only mentions space in the passages in question. and perhaps It 
reinforces the fact that the ideality of time \\'as al\vays secondary in importance to that of space for 
Kant. However, this lack of att~ntion to the notion of the ideality of time opens it to attaCk. In 
Appendix IV I show how Deleuze' s view of time as absolute returns to the rationalist conceptIOn 
of the absoluteness of duration. 
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as concept) with other pure concepts is raised. 5 In this case, the discussion of 
space is thus retrospectively revealed to have been de facto metaphysical up until 
the point where its epistemological range is inquired into. We have an immediate 
possession of the apriori forms of space, as evinced in the possibility of geometry. 
But it becomes necessary to move from an ontological register to an 
epistemological one, only when the issue of the limits and range of the relation of 
intuition to thought comes to the fore - because the (ontological) restriction to 
finite intuition will restrict the free range of our pure concepts. So the relation of 
compatibility between finite intuition and pure concepts has already narrowed 
down and altered the range of what it is possible to know about Gegenstande. 
This is the reason why even the 'Objective' account of Gegenstdnde must be 
called a deduction, and not an exposition: the question of right arises because the 
finitude of intuition already imposes its restriction, or stakes its claim. So the 
Objective Deduction applies across the board to all beings who have finite 
intuition, while nevertheless remaining solely related to the formal possibilities of 
the relation between thought and intuition. But (to return to the Subjective 
Deduction), this latter distinction must not be confused with the one between 
understanding and sensibility, which is characterised separately in a twofold way: 
firstly in terms of knowledge, or "relation to an Object", and secondly according 
to the status of the faculties involved. 
This reading fits with the two characteristics that show that there is "more 
at work" than the Objective Deduction: firstly, the understanding must be dealt 
with in its actual relation to objects, while secondly, an elucidation of the specific 
possibility of this relation is required. This latter characteristic should be read in 
relation to what is said in the surrounding pages. Kant points towards "three 
original sources (faculties of the soul), which contain the conditions of the 
possibility of all experience ... namely, sense, imagination, and apperception" 
(A94). It turns out in the course of the Subjective Deduction (as we will see) that 
"The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is 
the understanding" (AI18). The efforts of this part of the Deduction are all 
5 TIle various fonns tlllS incompatibility takes is precisely the subject matter of ~he Transcendental 
Dialectic. The antinomies are resolved by showing that the mutual ex1enSlOn of spatIal and 
intellectual concepts cannot proceed in tandem witll each other. As space is only related to finIte 
intuition. it is illegitimate to ex1end spatial concepts beyond such intuition. 
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towards showing how the understanding is the product of a very particular 
relation of the three faculties just mentioned. 
This, in outline, shows how the justifications of intuition and pure 
concepts are interrelated. The specific problem of the Subjective Deduction 
concerns how to conceive of the actual character of the interrelation. Given finite 
intuition, which involves restriction to one place at a time and one time at a place, 
how will the activity of thought be able to function, and think coherently across 
discrete intuitions? The crucial problem of A881B120-A911B123 - is that thoughts 
and intuitions are not analytically related, so that a "rhapsody" of intuitions is 
conceivable. In the light of the fact that intuitions and thoughts remam m 
themselves really distinct, the search for an apriori "rule of synthesis" 
(A911B123) must be initiated. As we will see shortly, the Transcendental 
Deduction of the Categories will begin to justify and demonstrate the necessity of 
such rules. However, as has been noted before, there is also a third deduction, of 
the Ideas of Pure Reason. By itself, the second deduction does not give us the 
coherence of experience, although commentators often talk of Kant's Deduction 
of the Categories as if it granted this. As we will see following our examination of 
the deduction of pure concepts, coherence is only possible if concepts find an 
orientation through Ideas. 
ii The Arguments of the Two Editions of the Critique of Pure Reason 
We are now in a preliminary position to survey the method of CPR as a whole. 
Kant's claim in the Prolegomena that the method of CPR is synthetic, (while the 
Prolegomena is analytic) has often caused confusion because synthetic method 
requires having secured apriori proofs from which to progress.6 However, such 
proofs would seem to be the very goal of critique, so some commentators who 
have sought to defend Kant's claim here have attempted to seek a moment of 
apriori self-grounding in CPR from which to progress. Now Kant's belief that he 
has found "the supreme [hochste] principle of all synthetic judgments" 
(A 1541B I 93) is often taken to rest on transcendental apperception, so the locus of 
this self-grounding has been sought there. As a hochste principle does not have to 
6 Kant does not mean to equate tltis methodological use of the distinction between . synthetic' and 
'anah1ic' with the other use of the distinction in terms of conceptual intension. 
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be a self-grounding principle, the crucial element of reflexivity involved in self-
grounding is sought in particular in the character of apperception as self-referring. 
However, it can be shown (I hope to do so in what follows) that the function of 
apperception in knowledge, while self-referring, is not self-grounding in the 
strong sense required. Kant's 'I think' is by no means a Fichtean 'I'. While most 
would agree with this latter statement, the self-grounding criterion for the'!, is 
still often taken as the starting point for a synthetic procedure through the appeal 
to some indubitable aspect about the 'I'. Some fact about experience or 
subjectivity is chosen, from which further principles can be deduced. 7 
However, this approach has opened itself to skeptical counterclaims about 
the necessity of the fact or first principle from which synthetic apriori claims are 
said to follow. 8 Defenders of Kant have had to take another tack. Allison's 
approach is well-known. He does not attempt to find an apriori first principle, but 
rather treats apperception as a logically necessary principle for judgment. In tum, 
the primacy of apperception is then shifted onto the role of judgment as an 
epistemic condition.9 On the other hand, Karl Ameriks has argued instead that the 
transcendental deduction should be seen simply as a regressive argument, and not 
synthetic at all; it is therefore not intended primarily to defeat the skeptic. lO 
Ameriks appeals to the transcendental deduction of space to show how geometry 
is taken as a fact, and regressively argued from. Thus analogically, Kant starts 
from certain claims about experience which he does not defend, such as the 
capacity for some empirical cognition. 
I think Ameriks is right that this appears to be Kant's approach in the 
second edition CPR. Kant in effect takes the regressive strategies of the 
Prolegomena and textually inserts them at crucial points in CPR. So at B 128, we 
find Kant appealing to the facts of geometry and natural science. However, 
because Kant leaves most of the rest of CPR standing, including the important 
later sections, this creates a fundamental fracture right through CPR, as many 
7 Dieter Henrich's version in Identity and Objectivity (contained in Henrich, The Cnity of Reason. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 199-1-) is a classic example, an~ Strawson' ~ accou~t 
in The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen. 1966) also presents a synthetIc a~unt ill that It 
moves from a description of self-conscious experience to synthetic apriori conclusIOns about the 
conditions necessary for this; cf 97f 
8 See section -1-.i. below for further detail. 
9 Allison. Kant's Transcendental Idealism. 137f 
10 Ameriks. 'Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument'. (in P. Kitcher ed 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Critical Essays, Oxford: Rowan & Littlefield 1998). 
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proponents of the 'patchwork' theory have recognised. 11 The regressive readinQ: 
'-' 
sets limits on the scope of CPR that are not present in the first edition. Notably. 
the relation between cognition and metaphysics is now cut adrift, and there\vith 
the metacritical dimension comes unstuck. In effect, CPR becomes limited to a 
theory of knowledge. The critical project becomes diverted by a general 
epistemologization. Ameriks' reading of the transcendental deduction as a 
regressive argument, in focussing on the issue of whether Kant's argument is anti-
skeptical or not, overlooks the greater account of metacritical validity at stake in 
Kant's theory as a whole. 12 Firstly, that Kant by no means (as Ameriks claims) 
presupposes the fact of empirical cognition, is attested by his statement (to be 
analysed later) that the coherence of experience is not to be assumed without a 
third deduction. While this is a first-edition claim, I would argue that it is 
,y 
intensified by Kant's tum to a new attempt to ground the coherence of empirical 
judgments in CJ. Secondly, the primacy of regressive argumentation 
underestimates the metacritical form of Kant's theory, and the fact that Kant, as 
an ex-rationalist, would find it hard to presuppose anything phenomenal or 
empirical as an acceptable given. To argue regressively from a given fact to its 
conditions is always open to the objection that the initial presupposition itself has 
not been critically evaluated. It presupposes at some point a kind of Cartesian 
evidence, a validity of immediate apprehension that is clearly undermined by 
Kant's paralogisms and his insistence that all knowledge claims be mediated by 
intuitions and some conceptual structure (to be justified) of those intuitions. 
Kant's transcendental account is grounded as a whole by the 'system' of the three 
deductions, as well as by piecemeal 'transcendental arguments' in the regressive 
sense. It is this systematic grounding, I believe, that made the CJ project pressing 
for Kant, wherein the issues of faculties and their relation, and systematicity come 
to the fore again. Again, the question of whether Kant's theory as a whole 
ultimately is metacritically defensible is separate from whether he intends it to be 
so. In sum, if the second edition CPR does testify to an epistemologization, then 
that is because Kant after 1786 decides to devote a fuller account in CJ (and 
II However. diagnosing where the fracture occurs is a matter of dispute. I think Eckart Forster. in 
;!<-ant's Notion of Philosophy'. referred to in chapter 1 above. has recognised .it most .acutely. . 
- Ironically, Ameriks' has done more than most to bring out the metaphYSical ~1a1m~ of Kant S 
project in his other writings. It is this side of Ameriks" scholarship that I belIeve IS the most 
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ultimately in OP) to the metaphysical and metacritical issues that have been 
displaced. My concern then, in the first part of this chapter, is to reveal the 
structure of the first edition, as it is there that we find 'The Idea of Transcendental 
Philosophy' worked through in its primal state. 
This fracture in CPR is, moreover, in fact most visible in the notion of 
possession, which we related to the quid facti. In the second edition, Kant states 
that we possess the facts of geometry and natural science: the quaestio facti refers 
exclusively to these indubitable facts. However, the meaning and reference of 
both 'possession' and quid facti has changed. In the first edition, we were said to 
possess certain apriori forms, which were original to each of our faculties. Thus, 
the quid facti did not refer to any particular set of facts, but, as Kant says in the 
discussion of Deductions in general, to thefact of possession of these pure forms. 
We have seen that this metaphysical framework provides the problematic 
background that allows the question of Objecte to emerge. But while 'relation to 
objects' is equivalent to knowledge [Erkenntnis], knowledge itself is a particular 
organisation of the faculties, and IS itself only justified by prior 
nonepistemological accounts of the limits of intuition, and by the transcendental 
analysis undertaken as a whole by the philosopher. This has already been argued 
from another perspective in chapter 3. I now turn to an alternative reading of the 
transcendental deduction in the first edition. After displacing the centrality of 
Kant's epistemology of conceptual recognition, I will elucidate the internal 
connection between the three deductions in the first edition, concentrating on the 
second and third deductions, of concepts and Ideas. I then conclude the chapter 
with a critique of the primacy of apperception (mostly as understood in the B-
Deduction) as it is defended by contemporary commentators. 
2 The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories 
Unity and Synthesis 
A concept, Kant states, is "as regards its form, something universal which serves 
as a rule" (AI06). A rule is a norm that is conformed to in an action. As Jonathan 
Bennett shows, Kant's aim in his theory of concepts is to show that "thinking is 
valuable. although ultimately I would ground his 'Leibnizianism' not in the historical Leibniz. but 
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something we do while sensing is something that happens to US,,13 Given what 
has already been noted in this chapter (and which Kant argues for in the 
introduction to the Analytic, before his exposition of concepts), it is important to 
realise that Kant's account of concepts as rules is already an account of concepts 
as used by finite beings. Whereas a sensation or an affection is always immediate. 
regardless of the complexity of the sensation, the notion of the rule itself is 
already complex, as it implies a rule, the act of recognition of the rule, whether 
implicit or not, and the act of recognition of the thing to which the rule is applied. 
Conforming to rules implies several intelligent and intelligible activities. 14 
At A68-91B93-4, Kant says that a concept, "rests on" functions. By 
'function' Kant means the '\lnity of the action of ordering different 
representations under a common one".lS This action, separated from all affection, 
must be "spontaneous". This notion of spontaneity therefore involves no real 
claim yet about the subject, but merely signifies that concepts are not receptive. 
Further, all concepts are "predicates of possible judgments", the latter which are 
"accordingly functions of unity among our representations", because in a 
judgment "many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one". "The 
understanding can make no other use of these concepts than that of judging by 
means of them". 
Now, the analytical unity of marks that composes a concept is indeed 
based on "the unity of an action", what we may call "the analytical unity of 
in a metacritical reworking of Leibniz, ala Deleuze. 
13 Bennett, Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 55. Cf. Pippin. 
Kant's Theory of Form, 97: "to understand a concept is to know how to use it". 
14 To have the concept of a man is not the same kind of thing as having an intuition of him. "it is 
just to be able to recognise men as men, to distinguish men from apes, to know that a man cannot 
be a vegetable, and so on" (BelU1ett, Kant'sAnalytic, 54). 
15 As intuitions are the only representations related immediately to their objects. a cona:pt must 
always be "a representation of a representation". However, the concept may represent an mtUltIOn 
or set of intuitions, or, more likely, another set of concepts. A concept always "hol~ of m~y, and 
'" among this many also comprehends a given representation, which is then related munediat~ly to 
the object". As Kant ex-plains in the Introduction to the first Critique (A81B~2) and further III the 
Jasche Logic, a concept is composed of "marks" (lvferkmale), so that for mstance. the con~ept 
'body' is composed of 'ex1ension', 'impenetrability', and 'shape'. In using the concept 'body as 
the subject of a judgment, one will predicate of it another concept. This concept Will be cO~p?se~ 
of other marks some of which may be contained in the first concept. For instance. 'dinslbliIty 
can be predic~ted of 'body', be~use the concept 'ex1ension' includes 'di,isibility· .. Thus the 
object which we have identified as 'body' "ill be unified "ith other things which we IdentIfy as 
'divisible' . 
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consciousness" (CPR B 133n.).16 If concepts are "functions of unity", then a unify 
of consciousness is required as a condition for the possibility of moving in the 
network of concepts, and organising the intuitive marks intended by them. 
However, "only by means of an antecedently conceived possible synthetic unity 
can I represent to myself the analytical unity" (ibid). But synthetic unity is in tum 
the product of a complex process of synthesis. Kant gives the name 'synthesis' 
(already overdetermined) to the "action" by which "the manifold first be gone 
through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be 
made out of it" (A77IBI03). This "action" is obviously complex and it will tum 
out to designate the distinct processes of apprehension, reproduction and 
recognition, which are produced by interrelations of the faculties of imagination 
and apperception. 17 Kant states in this section ('On the pure concepts of the 
understanding or categories'), that synthesis is "the mere effect of the 
imagination, of a blind though indispensible function of the soul, without which 
we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even 
conscious"(A781B103). He goes on to specify that "to bring this synthesis to 
concepts is a function that pertains to the understanding". 18 Thus the unity of the 
concept itself, that is, the unity of the act by which a concept is predicated of 
another is only made possible by the syntheses of the imagination. 19 While Kant 
emphasises that the ascription of a concept is an 'act', he leaves the active or 
passive status of the other syntheses undetermined. 
At A98-99, Kant makes "a general remark on which one must ground 
everything that follows", that all representations must be treated as modifications 
of the mind "subjected to the formal conditions of inner sense, namely time". 
Kant describes 'transcendentally' the process required to represent a manifold as 
such. In order to be represented as a manifold, the manifold must be grasped and 
16 This also holds for the logical use of concepts; see Logic, # 17. 106. See AllisolL Kant's 
Transcendental Idealism, 66f; Klaus Reich, The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments. 
~s. 1. Kneller & M. Losonsky (California: Stanford University Press, 1992). 9f.. .' 
I. "For it is this one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successIvely mtwted. 
and then also reproduced, into one representation" (A103, my italics). Kant says here that the word 
"concept" is enough to lead to this notion. 
18 Cf. Deleuze. Kant's Critical Philosophl'. 14-16. 
19 In a Reflexion on the first Critique: Kant affirms that "the transcendental synthesis of the 
imagination underlies all our concepts of the understanding" (Ak. 23: 18). quoted in Makkreel. 
Imagination and Interpretation in Kal1t (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1990), 27. 
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gathered as a unity; it must be 'apprehended' (first aspect of the synthesis).20 But, 
to be represented as a manifold, is to enter a judgment, an Ur-tei!, a separation, 
and this requires that in the following instant, it is reproduced by and in the 
imagination (second aspect). Kant argues against Hume that reproduction does not 
happen as a result of association; the rule that the reproduced element must be 
reproduced in this present is prior to the contingent fact of association (cf. Al 00, 
A1l2f.). Furthermore, in order for the reproduction to be related to what was 
apprehended, they must both be represented as the same, that is, recognised (third 
aspect). But concepts are exactly what allow sameness to be recognised, by 
'marking' the reproduced element; this sameness is not simply given. The concept 
is a rule: the distinct moments are brought to a rule by sharing a mark that is 
judged to be common. The Merlemal is what is bemerkt, noticed, picked out, 
selected. The rule can work both analytically and synthetically. If you see a, you 
must apply the concept X, which also contains band c; these marks 'count as' 
X;21 this is an analytic judgment. Or if you see d being reproduced with a, then 
20 However, he silently presupposes the synopsis of intuition, ,yhich is left out of the threefold 
synthesis. Nevertheless, it is important to the process of the deduction. We know from the 
Transcendental Aesthetic that data of time must be infinitely di, isible. Any sensation. due to the 
form of appearance, must be a stretch of indeterminate spatial exiension and a stretch of duration. 
That is, it is internally' manifold, or multiple in itself. But an important decision must be made right 
at the outset about what is meant by this representation of inner sense. Nothing states that the 
subject here experiences some 'flow' of time, within which the contents alter. In fact the opposite 
must be the case for Kant. The representation of a manifold in time must be a representation of the 
duration of the manifoldjrom within the present. Inner sense is after all aform, a pure framework. 
Hence the real starting point of the Deduction is the presupposition of a bare multipliCity or 
manifold, the conditions for the representation of which must be unfolded. 
This follows from the notion of a bare spatiotemporal multiplicity. If a multiplicity is a 
pure flux, some element of which is not retained in any form (for instance in the form of a past ofa 
present), then there can be no conceivable multiplicity at all. Hence the retention of some aspect of 
a multiplicity is necessary for it to be a multiplicity. Furthermore, this retention is not simply a 
retention but the development, or unfolding of the multiplicity as such. But while it seems to 
become extended into the present, it is more properly thought of as exiending into the past: it is 
only represented as exiending into the present. The present is represented as having a past. These 
ideas are developed more abstractly by Schelling and Hegel. HO'wever, it is important to see that 
for Kant the notion of a pure multiplicity was thinkable as the matter of intuition, \',ithout yet 
implying that the multiplicity bear within it an identity or at least unity, which can only occur 
through the form of the concept. Now. Schelling and Hegel would object to this that in order to 
think of a multiplicity as such requires thinking an identity to the manifold as differing from itse(f 
and that Kant's belief that reidentification can only happen through a concept merely shows the 
limitation of Kant's notion of concept. However, there is still a sense in which the multiplicity. as 
intuited, is at least potentialZv infinitely divisible, which underlines the importance of keepl~g the 
distinction between the internal coherence of the multiplicity itself. and the coherent ordenng of 
the multiplicity in the inner sense of the perceiYer. Because the former is indefinite. and is even 
perceived at e~'en' instant as indefinite, the multiplicity itself should not be completely identified 
~"ith its ongoing ~eidentification in the subject. 
_I On 'COWlting rules'. see L.J. Stem 'Empirical Concepts as Rules in the Critique of Pure 
Reason' ~4k1en des -+. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Berlin: de Gru~1er. 1974). 160. 
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you may make an empirical judgment that unifies d with X (a, b and c); such is a 
synthetic judgment. The rule 'represents' the reproduction of some manifold that 
is recognised as falling under it. 
The post-Kantians argued that to see this 'representation of a manifold' in 
terms of an analysis is inadequate, because it breaks up what can only happen 
together into three apparently separate aspects. They argued that the act of 
representation had to be generated rather than analysed. Taking off from 
Reinhold's early attempt, Fichte and the early Schelling argued that the 
articulation of self-consciousness was the only way to generate an account of 
difference and identity; in self-consciousness, consciousness takes itself as its own 
object, thus differentiating itself from itself while securing its own unity through 
the identification of itself with itself as object. This is prefigured in Kant's 
decision to run through the stages of synthesis again from the ground up, stating 
that apperception is the "inner ground" of synthesis (Al16). However, is Kant's 
notion of apperception in the A-deduction playing a grounding role in the post-
Kantian sense? Is something lost sight of if Kant's account is seen through post-
Kantian spectacles? 
The problem lies in the relation between the claim for a unity of 
consciousness and the correlative claim about a consciousness of unity that is 
taken to follow from this. In Identity and Objectivity, Henrich argues that Kant's 
insistence on the identity of the act of recognition showed that Kant was 
presupposing a Cartesian consciousness. 22 Henrich's key passage occurs at Al 08: 
"The mind could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the manifoldness of 
its representations, and indeed think this apriori, if it did not have before its eyes 
the identity of its action". But does this apriori consciousness of the identity of an 
action imply the consciousness of the numerical identity of the self? Henrich's 
claim has been criticised by Allison, who points out that "what we are aware of is 
not numerical identity, it is rather the 'fact' that this identity must be presupposed 
as a necessary condition of knowledge".23 However, Allison's claim too contains 
its own exaggeration, as a result of his belief that the "rule-governed unity of 
representations in consciousness ... [requires] the conceptual recognition of this 
~, 
-- Henrich. The Unify a/Reason. 185-88. 
unity" (ibid). This means that the normative status of the categories for 
consciousness "must be for that consciousness". 24 In the third chapter I referred to 
passages where Kant states clearly that ordinary empirical consciousness has no 
need of 'transcendental' philosophy; only when it confronts the effects of 
transgressing its rightful limits does it begin to apprehend such a need. Allison's 
claims for what the spontaneity of apperception can accomplish are too hig~ and I 
think the right level for the work of apperception in the deduction should be 
sought elsewhere. 25 A few sentences earlier Kant says that "this unity of 
consciousness would be impossible if in the cognition of the manifold the mind 
could not become conscious of the identity of the function by means of which this 
manifold is synthetically combined into one cognition" (AI08). Here Kant states 
what it is that one becomes conscious of - not of oneself, nor of the "fact" of 
transcendental unity, but of the identity of the function guiding this unity. Now 
we have seen that Kant describes concepts and judgments as "functions of unity" 
(A68-91B93). Hence what consciousness is aware of is the unity implied in the 
concept it is using. The use of concepts implies the ''unity of an act", by which 
what is reproduced is recognised. 26 
~3 Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 140. Cf. also Paul Guyer's critique of Henrich's claim 
for Cartesian consciousness in his review of Identity and Objectivity. Journal of Philosophy, 76. 
1979,161-2. 
24 Allison, Idealism and Freedom. 59-60. 
25 One problem with readings of Kant which make the categories into nomlS which are directly 
conformed to by the apperceptive subject itself is that they only really make sense for the 
categories of relation. It is plausible that the '1 think' 'takes itself to be confonning to categories 
of substance, causality. and reciprocity in making a judgment; but what of the other nine 
categories? The cases of judgments of quantity and quality (which are moreover both taken to be 
continuous), and judgments of modality are clearly not 'for consciousness' in Allison's and 
Pippin's sense of 'taking as'. As soon as the full machinery of Kant's categories is taken into 
account, this normative version starts to look absurd So either it is only applicable to three 
categories, in 'which case the Aristotelian claim that the categories are exhaustively universal must 
go, or Kant meant something else. 1 contend that the demonstration and justification of the \'alidity 
of the pure concepts in the Transcendental Deduction is carried out specifically by the 
transcendental philosopher, and not by the self-reflection of the experiencing 'subject'. 
26 It may be objected that this is to ignore that Kant is drawing our attention to a "transcendental 
synthesis", or a special act of the mind. But Karl Ameriks has decisively showll the error of 
"intemperate", or "activistic" readings in his critique of Paul Guyer's early work ('Kant and Guyer 
on Apperception'. Archiv for Geschichte der Philosophie, 65, 1983). Guyer writes that Kant is 
"clearly committed to the existence of a creative s'llthesis imposing order on the manifold of 
empiri~al intuition, whether it is conceived of as 'a single act of transcendental imagination. 
preceding all empirical syntheses, or as an ongoing acthity of ~onstitution ~~erl)ing th.e 
objective affinity of the objects of nature" (Guyer. 'Kant on Apperception and A Prion S ~ ll~eSlS . 
~~merican Philosophical Quarter~v, 17, 1980. 206) But Ameriks clarifies that there IS no 
transcendental svnthesis as such in Kant, although he does think that in the A-DeductIon. Kant 
tends to write ~s if there were. Rather. ",hat Kant is attempting to show is the transcendental 
requirement of unity in particular acts of empirical cognition (Ameriks, 'Kant and Guyer'. 175-
179). 
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This interpretation is borne out in the rest of this section of the deduct' Ion. 
which rests upon the notion that "all cognition requires a concept" (AI06). Kant 
begins by arguing from empirical concepts; for instance "in the case of the 
perception of something outside of us the concept of body makes necessary the 
representation of extension, and with it that of impenetrability, of shape, etc." 
(ibid). The application of a concept thus makes necessary the application of the 
other Merkmale analytically implied in the concept. This 'necessity' entails that 
these Merkmale are "brought to unity" in a judgment (cf A691B93). Now only 
because of this necessity in all concepts, can Kant move to his claim about pure 
concepts, which, as the highest genera of all concepts, are necessarily implied.27 
Thus "transcendental apperception" denotes the necessary condition that all 
cognition be subject to the general forms of the "functions of unity" of concepts?8 
Back at AI08, Kant writes: 
the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same 
time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all 
appearances in accordance with concepts, ie. in accordance with rules that not 
only make them necessarily reproducible, but also thereby determine an object 
for their intuition, ie. the conept of something in which they are necessarily 
connected [my italics]. 
Self-consciousness, then, if it IS permitted at all by the strictures of the 
Paralogisms, can at best be an indirect inference from the possession of unified 
experience through the application of particular concepts in recognition. 29 In the 
passage that introduces transcendental apperception, Kant makes it clear that 
"consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state in 
27 Cf. A106. On the pure concepts as highest genera, see Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism. 
116-117. Compare also Kant's notes to A661B91: "Experience consists of judgments, but it is to 
be asked whether these empirical judgments do not in the end presuppose apriori (pure) 
judgments". cf. Guyer & Wood's edition of CPR, 202. 
28 This further ex:plains why the consciousness of unity is by no means immediately available as 
such for inspection. The consciousness of unity is simply the ability to understand and apply 
concepts. But this ability itself depends on conformity to certain basic rules. Thus to grasp the 
thread of unity in ex-perience, I must conform, for instance, to the rule of causality. Causality IS 
one of the twelve categories that Kant says is required for unity to be possible. Therefore the 
spontaneity involved in the use of concepts is not to be identified with some active consciousness 
of unity. If the subject is conscious of its unity this is only due to the transcende~tal rules that 
allow it to be so. In other words, the consciousness of unity must be secondary to baSIC confornuty 
to rules that makes it possible. The spontaneous conformity to rules, therefore. from the empirical 
down to the transcendental. is not to be understood in terms of 'ordinary' self-consciousness. 
29 See also Andrew Brook's deflationist account of apperception in Kant and the .\/ind 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994). 37-·B and ch. 6. He states ~t the unity of 
consciousness must be thoroughly distinguished from the consciousness of that uruty. 
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internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable" (AI07).30 The condition 
that Kant is describing is instead "a condition that precedes all experience, and 
makes the latter itself possible" (ibid). It refers to nothing other than the structure 
required for the use of concepts, a structure which includes apprehension, 
reproduction and recognition equally. 31 
Now, we have already seen that this threefold synthesis is largely carried 
out by the imagination. Examination of another key passage on the unity of 
conSCIOusness can show how dependent recognition is on the processes that 
'precede' it: 
without consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we 
thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would 
be in vain. For it would be a new representation in our current state, which would 
not belong at all to the act [Actus] through which it had been gradually generated, 
and its manifold would never constitute a whole, since it would lack the unity that 
only consciousness can obtain for it (AI03). 
The notion that an act can "gradually" generate a representation conflicts 
somewhat with the notion that the act of recognition is "spontaneous". In fact, the 
putative 'gradualness' suggests an opacity in Kant's theory at this point that opens 
it to criticism. If we focus in on the interaction between reproduction and 
recognition, two alternatives emerge. Either the act of recognition is only possible 
if what it is recognising has already been recognised. Recognition would thus 
depend on a prior unity, not just of apprehension and reproduction, but of a kind 
of pre-cognition, or anticipation.32 Or the fact that a manifold is immediately 
reproduced in the continuous process of experience entails an automatic 'marking' 
of what is reproduced that affords it some immediate unity. But the unity 
produced would then not involve any special conceptual or classificatory activity 
on the part of 'recognition'. Does Kant have a possible answer to this 
complication? 
30 It is striking that in the A-deduction transcendental apperception is only twice e:\:plicitIy referred 
to in tenns of the notion of the T (Al17n., AIl3). 
31 A ,irtue of this interpretation is that it does not split off the account of transcendental 
apperception from the empirical use of concepts Kant is so keen to ground. S?me mte~retatlons 
make transcendental apperception into an abstract mysterious process that unifies ~nscIOusness. 
~ut is har~ to apply ~o the workings of empirical concep~s and intuitions as Kant descnbes ~em. . 
Cf Heldegger. Kant and the Problem of Jletaphyslcs, ed and trans. R.. Taft (Bloommgton. 
Indiana University Press. 1997), 120-132: also Henrich's work on self-conSCIOusness has brought 
out the necessit}; of pre-reflexiveness in self-recognition: see 'Self-consciousness: A Cnucal 
Introduction to a Theory', jfan and World. -1-. 1971. 
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Now while Kant states that apperception IS the "inner ground" of 
synthesis, he also states in the same passage that imagination provides the form. 33 
But at this point he says that the synthesis of reproduction does not take place 
apriori, because it "rests on conditions of experience". Kant states that the 
transcendental unity of apperception is therefore related to the "productive 
synthesis of the imagination" (AI18). But as Heidegger points out, "pure 
reproduction - does this not mean productive reproduction, hence a square 
circle?".34 Isn't Kant gesturing towards the problem we have just met? On the one 
hand, reproductive synthesis must presuppose some empirical data to be thinkable 
as re-production, but on the other hand, reproduction must be productive, in that 
recognition can 'find' something in it that was not present when it presented itself 
in apprehension. 
In order to explore this problem further, it will be necessary to delve 
deeper into the mechanics of Kant's account of concept formation and application. 
This will also allow us further to assess the validity of the deduction. Because if 
Kant's argument does indeed precede from a claim about all concepts, then the 
burden of his account of reproduction and recognition must be shifted towards the 
validity of his account of concepts, as well as of the role of imagination in 
conceptual recognition. 
ii Concept Formation and Application 
In the CPR Kant emphasises the application of concepts, while suppressing the 
formation of concepts. 35 The emphasis on concept application in CPR may be due 
to Kant's proximity at this point to his Leibnizian past, in which it is 
unproblematic that every thing, ideally, has its concept. The Leibnizian notion of 
the concept continues to abide in Kant's notion of the logical use of the 
understanding. 
33 "Since [the original unity of apperception] is the ground of all. cognitio~. th,: transcendental 
unity of the synthesis of the imagination is the pure fonn of all poSSIble cOgnItions (AII8) 
34 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem ojJvlef.aphysics, 127. 
35 It is this overemphasis that (for reasons that we will shortly spell. ou~) leads to an attempt at 
compensation in CJ: the distinction between determining and reflectIye Judgment. There. part of 
the role of concept fonnation gets handed over to reflective judgment while the use of concepts 
The formation of a concept involves the establishment of a rule to 
reproduce and recognise. In turn one only applies a concept after one has attained 
it; one recognises a set of marks as conforming to the rule. However, the 
application of a concept always happens in a judgment, which means that it is 
never purely applied: it is always amplified or at least explicated. The notion that 
"concepts are predicates of possible judgments" implies an indistinguishability or 
at least overlap between formation and application, as any judgment involves 
operating with incomplete concepts?6 The series a, b, c that makes up the 
intension of a concept is a kind of rule of thumb, that can in principle be 
augmented at any time. The rule demands: if you see a, b, and c together, you 
must apply the concept X. A concept in this case is really an indefinite series of 
marks, which at any point must be distinguishable from all other series. Indeed 
Kant insists that concepts are ultimately indefinable (A7281B756f)/7 synthetic 
judgments are perpetually amplifying concepts, while all empirical analytic 
judgments depend on a prior synthesis. Thus conceptual rules are in perpetual 
flux. 
The unity of the concept is not within the concept itself, but concerns the 
use of the concept; it concerns the "act of unity". The unity of the set of marks is 
grounded in the unity of the act of recognition. Then what distinguishes the 
concept itself from an associated 'unity', which is not really a unity at all? Each 
concept is made of marks, which themselves must be concepts: they could not be 
recognisable marks otherwise. But are the marks of these concepts also concepts? 
At some point they will amount to rules for recognition of sensible marks. But 
what can such rules be but rules of association? What is Kant's advance over 
Hume if the unity of the act relies on concepts drawn from association?38 
dealt with in CPR is now simply identified with detennining judgment (the subsumption of a 
particular under a knO\vn general concept). 
36 The fact that we cannot separate concept formation from application is not of itself ,iciously 
circular as Kant does not attempt to provide a genesis of concept formation, only a functional 
account. Pippin offers a circular account of the concept when he says "the concept is thus a rule for 
thinking together a number of individuals each of which possesses a 'marker' picked out 
conceptually (and so represented) as the principle of grouping", Kant's Theory of Forol. 106. 
37 Cf. L.W. Beck, 'Kant's Theory of Definition', and 'Can Kant's Synthetic Judgments Be Made 
Analytic', in R.P. Wolff ed, Kant:.4 Collection of Critical Essays (London: Macmillan. 1968). 
38 For the Kantian, the notion of the rule answers a set of empiricist difficulties concerning the 
concept. Firstly, how is a general Idea formed from particular instances through 'abstraction'? 
Secondly, if the 'abstract' Idea is drawn from a set of particular instances. how can one account for 
its characteristic of generality if abstract Ideas are also themselves particular? Thirdly. how does 
application of a general, abstract Idea to a concrete, particular Idea. occur? Robert Pippin points 
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In the Jasche Logic, Kant says that a series of 'logical acts' - comparison, 
reflection and abstraction - comprise the process of making a concept.39 Allison 
attempts to distance these 'logical acts' from empiricist principles, claiming that 
"simply having a set of sensible impressions that are associated with one another 
is not the same as having a concept. A concept requires the thought of the 
applicability of this set of sensible impressions to a plurality of possible 
objects".4o At a similar juncture, Pippin writes that "contrary to Hume, it is not the 
case that impressions just by their occurrence generate a feeling of associability. 
Perhaps Kant's most decisive objection to Hume is his claim that it is the mind 
which must actively order and associate them, and this according to acquired 
rules".41 However, these are very abstract presentations ofHume, which overlook 
the fact that the principles of association are actualised by habit, which grounds 
the expectation of future instantiations.42 Thus, association does not just happen 
by the mere 'occurrence' of impressions (contra Pippin), and the expectation of 
future instantiations provides the thought of possible applicability to a plurality of 
objects (contra Allison). Moreover, for Kant, the 'mind' is only active in the very 
''unity of the act" that is the recognition of the concept. Allison and Pippin imply 
that the mind has a choice about how to apply the concept; but Kant does not 
seem to intend that the "spontaneity" of conceptual acts in empirical cognition 
allows for any particular leeway. The act is simply the application of the concept 
which matches the marks apprehended, which presents itself on the basis of past 
experience. If we are able to abstract, reflect and compare, this is an activity of 
reason, not of experience as such, and one which no empiricist would deny is 
possible. 
Finally, if conceptual content depends on association, then Kant faces 
exactly the same problems as Hume in justifying the appropriateness by which 
concepts extract their marks. If a concept involves recognition of marks, what is it 
out that all of these problems are mired in a conception of the 'one over many' that has its roots in 
Plato. See Kant's Theory of Form, 106, with relation to concepts, and 13 L with relation to 
schemata. 
39 Logic, 100. 
40 Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 67. 
41 Pippin, Kant's Theory of Form, 116. 
~~ As Deleuze shows in Empiricism and Subjectivity, for Rume the principles of association are 
indeed principles to which the mind is subject. He shows that Hume's point is precisely that 
association doesn't just 'happen' of itself: it is the result of particular principles that structure the 
mind See chapter 6.2.ii. below. 
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in these marks that grounds the recognition? As Pippin asks, what warrants the 
appropriateness of the collection of marks, if the concept is simply a rule that 
constitutes recognition of these marks?43 Here we return to our problem about 
reproduction and recognition. The reproduction of this mark as that recognised 
concept is still mysterious. Does recognition anticipate the appropriateness of the 
mark, or does reproduction itself select the mark 'for' recognition? 
Kant's account of 'analytic unity' of concepts begins to look like a rather 
logicised abstraction, removed from the problems of forming concepts in the 
world. But this problem starts to infect the notion of concept application as well, 
for if a concept is to be applied, then the sensible manifold must be recognised to 
conform to it. But it must gain the right to apply itself to the manifold; it cannot 
simply 'impose' itself upon it for the sake of recognition. 
Hence concept application also requires something else, a tertium quid, to 
justify the application of a conceptual rule to this sensible instance. But we have a 
possible answer here, in the notion of the schematism. The schema is a 
"representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept 
with its image" (A1401B179).44 As we have seen in the case of concept formation, 
at a certain point in the account of the concept as rule, a need for 'guidance' from 
the manifold becomes urgent. The schema, as the "representation of a method", a 
"monogram of pure apriori imagination" (A1421B181) provides another kind of 
problematic totality which conditions the application of a general concept to a 
particular set of empirical intuitions.45 Thus, in the case of the concept "dog", the 
" 
43 "We could say that the collection of 'markers' that defines some such rule is 'warranted 
empirically', but the rule is supposed to be only an Erkenntnisgrund, or that by virtue of which the 
empirical manifold can be determinately apprehended in the first place. It does not seem at all 
useful to claim that the source of some rule is 'experience', unless we are again willing to ask what 
it is in experience that warrants the rule's objectifying function"; Kant's Theory of Form, 115. 
44 Kant says two contradictory things about this "procedure" or "method" . While stating 
sometimes that the schema is a rule (A1411B180), on the other hand he suggests that the schema 
calUlot be a rule, because then we would creating a regress of rules: the concept rule can only be 
applied if it confonns to the schema rule (cf A1331B172). The schema appears to be a method 
which is not a rule, but does allow the concept to be applied to the sensible manifold. 
45 Another interpretation of these issues is made by Paul Guyer. Guyer puts forward the thesis that 
empirical concepts as rules have no problem of application to the manifold because these concepts 
are schemata. "Empirical concepts are rules or schemata which tell us to predicate a certain title of 
a particular object, just in case certain sensible properties indeterminately specified in the rule are 
actually, and of course detenninately, instantiated by that particular object" (Kant and the Claims 
of Knowledge, 164). Hence Kant is not concerned with the issue of how to apply a concept. If 
concepts are schemata, then all that is needed to apply them is "Mother "it", or a talent for 
judgment (159, 162). However, Guyer's notion of the schematism is flawed. In the opening 
sentences of the 'Schematism' chapter, Kant says that "In all subsumptions of an object under a 
concept the representations of tlle fornler must be homogeneous \\ith the latter... Thus tlle 
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imagination creates a schematic diagram by which all dogs can be shown to be 
variations of this unrepresentable invariant, and conversely, that the concept can 
be shown to apply to this set of marks. 46 
It may seem that at this point all Kant's innovations concerning the 
concept are becoming lost in a gravitational pull back to Platonism. However, 
Kant's account of "construction" perhaps provides the key illustration for Kant of 
how schematism would work. For instance, Kant shows how the connection 
between the concept 'straight line' and the spatio-temporal determination 'shortest 
distance' can be resolved through a schematic method by which the concept is 
exhibited in pure intuition. A 'method' is promised by which the real possibility 
of the notion of the shortest line would be outlined through an internal 
determination of the variations of the concept in space and time; such a procedure 
would also fulfil the rationalist criteria for a "real definition".47 But, as Hegel and 
others showed, Kant's notion of the schematism would seem to be an artificial 
bridge over the difference in kind between concept (act) and intuition (receptivity) 
to which Kant had committed himself. 48 
In fact, it is arguably Maimon who suggested how this method of genesis 
could work without straying too far from Kant. ''Experience (intuition) shows how 
a straight line is the shortest between two points, but it is not that which makes the 
straight line the shortest".49 A genetic definition is required for the line. "The 
concept of line demands two elements: firstly the material or intuition (line, 
empirical concept of a plate has homogeneity with the pure geometrical concept of a circle, for the 
roundness that is thought in the former can be intuited in the latter" (A1371B176). Guyer's 
e~.'planation of this is that the inclusion of the concept of the circle in the concept of the plate 
displays homogeneity of object and concept because the circle is something that can be actually 
intuited. However, if this is the case, then the example Kant has chosen is a loaded one, because 
clearly the concept ofa circle involves a pure intuition. This gives us a good reason to 'ground' the 
concept of plate in that of a circle. Kant's next example, which Guyer also refers to, is the concept 
of a dog (A180), which brings back all the problems referred to earlier. In this case, it is Guyer's 
attribution of realism to Kant that allows him to state that concepts are schemata. Guyer thinks that 
the problem of the application of concepts can be defused, because he has a fundamentally realist 
account of recognition. We recognise the 'marks' of a dog (four-Ieggedness, barking, etc.) because 
those marks are collected together in reality. 
46 Cf. Pippin, Kant's Theory of Form, 143-50. Lauchlan Chipma.t1, 'Kant's Categories and their 
Schematism', in R. Walker ed., Kant on Pure Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 
39. 
47 Compare A7131B741 - A nOIB748 with A 7311B759. 
48 Hegel says that what happens in the schematism is "one of the most attractiYe sides of the 
Kantian philosophy", but the attempt to connect, for instance, the category of substance "ith its 
sensible determination, pennanence in time, is ex1ernal and superficial, ')ust as a piece of wood 
and a leg might be bound together by a cord"; Lectures on the History of Philosophv (trans. E. 
Haldane & F. Simpson, Lincoln: University of Nebraska 1995), Vol. IlL ~·n. 
232 
direction), secondly, the form or rule of the understanding according to which one 
thinks this intuition (identity of direction, rectilinearity) ... The action of drawino 
b 
this line is from the beginning subsumed under this rule".5o As we have seen for , 
Maimon the forms of intuition, space and time, are forms required for the 
differentiation of intuition, while he calls the objects of this genetic method "Ideas 
of the understanding", which are formally conceived as intensive magnitudes. But 
clearly, ifMaimon does bring to fulfilment Kant's suggestion that the schema be a 
method for generating conceptually ordered intuitions, it is at the price of a radical 
transformation of Kant's theory. However, by returning to the issue of empirical 
concepts it can be shown that such transformations and extensions were indeed 
already seeded throughout the extremities of CPR. 
3 Ideas and their Necessity 
Kant's theory of empirical concepts is caught in a dilemma. It cannot rely on 
realism, or demand order from things themselves; this would beg the question for 
a Humean, who would emphasise both the contingent and merely customary 
nature of concepts, and the importance of not confusing one's impressions with 
real objects. Nor can it appeal to the pure concepts of the understanding, as these 
by themselves are too wide to tell us anything in particular about that to which 
they are applied. 51 
In fact, Kant's account of knowledge as presented so far is fundamentally 
incomplete. The apriori forms of the understanding are often taken to be 
conditions for the 'coherence' of experience, but as already suggested, Kant 
argues directly against this view later in CPR, where he goes on to present his 
'third' deduction, of Ideas. Just as the second deduction was a response to the 
possibility that spatiotemporal "appearances could after all be so constituted that 
the understanding not find them in accord with the conditions of unity", thus 
presenting a mere "rhapsody" of sensations (A901B 123), so does Kant admit that 
it is quite possible that "among the appearances offering themselves to us there 
49 Maimon. Versuch tiber die Transcendentalphilosophie, 43: cf. 19. 
50 Ibid, 49. 
51 Cf. George Schrader's account in 'Kant's Theory of Concepts'. in RP. Wolff. Kant: .~ 
Collection o/Critical Essays. 
were such a great variety ... of content ... that even the most acute human 
understanding, through comparison of one with another, could not detect the least 
similarity (A6541B682).52 The understanding presents only a "distributive unity" 
among appearances, without granting a "collective unity" (A6441B672; cf. 
A5831B611) As the role of the content of knowledge is so far left undetermined , 
there must be some other rule for the coherence of experience beyond its 
distributive use. 53 However, if the collective unity of appearances is precisely 
what can never be experienced as such, the principle can only be regulative, not 
constitutive. Kant suggests that 
the transcendental Ideas .. , have an excellent and indispensably necessary 
regulative use, namely that of directing the understanding to a certain goal 
respecting which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point, 
which, although it is only an Idea (focus imaginarius) - ie. a point from which the 
concepts of the understanding do not really proceed, since it lies entirely outside 
the bounds of possible experience - nonetheless still serves to obtain for these 
concepts the greatest unity alongside the greatest extension (A6441B672). 
The Idea involves the extension of the series of marks included in a concept 
beyond themselves into a projected totality. It is only by projecting such a 
"horizon" (A6581B686) that the analytic unity of concepts can be used logically, 
in such a way that higher and lower "functions of unity" converge with each 
52 This possibility also provides the motivation for CJ. Cf. particularly the First Introduction: "For 
although experience forms a system in terms of transcendental laws, which comprise the condition 
tmder which experience as such is possible, yet empirical laws might be so infinitely diverse, and 
the forms of nature which pertain to particular experience so very heterogeneous, that the concept 
of a system in terms of these (empirical) laws must be quite alien to the understanding, and that the 
possibility - let alone the necessity - of such a whole is beyond our grasp. And yet for particular 
experience to cohere thoroughly in temlS of fixed principles. it must have this systematic 
coherence of empirical laws as well" (Cl First Intro 203). The main difference between CPR and 
CJ here is that in the former Kant does not yet admit the possibility that the forms as well as the 
content of nature might be infinitely diverse. Cf. A6541B682. 
53 Kant forbids the notion that reason "has gleaned this unity from the contingent constitution of 
nature in accordance with its principles of reason. For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary. 
since without it we would have no reason, and \vithout that, no coherent use of the understanding, 
and, lacking that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth" (A6511B679). Such a law can only be a 
transcendental principle. In Cl perhaps realising the importance of this function for even the 
simplest experience, Kant gives it the name of "reflective judgment". Kant's first description of 
reflective judgment in CJ precisely echoes the quote from CPR A6541B682: "Reflective judgment 
which is obliged to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, requires a principle. 
which it cannot borrow from experience, precisely because it is to be the basis for the unity of all 
empirical principles under higher though still empirical principles. and hence is to be the basis that 
makes it possible to subordinate empirical principles to one another in a systematic way. So this 
transcendental principle must be one that reflective judgment gives as a law, but only to itself' (CJ 
180). On reflective judgment, see 1. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment. 151-
168. 
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other.54 The Idea is thus the condition of the possibility of unity in a concept; it 
gives unity to a concept, by acting as the horizon in which unification can occur. 
Reason, as the faculty of Ideas, in this sense overshadows the understanding. 55 
But as the Idea is "indeterminate" and therefore unable to be recognised in 
a concept, the totality or 'Ideal focus' can only be problematic. The focus is in a 
strict sense "imaginary".56 We have already taken this notion in a Deleuzian 
direction; it has been shown that if the Ideas do 'give unity' that does not imply 
that they are unified in themselves. Hence the Ideas should not immediately be 
seen as responding to the "law of reason to seek unity". In the light of these earlier 
developments it is worth witnessing Kant's description of Ideas play out its 
consequences within the perspective of his epistemology. 
The first thing to notice is that with this notion of an 'ideal horizon', the 
distinction between the logical and real use of the understanding starts to take on a 
new significance. The logical use of the understanding projects a world fully 
representable by concepts. But this 'logical world' is nevertheless a problematic 
projection, which, from this side, must change its sense with each action of the 
real use of the understanding (for which conceptual intension is always in flUX).57 
What seem to be logical possibilities must have their shifting index in the 'real' 
possibility which exists for the concrete subject. Representation is thus a mirage, 
but a necessary one for Kant. This real use encounters its logical extension only in 
the form of the Idea. To recall Deleuze, the logical horizon of representation is 
constantly at risk of being 'blocked' by its real use. 
Now Kant insists that the Idea is not an object of knowledge, but is only 
used for knowledge. And this is why a deduction is necessary to justify the precise 
54 Whereas the second Deduction dealt with the affinity of possible appearances, the third 
Deduction returns to affinity. TIrree "logical principles" are required to give collective coherence 
to experience: homogeneity, specificity and continuity; the latter is a "law of the affini~' of all 
concepts, which offers a continuous transition from every species to every other through a 
graduated increase" (A6571B686). 
55 It is this set of c1ainlS that is developed in CJ's theory of reflective judgment. Pippin recognises 
this possibility, but adds "it is, I think, hard to see the range and limits of such a 'reflection', and 
hard to understand how the demand for order \ve impose on nature is at all guided by what we 
learn from nature" (119). With the Hegelian or Deleuzian notions of Idea and reflection, of course. 
tIns becomes less lIard, as Pippin shows in the case of Hegel, and as "ill be sho"n below for 
Deleuze. 
56 Cf. CJ 232, and chapter 4.3.ii. above. 
57 It must be kept in nlind that for Kant God would not have Ideas; Ideas are strictly finite 'foci' by 
wInch the the human nlind orients itself. The horizon of logical representation is a realm projected 
from the realm of the real. But tIle projection provides tlle structure by which the real can be 
thought. 
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validity and demonstration that Ideas can have (A6701B698). That Kant does not 
carry out this deduction with any formal structure should not make us overlook 
the fact that a deduction indeed occurs, under the heading 'On the final aim of the 
natural dialectic of human reason'. In fact, the two steps of any transcendental 
deduction are present. Firstly, the justification of the internal validity of the 
structure, then the account of the mutual relation of the faculties, together with the 
demonstration that the internal structure can be schematised. However, Kant 
presents his deduction as if it began with the second step. The reason for this 
surely goes back to the subject of our first chapter: Kant takes the internal 
structure of reason itself for granted. We will see how problematic this lack of 
treatment of the first step will be at the end of this section, when all the 
metacritical problems of reason will reappear once more. I now present a 
treatment of these two moments in Kant's Deduction of Ideas. 
My general aim in what follows is firstly to continue to show the 
importance of Ideas for knowledge, and then secondly, to show how, if weight is 
indeed placed on Ideas of Reason, this finally pushes Kant's system into a crisis. I 
claim that Deleuze recognises this crisis and exacerbates it, precisely in order to 
elicit from it a new distributive order of Ideas, thus actualising a potentiality that 
had remained latent from Leibniz to Kant. Thus Kant's tendency to push issues of 
metacritique onto teleology (the Ideas as "ends of reason") results in a startling 
denouement in Deleuze's philosophy. 
Ideas and Schemata 
Kant begins the deduction with a distinction between two ways m which 
"something is given to my reason": "as an object absolutely", or "as an object in 
the Idea" (A6701B698). In the former case, reason can have no objective validity 
concerning the object itself However, in the case of Ideas, reason does not have 
objective reality in the sense that Ideas can be demonstrated to determine objects, 
rather the objective reality of the Idea lies in its capacity to determine "other 
objects" in accordance with the Idea. Its reality is thus "only a schema, ordered in 
accordance with the conditions of the greatest unity of reason, for the concept of a 
thing in general". The latter clause is important as it shows that Kant is still 
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attempting to determine what "the concept of a thing in general" is. 58 The Idea is 
justified through its ability to schematise the Gegenstande of 'absolute' concepts. 
This can only mean that it gives sense to the problematic nexus of thought and 
intellectual intuition. 59 The Idea thus is a schema of the concept of unconditioned 
concepts for the orientation of "other" concepts. Kant goes on to specify that "the 
things in the world must be considered as if they had got their existence from a 
highest intelligence" (A6711B699). That is, the Idea will also be a schema of God. 
However, it is only in CJ that Kant elaborates on how Ideas might be 
thought as schemata, but in doing so he qualifies his account in CPR. He now 
describes the demonstration of a concept in an intuitive manifold in general as its 
Darstellung or presentation/exhibition, which he also baroquely calls 
'hypotyposis' : 
all hypotyposis .,. consists in making [a concept] sensible, and is either schematic 
or symbolic. In schematic hypotyposis there is a concept that the understanding 
has formed, and the intuition corresponding to it is given apriori. In symbolic 
hypotyposis there is a concept which only reason can think and to which no 
sensible intuition can be adequate (el 351). 
Schematic presentation is "direct", and "demonstrative", while symbolic 
presentation is "indirect" (Cl 352) and "merely analogous to ... schematising" (CJ 
351). It is also analogical in the sense that it takes a concept that it is using to 
reflect on an intuition "and applies the mere rule ... to an entirely different object" 
(eJ 352). Kant then says that "all our cognition of God is merely symbolic. 
Whoever regards it as schematic, while including in it the properties of 
understanding, will, etc., whose objective reality is proved only in worldly beings 
- falls into anthropomorphism" (Cl 353). This move must be seen as a 
modification of Kant's earlier suggestion that God has a schema. Nevertheless, 
Kant's main point is in fact reinforced: the specification of a "symbolic" form of 
intellectual activity furthers the notion that Ideas provide a distinct component of 
the mind beyond recognition. 60 
58 Indeed, later Kant emphasises the regulative nature of the claim for an intelligible and intelligent 
God by saying that although "we must presuppose such a being ... we have presupposed only a 
Something, of which we have no concept at all of what it is in itself (a merely transcendental 
object [Gegenstandj)" (A6981B726). 
59 See chapter 3.2,ii. above. 
60 In CJ art provides the prime example of a symbolic presentation of Ideas (cf Deleuze, Kant's 
Critical Philosophy, 54). A white lily might symbolise innocence, which is a moral chara~tenstJC 
related to the Idea of perfection: thus an immaterial Idea gains a symbolic 'incarnatIOn or an 
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However, Kant's vacillation about whether Ideas are schematised or 
symbolised can be related to a more general problem about the role of Ideas. The 
later regions of CPR are probably so ignored because the notion that an Idea is 
'merely' regulative can seem to say only that we ought to use our reason to 
explore nature. Now this distinction between 'regulative' and 'constitutive' needs 
to be correctly determined. That an Idea is regulative does not mean that it is not 
necessary for knowledge; it means rather that it cannot be said to apply or 
determine nature in the way that the categories can justifiably do (in virtue of their 
universality for all appearances). For Kant, if an Idea is not 'constitutive' for 
nature, it is constitutive for knowledge or experience. The structure of the three 
deductions, and their interrelation suggest that this deduction of regulative Ideas is 
just as much a necessary condition of knowledge as the other two deductions are. 
"I am not only warranted but even compelled to realise this Idea" (A677!B705). 
The discourse of the "ends of reason" is actually built into the account of 
knowledge, while, on the other hand, knowledge is necessarily entangled in Ideas, 
and so is never simply recognition. 61 
Ideas thus help to schematise a problematic totality for empirical concept 
formation, thus providing an essential 'third thing' that mediates between 
concepts and their marks. But this necessity is mirrored by a similar mediation in 
the case of the role of the schematism as third thing between concepts and 
intuitions. As we saw above, the schematism points towards an internal 
determination of the sensible manifold by the apriori imagination. 
"indirect presentation" in nature as an object of reflection. {Although, interestingly, Kant still 
speaks of poetry in temlS of a "schema of the supersensible"; CJ 327). 
But doesn't Kant also in effect suggest that orgmric fonus too are schematic {)f ~mbollc 
presentations of the internal teleology of reason? An organic form, strictly speaking, cannot be 
"experienced"; it presents an anomaly for the "distributive unity" (in Kant's sense) of the 
categories, as it seems to cause itself. rather than being caused by a substance that must be seen as 
preceding it. according to the first two analogies. (It is often JXllitted out that the second analogy 
tells us nothing about particular causal comlections, only that there must be one for each empirical 
judgment). It requires reflective judgment to be able to understand it at all. (Kant also goes on t.o 
talk: about animals sharing "a common schema" or "archetype", which is "able to produce this 
great diversity of species, by shortening some parts and lengthening others. by the ~\'olution of 
some and evolution of others". The "analogy" among the parts of these species ""remforces .o~ 
suspicion that they are actually akin, produced by an original mother"; C] 418-9). In genemllt IS 
clear that for Kant Ideas are necessary to experience coherence in the whole of organic nature. It IS 
possible to see C] itself as an elaboration of the deduction of Ideas in that it shows the many ways 
in which Ideas can be presented. 
61 It is also very pertinent that Kant does not frame the "compulsion"" to think ~ in particularly 
practical terms in this discussion. thus indicating that freedom is not the force that Impels us out of 
mere recognition, but rather something in Ideas themseh·es. 
It is striking that the determination of the concept in Kant at both of its 
extremities relies on peculiar procedures of the imagination. What warrants the 
formation of the concept? Only the Idea as a problematic task. What guides the 
concept to its application? The schema as the invariant intensive structure that 
allows the incarnation of various extensive actualisations. Imagination is what 
leads the way out of the understanding both in the guidance of the formation of 
the concept and in the schematism. In the former case the imagination prepares a 
sensible symbol of the Idea, the validity of which depends on its very elusiveness 
to recognition. In the latter case, Kant points towards a kind of construction that 
would provide a real definition of the laws of the sensible manifold. 
Do we then finally have a suggestion about how imagination might be 
responsible for the conjunction of reproduction and recognition, through its 
capacity to unite the inner depths of intuition with the extremities of thought? The 
imagination certainly seems to provide the possibility of the reproduction of the 
manifold having a certain rational order that might make it available to 
recognition. However, what we have before us is an irreducible openness in the 
concept, in resonance with Ideas and intuition, which eludes the synthesis of 
recognition. The role of recognition would no longer be central, and thus Kant's 
theory would need to be further modified. With Deleuze, we have already been 
making moves towards this modification. 62 But to conclude our account of the 
structure of Kant's critical project, it is now necessary to return to the issue of the 
first step of the deduction of Ideas, and the question of the internal validity of the 
concepts of reason that are being schematised. 
62 A problematic point can be raised here, to be taken up in Appendix IV, related to the ne>.1 
chapter. By making the imagination responsible for both processes, aren't we back "ith ~n 
indistinction between fonnation and application? Two directions lead off from here. Hegel s 
trajectory will begin by affirming the imagination as the "common root" of the understanding and 
intuition, while Deleuze will attempt to keep the faculties distinct, thus preserving the divergent 
forms of differentiation that belong to each faculty. How can he preserve the connection between 
Ideas and intuitions without turning to something like imagination as a mediating middle: It can 
be recalled here how similar Hegel and Deleuze are on the connection between aesthetIc Ideas 
with rational Ideas. Hegel criticises Kant for acting "as if the aesthetic Idea di~ no~ have It.: 
e>'lX>sition in the Idea of Reason, and the Idea of Reason did not have its demonstratIon m beau~· 
(Faith and Kno'w/edge, 87), while Deleuze writes that "the aesthetic Idea is really the same thing 
as tile rational Idea: it e>'l'resses what is e>'l'ressible in the latter" (Kant's Criti~al Phrlosophy, ~7) 
Their differences really concern the manner of connecting rational and aesthetIC Ideas. that IS. m a 
sense. the maImer of schematising or symbolising the Idea. 
2~9 
II The Structure of Ideas 
The first step of this deduction has an unusual status. If the first two deductions 
involved preliminary analyses of the 'origins" or inner sources of a particular kind 
of cognition in sensibility and the understanding, the last deduction examines the 
necessary structure of reason itself. But our first chapter showed that the topic of 
the status of reason itself in CPR is fraught with metacritical difficulties. For 
reason must not only present its own criteria for its essential ends, but it also must 
subject the other faculties to itself. It follows from the latter claim that the third 
deduction itself can also be said in principle to subordinate the other two 
deductions to itself. 
In this way, the three deductions must be seen in the light of the larger 
teleological fabric that was introduced in chapter 1. The first and second 
deductions point to the third, which finally ties up "the essential ends of reason". 
CPR is thus by no means just a critique of knowledge, but a treatise on the 
destination of man. 63 
The psychological, cosmological and theological Ideas finally find their 
claim to validity through their projection of the maximum of systematic unity for 
experience (A6711B699), thus allowing the formal return of the structure of 
Kant's early work. In the first edition CPR, Kant says that "the things in the world 
must be considered as if they had got their existence from a highest intelligence" 
(ibid, italics mine). By relying only on its 'as if status, Kant would seem to be 
able to reaffirm the intelligence of God over his ontological and modal power. 
While such power was better demonstrated in Kant's early work, by here giving 
God a merely regulative status, Kant in effect can prioritise his intelligence, as 
this latter provides a clearer regulative sense for us, which the modal ontological 
argument by itself lacks. Now, we have seen that Kant modifies his views about 
the schema of God. But more can be said about the uncertain status of God in this 
region of the critical project. Perhaps there is a concealed possibility in the first 
63 At the end of the section under discussion. Kant remarks that '""all human cognition begins "lth 
intuitions, goes from there to concepts, and ends "ith Ideas". He then suggests that "a completed 
critique convinces us that reason in its speculative use can "ith these elements never get beyond 
the field of possible e)\.-perience, and that the proper vocation {Bestimmung] of this supreme faculty 
of cognition is to employ all its methods and principles only in order to pene~te mto ~e deepest 
inwardness of nature in accordance 'With all possible principles of unity, of which the wuty of ends 
is the most prominent" (A7031B73 1). 
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VIew. In what follows the metacritical issues that have been encountered are 
pushed to a head. 
Kant goes on to say that "the highest formal unity that alone rests on 
concepts of reason is the purposive unity of things; and the speculative interest 
of reason makes it necessary to regard every ordinance in the world as if it had 
sprouted from the intention of a highest reason" (A6871B715). In an explicitly 
ontological register, he adds that "complete purposive unity is perfection 
(absolutely considered) .. , The greatest systematic unity is the ... ground of the 
possibility of the greatest use of human reason. Hence the Idea of it is inseparably 
bound up with the essence of our reason" (A6951B723). But these latter 
ontological descriptions of the systematic totality provided by God could equally 
be applied at the level of the pure ontological arguments that we encountered in 
chapter 2. After all, as Kant shows in CJ, purposiveness can be thought without 
purpose; therefore an intelligent being is not necessarily thought along with the 
purposiveness of things. In fact, it is merely the "very contingency of [a] thing's 
form [that] is a basis for regarding the product as if it had come about through a 
causality that only reason can have" (CJ 370). Reason cannot simply let the 
contingency be, it "must always cognise not only the product's form, but the 
form's necessity as well" (ibid). Kant's reference to teleology here can be seen as 
exactly analogous to Leibniz's tum to teleology once the irreducibility of real 
possibility, or compossibility, has been shown. In chapter 2 I argued that the latter 
moment is the essential one, and that the teleological notion of an intelligent God 
is really to be seen as the simplest way in traditional terms to deal with the 
ontological chasm that has been opened up. 
So on what does Kant's regulative account of a necessarily intelligent God 
rest? It must rest on Kant's characterisation of reason's own needs. But is it 
straightforwardly true that reason desires purpose, unity and collective totality? 
Why is it better to think nature holistically, when for all we know, it may not be 
articulated in itself in such a way? An alternative has already been glimpsed: 
rather than being collectively articulated, the inner natures of things may be 
distributively organised, so that their external relations may depend in primary 
ways on intensive relations. Where in fact does Kant find the criteria of unity and 
coll ecti vity? 
2~1 
Kant says that our suppositions about God are thought only relatively, "on 
behalf of the systematic unity of the world of sense" (A6791B707), and there is no 
requirement to make a suppositio absoluta about God (A6761B704). Hence God 
must be thought "according to the analogy of realities in the world, of substances, 
causality and necessity ... in their highest perfection" (A6781B706). God must be 
thought according to the analogy of the forms of judgment. But has Kant 
adequately grounded the claim that God must be thought relatively and 
analogically? If reason does transparently present its "essential ends" then Kant 
can argue that the contingency of nature must imply that reason articulate it in 
terms of purposes, unity and totality. But it was found that in the first edition 
CP~ Kant seems to rely on a metaphysical teleology, which became 
problematised in his practical philosophy. Deleuze's resolution of this - his 
exacerbation of 'problematicity' by giving it its own specific notion - has been 
introduced as an alternative. In CJ, Kant himself envisages an alternative: the 
possibility for a new ground of the unity and vocation of the faculties (including 
reason) is shown by way of a genesis of their relation, suggesting that the internal 
teleology of reason, understanding and sensibility no longer in principle requires 
an end outside of itself (a reason in itself); reason determines its ends in relation to 
the other faculties. 
But in this case, Kant has less and less need for an intelligent GOd.64 The 
way is open for a competing account of reason's relation to contingency. As we 
have seen, the modal ontological argument of Kant's early work in effect also 
provides a way of thinking the contingency of nature through the counterfactual 
form of compossibility. But then 'God', or the ontological structure of reality, no 
longer needs to be thought according to the analogy of judgment, but can be 
thought for itself. Although it is Deleuze that develops this direction, Kant does 
move towards something like it in the Opus Posthumum, as has been suggested. 
Furthermore it has been seen that for Kant we are referred to the world's 
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systematic unity "only by means of a schema of that unity" (A6971B725; cf. 
64 In fact the recourse in CPR to an intelligent God, rather than having any internal yalidity 
specifically demonstrable for the structure of reason, serves as a means for Kant to introduce the 
most traditional conceptions of what God is and what God thinks good. Kant eyen admits ~t. "m 
tIllS Idea we can allow certain anthropomorphisms. wltich are e~]XXiient for the regulatn·e pru;clJJl:e 
we are thinking of, without fear or blame" (A697fB725). In terms o.f the moveme?t of ~~t ~ 
argwllent, there is no more need to follow his appeal to anthropomorpltism than there IS to tltink 0 
A6701B698). Given the outlines in Kant's theory suggesting an internal 
'schematic' relation between Ideas, imagination, and intuition, is· it in fact possible 
to return to the rationalist project of attaining a real definition of God that , 
generates the totality of real possibility in a non-anthropomorphic way? Deleuze 
in effect occupies this open site in Kant's work. Firstly he can be seen as 
reconciling the symbolic and schematic presentations of reality through the notion 
that Ideas are indirectly presented as problems (he elaborates how this happens in 
terms of the ''transcendent exercise of the faculties", to be further expounded in 
chapter 6.2). Secondly, he theoretically affirms the play of compossibilities that 
was denoted by the name of God in Leibniz and Spinoza. However, Deleuze 
affirms the "unity" of ontological totality not collectively but distributively, so 
that it is affirmed only through each really distinct part. The Absolute is attained 
only through access to the problematic, which qua problematic, promises no 
collective unity or totality, only the eternally mobile distributions of the object = 
x. Deleuze thus locates himself in the same metaphysical zones that Kant 
ultimately occupies (both in principle and historically in CJ and OP); but I will 
argue that Deleuze's return to Leibnizian and Spinozist issues is ultimately more 
consistent than Kant's actual resolution of these problems. 
4 The Primacy of Apperception 
Having given a non-traditional account of the role of apperception in Kant's 
critical project, based around the first edition CPR, I now tum to the more usual 
notion that apperception is in some sense the premise or first principle of the 
critical project. A case can indeed be made that this was Kant's intent by referring 
to the claims of the B-deduction. However, I would suggest that Kant's greater 
project in the first edition CPR is not negated, but on the contrary is redistributed 
throughout CJ and OP. The 'epistemologization' introduced in the second edition 
CPR should be seen in the light of Kant's redistribution of metacritical, 
metaphysical and teleological issues (all vital to the critical project) to other 
works. This introduces a fracture into CPR itself, so that it can now be seen from 
two angles: first as an attempt at a treatise on the destination of man, and then 
reason in tenns of "e~ .. pediency". Kant's later remarks, cited above, about the symbolic 
presentation of God serve as a corrective to his earlier view. 
secondly as an attempt at the epistemological part of a treatise on the destination 
ofman. 65 
Nevertheless, the second edition CPR introduces some vital new ideas 
concerning inner and outer sense, which to some extent can be seen as 
precipitating the great reorganisation of 1786. But I shall argue that in fact, in 
union with the continuing edicts of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, they end up 
providing even more evidence against the methodological primacy of 
apperception, the weight of which must therefore be shifted elsewhere, whether it 
be onto pre-reflexive grounds, or onto teleological conceptions of the subject as 
an Idea.66 
Apperception and Spontaneity 
Kant's claim about transcendental apperception is expressed in the following 
famous proposition: "The I think must be able to accompany all my 
representations" (B 131). This proposition can be understood as either an 
uncontroversial analytic truth that follows from the having of representations, or it 
can be seen as a synthetic apriori truth. In recent times the question of the 
syntheticity or analyticity of the 'I think' has polarised commentators wishing to 
understand the deduction. Strawson, Henrich and Guyer have underlined the 
necessity for the deduction of the synthetic apriority of apperception itself, 1ll 
order to get the anti-skeptical claims of the Deduction underway. 
In Identity and Objectivity, Henrich argues that the unity of apperception 
can only be understood as resting on either the simplicity or the numerical identity 
of the self If the self is simple, however, we could not derive any categories from 
its necessity, because we cannot account for any activity of synthesis. We cannot 
get from simplicity to the complexity that is a necessary presupposition for 
synthesis. 67 Hence apperception must involve numerical identity of the self 
65 As I remarked in chapter 1, I have been influenced here by E. Forster's suggestions in 'Kant's 
Notion of Philosophy'. 
66 In Appendix III, ~elated to the end of this chapter, I also suggest that in OP Kant finally. comes 
to accept the proposal, first suggested by Aenesidemus, that the transcendental. subject of 
apperception must have the status of an Idea. This ,,,ill lead finally to the confrontatIOn \\1th. an 
ambiguity which has been constantly on tlle horizon, between the mere fom1ality of apperceptIon 
- -
and more 'substantial' claims about the subject and self. 
6i Cf. Henrich.. Identity and Objectivity. in The Unity ?f Reaso~. 171: "l?e. subject not only m~~~ 
be able to think. of itself as being one in relation to an mdeternunate multIphclt) of thoughts. bu 
through complex states.68 He fIrst suggests that this could entail a 'strict' or 
Leibnizian numerical identity in which identity is secured only if a thing retains 
all the properties that it ever has, because the categories would serve precisely to 
secure the continual self-same identity of all the subject's states.69 Henrich gives a 
number of reasons why this isn't the kind of identity Kant has in mind, the crucial 
one being that it doesn't account for the apriority of the self s awareness of its 
identity; the self is rather seen as continually acquiring knowledge of its 
continuing self-identity. So the identity of the self must instead be a "moderate 
identity". Essentially this involves the capacity of the subject to remain itself 
through the transition between states by means of the "thOUght of particular ways 
of transition", ie. the categories. That is, the subject has the apriori ability to make 
judgments about its continuing identity due to its use of the categories. 
I shall mention three problems with this approach that have come to light. 
Firstly, the perceived untenability of presupposing a 'Cartesian consciousness' as 
the basis for the unity and numerical identity of apperception. This problem can 
be subsumed under a second more general problem, that of the susceptibility of 
the argument to the classic skeptical claim, recurrent in various forms from G.E. 
Schulze (or' Aenesidemus') to Stroud, that transcendental arguments only prove 
what it is necessary to believe in order to fulfIl a certain requirement of the 
concept of experience. 70 Thirdly, there is a general concern that the status of the 'I 
think' might conflict with Kant's claims in the Paralogisms. Kant argues against 
any consciousness of the numerical identity of the self: 
Identity of consciousness of myself at different times is ... only a formal 
condition of my thoughts and their connection, but it does not prove at all the 
numerical identity of my subject, in which - despite the logical identity of the I -
must also be in a position to bring together many kinds of contents into particular complex 
thoughts". 
68 Ibid, 175: "The subject must be able to progress [ubergehen] from one state to another. And.it 
must be able to do this in such a way that it is able to think of itself as the same subject both m 
relation to its states and in relation to the process of transition" . 
69 Ibid 182. 
70 Aenesidemus claims that "the Critique claims that the original determinations of the human 
mind are the real ground or source of the necessary synthetic judgments found in our know~edge: 
but it does this by inferring, from the fact that we can only think of the faculty of represen~tlOn as 
the ground of these judgments, that the mind must be their ground in actual fact t~ . G..E 
Schulze, Aenesidemus, in di Giovanni & Harris eds, Between Kant and Hegel (Indian~hs 
Hackett, 1985), 113. In his classic article on "Transcendental Arguments", Str~u~ states the Issue 
as follows: "For any candidate S, proposed as a member of the pm'Ile~ed class lof 
transcendentally true p~opositions], the skeptic can always very plausibly ~sist ~t It IS enough to 
make language [or experience] possible if we believe that S is true", contamed m R Walker (ed). 
Kant on Pure Reason, 128. 
a change ~an go ?n th~t does not: all~';, ~ to keep its identity; and this even though 
all the whIle the IdentIcal soundmg I IS assigned to it (A363). 
Karl Ameriks and Andrew Brook emphasise that the identity of consciousness 
relevant for the 'I think' must be seen only as a transcendental condition for "one 
experience" (cf AIIO), rather than for a numerical identity between discrete 
experiences.71 If I am aware of my identity with my past in any given moment, 
this says nothing about my 'objective' identity or continuity with myself 72 As 
Ameriks puts it, "Kant's premiss is not that my consciousness really is in these 
various times but only that there are various times 'in' my consciousness ... The 
persistent representation of an'!, need not be the representation of a persistent 
Allison's account of apperception excludes the claim to synthetic apriori 
validity involved in Henrich's account, and argues that its status is purely 
analytic. 74 He develops Klaus Reich's account of the analytic unity of 
apperception as a formal, abstract model of concept use, and argues that 
apperception and objectivity simply imply one another.75 Allison attenuates the 
notion of objective validity so that it simply indicates the capability of a judgment 
to be true. The analytic unity of apperception comprises the necessary unity 
involved in the making of a judgment.76 He then takes the first five paragraphs of 
the B-deduction to involve the following analytic claims. 77 Any representation of 
71 Andrew Brook has written most extensively on this topic; cf. Kant and the Afind, 32f., 132f.. and 
chapter 8 on "unity without identity over time". Ameriks provides a similar analysis in han! 's 
Theory of Afind. Interestingly tillS same insistence is made by Brook and Ameriks from radically 
different perspectives: Brook defends a functionalist account of apperception, while Ameriks is 
resolutely metaphysical. Both functionalism and metaphysics can be understood to encroach upon 
Kant's clainls for the '1 think' from different sides. 
72 Cf. Kant's peculiar thouglIt experiments with the elastic balls at A363; and Ameriks' 
commentary (see note below). 
73 Anleriks, Kant's Theory of Mind, 134-5. 
74 Guyer also criticises Henrich's argument, but claims, against Allison, that the synthetic apriori 
validity of apperception itself is essential to Kant. (Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Kno'wledge, 
132f. On the necessity of a synthetic apriori premise cf. 770 His own discussion of the 
transcendental deduction involves its dissolution into a 'patchwork theory', whereby the two mam 
candidates for the role of central argument are the one just mentioned and a regressive argument 
that presupposes objective knowledge but uses the deduction to prove the applicability ~f the 
categories. 11Iis latter fails due to the limitations of such a regressive argument against skep.oclsm. 
Instead, he offers a minimal claim about empirical consciousness necessarily dependi~g on 
objective knowledge. However, this has been criticised as essentially a dressed ~p versIOn of 
Strawson's argument, and hence subject to the same criticisms. Cf. lM. Young, reVIew of G~yeL 
~l!-ant-Studien, 1990). 101: H. Allison, review of Guyer, (Journal of Philosophy 86. 1989). 21:' 
I) Klaus Reich, The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments. 9ff. 
76 Allison. Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 138. 
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a manifold as a manifold is a single complex thought. As "concepts are predicates 
of possible judgments", the thinking of this single complex thought will be 
through the activity of judgment. A single complex thought requires a single 
thinking subject, because the thoughts of the distributed parts of a whole are not 
equivalent to the thought of the collective whole itself. If the subject is conscious 
of the parts of its thought as a unity, then it also must be able to be conscious of its 
own identity as subject of these representations. Allison thus claims that the 
proposition "The I think must be able to accompany all my representations" 
necessarily implies a subject capable of recognising itself as identical throughout 
its representations. Nevertheless, he says, this is only "the necessity of a 
possibility", and thus doesn't entail the material claims of the above 
interpretations. Against Henrich's interpretation, there is no claim that any explicit 
awareness of numerical identity is necessary for this thinking subject. Finally, the 
crucial claim that the deduction is to prove the applicability of the pure concepts 
to intuition is shifted to the second half of the B-deduction through the 
introduction of the necessity of the unity of the spatiotemporal manifold. 78 This 
approach implies a strong reliance on transcendental idealism; without it, 
Allison's deduction would go the way of Strawson et al.79 
There are several points in Allison's reading that are relevant for us here, 
although I can only focus on one cluster of issues around apperception itself. 80 
78 His approach here echoes that of Henrich in 'The Proof Structure of the Transcendental 
Deduction', in R. Walker ed, Kant on Pure Reason. Ameriks has questioned why Henrich turns to 
his later account of Cartesian consciousness when he had put forward a more convincing account 
in tillS earlier (1969) article; 'Recent Work on Kant's Theoretical Philosophy' (American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 19, 1982). 16. 
79 I shall have to leave this side of the deduction until the discussion of Deleuze; but we have 
already seen that for Deleuze the e:x.iensive mllty of space and time is secondary to its intemaL 
intensive differentiation; so its role in securing the deduction would be put in doubt. . 
80 I tIllnk Allison's argument is also problematised by his manoeuvres around the not.lO.n. of 
'objective validity' (see Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 144-8). Allison straddles the diVISIon 
between the metaphysical and the transcendental deductions uncertainly here. Kant argues on A97 
that the objective validity of the categories in the thought of objects is insufficient because there IS 
"more at work" than the understanding. He has argued for objective validity as ~ relatIOn TO 
objects, and requires an elucidation of the possibility of tItis relation. The A-Dedu~tlO~ proceeds 
on tltis basis. Objective validity thus already involves the transcendental applIcatIOn of_the 
categories, not simply their logical use. Allison tries to save the generality of paragraphs 1."-20 
from any involvement in the commitments of this application. Admittedly these COmmItments are 
not clear, but it is certain that it involves the relation of a concept to its object in intuitron (Cf. 
B179, B187. Allison himself notes tltis in The Kant-Eberhard Controversy. 63-5). Allison argues 
iliat ilie object in these passages is not the transcendental object. which he argue~ inyoh'es the 
'weighty' sense of an object. But the transcendental object is surely precisely the ObJect = :\ that IS 
involved in the transcendental use of the categories. Again, Allison himself argues differently III an 
. . . di" h ben\een the 
earlIer work, yiz 'Kant and the Transcendental ObJect, where he stmguts es 
The analyticity of the proposition from B 131 derives from the fact that the '1 
think' must be able to accompany all my representations. With this emphasis in 
mind, the proposition becomes a tautology, and does not tell us anything about a 
subject of representations. What it does imply is that each empirical representation 
1 have must be able to be gathered up by a transcendental 'I think,.81 We may be 
able to go on to infer that the transcendental 'I think' is thus only possible on the 
basis of a synthesis according to categories, but this tells us nothing about the 
numerical identity of the 'I think'. Hence again the importance of keeping a 
distinction between the unity of consciousness ("one single experience") and the 
consciousness of unity; it is the latter claim that is ambiguous. Allison wants to 
attribute reflective spontaneity to a subject capable of recognising itself as 
identical. But can he move from his analytic argument about apperception to such 
a synthetic claim? 
The problematic nature of Allison's reading can be brought out if we focus 
on the phrase 'must be able to accompany'. As Allison shows, it is the necessity 
of a possibility of self-consciousness, not the actual, continuous accompaniment 
of self-consciousness which Kant is arguing for here. But Allison is caught in a 
double bind situation. Either self-consciousness is in fact fundamental for the 
application of the categories, in which case he has to move back towards making a 
synthetic apriori claim for it, or self-consciousness is merely necessarily possible, 
in which case the universality of the categories is hardly assured, as the actuality 
of self-consciousness is not implied at all. 82 
This chimes with Guyer's criticism that Allison only adduces a logical 
necessity, not any de re necessity for the 'I think'; but only the latter will suffice 
interpretation of the transcendental object as the thing in itself and the transcendental. object a.s the 
correlate of apperception. However, he never equates either one straightforwardly \nth a we,lgbty 
sense of objectivity. I contend that objective validity is not just 'valid', or 'capable of truth . but 
that the objectivity involved involves intuition in the most general sense (see above, sectl.on 1). 
Allison seems to have turned away from the interpretations of his earlier work m order to Isolate 
the logical analyticity of apperception. . . 
81 Cf K. Ameriks' recent reconstruction of this le\"el of the Transcendental DeductIon III 
'Understanding Apperception Today' (in P. Parrilli, ed., Kant and Contemporary Epistemology: 
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), and 'Kant and the Self, (in D. Klemm & G. ZOller: eds .. FigUring the 
Self, Albany: SUNY, 1997). These articles present the most sophisticated reading of appercept.lOn 
tllat I have so far encountered. Ameriks does not. however. use his argument expliCItly agamst 
Allison's claims. . d I 
Sc Cf Hector-Neri Casteneda's argunlent in 'The Role of Apperception in Kant s Transcen cnta 
Deduction of the Categories', (XOltS 2~. 1990). 150. 
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to get the argument out of mere conceptual analysis. 83 (Once agai~ the issue of 
the logical and the real.) The question would then be whether Allison is having it 
both ways by arguing for the analyticity of apperception and then finessing the 
modal status of the premise so he can claim that the status of apperception is 
necessary, but only as a 'possibility', not as necessarily existential. 
The ambiguous modal status clouds the status of apperception as an "ace, 
or as "spontaneous". The move from the logical requirement for an "act of unity" 
to its transcendental status/or experience is problematic. How exactly does the act 
of apperception take place? Where is the weight of the claim for spontaneity 
located? As we have seen, Allison makes a point of diverging from Henrich's 
reading of Kant's statement that ''we are conscious apriori of the complete 
identity of the self in respect of all representations ... as being a necessary 
condition of the possibility of all representations" (A1l6). In conformity with the 
Paralogisms, Allison insists that apperception gives us no knowledge of the self; 
self-consciousness is not self-knowledge. The 'I think' cannot be thought through 
the categories as the I is presupposed by the categories; it therefore cannot be 
"objectified" and is rather (with Wittgenstein) "a limit of the world".84 Referring 
back to A116, he claims instead that ''what we are aware of is not numerical 
identity; it is rather the 'fact' that this identity must be presupposed as a necessary 
condition of knowledge". 85 But doesn't this mystify further the issue of what self-
consciousness is aware oj? Is the apperceptive subject really aware of this "fact" 
in all its representations? 
Recently Allison, perhaps in order to resolve these issues, has pursued a 
stronger claim for the necessity of self-consciousness in experience, which affirms 
aspects of Robert Pippin's normative theory of apperception. 86 In order to be able 
to recognise the ordered unity in my representations, I must take myself as 
conforming to the criteria for such unity. "The unity must be not only in a single 
83 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. 140: "What Kant require.s is not ~ anal~1ic 
claim that if I call several representations mine I must see them as representatlo~ of ~ smgle ~lf 
(an explication, as it were of what it means to call them "mine"), but a ~l1thetIC claIm assertmg 
, . d th ascnbe 
the de re necessity that, whatever representations I have, I can call them ~e an . us . 
them to myself as representations of a single self. Only apriori certamty of this ~'nthetlc 
proposition would require apriori knowledge of any synthesis of them", 
84 Allison, Kant's Transcendental Jdealism, 290-3. 
85 Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 140, , . C d' 
86 . . r 'Kan h S taneitv of Mmd ( ana Ian As presented m Aanl 's Theory of Form, 153-187, ton t e pon. . 
Journal of Philosophy, 17. 1987). and Hegel's Idealism. 16-24, 
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consciousness, it must be for that consciousness".87 That is, the mind must be able 
to spontaneously recognise the criteria of unity as well as the components of the 
unity itself. Apperception is a conscious self-relating via the norms of the 
categories. But while Pippin may be able to defend such an account in Hegelian 
terms, it would seem to require a rather dogmatic, insomniac subject in the case of 
Kant. Moreover, four conceptual problems can be mentioned. 
Firstly, if the unity is for a consciousness, then which consciousness'> The 
categories, as criteria for unity, are themselves presupposed in order to provide a 
thread for the unity of experience. But are we supposed to conceive a spontaneous 
subject somehow apart from these criteria, 'consciously' conforming to them? 
Even if such a subject only has sense by means of these criteria? In other words, 
at what level is the claim for reflective spontaneity really secured for itself? It 
cannot simply be that spontaneous apperception is simply another transcendental 
condition like the categories, because it is itself supposed to be the mediating 
'third thing' that justifies the synthetic apriority of the categories (cf. again the 
crucial claims at A881B 120-A911B 123). If the weight of the claim is going to be 
displaced (ie. so that apperception is merely another 'formal' condition), it should 
at least be clear where it is being displaced to. (My interpretation orients the 
displacement in the direction of teleology). 
Secondly, Pippin's account of normative claim making is presented as 
more than merely analytic,88 but nevertheless vacillates uncertainly around the 
claim that the normative 'taking-as' is implicit. Either it is too implicit, in which 
case the normativity seems to disappear;89 or it becomes explicit, and leads to a 
'dual' account of consciousness, where empirical judgment is shadowed by an 
equally de re transcendental judgment.9o 
87 'On NaturnlizingKant's Transcendental Psychology' in Idealism and Freedom, 60 
88 Cf. Pippin, Hegel's Idealism, 27. ., . . 
89 "When S claims to know P. S must be implicitly understanding himself to be parUCIpatmg ill the 
practice of judgment and justification. and ... S must contextually or implicitly ~nde~d enough 
of such a practice to count as participating in it. (Such a reflexhoe a"oareness nnght slTIlply always 
be implicit and evinced only by what else S can and would do)."' (ibid 22-~3~. The parenthetIc 
remark surely suggests that such 'implicit self-reflexi"ity' could be more rrnrumally understood 
according to a framework of counterfactuals. . . I 
90 Ameriks compares tlns aspect of Pippin's account with F. Neuhouser's interpretauon of FIC He: 
they both posit an '''ever-present' awareness tllat one is conscious" r~t and the Se.lf ' .. ;2, n. ~2~ 
Cf. also Ameriks' criticism of Pippin's clainl iliat "all hunlall tho~gh~ l~ 'self-refl~XlY~ ~Hegel.\ 
Idealism, 7): "It is hard to see what is to be gained by stubbornly InsIstIng on the a~ claIm her~ 
. . th . Inyolyed III It seems obvious that tllere could be all sorts of non-refleXIve relaUons at \\e are . 
. ..' f E' t looist?' (Philosonh\' and Ameriks, 'Recent Work on Hegel: The RehabIlitatIOn 0 an pIS emo 0' .• r . 
2:'0 
Thirdly, Kant would claim, I think, that apperception itself cannot be 
experienced as spontaneous, because of what he calls the "paradox" of inner sense 
(B 152; cf. B67 -69, B 152-7), in relation to which he writes that "the consciousness 
of oneself is ... far from being a cognition of oneself' (B 158). All determination is 
referred to intuitio~ the two pure forms of which are space and time. In order to 
experience my own spontaneity, I would have to take it as an object, which would 
require that it be subj ected to and mediated by inner sense, the form of 
determinability of which is time. "[T]he subject, which is the object of [inner] 
sense, can only be represented by its means [that is, by the means of inner sense] 
as appearance, not as it would judge of itself if its intuition were mere self-
activity, ie. intellectual" (B68); the subject is therefore "affected from within, .,. as 
it appears to itself, not as it is" (B69). I cannot determine my own spontaneity 
prior to the act of determination in time. Moreover such a determination would , , 
by the hypothesis, already require spontaneity in the very determining of 
spontaneity. Thus with the paradox of inner sense, not only can I not determine 
myself as a spontaneously active being, but I cannot determine myself as 
spontaneous at al1. 91 I can ultimately only philosophically presuppose spontaneity, 
as I can reason, as a transcendental philosopher, that concepts themselves are not 
given, so must be produced by a mind. Hence the self-relation that is attributed to 
the notion of apperception remains mysterious, or at least must be mediated by 
other characteristics. 92 
Phenomenological Research, 52, 1992). 197. For me, the Idea is the locus of the relation between 
non-reflexive and reflexive relations; cf chapter 6.2.iii and 6.3 below. 
91 Cf S. Houlgate's treatment of this issue in 'Hegel, Kan~ and the Fonnal Distinctions of 
Reflective Understanding', (in A. Collins, Hegel and the A10dern H7orld), 137-40. Houlgate 
suggests, indirectly, that Hegel offers us a way out of the paradox of inner sense. He writes: "If I 
am conscious of myself as thinking and detennining, then perhaps that is precisely what the 'I' is 
in itself, what I am in myself as '1': not a conceivably determinable (though in fact inaccessible) 
being or thing which thinks, but just the acti"ity of thinking itself, an activity "ithout an 
underlying agent, a doing without a doer (as Nietzsche might put it). that is to say. a self-
detennining thought" (140). My problem would be \"ith the first clause: "If I am conscIOUS of 
myself as thinking and determining ... " To what e:-.:tent can one appeal to the transparen~' of self-
consciousness? Does Kant's paradox of inner sense not show us the internal c~m~le"lty of the 
'act' of self-consciousness in such a way that its use as a model for detemnnatIOn IS put III 
question? I return to these ~roblems below'when I discuss D. Henrich's and M Frank's notions of 
self-consciousness, , 
92 Although I can only suggest it here, it seems to me that this train of thought als~ puts in qu~stIon 
certain claims underlying the argument of Hegel' s Phenomen~/ogy. ~ Appendix I I menuoned 
that Hegel presupposes at the outset of the Phenomenology an 'abstract account of the relauon of 
consciousness to its object: "consciousness simultaneously distingu~shes I,tself from somethlll~ 
and at the same time relates itself to it or. as it is said this somethmg eXIsts for consciousness. 
and the determinate aspect of this relating. or of the being of something for a conSCIOusness. IS 
Fourthly it follows in general that a fundamental ambiguity about the 
status of apperception is present in Kant. Although Kant seems to imply that, in 
the form of self-consciousness, apperception is open to reflection, there is also a 
sense that, although it is founding for experience, it must remain at the level of a 
condition discovered only by the transcendental philosopher. The criteria of 
experience are only really revealed in the transcendental analysis undertaken by 
Kant; they are not available by right to every subject.93 But in this case how can 
Kant prove the de re necessity of his account of apperception without being 
vulnerable to other potential explanations for the unity of consciousness? 
Apperception seems to become at best an Idea, something we are supposed to 
presuppose for the unity of experience, but which cannot be apprehended as 
such.94 There is one alternative, though: that Kant identify de re the activity of 
thought involved in transcendental analysis with apperception. However, I will 
show in chapter 6.2.iii that this could. not wor~ by appealing to Deleuzian 
arguments about the distinction between thought and experience. 
In his most recent essays on apperception, Allison concedes ground to 
Guyer and appeals to the notion of a 'fact of reason' in lieu of any attempt to 
ground it synthetically.95 Apperception finally seems to be isolated as another 
'fact of reason', in which case its harmonic functioning with the other 'facts' 
knowing" (52). Isn't this "abstract detennination" doing rather more than it should by right, given 
the avowed self-grounding nature and exhaustiveness of the Phenomenology? Pippin's account in 
effect admits th.is by claiming this nonnative self-reflexivity as a starting point. Quoting the 
passage just mentioned, Pippin writes that Hegel is here "appropriating a good deal from Kant", 
and that "he can make this claim because he regards consciousness as judgmental, as having a 
'relation to objects'. by establishing one through its active judging. Consciousness relates itself to 
objects" (Hegel's Idealism, 104; first italics mine). If this is right, then it is possible that the above 
reflections apply to Hegel's account as well as to Kant's. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that 
Hegel's "distinguishing and relating" echoes Reinhold's account of the "fact of consciousness ". If 
Hegel's "abstract" account of consciousness is doing the kind of work that some Hegelians say it 
is, then does it too describe a "fact of consciousness"? What then are we to make of Hegel's robust 
early criticisms of Reinhold in the Difference essay (178-195)? 
93 Compare my claims to this effect in chapter 3. As I suggested above in note 25. the problem 
with such "normative" accounts of Kant is that they have to abandon all hope of being able to 
understand how it is not just the categories of relation that unify experience. but those of Quantity 
(the Axioms of Intuition), Quality (the Anticipations) and Modality (the Empirical Pos~lllates~. 
How a self-conscious subject can be treating these as nonns in the process of expenence IS 
impossible to conceive, and, if it is partially attempted, it invariably ends uP. producing a bloated 
impossibly baroque account of the subject. Again, I would insist that the project of demonstratIOn 
andjustijicatioJ1 achieved in the deductions is carried out by the philosopher, not by the subject. 
TIle subject, which thinks according to the pure concepts of the understandin.g. can rely. on the 
findings of the transcendental philosopher to guarantee the validity and appropnateness of ItS pure 
concepts for ex-perience. 
9~ These suggestions will be developed below and in Appendix III. _ 
9.) 'Apperception and Analyticity ill the B-deduction' in Idealism and Freedom. ) 1. 
needs explaining. Under additional pressure from the impossibility of proving 
transcendental freedom, Allison is content to allow that spontaneity is only an 
Idea. "Spontaneity functions in the technical Kantian sense as an idea in light of 
which the act of thinking must be conceived in order to retain its normative 
status".96 We can only act, or take ourselves to be acting, in the light of this Idea. 
But if apperception must be so fundamentally referred to Ideas, Allison's 
and Pippin's belief in the primacy of 'taking as', as the identification of the 
spontaneous subject able to make reasoned judgments with the self-conscious 
subject of apperception, is also open to question. As we will see, Deleuze in effect 
shows that a large part of this function of 'taking as' is identical with recognition, 
or subsumption under a judgment, and recognition is a vastly overrated aspect of 
cognitive activity. Rather than being identified with the dignity of thought, 
recognition must be distinguished from thought. Furthermore, there are other 
activities of thought that engage much more profoundly with Ideas. 
Thinking is precisely not an experience, or to be identified in any way with 
recognition. In his late opuscule 'Is it an experience that we think?', Kant says the 
same thing. While I may construct a square according to the laws of empirical 
cognition, and in fundamental reference to time and space, "when I think a square 
apriori, I cannot say that this thought is an experience".97 Kant then argues in 
general that while "my consciousness when I order [anstelle] an experience" 
determines my existence in time, this consciousness itself cannot be in time, as if 
it were there would be an infinite regress of times, each containing the other. 
"Transcendental consciousness" is therefore not an experience (ibid). What, 
though, can thought be if it is not 'taking as', or conceptual recognition,) 
Ironically, the trajectory of Allison's reading can be reformulated in Deleuzian 
terms so that the issue shifts away from 'taking as'. Even if thinking were 'acting 
according to the Idea of spontaneity', then this would indicate that we should 
focus on the cognitive relation to Ideas first if we are to understand thinking. 
Thinking is inhabiting the problem of what it is to think, or being forced to think 
by an Idea which remains problematic for experience.98 
96 'On Naturalizing Kant's Transcendental Psychology', Idealism and Freedom. 64. 
97 Kant, 'Beantwortung der Frage: 1st es eine Erfahrung, dass wir denkenT. Ak. 18:319. 
98 It is Aenesidemus who first acutely asks whether the Kantian subject must ~ thought as an. Idea. 
Aenesidemus' problem is metacritical. If the synthetic apri ori law~ of e:'\~nence. founded m ~c 
transcendental subject, are to be true, then they cannot be themseh es subject to mere appearan 
)-~ 
-:', 
ii The Unknown Ground of Self-Consciousness 
It is important that we now turn to a final group of suggestions about Kant's 
theory of self-consciousness, which takes us away from formal readings of 
apperception towards direct claims about the subject itself There is another aspect 
to Dieter Henrich's reading of Kant that was not mentioned in the above account. 
Although Henrich ascribes a Cartesian consciousness to apperception in Identi(r 
and Objectivity, elsewhere he makes a famous attack on Kant's notion of self-
consciousness that leads one to suspect that his presentation of Kant as Cartesian 
is to be seen in terms of a step on the way to Henrich's own, more adequate 
account of self-consciousness.99 Henrich claims that Kant implicitly adheres to 
what he calls 'the reflection theory' of self-consciousness, which supposes that 
self-consciousness arises in the first place out of a reflection upon myself. But 
Henrich argues, like Sydney Shoemaker, that self-consciousness is only possible if 
I am already aware of the self with which I am identifying. Any self-
representation such as that involved in apperception thus must rely on a pre-
reflexive identification with myself as object which precedes all explicit 
identification of the self. That is, there is an unknown ground that underlies self-
consciousness, which, as unknown, eludes my spontaneous self-determination. 
My act of spontaneity is not radically autonomous, but depends on something 
Other to my own act. 100 Henrich finds the first glimmerings of such an idea in the 
later Fichte. 
In fact, as Henrich and Manfred Frank have shown, there is a sense III 
which all the immediate post-Kantians were involved in this gradual realisation. 
Fichte marks the beginning of a retreat away from the notion that apperception 
But if this is true how are we to know this? The mind must then be noumenaL or at least a 
transcendental Id~ (Schulze, 'Aenesidemus'. 122). Aenesidemus, however, argues that it can be 
neither, because they both would conflict with the Paralogisms (which. as a skeptic. he a~es 
very much; cf. ibid, 127-9). In particular, Ideas have no empirical use, so they could not be saId to 
ground the subject of e>.:perience (ibid, 125). Aenesidemus concludes skeptically that we have no 
conceivable access to synthetic apriori truths, and that we cannot know. "hether an~1hmg 
corresponds to our representations. It is shown in Appendix III that the suggestl?n that the subject 
can only be an Idea in fact comes to be taken up positively by the late Kant III OP, partly as a 
result of Aenesidemus' promptings. 
99 See Henrich 'Self-Consciousness'; 'Fichte's Original Insight". . 
100 In my vie~. it is these kinds of doubt about spontaneity that form the backdrop to. Deleuze s 
account 'ofthe :fr3ctured 1'. The 'I think' is an "I fractured by time", according to an '.'ahenatJon In 
principle, insurmountable in principle": hence it "lives" the activi~ of thought.., --hke an Other 
within itself' (DR 58/81, 86/116). See the account of the 'fractured I III chapter 6 .. , bclo". 
provides a central conSCIOusness of unity towards the notion that self-
consciousness relies on a pre-reflexive ground. This ground is no longer a 
Tathandlung, but can only be called an "intellectual intuition". Hence Fichte must 
give up the realm of experience in the search for its conditions. lOI A similar 
approach is to be found in Schelling, perhaps increasingly so, to the point where 
this pre-reflexive ground of being is taken to be a ground of Being, outside all 
representational thought. On the other hand, as Frank has shown, the later 
Reinhold, Holderlin and Novalis also vacate the centre ground of apperception, 
but in a different direction - towards a notion of the subject as Idea, founded on a 
teleology. For Novalis and Hoiderlin the self-consciousness of the subject testifies 
to a split in original Being, and can only be experienced as a loss.I02 We have seen 
the importance of the notion of the spatiotemporal schematism for Novalis. From 
the present perspective, we can see that there is a sense in which schematism thus 
fills the void produced by the original chiasmus of reflection. As Frank remarks, 
"lost being is ... represented under the schema of the past, not(-yet)-Being under 
that of the future. Split between the two, the self loses its strict identity and is 
transformed into the continuity of a life history". 103 
Now Ameriks argues, against Henrich and Frank, that Kant does indeed 
affirm an adequate account of self-consciousness, which includes the vital 
element of pre-reflexivity. He appeals to Kant's claim that the "I think expresses 
an indeterminate empirical intuition ... an indeterminate perception ... something 
real that is given ... not as appearance nor as thing in itself (noumenon) but as 
something which actually exists" (B422-3n).104 This, Ameriks argues, exactly 
fulfils Henrich's requirement. Implicitly arguing against Allison's view as 
outlined above Ameriks claims there are two senses in which the subject can be a , 
limit of the world. On the one hand, there can be a "nowhere because centreless" 
perspective. But there can also, on the other hand, be a "primordial sense of self-
familiarity ... that, rather than being in principle 'from everywhere', is instead 
101 Cf. Frederick Neuhouser. Fichte's Theorv of Subjectivity (Cambridge: Cambridge Universit~ 
Press, 1990). 86-102. Neuhouser's resolution of this problem involves a theory of "dual 
consciousness" which has been heavilv criticised by Ameriks in "Kant and the Self, 62-67. 
102 For H6lderlin's view, see "Judgm~nt and Being', in Essays and Letters on Theory (tr.ms. and 
ed. T. Pfau, Albany: SUNY, 1988),37-8. . 
103 Frank, 'Philosophical Foundations of Early Romanticism '. in Ameriks and Stunna eds .. The 
.\fodem Subject (Albany: SUNY. 1995), 76. . 
104 Ameriks. 'From K~t to Frank: TIle Ineliminable Subject", in Amenks and Stumla eds. The 
.\{odem Subject. 222. 
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from an extraordinarily concrete 'somewhere' a somewhere so co t h 
' ncre e t at an\, 
description of it would be too general to guarantee unique applicability". 105 
However, this notion of immediate self-awareness carries its own perils, as 
shown by Manfred Frank's attempts to elaborate it. He confesses that it is not 
possible to move from this bare awareness to anything substantial about the 
identity of the subject. The awareness of the subject remains prepropositional and 
does not allow itself to cross the bridge to any de re formulations. 106 Moreover 
Shoemaker, the leading Anglo-American proponent of this view, admits that 
despite my feeling of intimacy with my memories, nothing allows me to infer that 
J was the experiencer of the object of those memories. 107 All that can be granted is 
that I register my memories as mine now.I08 
Nevertheless, these accounts of pre-reflexivity are extremely important; 
moreover Ameriks' appeal to Kant's reference to indeterminate intuition is of 
crucial relevance, and can return us to the suggestion that the subj ect must be 
considered, somehow, as an Idea. Furthermore, it has been glimpsed above that in 
CJ indeterminate intuitions are treated as "aesthetic presentations of an Idea".109 
Might there not finally be a sense too in which the self figures itself, or gives itself 
form, as an Idea?llo 
105 Ibid. 
106 Frank expresses in a nutshell the dilemma faced by his theory here: "How am I to recognise 
that what is ascribed de se is the nonobjective givenness of certain spatiotemporal objects') The 
problem of making plausible any kind of identity theory (such as I seek) will always consist in the 
fact that it also must overcome 'cognitive closure' [Frank refers here to Colin McGinn's claim that 
"we have direct cognitive access to one tenn of the mind-brain relation (our minds), but we do not 
have such access to the nature of the link" 'Can we Solve the Mind-Body Problem?' in The , . 
Problem of Consciousness, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, 8]. In other words, I must be able to 
recognise that I myself am the de re (thus independently of my subjective perspective) identified 
body (or a functional identified causal role or whatever); Frank, 'Is Subjectivity a Non-Thing. an 
Absurdity, in Ameriks & Stunna, The A10dem Subject, 196 n.46. See also Robert Pippin's reading 
of Frank in 'On Not Being a Neo-Structuralist' (Common Knowledge, 6/2, 1997): "Frank yeers off 
only in denying that the right way to conceive of the subject's self-disclosure is on the 'reflectiye' 
model" (152): by this latter model Pippin means his own interpretation of Kantianism as 
essentially invol~ng the "radical assertion that all thinking ... is judging ... a claim-making. a 
taking by me to be so" (153). I have given reasons abm"e for criticising this model. One way of 
ex."pressing my problem is in tenus of whether a Deleuzian model can negotiate between the poles 
provided by Frank and Pippin. 
107 Sydney Shoemaker, 'Persons and their Pasts' (American Philosophical Quart~rZv 7/4. 1970). 
271-2. Shoemaker here qualifies his earlier theory about the intimacy of self-conSCIOusness. which 
had been influential upon Henrich and Frank. . . 
108 This view echoes Kant's own concerns in the Paralogisms (cf. A-,83): see Amenks s 
formulation above. section 4.i., note 73. 
109 . Cf. note 60 above, and chapter 1.2,i.a. & 1.4. " . .' 
110 In Appendix III I show that Kant himself ends up attempting something Just hke thIS ill OP. 
prOlllpted by Aenesidemus. 
In conclusion, a Deleuzian suggestion can be foreshadowed. On the one 
hand we have noted that Kant admits in CPR that we cannot identify the empirical 
self with the subject of apperception; in chapter 3 it was shown that no token-
identity could be found between the phenomenal and noumenal subjects: Kant 
indeed allows that noumenally there may be many souls. On the other hand v\e 
have also seen that some 'pre-reflexive', nonconceptual 'familiarity' is apparent 
in all self-consciousness. Now, with the possibility, opened up in the last chapter, 
of a problematic expression of the noumenon, another sense can be glimpsed to 
the possibility that Ideas may orientate the self-awareness of the subject. 
For Henrich and Frank the subject is familiar with what' is being 
reidentified but cannot say why or verify it in any way; this 'identity' is prior to 
any empirical memory, and thus far appears like a peculiarly mute and powerless 
form of intellectual intuition. Deleuze will suggest that this pre-reflexive ground 
must be articulated through a new exploration of memory. There is already a sense 
in Henrich and Frank that a kind of anamnesis is at issue, which creates a 
mysterious gap between the intimacy that my memories present to me and my 
ability to consciously represent them as my memories. As we have understood it 
so far, this pre-reflexivity can provide no rule for any special continuity between 
the selves that I remember having been. I will suggest that Deleuze' s theory does 
provide such a rule. 111 He also takes up anew the problem of the alternative 
between ground and goal that faced the post-Kantians: Novalis' and Hblderlin's 
lament for the "loss of Being" find a new echo in Deleuze's accounts of memory 
and the fractured'!,. Nevertheless, it will tum out to be another irony about the 
proper place of 'pre-critical' metaphysics, that in the course of attempting to 
elaborate a 'truly critical' notion of self-consciousness we may perhaps end up 
with very metaphysical, almost 'barbaric' hypotheses about multiple souls and 
anamnesis. 
In sum, transcendental philosophy is haunted by the Scylla and Charybdis 
of ground and goal. They are like two metaphysical tendencies pulling 
. . ." I 
apperception apart, and in a sense pulhng the subject apart. WhIle cntlca 
philosophy teaches that metaphysics generates illusions, the very means by which 
f} b· d or. in [)c1cU7C III See Appendix IV. related to the next chapter. on the syntheses 0 1a It an mem . 
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it teaches this lesson itself must rely on a metaphysics. Is there a way out of this 
circle? 
2:"X 
Chapter Six 
Quid Facti and Quid Juris: Deleuze 
1 The Doctrine of the Faculties 
Deleuze's small monograph Kant's Critical Philosophy is on the whole little 
discussed. The book has a very specific function, both as a reading of Kant and as 
part of De leuze's early explorations. Essentially, the book's task is to explore not 
the three Critiques themselves but the relations between them, and by implication 
the metacritical status of the critical project as a whole. It does this through the 
analysis of one continuous strand that runs through all three Critiques: the 
organisation of the faculties. The difficulty of the book lies in its foregrounding of 
this neglected doctrine as the key to the critical project. Traditionally, the doctrine 
of the faculties has not fared well in Kant scholarship, being adduced to a general 
confusion in Kant's mind of the question de jure of the necessary conditions of 
experience with the further need for an account of how the mind carries out its 
syntheses and synopses in terms of the processes responsible for them. l Strawson 
calls the doctrine of the faculties 
an essay in the imaginary subject of transcendental psychology ... [which] is 
exposed to the ad hominem objection that we can claim no empirical knowledge 
of its truth; for this would be to claim empirical knowledge of the occurrence of 
that which is held to be the antecedent condition of empirical knowledge. 2 
Thus the doctrine also involves a metacritical confusion on Kant's part between 
the transcendental and the empirical. Related to this criticism is the fact that the 
I Cf. Kitcher, 'Kant's Cognitive Self. in P. Kitcher (ed), Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Critical 
Essays. 66. 
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faculties seem to be brute 'givens' in the transcendental project, and thus are 
insufficiently justified But some critics have defended the faculties. A brief 
discussion of Dieter Henrich's approaches to the topic may be useful to orientate 
ourselves; I will show how Henrich's and Deleuze's approaches have much in 
common at various points, but that Deleuze develops an option that was discarded 
by Henrich. 
In his 1955 article 'The Unity of Subjectivity', Henrich argues that Kant's 
insistence on the plurality of faculties is polemically directed towards earlier 
rationalist notions that the faculties could be reduced to one ''basic power" (in 
Wolff's case a vis representativa on a Leibnizian model).3 Henrich brings out the 
problematic character of Kant's suggestion of "common root" to understanding 
and sensibility (A15/B29). He points out that "sensibility and understanding are 
different in their phenomenal presentation and an identity of the two, no matter 
how hidden, cannot be assumed. . .. An understanding that should have access to 
the problematic common root would have to think nondiscursively".4 Kant's 
insistence on the problematicity of intellectual intuition, as some postulated unity 
of the two, thus necessitates the retention of what could be called the 'real 
distinction' of the faculties. Henrich then claims that "the unity of subjectivity, in 
Kant's final construction of it, is conceived as teleological".5 However, Henrich 
blocks the development of his suggestion of the "intrasubjective teleology" of the 
faculties, 6 by insisting that faculties are known only through their effects.7 He 
describes the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories as starting from a 
treatment of apperception in a "logical analysis of knowledge", which must 
describe the involvement in knowledge of other conditions (imagination, 
sensibility, etc.), "which have to be presupposed, but remain inaccessible in their 
2 P.F. Strawson, The Bounds a/Sense, 32; cf. 97. . 
3 Dieter Henrich, 'The Unity of Subjectivity', in The Unity a/Reason, 22f. Henrich quotes CJ: ."It 
is quite easy to establish, and has in fact been realised for some time, that this attem~t to b~g 
unity into that diversity of faculties though othernrise undertaken in the genuine philosophIcal 
. . , 
spirit, is futile" (CJ 394). 
-l Henrich, 'Unity of Subjecti\rity', 30. 
5 ibid, 33. 
6 ibid, 31. . 
7 "What we know of them are always empirical derivations, such as attention or reproductI~? for 
imagination or the "affection of the empirical sense -, through objects "as. appearances .. for 
sensibility. The transcendental cognitive functions are already presupposed In each cogrutIon.. 
induding that ofthe empirical realisation of knowledge", ibid 36. 
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being".8 Kant thus accepts a "methodological skepticism towards the Subjective 
Deduction".9 Imagination should be seen as "merely the term for the unity of 
'activities' required ... to render intelligible the actuality of knowledge" (ibid). 10 
But from the Deleuzian point of view we have developed so far, Henrich's 
argument fails to follow through the suggestion of "intrasubjective teleology" to 
the metacriticallevel. Firstly, Henrich supposes the faculties can be treated only in 
terms of their effects; as has been suggested, Deleuze claims that a transcendental 
account of the faculties is possible: what he calls 'transcendental empiricism'. 
Secondly, and perhaps crucially, Henrich presupposes the "actuality of 
knowledge", despite having suggested that the unity of subjectivity could only be 
accounted for teleologically. For if "the unification of the sources [ of knowledge] 
is predelineated in their structure - a structure through which alone knowledge 
can be what it iS",l1 then surely 'knowledge' itself, rather than being presupposed 
as miraculously actual, is already being opened up in principle to an interrogation 
concerning its teleology. Henrich's "intrasubjective teleology" must be 
determined further; it cannot simply rely on a providential harmony. As we have 
already glimpsed, the wider structure of CPR, as a treatise on the vocation of man, 
is always implicitly posing this question: what is knowledge/or, what is the value 
of knowledge, in the service of which problems is knowledge being placed? 
Through an analysis of Deleuze's work, we can perhaps show how the 
teleological question of knowledge can be seen as possessing a certain priority 
over regressive transcendental accounts of the possibility of knowledge. 
Henrich's insistence in his later work on the presupposition of 'facts of 
reason' can be seen as an intensification of concern with the givenness involved in 
the notion of faculty. He no longer focuses on faculties as such, but is still 
8 Ibid, 37. 
9 Ibid, 39. 
10 Henrich claims that while imagination has "merely subjective significance", sensibility and 
understanding are "sources of objective contents of knowledge". They "contribute to every 
instance of knowledge of a specific content, whereas imagination has to be presupposed ?nl~ !or 
the coming about of knowledge" (38-9). But such a view cannot be true. No sensible mtultIon 
could have fonn or meaning without the syntheses of the imagination and its schematic processes. 
Henrich's application of the tenn 'objective' to sensibility, outside of the account of '~~lat~on to 
Objecte', is un-Kantian, and presupposes what I would call a 'materialist p~e:mpposltlOn 5see 
chapter 2 above, note 113) about the appropriateness of adequately detemurung a.egen.sta/~de 
through sensibility. But surely for Kant, as an ex-Leibnizian, both sensibility ~d the unagmatIon 
could be equally inadequate ways of comprehending Gegenstiinde (despite bemg demonstrated as 
adequate for Objecte). 
11 Ib·d"'''' 1 _"_'. 
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insistent that the post-Kantians' tum to intellectual intuition cannot overcome the 
need for a finite being to presuppose something as given outside of its own self-
constitution. 12 Henrich's notion of a synthetic apriori capacity for self-
consciousness has already been criticised, but in this context we should note that 
the proliferation of such 'facts of reason' can be seen as an objection in itself in a 
supposedly 'critical' philosophy. Deleuze's book attempts to address precisely 
this issue. In an apparently hitherto neglected article,. the Kant scholar Ralf 
Meerbote praises the ambition of Deleuze' s book, arguing that "a transcendental, 
non-empirical characterisation both of the faculties and of pertinent relations 
[between them] needs to be given" in part because of the aforementioned 
recurring problem of facts of reason. He claims that "Deleuze takes considerable 
steps towards providing some such all-encompassing interpretation of the whole 
of Kant's Critical Philosophy". 13 Meerbote then argues that teleology will come to 
ground such a transcendental interpretation 
if reflection (understood in the specifically Kantian sense in which reflection is 
reflective judgment, typified by, among other things, judgments about the 
teleological structure of actions and faculties) can be interpreted to be identical, 
in part, or in its entirety to what Kant conceives pure apperception to be. (ibid.) 
Pure apperception, he says, would then be considered "wholly originary, self-
legislative and self-determining". But the problem with Meerbote's interpretation 
is that Deleuze actually gives a shockingly slight role to apperception and to the 
Transcendental Deduction in general. Meerbote seems to take Deleuze's omission 
of a serious discussion of apperception as a sign of its uncontroversial ubiquity in 
his account. Thus he reads Deleuze as providing an interesting 'internal' approach 
to the role of apperception in the Kantian system through correlating apperception 
with teleological reflection. But this, unfortunately perhaps, is not what is going 
12 Henrich's general argument here is associated \-vith his famous criticism of the 'reflection 
theory' of self-consciousness, which was encountered in chapter 5.4.ii. In his essay 'The Concept 
of Moral Insight and Kant's Doctrine of the Fact of Reason' (in The Unify of Reason , chapter 2.) 
Henrich argues that the rationality of the practical agent cannot be grounded in any further 
transcendental reflection, but must be presupposed as a brute fact, from which conditions of 
possibility rnav then be derived. As was sho\-m in the last chapter, his argument in Identity and 
Objectivity fu{ally turns on the necessity for a Cartesian capacity of apperception which must be 
presupposed as given in order for the Transcendental Deduction to work. There Henrich's aim is to 
confute the Strawsonian Idea of a Deduction as an ana~ysi s of the 'concept' of e:\.-perience. such an 
analysis being open to skeptical objections as to its meaning and its necessity. Henrich su~ests 
that the presupposition of a judgmental capacity or faculty for self-consciousness as the baSIS for 
the function of the understanding, a capacity which is indubitable for any thinking subject moves 
towards bypassing skeptical objections on this front. 
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on in the text. What Deleuze is really concerned with is a systematic unity of the 
faculties as by itself providing the clue to the grounding of critique. But why 
doesn 'f Deleuze follow the approach that Meerbote so clearly sees in his work? 
This is a complicated issue. Deleuze seems to have two approaches to 
Kant which he does not explicitly square up, but which are both fundamental for 
his project; the first occurs in Kant's Critical Philosophy and D~ the second in 
DR only. They can be read as internal critiques of the A- and B-Deductions in 
turn. This chapter will be divided into a reading of the essential elements of both. 
The first approach involves extending the logic of the Subjective Deduction to an 
account of the mutual relation of the faculties, the result of which, I would argue, 
if connected with the reflections on self-critique undertaken so far, brings to light 
one of the unspelled out destinations of Kant's critical project as he envisaged it in 
the first edition CPR and in Cl However, we will find that Deleuze's 
transformation of the Subjective Deduction takes a perilous route, through a 
controversial reading of the Deduction, then into the wider question of what 
distinguishes Kantian 'transcendence' from a Humean account of knowledge, and 
finally towards the question of teleology. 
The second approach pays attention to the renewed analysis Kant devoted 
to inner and outer sense in the B-deduction and claims that the argument of the 
Paralogisms of Pure Reason intrudes upon the claims made for apperception in the 
Deduction; in Deleuze's later language, Kant's "paradox" of inner sense, when 
understood truly, shows us an 'I think' "fractured" by the "pure form of time". 
This line of argument, I contend, should be placed into the context of Kant's 
general claims about 'determinability' and will be related back to the formal, 
ontological and metacritical claims developed in chapters 2 and 4. I suggest this is 
the destiny of the Objective Deduction in the Deleuzian project. 
However, the relation of these two approaches is also complex. For, 
having pushed the weight of the Kantian project onto teleology in the first 
approach, Deleuze precisely takes away the notion of an ultimate 'final ground' in 
the second approach. Nevertheless, I think these two approaches do precisely 
converge at the zenith of Deleuze's system, potentially revealing not only a 
consistently metacritical unity, but also, finally, a consistent twofold sense to the 
13 Meerbote. 'Deleuze on the Systematic Unity of the Critical Philosophy' (Kant-Studien 77. 
1986).349. 
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notion of immanence, which has so far been fragmented into distinct formal 
, 
ontological and metacritical components. 
2 Deleuze and the Teleological Ground of Critique 
To begin with, I will focus on the first approach, namely, Deleuze's 
demonstration that the context of the notion of apperception in the Subjective 
Deduction is to be interpreted in terms of a teleology. Deleuze attempts to show 
that the Subjective Deduction's aim to prove the objective reality of the categories 
invokes instead a Leibnizian echo of a 'harmony' between the transcendental 
subject and the sensible world. We should note that the opposite is at stake to 
what Meerbote claims: it is . apperception that ultimately depends on a 
metaphysical account of teleology rather than teleology 'being grounded in a 
widened account of apperception. Deleuze announces the peculiar slant of his 
interpretation in the following sentence: 
The fundamental idea of what Kant calls his 'Copernican Revolution' is the 
following: substituting the principle of a necessary submission of object to 
subject for the idea of a harmony between subject and object (final accord),I-l 
The Copernican Revolution is interpreted as the transformation of the Leibnizian 
(and early Kantian) problem of harmony. Deleuze's presentation of the issue may 
be seen as an unusual prioritisation of Leibniz, considering the Copernican turn is 
often seen to be directed against rationalist accounts of what is by right available 
to the intellect, as much as empiricist theories of derivation of objective 
knowledge from sense impressions. But we have already seen how the problem of 
the synthetic apriori can profitably be seen to 'name' a problem that haunts both 
rationalists and empiricists alike and that perhaps the most helpful way to read 
Kant's early writings and their culmination in the 1772 letter to Herz is in terms of 
a transformation of Leibnizianism. At the end of his discussion of CPR, Deleuze 
goes on strikingly to put the issue of the possibility of knowledge into the 
important wider teleological context, crystallising some of the claims made so far: 
It is ... necessary not only that phenomena should be subject to the categories 
from the point of view of form, but also that their content correspond to, or 
symbolise, the Ideas of reason. At this level a harmony, a finality, is reintroduced. 
But here it is clear that the harmony between the content of phenomena and the 
Ideas of reason is simply postulated. It is not, indeed, a question of saying that 
14 Kant's Critical Philosophy. l·t 
reason legislates over the content of phenomena. It must presuppose a syste t' 
fN ' tho rna IC unity 0 ature; It must pose IS unity as a problem or a limit and base all it 
moves on the idea of this limit at infinity. IS ' S 
Deleuze on the A-Deduction 
With the analysis of any reading of the Transcendental Deduction of the 
Categories, it is vital to observe where the emphases are placed, because the 
strength and character of the objectivity claim can vary enormously. Immediately 
following the first quotation above from the Kant book (14) on the submission of 
the object to the subject, Deleuze raises the issue of why Kantian idealism is not a 
subjective idealism. He emphasises that we are affected by phenomena, that they 
are not products of our activity, and then asks how they can then be subject to us. 
His answer is neither to phenomenalise Kant, nor to adopt something like 
Allison's approach and to say that transcendental idealism is a second order 
discourse and therefore has no bearing on the empirical reality of phenomena. 
Rather, he simply says "In Kant, the problem of the relation of subject to object 
tends to be internalised; it becomes the problem of a relation between subjective 
faculties that differ in nature (receptive sensibility and active understanding)" 
(ibid). However, such an approach would indicate that Deleuze is approaching the 
whole question of objective knowledge simply in terms of the Subjective 
Deduction. Thus the context of the Objective Deduction, with its apprehension of 
the Gegenstand would be lost. But Deleuze sells his overall position short with 
this account in the Kant monograph. As we have found already, Deleuze does 
have a 'Objective' account of the de jure limits of conceptual representation and 
intuition (as well as an interesting approach to the problem of noumena). As 
suggested, I will be focussing on the 'Objective Deduction' in the last part of this 
chapter, reversing Kant's order in CPR. 
Deleuze's main description of the deduction is extremely brief. If this 
brevity can be defended at all, it can only be on good grounds, to be given, for 
claiming that the true focus for the role and account of the deduction itself lies 
elsewhere. Deleuze's description of the main moves of the deduction goes against 
much other Kant scholarship through its insistence on sticking to the account of 
synthesis in the first edition, where it is described purely in terms of the processes 
of apprehension and reproduction. These latter are the "two aspects" of synthesis 
15 Ibid. 20. 
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governed by the imagination. Synthesis is the minimal relating of a sensible 
diversity together in one representation and across time. Given the relative 
autonomy of this account of the imagination, Deleuze then asks the question 
whether "synthesis is sufficient to constitute knowledge?,,16 He says that in fact 
"knowledge implies two things which go beyond synthesis itself' (ibid). These 
two things are the belonging of representations to a single consciousness, and on 
the other hand the relation of knowledge to an object. In this case, the role of what 
Kant calls the synthesis of recognition is not after all a synthesis, but "the act by 
which the represented manifold is related to an object". This act of apperception 
has an "expression", "a formal objectivation" - the form of an object in general, 
the 'object = x'. Deleuze goes on to define the categories as "representations of 
the unity of consciousness and, as such, predicates of an object in generaf'. 17 He 
concludes that it is not the understanding that synthesises, but rather it is 
responsible for the unity of synthesis. 18 
16 Ibid 15 
17 Kan~ 's Critical Philosophy, 16. 
18 In fact there are some potential problems '\-vith this aspect of Deleuze' s interpretation of the 'I 
think' in Kant's Critical Philosophy. specifically concerning the kind of reciprocity that is 
affirmed between apperception and objectivity. He says "the object in general is the correlate of 
the 'I think' or of the unity of consciousness; it is the e)"rpression of the cogito, its fonnal 
objectivation." (16). By itself, this proposition opens itself to two readings, a standard one and a 
more problematic one. The first reading would state simply that inasmuch as the '1 think' thinks 
something it thinks an Object, through the pure concepts of the understanding. (As Kant says, "It is 
the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and 
therefore their objective validity and their becoming cognitions" (B137). On this specifIc notion of 
the 'objective unity of apperception', cf. Klaus Reich, The Completeness of Kant's Table of 
Judgments, 28). This means that all an Object will be is the set of categoreal relations - substance, 
causality, etc. that synthesise representations in a single consciousness. However, Deleuze calls 
Kant's 'I think' a cOgito, and says that the object is an expression of the cogito. Kant does indeed 
refer to apperception as a cogito, but this is only in the Paralogisms, where he is explicitly 
concerned with the 'I think' in itself, and not as a formal unifying function. Let us move to 
Deleuze's next, e)"rplanatory sentence: "Therefore the real (synthetic) formula of the cogito is: 1 
think myself and in thinking myself, I think the object in general to which 1 relate a represented 
diversity" . 
It seems clear that Deleuze is deriving the object = x directly from the act of self-
consciousness. He is not just saying that all my representations must be related to single 
consciousness, or even that my representations must be related to a self-conscious subject. lf we 
turn back to Deleuze's introduction of Kant's account of apperception. we find it unfortunately 
ambiguous: "Knowledge implies two things which go beyond synthesis itself: it implies 
consciousness, or more precisely the belonging of representations to a single consciousness within 
which thev must be linked. Now, the ~'11thesis of the imaginatiolL taken in itself. is not at all self-
conscious;' (Kant's Critical Philosophy, 15). The first sentence says that knowledge is only 
possible when representations are s)'11thesised in a single consciousness (this is the thesis ~f a wnty 
of consciousness). The second sentence implies that this unity of consciousness reqUIres self-
consciousness (thesis of a consciousness of unity). Deleuze seems to conflate the two these~. He is 
saying that in the act of thinking myself I think the object to which 1 relate my representaUons. 3S 
if the act of self-consciousness comes first. Now on a strong reading of transcendental 
apperception such as Dieter Henrich's in Jdentity and Objectivity. Kant is claimed to require a 
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Now, Deleuze distinguishes the task of the Transcendental Deduction as 
accounting for the subjection or legislation of phenomena by the understanding. 
He suggests that the Transcendental Aesthetic contains no deduction, but only a 
transcendental exposition, precisely because phenomena are not subject to space 
and time, but are defined precisely by their role as spatiotemporal appearances. 19 
In pointing out the nonanalytic nature of what the Deduction has to prove, 
Deleuze now silently shifts attention to the second edition Deduction to which he 
devotes all of three sentences.20 
Deleuze summarises the steps of the argument by alluding to the notion, 
most explicit in the B-Deduction, that space and time themselves need to be 
synthesised by the transcendental imagination, and so they themselves are 
therefore subject to the understanding, which produces the unity for this synthesis 
(cf. # 24f. of the B-Deduction)?l As it stands this is inadequate even as a 
summary, for two reasons. Firstly, Deleuze has not adequately shown how the 
understanding is necessary in the first place for synthesis, other than to assert that 
it is presupposed for knowledge. Why, in particular, should the synthesis of space 
Cartesian consciousness which is made possible by the categories. But even there the Cartesian 
self-identity is not substantial, requiring only a moderate experience of self-identity. Nevertheless 
we have seen that Henrich's theory has been criticised for presupposing something indefensible 
and dogmatic. But Deleuze's reading seems to be even more dogmatic. The object is an expression 
of self-consciousness. This implies a rather more substantial cogito than even Henrich admits. 
Now, Kant did hold something like the theory imputed to him by Deleuze, in the mid-1770's. Thus 
in Reflection 4674, Kant claims, "The object can only be represented according to the relations of 
the subject, and is nothing but the subjective representation of subject itself, but generalised 
because 1 am the original of all objects" (quoted in W. Carl, 'Kant's First Drafts of a Deduction', 
16) My subjectivity itself is originally articulated through the interrelated forms of substance, 
causality and reciprocity. HO'wever, he abandoned tins conception because it conflicted with tile 
ban in the Paralogisms about what should be merely formal claims about the transcendental 
subject. As we have seen, nothing substantial about the subject, no numerical identity can be 
presumed 
If Deleuze is identifying apperception with a substantial cogito, then it follows from this 
that apperception will be in conflict with the argument of the Paralogisms against the identity of 
the subject. But is tIris a misreading of Kant in his critical period? If it can be shown that some 
aspect of the Kantian 'I think' does indeed contain some dubious claim to substantiality. then 
Deleuze's apparent misreading may be vindicated. Now Deleuze in fact will claim in DR that 
Kant's arguments about the 'paradox of inner sense' and the impossibility of knowledge of God 
themselves serve to fracture Kant's notion of an integral 'I think'. However, discussion of this 
development must be postponed until section 3 below. 
19 TIus obviously conflicts with my reading in chapter 5.1 of the retrospective nature of the 
Deduction in th~ Aesthetic. However, 1 will suggest below (cf. footnote 23) that Deleuze's 
position on the Aesthetic in the Kant book should be seen in the contex1 of his overall strategy. 
20 1 shall outline his approach here not only to l1ighlight its inadequacy but also to show how it 
plays no significant role in Deleuze's main argument. My account in tins chapter as a whole can be 
seen as a reconstruction of what Deleuze should be sa)ing. He does not need to appeal to the B-
Deduction at tIris point. 
and time in general require a unity proper to the understanding? While Deleuze 
does explicitly question why the spatiotemporal synthesis should be subject to the 
understanding, it often seems like the logic of subjection is doing by itself the 
work that apperception should be doing. The problem is that by stripping 
apperception of its synthetic nature and giving that entirely to the imagination he 
seems to deprive apperception of any of its dynamic properties. Apperception is 
surely a unifying as well as the mere form of unity. 22 
Secondly, Deleuze misses out the crucial premise that for Kant space and 
time themselves must be unities. Now, we saw in chapter 4.2 that Deleuze's 
account of space and time in DR emphasises precisely the opposite. They are 
shown to be internally and intensively differentiated; their unity would only be an 
extensive, external representation of their own deeper structure. This would block 
the necessity of attributing unity to space and time, which is the essential step in 
the second half of the B-deduction - ie. the necessary connection of the 
singularity of space with the unity of consciousness. 23 
So what, if anything, is doing the work in Deleuze's verSIOn of the 
Deduction? The answer is complex, especially if we attempt to explain it in the 
context of Deleuze's other writings. It involves a return to the question of the 
nature of Kant's advance beyond Hume. Deleuze sets up a resonance between his 
two studies of Kant and Hume, whereby the status of the Copernican tum is 
implicitly put in question by finding moves in Hume that would be more 
traditionally associated with Kant. Two essential issues are broached. Firstly, the 
21 Cf Allison's reconstruction of the 'second part' of the B-deduction in Kant's Transcendental 
Idealism, 158-172. 
22 Nevertheless, it could be pointed out that in the first edition, Kant does not refer so much to a 
"synthetic unity of apperception" as to an "original unity of apperception", which is augmented in 
experience by the imaginative apparatus for synthesis. The advantage of Deleuze's interpretation 
would be that it clears up the ambiguity about the role of the imagination in the two editions of the 
deduction. By giving apprehension and reproduction all the powers of synthesis he would also be 
potentially shedding light (paradoxically, as obviously the two versions of the Deduction weren't 
meant to appear together) on the recourse to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination in the 
B-deduction as the source of the necessary synthesis of space and time themsehcs. However. such 
a move remains undeveloped by Deleuze. Furthermore, see Appendix IV on his actual reading of 
the pre-conceptual syntheses. 
~3 One could suggest that Deleuze is quietIy setting up the possibility of his mm account of the 
schematism of Ideas in an internally differentiated spatio-temporal manifold but he would need ~o 
criticise Kant's own account much more successfully for us to recognise the necessi(v of this 
development. It is significant that Deleuze does noi really address space and time in Kant's 
Critical Philosophy and Deleuze's later interpretation of Kant on space and tinle has to be seen as 
illmninating tins Olnission in his own earlier rendering of the deduction. Again. one feels strongly 
that these issues would have benefitted from a much more e:xtensiye and careful analYSIS frol11 
DelellZe. 
status of knowledge in Kant will be put in question through a reading of the 
question of apriori synthesis back into Hume. Secondly, it will ultimately follow 
that according to Deleuze the difference between Kant and Burne (and the 
ultimate grounds for the distinction between the transcendental and empirical) will 
be shifted onto the different ways in which they deal with teleology. 
ii Quid Facti and Quid Juris in Kant and Hume 
Deleuze says that for Kant "knowledge implies two things which go beyond 
synthesis itself: it implies consciousness, or more precisely the belonging of 
representations to a single consciousness within which they must be linked. Now, 
the synthesis of the imagination, taken in itself, is not at all self-conscious". 24 
However, in what sense is it possible to take the synthesis of the imagination "in 
itself'? I argue now that Deleuze's strategy will be to return to the roots of the 
question of what distinguishes knowledge from imagination. He sets up a basic 
distinction between what is given in experience and the act of "going beyond" the 
given. "The given cannot be the basis by which we go beyond the given".25 
In Empiricism and Subjectivity, Deleuze discusses this going beyond 
explicitly in terms of 'transcendence,.26 Our transcendence of the given is 
conditioned by the apriori structures of cognition that allow us to experience 
universal determinations, and can be justified de jure (whether they be 'obj ects', 
art works, or purposive elements in the environment). While this use of the term 
'transcendence' disappears after Empiricism and Subjectivity, throughout his 
works Deleuze continues to draw our attention to the Kantian distinction between 
questions of fact and questions of right, the quid facti and qUid juris: it is one of 
his abiding and crucial inheritances from Kant. Thus, while there may appear to 
be certainfacts about minds in general, and moreover about the constitution of the 
24 Kant's Critical Philosophy, 15. 
25 Ibid, 12. Note that the passage just quoted (15) also talks of 'going beyond' synthesis. 
26 Cf. Hyppolite in Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: In Kant .. the 
common consciousness goes beyond itself; it transcends itself and becoI?es tr~ce~dental 
consciousness. But the movement of transcending itself, of going beyond Itself. IS typical of 
consciousness as such" (16). The framing of Kantianism in ternlS of transcendence is a staple of 
twentieth century French philosophy, deriving from Sartre. and then from Heidegger's Kant and 
the Problem of Aleta physics. Heidegger suggests that "transcendental knowledge ... concerns the 
stepping-over (transcendence) of pure reason to the being. ... With the problem.oftransce~de~ce. a 
'theory of knowledge' is not set in place of metaphysics, but rather the mner poSSibilIty of 
ontology is questioned". 10, 11). 
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elements of the human mind, the critical weight of Kant's transcendental project 
lies with its justification of these facts and with our right to claim that they give 
rise to true articulations in our knowledge and thought.27 
Now we might expect Deleuze to admit that Kant's advance on Hume is 
precisely in his complete distinction between the rule-governed activity of the 
understanding and the passive receptivity of the sensibility, which allows him to 
posit the immediate necessity of 'going beyond' the given in a way Hume cannot 
do, because of his reliance on the notion that ideas are derived from sense 
impressions. Hume's inability to pose clearly the question quid juris would in 
effect imply that his treatment of the question quid facti would itself have to 
deflate any claims about what appears to be the 'fact' of transcendence. However, 
against prevailing wisdom that Hume's philosophy is either naturalism or 
skepticism, Deleuze reads Kantian concerns back into Hume. For Hume too, there 
is indeed a distinct fact of knowledge. "Quid facti? What is the fact of knowledge? 
It is transcendence or going beyond. I affirm more than I know; my judgment 
goes beyond the idea [in Hume's sense]. In other words, ] am a subjecf'?8 
Deleuze, repeating in Kant's Critical Philosophy the thesis of Empiricism and 
Subjectivity from ten years previously, claims that Hume too constructs principles 
that allow for the possibility of going beyond the given. For Hume 'experience' 
means past experience - the synthesis of past impressions with present ones 
according to sensibility and imagination. However, the principles for ordering past 
experiences are not derived from the given. Association according to rules of 
resemblance, contiguity, and causality are not derived from sensibility or 
imagination; nothing in these latter two faculties will tell us how association 
works. Hume's principles too have the status of rules for the ordering of the 
manifold given by sensibility and imagination; hence the distinction between Kant 
and Hume is not to be found in the question of 'derivation'; both adhere to a fact 
of 'transcendence' .29 
On this reading, both Kant and Hume agree that there are certain matters 
of fact concerning our ability to apprehend and associate representations, which 
n As already suggested in chapter 5. L Kant's notion of the quaestio facti is ambiguous. This "ill 
prove to be important shortly. 
28 Empiricism and Subjectivity. 28. 
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go beyond the given, considered as mere sensible data. However, such 'facts' still 
do not give us the right to affirm anything about objective reality. Deleuze then 
goes on to say that the quid juris is a problem for both Kant and Hume. They both 
ask the question: how does nature conform to our principles? Why should certain 
principles, whether Humean or Kantian, be allowed to transcend the given? 
Deleuze emphasises that for both Hume and Kant, the application of the principles 
is only conditional upon there being some available justification for objectivity in 
expenence. 
It is not, however, sufficient that we have principles, we must have the 
opportunity to exercise them. I say: 'The sun will rise tomorrow', but tomorrow 
will not become present without the sun actually rising. We would quickly lose 
the opportunity to exercise our principles if experience did not itself come to 
confirm and, as it were, give substance to our going beyond. The given of 
experience must therefore itself be subject to prinCiples of the same kind as the 
subjective principles which govern our own moves. 30 
Deleuze identifies the claim of this paragraph, which he is attributing to Hume, 
with the claim of the famous paragraph in CPR which imagines "if cinnabar were 
sometimes red, sometimes black ... my empirical imagination would never find 
opportunity when representing red colour to bring to mind heavy cinnabar" 
(AIOO-l).31 So here Kant and Hume are seen to be pursuing the same path of 
justification: there is something (a third thing) that gives us the opportunity to 
associate. Principles or concepts are not imposed upon the given, rather it can be 
shown that something in the given requires them. Now, as was mentioned in 
29 M. Bell's 'Transcendental Empiricism: Deleuze's Answer to HumeT (delivered at Middlesex 
University, January 2001) gives an account of the sense in which Hume's notion of subjectivity 
goes beyond Kant's allegation that its structure is a product of derivation from sense experience. 
30 Kant's Critical Philosophy. 12; italics mine. 
31 Kant can be understood to be responding in this passage to Hume's query "'is there any more 
intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all trees will flourish in December?", Enquiry, 36. 
However, AIOO itself rests on an inadequate claim against Hume's association thesis. Reference to 
AIl3 on 'transcendental affinity' does not help either. Guyer and Allison both fmd fundamental 
flaws in the Al00 passage and its related claims. Guyer argues that Kant only establishes the 
conditional necessity that "if I am to know an object, then there had better in fact be some 
regularity among the representations of it which I can ex-perience", but not the stronger claim that 
"if I am to experience an object, then I must be aware of a necessary regularity among the 
representations of it" (Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 121-4). Thus he holds Kant to have 
introduced a modal fallacy, where he confuses the necessity of a conditional with the necessity of 
its antecedent, and thus illicitly infers the necessity of its consequent. "Thus from the prenuse that 
if it is contingent that the data of intuition are orderly, it is also contingent that we can reproduce 
them, he concludes that it is in fact necessary that they are orderly" (ibid). But Kant has onl~ 
sho\\11 a conditional necessity, not anv absolute necessity that such a reproduction must take place. 
What then are we left with? A conditional reading of the transcendental argument in CPR. If there 
is objectivity in nature, then a subject must be responsible for S)11thesising it. TItis would ill effect 
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chapter 2.1, Deleuze points out that in Hume's EnquilY we find an hypothesis of 
finality grounding the conditional structure of objectivity. 
Here, then, is a kind of pre-established hannony between the course of nature and 
the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the 
fonner is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions 
have still, we fmd, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature. 
Custom is that principle, by which this correspondence has been effected.32 
Deleuze claims that Hume' s remarks about pre-established harmony in the 
Enquiry are intended as a serious solution to the problem of what the something 
is, of what the ground for the objectivity of the principles is (the 'third thing' 
again). This thesis is clearly controversial, as such an appeal to pre-established 
harmony is absent from the Treatise, and in the Essay seems merely to refer to 
another fact: that as a matter of fact nature has so endowed us to be able to draw 
order from it, by means of custom. But in fact, by taking seriously Burne's remark 
about teleology, Deleuze is really expressing agreement with the Kantian point 
that although custom may "effect" the correspondence, it is not enough to ground 
objectivity claims; and therefore Burne in this case would be quite right to look 
for something else to provide this ground. 
However, Deleuze follows this controversial Kantian reading of Burne 
with another equally controversial claim about Kant. One of Kant's original 
moves over the preceding tradition can be taken to be precisely his attempt to 
circumvent the need for an 'external' hypothesis (eg. about finality) about the 
'third thing' that grounds correspondence. Kant is usually taken to argue that what 
guarantees the correspondence between our concepts and nature is the principle of 
the possibility of experience; this would be the truth behind the something that is 
sought as the truth of transcendence, the transcendental object = x. But Deleuze 
claims that the burden of proof for the quid juris in Kant also rests on an appeal to 
principles of harmony, especially in CJ, in the special sense of a harmony of the 
faculties. The predominant strategy in Deleuze's book on Kant is to push Kant 
towards a reliance on teleology on the question of objective reality. 
However, the ground has been prepared in preceding chapters for this 
move. The coherence of experience itself must depend on a teleological structure 
that is set up in the background of CPR. The apriori synthesis made possible by 
pull Kant all the more towards Hume. (See also H. Allison.. 'Transcendental Affinity - Kant' s 
Answer to Hwne?', in L. W. Beck ed., Proceedings o/the Third International Kant Congress). 
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the pure concepts, which only functions in relation to empirical cognition and 
empirical concept use, must be related to association at one extreme, and to Ideas 
at the other. Association provides the intension of the concept, while its status as a 
whole is referred to the projective schema of an Idea. It was also claimed that the 
notion of apperception itself, when developed for itself, tends too to point in this 
direction. 33 
32 Hume, EnqUiries, 54-5. 
33 Note on the Subordination of Concepts in Deleuze. More can be said here about Deleuze's 
relegation of concepts. Such a relegation would seem most perplexing if the task is indeed to 
pinpoint what it is that allows us to transcend the given, as concepts seem to be the most likely 
candidate. However, in chapter 3 we began to see that Deleuze envisages that a synthetic acco~t 
of the relation between Ideas and intensities would be able to transform Kant's account of the 
relation between concepts and intuitions; while in chapter 4 we found in Kant himself the concept 
being pulled apart in the direction of the extremes of Idea and intuition. "It is only under these 
conditions", says Deleuze, "that we can penetrate the mystery of the division of" the concept" 
('Methode de Dramatisation', 101) Deleuze suggests that the division and specification of 
concepts cannot be adequately understood on the Kantian model, but that Kant does provide the 
means of solving this problem with the schematism. However, although the "schema is indeed a 
rule of determination for time and construction for space ... it is conceived and put to work in 
relation to concepts lmderstood in terms of logical possibility: this is so much part of its nature that 
it does no more than convert logical possibility into transcendental possibility" (DR 218/281). The 
principle of this conversion is obscure, and, echoing Hegel, Deleuze draws attention to the 
"externality" of concept and intuition to each other in the schematism. Deleuze instead contends 
that "a concept alone is completely incapable of specifying or dividing itself; the agents of 
differenciation are the spatio-temporal dynamisms which act within or beneath it, like a hidden 
art" (ibid, cf. 'Methode', 95-6) And, crucially, Deleuze claims that if spatiotemporal dynamism 
remains "e:x1ernal to concepts ... it is internal to Ideas" (DR 218/281). The self-differentiation of an 
Idea in space and time according to intensive relations, then, occurs according to repetition, not 
conceptual identity. Its "constitution" as such will work at an entirely different level to the 
concepts that are used to understand its status once constituted "There is nothing that does not 
lose its identity as this is constituted by concepts, and its similarity as this is constituted in 
representation, when the dynamic space and time of its actual constitution is discovered" (ibid). 
But if this is the fate of the Kantian concept, then surely this and everything we found in 
the last chapter must lead to the rethinking of the nature, role and importance of conceptual 
determination. Now, in effect, Deleuze suggests that Hume's account of determination is more 
suited to the above situation. Hume does not envisage determination according to the form of 
judgment, in which predicates are said to be unified by a subject-concept. Nor does he conceive 
concepts as generalities in the same way as Kant. Instead, complex ideas are composed of relations 
between distinct terms that remain e:x1ernal to those terms (Empiricism and Subjectivity, 66). If a 
resemblance is noted between two particulars, it does not "belong" to those particulars, but exists 
only insofar as the relation is inferred by a subject. In this way, Deleuze says, Hume liberates 
determination from the "is" of predication. The 'is' simply sanctifies the function of judgment in 
reidentifying particulars according to generality. But on Hume's model, resemblance, conti~ty 
and causality form "passages" between ideas and exist only "intensively", in the sense that if the 
particular relation was altered in any way, it would change in nature. If the relation was broken 
into parts, it would no longer be the same relation; it is crucially independent of the temlS 
themselves. (In an article on Hume from the seventies, Deleuze asserts that ~e wo~ld of 
empiricism is a "world of e:x1eriority, a world where thought is in a fundamental relation W1~ the 
Outside a world where there are terms which are veritable atoms, and relations which are yentable 
e~1ernai passages - a world where the conjunction "and" dethrones the interiority of the yerb "is": 
Deleuze, 'Hwne', in F. Chatelet ed, Histoire de fa Philosophie, Vol. .j. (Hachette, 1972) p. 67: cf. 
the reference to the logic of relations in Di a/ogues, 15). . 
So despite Hunle' s account of concept formation involving "a.bstraction", in a sense It 
involves less abstraction than the Kantian account of concepts must ultImately demand because 
We therefore need to take account of these dimensions in order to gr d 
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the question quid juris. Such a move has widespread implications. If the question 
of the validity of the quid juris must be postponed until its teleological validity is 
secured, this also implies that the quid facti too should be reconfigured in the light 
of this. For, on the one hand, the intimacy of the relation between the quid facti 
and quid juris in the second-edition CPR depends on the primacy of apperception; 
if this primacy must be criticised and qualified, then the possibility seems to open 
up of separate accounts for the quid facti of transcendence and the quid juris of 
the justification of transcendence. But isn't this, on the other hand, what we find 
already in the first -edition CPR, where the account of the quid facti via the 
syntheses of imagination in the Subjective Deduction is more explicitly 
independent and is precisely finally subject to a projected teleological resolution 
of the quid juris? But then, we conclude, the situation with Kant appears, in either 
case, not to be much different from the situation with Hume. I suggest this 
homology between Kant and Hume at this point in order now to open the field for 
Deleuze's radical development of the questions quid facti and quid juris; I will 
return to it at the start of the next section. 
In fact, as was shown in chapter 5.1, there are two senses to the quid facti 
in Kant.34 I claim now that the appreciation of Deleuze's account depends on 
grasping his precise approach to the quaestio facti. Deleuze's approach to the 
Subjective Deduction goes in two directions at this point. Firstly, he attempts to 
construct an independent revision of the "threefold synthesis" which underpins 
Kant's A-Deduction (CPR A99f.). Deleuze's inclination towards Hume (and 
Bergson) allows him to take Kant's first two syntheses in the direction of a 
the role of generality is not enshrined in the form of the concept. Humean complex ideas. as 
relational, are perpetually open to new relations, and do not necessarily have to be immediately 
referred to the "unity of an act" which conforms to a representational conceptual hierarchy of 
genus and species; we saw in any case that in Kant the intension of the concept is intrinsically 
unified only by an Idea, not by the unity of the act itself. Deleuze implicitly envisages an 
intersection of Hume's account of ideas with his own more rationalist notion of an Idea as a 
multiplicity of differential relations. One of the paradoxes of Deleuze. we might say. "is to have 
rediscover~d the concrete force of empiricism in applying it in support of a new rationalism". 
(Deleuze, ExpreSsionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 149. Deleuze is referring to ~pinoza, but .the 
deSCription applies equally to his own work, especially as it returns to the geneSIS of the cntICal 
project from the twin roots of empiricism and rationalism.) . 
34 In the first edition, the fact of the possession of certain apriori cognitions had a metaphYSICal 
resonance. We possess different kinds of access to Gegenstiinde, which are not assured untIl theIr 
competing claims are resolved by right. Only in the second edition CPR does Kant change the 
sense of the qUid facti, so that it signifies possession of particular facts (such as facts of geometry 
or science). 
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twofold passive synthesis of habit and memory. However, if this reconstruction of 
the A-Deduction was merely psychological, it would concern empirical facti in 
the second sense. And such an approach has in fact been the Achilles heel of 
readings of Subjective Deduction. But it is clear that Deleuze is aware of this as 
he strongly criticises the psychological aspects of Kant's deduction.35 Therefore a 
second aspect of Deleuze's account of the syntheses of time must be brouaht 
b 
forward. Deleuze grounds the temporal syntheses in an ideal genesis of the 
constitution of "repetition for itself' (DR 71/97). His account of elementary 
nonconceptual syntheses (with habit and memory replacing imagination), will 
proceed by unfolding the core notion of repetition for finite minds. In effect, 
Deleuze here is returning to the first sense of the quid facti in Kant. I would 
moreover claim that this move is better justified than Kant's analogous 
metaphysical facti. In the first edition CPR, the quaestio facti concerns the 
elements that are taken to be "in our possession", whose relation is then justified 
first of all in the Objective Deduction, and then, in their actuality, in the 
Subjective Deduction. But we have seen in chapter 4 that Deleuze conducts a 
preliminary account of the limits and relations of Ideas, concepts and intensities 
around the theme of a critique of representation. On this basis, Deleuze will 
ideally generate the notion of finite synthesis from the notion of repetition. 
Therefore the quidfacti becomes solely related to a kind of Objective Deduction. 
Reversing Kant, Deleuze separates the generalfactum of 'transcendence' from its 
subjective aspects; the account of synthesis will be Objective. 
But on the other hand, the problem of the quid juris remains at the 
teleological level. As we have seen, the weight of the Subjective Deduction has 
been placed on teleology. Deleuze therefore has two more tasks. Firstly, to 
proceed with the quid juris at the teleological level; this will be enacted through 
an account of the relation of the faculties. But secondly, he must finally relate the 
formal (Objective) claims about repetition with the subjective claims about the 
faculties. The latter, as the location of the quid juris, must ground the former, but 
35 "It is clear that [in the A-Deduction] Kant traces the so-called transcendental structures from the 
empirical acts of a psychological consciousness: the transcendental ~nth~sis o~ apprehensl~n IS 
directly induced from an empirical apprehension. and so on. In order to hIde tl11.S all too om I~US 
. . . gh. . be hidd tl e traClIlo procedure, Kant suppressed this tex1 in the second editIOn. Althou It IS ner en. 1 b 
method with all its 'psychologism', neverfueless subsists." (DR 135/176-77). 
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the structure of repetition must itself demonstrate a teleological movement that 
provides the form for the posing and resolution of the qUid juris. 
I give a full account of the first two' syntheses of time', habit and memory, 
in Appendix IV. The 'third synthesis' of repetition will be the important one for 
my argument here, as it will provide the ground for the first two. At the end of this 
chapter I follow through Deleuze's final moves concerning the grounding of 
repetition for itself. But what I want to show now is how Deleuze's notion of 
transcendental empiricism provides a completion of the moves so far undertaken 
concerning the Subjective Deduction. Only when this is complete will the hidden 
ground connecting Objective and Subjective accounts be able to be located. 
iii Transcendental Empiricism 
The question of the distinction and relation of Kant's and Hume's philosophies to 
each other has been left in the air. What, finally, allows Kant's philosophy to 
remain distinct from Hume' s on the question of ju stification? What, in the current 
context, is for Deleuze the ground of the distinction between empiricism and 
transcendental philosophy? 
A textual anomaly between Kant's Critical Philosophy and Empiricism 
and Subjectivity may help here. We saw earlier that in the former the problem of 
the 'cinnabar' passage in CPR was identified with Hume's problem that 
association requires an "opportunity" from nature in order to associate. But in 
Deleuze's Hume study, the same passage is quoted at length not in support of an 
identity between Kant and Hume, but in support of Kant's critique of Hume. Ifwe 
tum to this passage, the difference between the two philosophers becomes clear: it 
concerns the nature of idealism. 
Let us suppose the given is not initially subject to principles of the same ~~ as 
those that regulate the connection of representations in the case of an empmc~l 
subject. In this case, the subject could never encounter this agreement, except m 
an absolutely accidental way. It would not even have the occasion to connect Its 
representations according to the rules whose corresponding faculty it nevertheless 
possessed.36 
In support of the last sentence Deleuze cites All3 where Kant appeals for a 
condition to ground ''the thoroughgoing affinity of appearances, whereby they 
36 Empiricism and Subjectivity. 111. 
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stand and must stand under unchanging laws". Kant, according to Deleuze, 
transforms the problem so that the question turns on what is necessary to form a 
Nature in general. "The given is not a thing in itself, but rather a set of 
phenomena, a set that can be presented as a nature only by means of an apriori 
synthesis".37 As Deleuze amplifies in the Hume study, Hume's principles operate 
according to a dualism between nature (in itself) and subjectivity, whereas Kant 
abolishes this dualism by phenomenalising the relation to objects.38 
Deleuze names the "criterion of empiricism" as a dualism between 
relations and terms. This effectively displaces the ground for Kant's distinction of 
his own method from empiricism. Kant claims that "although all our cognition 
commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from 
experience" (B 1), referring to the thesis that empiricism involves a derivation of 
the structure of relations from the accumulation of sense data. So, for Kant, 
empiricism would seem to require the derivation of relations from things. But 
Deleuze in fact turns Kant's requirement for a nonempiricist theory back on itself: 
"We will call 'nonempiricist' every theory according to which, in one way or 
another, relations are derived from the nature of things.,,39 Deleuze thus here 
defines the Copernican tum in terms of the necessity of the internality of relations, 
as a result of its phenomenalisation of the given. "For Kant, relations depend on 
the nature of things in the sense that, as phenomena, things presuppose a synthesis 
whose source is the same as the source of relations. ,,40 
Now, despite Deleuze's apparent favour for emplf1ClSm, he in effect 
admits that the 'objective validity' of Hume's account remains compromised by 
its dualism. All Hume can appeal to is a metaphysical teleology whereby the 
dualism finds its 'third' in an external purpose. Kant's main advantage over Hume 
thus seems to lie in his treatment of phenomena in terms of transcendental 
37 ibid. Cf. Kant's Critical Philosophy, 12. . 
38 It was suggested above (in footnote 31), that Kant's claim in AlB is inadequat~ by ~tself. But 
Deleuze reads Kant's advance as specifically involving the appeal to transcendentalidealIs~ Thus 
I diverge from Martin Bell's thesis in 'Relations and Reversals: Deleuze. Hume ~d Kant (m A. 
Rehberg & R. Jones eds., The A1atter of Critique), 198, that Kant can be saId to affinn. th~ 
internality of relations because of the "a priori nature of the mind", or '~e trd1lscen~ntal sU?Ject 
itself. I claim that it is specifically Kant's transcendental idealism to w~ch Deleuz.e IS refemng ~ 
this instance. Even though Deleuze will hinlself disagree in general mth the mam ~enets of thIS 
. . di' h d from J doctrine. he has a general commitment to a philosophy of Immanence. as stmgms e 
Humean empirical idealism of ideas and things. 
39 Empiricism and Subjectivity, 109. 
~o Ibid. 111. 
~-­
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idealism. If the given becomes internal to the subject, then a critical teleology is 
possible. In CJ Kant attempts to provide a nonmetaphysical nonext I 
, erna account 
of this teleology, revolving around the relations of the faculties themselves. 
Deleuze's move is to develop the notion of the relative autonomy of the faculties, 
which is only imperfectly attained in the first edition of the CP~ and is finallv 
opened up in CPrR and CJ.41 In so doing, I claim, the issue of the quid juris is 
decisively displaced onto the question of the use of the faculties according to 
internally justified ends. 
In chapters 1 and 3 I have shown the sense in which Kant's critical project 
is defined first of all as a self-critique of reason. Once the account of apriori 
cognitions is limited to finite beings, all of Kant's project strains towards the 
question of purpose. Kant's question is: what are the ends of reason and how are 
they possible? These are the questions with which the CPR starts, and they are the 
questions which are continued throughout the critical project and finally set up in 
their most far reaching sense in the CJ. It follows from this that the question: 'how 
is experience possible?' is subordinated to this first set of questions. The wider 
problem is the mutual relation of the ends of any possible finite being, and the 
sense these mutually limited ends can have. Thus, if the question 'what can I 
know', is ultimately, like all questions, subject to the question 'What is man', the 
latter question really means 'What is man for' , or what is the destiny of man? 42 
41 This move, and following discussion of it, should be seen in the light of the discussion in 
chapter 1. 5. 
4~ It is worth recapping on the main thrust of my Kant interpretation here. In my yiew. the 
enduring problem that has dogged the reading of Kant is the abstraction of one critical problem 
from the whole project. Thus, in much Anglo-American literature, we find that Kant's problem is 
transformed into the problem of knowledge, while in the literature influenced by the Reinhold-
Fichte tradition, the primacy of practical reason is asserted and detached from the dynamic of the 
ends - in the plural - of reason. With both of these abstractions, the full range of the critical project 
has been lost sight of, together with its metacritical dimension. One of my claims throughout has 
been that Kant's overarching aim has often been reversed: for the account of the limits of 
knowledge was intended to serve as a warning not to let knowledge take over from the interests of 
reason. All knowledge is always for the sake of. .. it must be seen from the perspectiye of its role 
in the finite situation in general. 
However we have seen that there are two discernible tendencies in Kant himself. The 
first is both meta~hysical and metacritica~ and provides the framework for the ~ ~dition CPR. 
while the second involves an epistemologising retreat, represented by the second editIOn. Thus the 
question of the possibility of knowledge can be subordinated to the first tendency, but can also 
become autonomous, if 'facts of reason' are given primacy and undergirded by regressIve 
arguments. However, it has also been seen that Kant's whole project in the first edition CPR IS 
newly distributed across C1 and the Opus Posthumum. The distinction between Idea~ .. 3S 
problematic, and experience, as conceptual, remains absolutely central throu~~ut ~e cntlcal 
project, and is essential for the mutuallimitatioll of apriori cognitions on wluch cntIque IS based 
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In CPR the faculties of sensibility and imagination functioned in their 
subjection to the understanding; the Subjective Deduction was conducted in the 
light of the end of knowledge. But in C1, Kant finds in aesthetic judgment a sign 
of the free accord of the faculties. The question of the destination of cognition is 
opened up. In a sense, the~ the ultimate conditions for the Subjective Deduction 
in CPR are found in C1. There is no regressive argument in C1, because Kant is 
asking about the conditions for the relations of all the faculties; hence the faculties 
become premises in a wider transcendental argument, their relation to each other 
being now at stake. The background for the claims of aesthetic and teleological 
judgment is no longer simply the limits of possible experience or cognition, but 
the mutual measurement of the faculties themselves. As we have see~ Kant 
himself affirms the transcendent exercise of a faculty in the case of the sublime: 
the imagination encounters its "vocation" in reaso~ at the same time as it realises 
it cannot itself do what reason can do. Deleuze wants to extend this principle to all 
of the faculties, so that the vocation of each faculty lies in its transcendent 
exercise, and in its mutual genetic relation to other faculties. But what can this 
mean but that each faculty has the capacity to encounter problems, which resist 
experiential cognition? The realm of problematic Ideas, therefore, will ultimately 
govern the form of the quid juris, and the procedure of critique itself (the mutual 
determination of apriori cognitions) will become identified for Deleuze with a 
If the problem of CPR is indeed 'hOlt' do we know anything?' it can only answer this if 
the apparatus required for knowledge is related firstly to a general account of apriori cognitions 
and their relations, which, secondly, must be developed into a wider, metacritical framework of 
possible finite ends. At this point in the thesis we are still engaged in reconstructing these 
requirements. Nevertheless it has been shown that the system of human ends is put to a limited 
usage in knowledge, The Idea that inspires us to know is eternally out-of-field for knowledge: we 
will never know this side of the object; what causes us to know is never known. Ideas are not 
categories, which only apply to the ideal subject of knowledge. Even in an act of knowledge. the 
subject seeks something that is beyond the template of unity. Insofar as the knower seeks, he is 
drawn by an Idea, which he cannot unify. 
Throughout this thesis. in sum,. the central ground of CPR has been opened up in principle 
to confront its limits. 'Knowledge', then, both presupposes the Idea in its empirical functioning as 
well as in its transcendental characterisation. If all of our experience can be seen in terms of partial 
empirical enquiries into the world, we have seen that Kant's own model of the Copemican tum 
nonetheless appeals to t!J€ notion that "reason compels nature to answer itS. questions" (Pre~ace to 
the Second Edition, CPR Bxiii). In the light of our analysis of Kant's theory of concepts. this goes 
beyond a Popperian notion that hypotheses must be made prior to the acquisition of knowledge. 
but states that e:\:perience itself is oriented by problems, A concept is by nature general~ so, always 
refers, as Deleuze says, to a "set of objects" (DR 168/219). but this set can ~nly have SIgnificance 
in tenns of a problematic field. However, despite suggesting that knomng ~s preceded by as~ng 
nature questions, and therefore that empirical cognition \,i11 always be motlvated,b~: Ideas. Kant 
continues to play down the corollary that knowledge does not simply involve descnptlOns of stales 
transcendental empiricism. In this sense, the validity of CJ is finally posed at a 
metacritical level. Moreover, the products of the faculties - knowledge, morality, 
art, theology and empirical teleology - are now all intrinsically ordered in relation 
to each other according to the criteria of systematicity and the metacritical 
teleology of faculties; a "final end" of the system of man is possible.43 
In this case, the Kantian correlation between the transcendental subject 
and the object = x is also transformed and widened. For Deleuze "the , 
transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable from its ... transcendent 
exercise" (DR 1431186);44 the 'transcendental subject' should be defined by the 
'transcendent exercise' of its faculties that allows it to sense or think through 
problematic Ideas. Now for Kant, the object = x, as the correlate of apperceptive 
thought, served to unify the passive and active faculties into a common Object, 
defined as a structure beyond what is given through the particular channels of the 
faculties. Kant attempted to ground this object = x by its relation to the knOWing 
subject. In the second edition CPR, this tendency is accompanied by a new 
emphasis on the '1 think', as the correlate of the object = x. But Deleuze places 
these moves squarely back into the discourse of the faculties. "For Kant, as for 
Descartes, it is the identity of the Self in the '1 think' which grounds the harmony 
of all the faculties and their agreement on the form of a supposed Same object" 
(DR 1331174); the '1 think' organises the harmony of the faculties "under the form 
of a given common sense" (DR 1371179). Kant's prioritisation of knowledge, 
from the current perspective (as a result of the obstacles encountered in chapter 5), 
finally amounts to nothing more than a 'common sense' use of the faculties, in 
which 'thinking' is limited to mere recognition, the use of established, common 
concepts. But if the object = x is to be identified with the problematic object, it is 
precisely the uncommon use of the faculties whose grounding is at issue. The 
mere generality of a concept, while serving to reidentify an object, may actually 
of affairs, but concerns solutions. It has been sho,,'11 that Deleuze's interpretation brings out the 
inner logic of Kant's position. 
43 For Deleuze, the genetic relation occurs between sensibility. memo~' and thought. 
Unfortunately Deleuze's reasoning here can be paradoxical to the point of O~~lty. H~ calls the 
relation between imagination and reason in the sublime a "discordant accord (Kant s O~rtrcal 
Phi losoph\l 51), in this way holding tenuously onto a principle of the harmony of the facultIes. In 
:.J' ,- .. • th that each DR, the transcendent exercise of the faculties is called a "final power , ill e sense 
facility can "discover .. , its own unique passion", its own "transcendent object"" (DR I ~3/186). But 
at the same time Deleuze insists that this "discord of the facilities" "presupposes neIther affimty 
nor predestination" (DR 145/189). 
44 Cf. the discussion above in chapter 1.5. 
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obscure the problematic nature of a thing, by leaving us without a means to think: 
it. In defining the activity of the cognitive subject in terms of conceptual activity, 
Kant leaves obscure how the subject could ever think through a problem. (While 
common sense is of course essential for conceptual recognition, the issue is 
whether the object = x and thought itself should be exclusively defined in terms of 
it, considering the other perspectives opened up so far.) 
We can make our final moves by developing this transformation of the 
'transcendental subject'. When Deleuze talks of sensations and memories that are 
outside of the structure of recognition, he is clearly flouting Kant's fundamental 
criterion of unity in experience: 
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise 
something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is 
as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at 
least would be nothing for me (B132). 
But for Deleuze, some sensations resist conceptualisation because one does not 
have a concept for them. It is a confusion to say that that means they are nothing 
for me. Firstly, we should be clear that Kant cannot mean that representations 
must be able to be recognised as mine, in the sense that they belong to my "self'. 
The point must rather be seen as a statement of a general idealism, in which the 'I 
think' is specified as a condition for all possible representation. The 'I think', in 
the second edition CPR, for Kant is the central form of the understanding, the 
central pivot of the pure concepts of the understanding; to the extent that 
sensibility and imagination are subordinated to it in knowledge, it dominates all 
representations as known. If a representation is brought under a concept, it must 
be conditioned by the 'I think'. 
Deleuze's specific way of dealing with this is twofold. Firstly, even for 
Kant, the 'I think' does not by itseIfyield up a coherent relational experience, only 
a unified thought; for experience (knowledge) it must depend on imagination, etc. 
Now the transcendent exercise of the faculties clearly involves forms of cognition 
that are precisely not known; they are thought and sensed; it thus involves these 
other 'elements' of cognition. But that is not enough to justify their possibility, as 
Deleuze realises: Kant has still stipulated that they must conform to the 'I think' 
to have any significance. To overcome Kant's view it is essential to criticise his 
identification of thought with apperception under the aegis of knowledge. Kant is 
2XI 
in effect taking the unity of the 'I think' that grounds the understanding bv itself 
(considered prior to its entry into the composite of experience) as the model for all 
thought. But Deleuze argues that there is more to thought than this. Thought is not 
apriori to be identified with the thought of an 'I think'. Deleuze here takes up 
Kant's own notion (encountered in chapter 5.4.i), that thinking is not an 
experience; he infers that thinking should therefore not be conceived on the model 
of experience. 
Furthermore, we have seen in any case the consequences of granting 
apperception an autonomy as self-consciousness. Not only is it open to Henrich's 
aporiae about pre-reflexivity, but the 'paradox of inner sense' problematises its 
significance prior to all determinability, so that it ultimately has to be explained in 
terms of problematic Ideas.45 Now for Deleuze, in fact, this situation precisely 
reveals to us the true nature of thought - to think through problems or Ideas. Such 
thinking is not conditioned by the 'I think', because the 'I think' itself has turned 
out to be a form of the Idea according to which one orients one's thought. 
I suggest that we are now in the vicinity of a possible metacritical account 
of the qUid juris. We have followed the account of the structure of the object in 
the A-Deduction to its ultimate grounding under the teleological horizon of 
knowledge. If the object = x is to be truly justified, then its universal status for all 
cognition must be demonstrated; its final ground must be at the level of the 
transcendental constitution of experience. But the object = x is no longer a 
permanent structure of empirical cognition, rather it is a name for the 'ideal focus' 
itself that pulls us out of experience towards its problematic conditions. The 
capacity to think and sense problematic 'objects' in the end 'grounds' our 
'transcendence', precisely at the same time as 'ungrounding' representation (the 
realm of established solutions). 
But with this move, surely the notion of transcendence is given a 
metacritical justification. One classic formulation of a metacritical problem 
concerns how the transcendental philosopher can account for his experience. 
while being 'in' that experience. But the transcendent exercise of the faculties 
gives us a metacritical account of the procedure of critique itself, as the mutual 
limitation of forms of cognition. It is precisely the problematic thought of the 
45 1 will return to this in section 3 below. 
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transcendental philosopher that is self-grounding so that the t d 
' ranscen ental 
subject is not identified with the subject of exnerience Rather e . . r . ,xpenence IS 
accounted for within the potential structure of cognition opened up by the subject 
of transcendent exercise. There may indeed be unity order or struct . 
, , ure III my 
experience, but for the transcendental philosopher the real questions are how it has 
been unified, according to which rules and problems, and whether its metacritical 
level is adequate. These are potentially answerable within a transcendental 
empiricism. Nevertheless, in Appendix V, where I develop this account further it , 
will be seen that 'transcendent exercise' is by no means limited to philosophy; 
rather art provides one of its paradigm forms. 46 
3 The Fractured 'I' and the Deleuzian Absolute 
We should finally assess Deleuze's account of the implications of the 'paradox of 
inner sense' with regard to the subject. It is this Kantian thought and its 
consequences that, paradoxically while serving to unground the subject, also sets 
free the true form of the 'ideal synthesis of difference' as Deleuze understands it. 
46 The critical project in Kant must therefore be seen not so much as carrying out the grounding of 
knowledge for the sake of itself, but of ascertaining its limits. To ground knowledge for Kant is in 
a sense to unground it, by revealing its limit. But the beyond of this limit is a domain of the subject 
radically different from the domain of knowledge. Hegel suggests that to set up a limit is already 
to know what is beyond the limit: it shows that the same subject has already crossed the limit. But 
for Deleuze, we do not know what is beyond the limit but we can think it Hegel's comprehension 
of the subject in terms of the form of self-consciousness involves a formal 'homogenisation' of 
both sides of the limits of the subject. But the Kantian subject is a complex, internally 
differentiated entity. besieged and haunted on all sides by Ideas and sensations that attempt to 
shatter the '1 think' that attempts to accompany representations. The destination of the Kantian 
subject for Deleuze lies in its transcendent exercise. If the I is fractured, Deleuze remarks against 
Hegel, "what is thus revealed is being, ,"hich is said of differences which are neither in substance 
nor in a subject" (DR 58/81: italics mine). 
This problematic notion of the subject appears clearly in Kant's discussion of the 
transcendent exercise in the case of the sublime. where he is forced to introduce the ancient notion 
of the 'soul'. At the point that the imagination "finds nothing beyond the sensible world to "hich it 
can lay hold", it attains "a feeling of being unbounded" (CJ 127). Kant says that "that rem.oval.ls 
thus a presentation of the infinite" (ibid). That is. the imagination apprehends the infinite 
inmlediately, but as absent. It apprehends nothing - but its own supersensible destination. '"It can 
never be anything more than a negative presentation - but it still expands the soul." De~euze says. 
crucially, that "the soul is felt as the indeterminate supersensible unity of all the faculties: we arc 
ourselves brought back to a focus, as a 'focal point' in the supersensible" (Aant's Critical 
Phi losophy, 51). Two e).1:remely important things happen here. Firstly, ~ ~dea of ourselves IS felt. 
It is only through the transcendent exercise of t1le sensibility or imagmauon that an Idea can be 
felt that it achieves a problematic sense in an affective faculty of the. subject Seco~dly .. the Ideal 
focal point that we are has no real name in Kant: a veil hangs over It - the name soul .. It IS an 
important indication that the Kantian subject may be more expansive and mystenous than IS often 
thought by t1le identification oft1le subject with self-consciousness. 
It will moreover transport us right back into the issues of determinability and real 
possibility encountered in earlier parts of the thesis. 
Kant says that "the I think expresses the act of determining mv 
~ . 
existence", stressing that "the existence is thereby already given". By stressing 
that I can talk formally of my existence as given in some sense before its 
determination (in time) Kant implies that my existence must be seen as 
undetermined in its basic status as self-positing. However, "the way in which I am 
to determine it .,. is not yet given." Deleuze remarks that this means that the I 
think, determination in general, cannot de jure cross the boundary into reality or 
being, without the addition of 
a third logical value: the determinable, or rather the form in which the 
undetermined is determinable (by the determination). This third value suffices to 
make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference -
no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but 
in the form of a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such and 
what it determines (DR 861116) 
This third value of the determinable, between the determination of thought and 
undetermined being (between logic and reality) is time (the form of inner sense). 
But this is a very ambiguous formulation for Kant, as it leads directly to the 
'paradox of inner sense'. 47 It was shown in chapter 5.2.ii that this paradox 
threatens to infiltrate the very structure of the 'I think'. 
Now we have seen that in his late attempt to ground a "system of 
experience", Kant exacerbates the wound in the '1' (according to which the '1' 
can only be affected by itself in time and space), in the hope that God can finally 
ground it. While Kant comes to accept the status of the subject as Idea, he 
nevertheless attempts to ground it in a new system of self-world-God. But he 
could not shake off the fact that Ideas, for him, were only regulative, and to decree 
them constitutive was to return to a purely metaphysical ontotheological 
argument. Now Deleuze attempts to locate for itself the faultline behind this 
movement in Kant's account: ''we should be concerned with a precise moment 
within Kantianism, a furtive and explosive moment which is not even continued 
by Kant, much less by post-Kantianism" (DR 58/82). This explosive moment 
4; "The detemlination of mv existence can only occur in correspondence "ith the ~orm of lnner 
sense, according to the particular way in which the manifold that I combme IS given III lnner 
. " fi . . f If s I am but onl,- as I appear to m\·sclf. The IIltuItI.on. and I there ore l~ave no cogmtlOn ° m~'se a .. ' -, I ~~ -
conSCIOusness of oneself IS therefore far from bemg a cogrutIon of oneself (8 - ). 
precisely concerns the internal relation of the 'paradox of inner sense' and Kant's 
own arguments against theoretical proofs for God: 
When Kant puts rational theology into question, in the same stroke h' d 
kind f d· 'l'b . fi e mtro llces a . .0. Iseq~1 I. nu~, a ssure or cr~ck ~ ~e pure Self of the 'I think', an 
ahenatlOn m pnnclple, msurmountable m pnnclple: the sublect can h C' rth 
.. J encelO 
represent Its own spontaneIty only as that of an Other, and in so doin' k 
. h '. g mvo e a 
mystenous co erence m the last mstance which excludes its own, as well as that 
of the world and God (DR 58; translation modified). 
Now the foundation of Kant's critique of the ontological argument IS the 
fundamental Kantian premise that all conceptual thought must be related to an 
intuition (that is, determinable). Deleuze in fact agrees with Kant that "all 
concepts only ever designate possibilities" (DR 139/181). Concepts (whether of 
the pure 'I' or of God) cannot be directly related to existence. The fracture in the 
subject, then, testifies 'at first hand' to the radical impossibility of intellectual 
intuition: conceptual thought and being cannot be conceived in any immediate 
unity. The fracture in the 'I' and the death of God are thus two sides of the same 
. 48 
com. 
Hence what is it that ultimately grounds the relation of thought (in any 
form) to being? The 'third', the form of determinability, seems finally to express 
no more than a "mysterious coherence", an unknown harmony. For Kant, if the 
subject can only be posited according to a regulative Idea, this merely regulative 
nature would in principle threaten the whole of the edifice of the critical 
philosophy; on the other hand, Kant can find no grounds either for its constitutive 
nature. But Deleuze sees past these two possibilities. In fact, the introduction of 
inner sense into the intimacy of the 'I think' should itself be seen as 
accomplishing a move towards what the Deduction was intended to prove. The 'I 
think' is already related to the form of time; only by such a stipulation of the form 
of detemlinability can it engage in any determination at all (DR 58/81, 85f.1116f.) 
Deleuze brings out this paradoxical status in the following startling quote: 
It is as though the I were fractured from one end to the other: fractured. by the 
pure and empty form of time. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self 
48 111ere is a Cartesian analogy to the move Deleuze wants to e~ect in ~ti~sm. While 
Descartes insulates his Cogito from dependence on anything other than Its ?\\ n thinking. he cannot 
guarantee the identity of the Cogito through time. The Cogito tells us nothing about Itself. For tIllS 
. . f h '. se b\' God So the IdentIty of the Descartes must rely on the contmuous creanon 0 t e urn\er . ' .' 
subject relies on dod. If God goes. so does the guarantee of the identity of the subject. Deleuze 
.. t' n of continuous creatIon mto a 
wants to e)..1end this argwnent beyond the e~1ra\'agant concepllo -
Kantian milieu. 
which appears in time... [This correlation] constitutes th d' 
d I th I . e IScovery of the transcen enta, e e ement of the CopernIcan revolution (DR 86/117' '. 
, my ItalIcs). 
But this "discovery of the transcendental" seems to be identical to th "d' 
. e lSCOyery 
of Difference" mentioned at the start of this section. Deleuze in fact argues that 
this fracture is by no means the negation of transcendental philosophy but its most 
profound characteristic. The fracture in the self is the "internal Difference which 
establishes an apriori relation between thought and being" (ibid). For Deleuze, the 
'transcendental' does not primarily specify the account of "modes of knowledge" 
(A561B81), but first of all the project of relating 'logic' to 'reality', the project we 
found at the roots of Kant ian ism (the search for a truly sufficient reason). But the 
crucial innovation in Kant is that determinability here, as opposed to Leibniz, 
involves time. 49 
For Deleuze, on the one hand, the fracture in the 'I' represents the central 
opening for the possibility of the Kantian project; but on the other hand, he 
represents it as wrecking the possibility of Kantianism as we know it, by sullying 
the purity of apperception. 50 Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Categories 
requires the move from 'logical apperception' to its instantiation in spatiotemporal 
form. But how can we determine the logical apperception at all, if all 
determination depends on determinability? We have already encountered 
arguments in this chapter and elsewhere against the identification of the form of 
49 By emphasising in this way the paradox of inner sense in Kant, Deleuze is effecting a 
transfonnation of the historical context of the Kantian project. On the one hand, he is reconnecting 
Kant to anti-Cartesian tendencies, which also displace self-consciousness from the primary role it 
is often thought to have. On the other hand, Kant is also diverted away from his Fichtean legacy. 
centred on the development of the primacy of apperception. Fichte founds his system on self-
positing, in which self-consciousness can deduce from its own activity the forms of subjectiyity 
and objectivity. The move towards Leibniz should be spelled out. For Leibniz, the cogito is not 
primary because of its contingency. Against the claim that thought has immediate access to its o\\n 
reality, Leibniz counters that "the cogito is merely a proposition of fact, founded on immediate 
experience, and is not a necessary proposition whose necessity is seen in the inullediate agreement 
of Ideas. On the contrary, only God can see how these two terms, I and existence, are connected -
that is, why I exist" (Nett' Essays on Human Understanding, ·U 1). It might seem that Descartes 
had merely argued for the fact that I exist, not for why I exist. But it is the status of the proposl110n 
that is important: the cogito itself is not a necessary proposition, it is c~ntingent. A: such It 
requires a sufficient reason in order to make any claim that is not merely lOgIcal. In Kanuan te~l1s. 
it is synthetic, and as such requires "some third thing" to ground its truth. (See R. McRae. . As 
though only God and it existed in the World''', in M. Hooker, Leibniz: Critical and inlepretatm: 
Essays, 81-3). . . 
50 '"If the greatest initiative of transcendental philosophy was to introduce the form of tIme mto 
thought as such, then this pure and empty fonn in ~ signifies in~s~lu.bly .t~e death of God ~~ 
fractured I and the passive self. It is true that Kant did not pursue this lrutlatl\e. both ~ and tht: 
wldenvent a practical resurrection. Even in the speculative domam the fracture IS qwckly fi lied b~ 
thinking with an 'I think,.51 For Deleuze the pure form ofthinkl'ng t . 
, mus precisely 
take place in the "internal difference" between thought and bel'ng B t' -
. u gIven the 
identification of the object = x with the problematic Idea alongsl'de I' 
, our ana YSIS 
of intensity, doesn't the model of repetition provide us exactly with a notion of 
determinability? On the one hand, we have seen in outline how "internal 
difference" for Deleuze, must refer to the relation of problematic Ideas to the 
actualised manifold. 52 On the other hand, we have already seen that more can be 
said about space and time (via notions of intensity and duration) than Kant 
allowed. The form of duration (and the two passive syntheses), as articulated in 
the ideal constitution of repetition (Appendix IV) has provided the rudiments for 
another kind of Objective Deduction, which moreover completely bypasses 
apperception. Thus don't we find another way of crossing the divide of logic and 
reality and pursuing the general task of the deduction? 
In fact, it is exactly at this point that 'representation' IS decisively 
ungrounded for Deleuze. He has pushed Kant's system to an ultimate reliance on 
teleology, only to radically unground the circular form of teleology at the last 
moment. The internal teleology of his system is restricted to the Subjective 
genesis of the relation of the faculties, while the Objective form of the system of 
the 'ends of reason', is articulated according to the logic of Ideas in their pure 
form, unfastened from their theological horizon, from the metaphysics of 
a new form of identity - namely, active synthetic identity; whereas the passive self is defined only 
by receptivity and, as such, endowed with no power of synthesis" (DR 871117). 
51 Kant, however, defends the simplicity of the principle of apperception, arguing precisely that "r 
am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself but only that I am" 
(B157); the paradox of inner sense does not affect the transcendental status of apperception. 
However, three points can be mentioned. 1. The "that" remains cut off from determinability in 
general and so gives us no sense of what could be developed from the notion of apperception. lf 
the '1 think' is undetermined before it introduces the "third value" of determinability, then how can 
the pure concepts of the understanding follow from it? 2. What Kant needs in order to fulfil the 
requirement of the deduction is to move from the structure of unity in the 'I think' to the forms of 
unity in intuition. So, even if the mere form of determination, the I think, is undisputed \\hat is 
really needed is the demonstration of its necessary compatibility with, or application to, intuition. 
So although apperception remains necessary for representational thought, the entire effort o~ the 
deduction is to show that apperception itself crosses the bridge to reality and governs the manifold 
of intuition. Hence what has been problematised is also the application of apperceptIon .to the 
manifold, 3. If the paradox of inner sense signifies that all thought must already be deterrrunable, 
then how can the pure concepts of the understanding be said to delineate in a~ance the POSSI bl II~' 
of e>.."perience? Kant states that the notion of the possibility of eX"pcrience pro\1~es us \~lth the long 
sought-after 'third thing' between logic (determination) and reality (unde~emun~ eXIstence). But 
possibility by itself will remain merely logical unless it is transfonned mth specific regard to the 
problem of real possibility. 
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representation. The teleological completion of the Idea of the subject in the Ideas 
of world and God, as envisaged in the Opus posthumum, is definitively excluded, 
and the self, "the passive position" of the I think, must "live [the latter] like an 
Other within itself' (DR 861116). 
Deleuze remarks that one thinker perhaps did continue this "explosive 
moment" in Kantianism. In Holderlin' s remarks on tragedy the fraught relation 
between the subject and God, and the catastrophe that the death of God brings for 
the subject, become clear in the wake of Kant.53 In his 'Remarks on Oedipus', 
Holderlin provides the tragic emblem of the fractured'!', sacrificed to the flow of 
inner and outer sense. 
At the crucial, horrible moment towards the end of Oedipus Rex, Oedipus 
realises he has lived his entire life without understanding the laws that have been 
actually governing his fate. He realises that he has been living a life that he can 
now no longer call his own. The normative relation between past, present and 
future has been broken. Holderlin describes the empty moment of Oedipus' 
realisation as a caesura, and says that a "categoreal overturning" occurs and space 
and time are experienced in their pure state. "At such moments, man forgets 
himself and the god and turns around like a traitor ... In the utmost form of 
suffering, namely, there exists nothing but the conditions of time and space"S4. 
Holderlin states that "God forgets himself because he is nothing but time". But 
"time is overturned [umgekehrt] categorically at such a moment, no longer fitting 
beginning and end" (ibid). Perhaps what he means is that the schematised 
category of causality described in Kant's second analogy no longer holds, because 
the subject cannot carry out the synthesis, as the contents of his memory now 
belong to somebody he cannot identify with, who exists only as a 'before'. In this 
moment a pure temporal difference is experienced, a before, a caesura and an 
after, a pure synthesis without an experiencing subject. This is what Deleuze calls 
the "third synthesis of time". 
52 "The Cogito incorporates all the power of a differential un~nscious, an unconscious .o~ pun: 
thought which intemalises the difference between the detenmnable Self and the deternurung r 
(DR 1741226). . 
53 "In this sense. it is correct to claim that neither Fichte nor Hegel IS the descendent of Kant -
rather. it is H6lderlin who discovers the emptinesss of pure time and in this emptmess. 
simultaneously the continued diversion of the divine, the prolonged fracture of the I and the 
constitutive ~ssion of the self' (DR 871118). 
54 Holderlin, 'Remarks on Oedipus', in Essays and Letters on Theory. 108. 
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This pure repetition, in which Oedipus 'repeats' his truth at the expense of 
his empirical coherence, would in principle be a pure synthesis of an Idea. 
'Oedipus' collapses into a "state of free differences ... no longer subject to the 
form imposed upon them by an I or an ego, ... they assume a shape which 
excludes my own coherence no less than that of any identity whatsoever" (DR 
113/149).55 This third synthesis is obviously not of the same kind as the other two 
syntheses, and refers to a 'privileged' moment in the subject's life, when 
repetition finally attains its own autonomy, at the cost of the subject itself. It is 
this third synthesis that underlies the other syntheses, in that it enacts a pure 
correlation between difference and repetition. Problems are synthesised, 'in and 
for themselves'. Being scrys its own sense, its own 'absolute' sense. However for 
Deleuze, we are in the vicinity not of Hegel's absolute, but of Nietzsche's eternal 
return, in which "repetition ... consists in conceiving the same on the basis of the 
55 Given the claims in Appendix IV, it might seem that we already have the means to avoid 
Oedipus' catastrophe, as we have seen how passive synthesis orders sensibility. lfthe "ideal/oci" 
are no longer thought according to the rule of teleology, the order of Ideas nevertheless has its own 
virtual coherence, as we have witnessed. But they can no longer serve to unify at the limit, the 
coherent subject. Deleuze insists that the horizon of our thought is intrinsically problematic. That 
is, the problem itself, in its uncertain implication of convergent and divergent differential relations 
between singularities, is the only criterion for the order of the world and the subject. Once this 
order has been subject to problematisation, we can no longer rely simply on a coherent narrative 
about the past~ we cannot appeal to the notion that the order of the world is simply the result of the 
way it has been. The second synthesis already prepares this possibility through the notion that the 
levels of the past coexist, and therefore form their own networks of "nonlocalisable connections". 
The [mal problematisation we witness here opens up all the convergent and divergent series that 
could have been at anyone point: the world has no other ground than the complicated "chaosmos" 
of virtual Ideas. 
What H61derlin calls the "turning away" of God at this moment thus not only affects the 
teleological coherence that is posited as an ideal foci in the future, but also the coherence of the 
past. The sense we make ofthe past depends, as we saw, on a continual repetition of the whole of 
the past. But the significance of anyone past moment always must d~pend on what happened in 
between and is influencing our present. In fact, the essence of the virtual realm of Ideas is neither 
bound to the past nor the present, but can be seen as a pure repetition without origin, as every past 
must always be referred to its problematic nexus with other pasts, and future interpretations of the 
past. Thus this mysterious 'third synthesis of time' is the revelation of "the pure and empty form of 
time" (DR 86/116). Time appears in its pure form, no longer fastened to any intrinsic order and 
convergence of its contents (on the distinction between form and content here, cf. DR 1101146). 
The 'I' is yielded up to the "constitutive passion of the self' (DR 87/117), for which the only 
identity is the repetition of differences which form their own order in the \irtua1.Deleuze appeals 
to literary examples at this point. In Proust, the hero does not repeat an 'original' love for his 
mother, but in his love for Albertine repeats the love of Swann for Odette (cf. DR 124/163). "It is 
true that our loves repeat our feelings for the mother, but the latter already repeats other loves. 
which we have not ourselves ex-periellced" (Proust and Signs, 72). Gerard de Nerval's tale Sylvie 
is also referred to (DR 18/28), in which the hero's nostalgia for a past love is revealed to be a kind 
of 'optical effect' arising emergently from the resonance of the past and present (G. de Nerval. 
Selected Writings, Penguin 1999). 
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different" (DR 41/60).56 Perhaps it is now possible to see why "immanence is the 
vertigo of philosophy". 57 
We can start at last to envIsage the kind of "truly sufficient reason" 
Deleuze has in mind. Deleuze' s crooked path to the absolute has been achieved 
through transcendental means, by reconstructing the transcendental syntheses of 
the subj ect on the model of repetition so that they point towards the outline of a 
final synthesis in which the subject gives way to a repetition that exceeds it. This 
final form is in a sense the point where problematicity becomes the inescapable 
ground to all knowledge and thought, but in such a radical sense that the 
characteristic of problems as distinct from each other is referred to their deeper 
'complicated' matrix in a distributed field of singularities with no original order or 
rule of convergence. As well as Nietzsche and structuralism, we should think here 
of Plotinus and other neo-Platonist theories where the self, in ascending to the 
absolute, loses its individuality, and achieves some sort of 'eternal' status. 58 For 
56 The conception of the Absolute here, however, remains Leibnizian in important respects. Each 
'distributive' Idea, even at the point of its most ideal synthesis of repetition. does not dissolve into 
a 'collective' all in which differences find their unity. The following passage is important: 
"Repetition necessarily flows from this play of difference ... [in the following way]: Because each 
series is explicated and unfolded only in implicating the others, it therefore repeats the others and 
is repeated in the others, which in turn implicate it. However, it is implicated by the others only 
insofar as it simultaneously implicates those others, with the result that it returns to itself as many 
times as it returns to another. Returning to itself is the ground of the bare repetitions, just as 
returning to another is the ground of the clothed repetitions" (DR 300/383). As long as the Ideas 
are conceived without God or any other unified horizon, the only unity in these implicated 
differences will be perspectival. TItis passage should be related back to chapter 4.4.i, with its 
account of a distributed monadism. 
57 See Introduction, section 2 above. 
58 In the fourth tractate in the second Ennead about "intelligible matter", Plotinus writes that "any 
attribute to any subject must be a Reason-Principle, and Indefiniteness is not a Reason-Principle ... 
[But] the Matter even of the Intellectual Realm is the Indefinite (the undelimited); it must be a 
thing generated by the undefined nature, the illimitable nature of the Eternal Being" (Enneads, 
trans. S. MacKenna, London: Penguin, 1991, 106). This "indefinite" is very close to Deleuze' s 
conception of an Idea, and indeed Plotinus writes in this passage of "the difference of archetype 
and image". In the seventh tractate of the fifth Ennead, on 'archetypes', Plotinus "rites that "if the 
Soul of the individual contains the Reason-Principle of all that it traverses, once more all men have 
their (archetypic) existence There: and it is our doctrine that every soul contains all the Reason-
Principles that exist in the Cosmos" (407). Given the previous remarks about the indefiniteness of 
archetypes, Plotinus foreshadows Deleuze, who is not at all averse to pointing out the esoteric 
nature of his claims about the third svnthesis. For the most striking statement in this regard see 
DR 244/314, where Deleuze talks of the "subtle, implicated matter of the eternal return ... If the 
etemal return reduces qualities to the status of pure signs, and retains of eX1ensities only w~at 
combines with the original depth, even at the cost of our coherence and in favour of a supenor 
coherence, then the most beautiful qualities will appear, the most brilliant colours. the most 
precious stones and the most vibrant extensions. For once reduced to their sen~al reas.ons. ~d 
having broken all relation with the negative, these will remain for ever affixed. III the m~enslye 
space of positive differences. Then, in tum, the [mal prediction o~ ~e Phae~o WIll be realISed. in 
which Plato promised to the sensibility disconnected from its empmcal exer~I~ te~ples .. stars and 
gods such as had never before been seen. unheard-of affimlations. The predictIOn IS realIsed It IS 
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Deleuze, though, the notion of eternity would be a concept that denotes by default 
the peculiar temporality of the third synthesis, as detached in principle from the 
empirical syntheses of cognition - "the pure form of time" (DR 861117, 1111147). 
Thus we achieve, in principle, a path between the subject and an ontology 
which no longer depends on God but precisely arises out of the absence of God. It 
was suggested in chapter 2 that Kant's early modal proof for the existence of God 
disappeared underground in Kant's critical period, and it was suggested that it 
reappears in the Opus posthumum once Kant starts to deal with the consequences 
of the paradox of inner sense. But considering our transformation of the model of 
real possibility into a radicalised Leibnizian account of problematic relations of 
singularities, perhaps the destiny of Kant's earlier argument lies here with 
Deleuze. A different passage from thought to being is reawoken as a result of the 
fracture in the cogito: whereas Kant returns once again to the metaphysical 
argument for real possibility, for Deleuze, the 'coherence' of the world (as 
universe) finally does not depend on the subject at all, but on the "play in the 
creation of the world", the free play of problematic Ideas. Both Kant and Deleuze 
appeal in different ways at this point to rationalist models of ontological 
differentiation. 
However, Deleuze affirms the ongoing dissonance in token- and type-
identity between phenomenal and noumenal worlds. We are not the same subject 
in the two domains: the link is definitively broken. The world has dissolved, God 
is dead and the greater, mysterious coherence that is governed by Ideas is instead 
affirmed. "It is the nature of consciousness to be false, problems by their nature 
escape consciousness" (DR 208/268-9). That does not mean that there is no 
connection at all between the noumenal and phenomenal realms, rather that the 
latter must be understood as an inadequate synthesis (composed of habits and 
memories) of the Ideas that govern it. 
The mysterious third synthesis fulfills a position III Deleuze' s system 
somewhere between Kant's intellectually intuiting God, and Hegel's Absolute 
true, only by the very overturning of Platonism". This extraordinar}' pas~ge, \\ith its return to, the 
neo-Platonic doctrine of 'seminal reasons', and its affirmation of this most 'otherworldly of 
passages from Plato (Phaedo 107c-1l5a), brings us closest to the profou.nd stran~eness and 
untimeliness of Deleuze' s project, while nevertheless being closest, I belIeve, to Its deepest 
motivations. 
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Subject. It expresses the highest point of the system, and as time is absolute,59 it is 
open to some sort of apprehension (if not 'experience' in the Kantian sense), but 
only in principle, and precisely not as a whole. That this moment is possible is 
both the indication of the absolute status of Deleuze' s system, and a fate worse 
than death for the miserable Oedipus, the Deleuzian shadow of Hegel's Christ.60 
However, it should be emphasised that the catastrophe of Oedipus 
represents a 'limit-situation' of pure repetition. Elsewhere in DR, Deleuze 
precisely emphasises that the apprehension, repetition, and living-through of 
problems does in fact provide finite beings, if not with a final sufficient reason, 
then with a 'semi-divine' capacity to seek the "real conditions of experience". Far 
from affirming a 'fall into indifference', Deleuze's theory of problems and their 
synthesis is meant to show that there is no 'indifference', and that the 
differentiated structure of the virtual provides the articulated backdrop for finite 
beings, whose lives can be considered less in terms of 'experience' than in terms 
of the constant solution and dissolution, with more or less degrees of 
inventiveness, of problems. As with the suggestion of the case of the sublime, 
there are concrete ways in which the subject, while not being able to think itself 
59 See Appendix IV. 
60 Note on Philosophers, Kings and Subjects. We have seen that Deleuze describes Spinoza as "the 
prince of philosophers". In Hegel's system, despite the fact that every subject is in a sense a 
philosopher to the extent that they have a self-understanding of the criteria to which they conform, 
there can be no king of philosophers to the extent that Hegel himself is simply the impersonal 
voice of the culmination of philosophy's development. But there are three suggestions concerning 
who the privileged subject is who occupies the pinnacle of the system of substance-subject. Firstly, 
Christ can be represented as the subject of the Phenomenology. As well as Hegel's remarks in the 
section on religion, it is in a sense always Christ who suffers the humiliations of the subject on the 
highway of despair; it is Christ who suffers even in the pathetic humiliations undergone by 
Rameau's Nephew. Secondly, in the Philosophy o/Right (trans. A Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), the Monarch is a representation of the sovereign subject: he occupies the 
'empty place', at the pinnacle of the Absolute Subject (#279-280, 316-322). Thirdly, of course, it 
is Us - the modem collective subject - who is the privileged subject of the whole system, who 
suffer Calvary and are resurrected only through the preservation and "internalisation" of Calvary 
(Phenomenology, 493). 
Who is the king of philosophers, or at least the privileged philosophical subject for 
Deleuze? In DR, Deleuze describes his system by way of a peculiar symbol taken from Antonin 
Artaud: "crowned anarchy" (DR 41/60). Is Deleuze simply continuing in the good republican 
tradition in which the severed head of the King symbolises the death of God, and is the 
cosmopolitical emblem of the ensuing Copernican revolution in which the finite subject is finally 
freed from subjection? But there is a more sinister strain at work. There is only one king who 
appears in Deleuze's work: Oedipus. The subject of Deleuze's philosophy of immanence IS 
Oedipus, the symbol of the fractured '1', the sovereign whose fate is to becom~ Nobody_ Even If 
Deleuze's philosophy is metacritically defensible, and a philosophy ~f Immanence _ al~ng 
Deleuzian lines is possible, the results must be entirely different from Hegel' ~ "mtem~hsatlon of 
hmnan history. Deleuze after all, calls DR "an apocalyptic book" (DR x.xil4) , While Deleuze 
affimls a "phllosophy of joy", there are other references in DR to a "theatre of terror" (cf DR 
18/28) 
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immediately, is 'subject' to a repetition that at least plays out its inability to 
experience itself. 61 Moreover, the transcendental empiricist, as the mobile subject 
of this system of repetition, can precisely enact and describe the problems 
incarnated in human life. 
In sum, the relation of the subject and the object = x undergoes a startling 
metamorphosis in Deleuze' s work. On the one hand, the object = x, says Deleuze. 
61 Note on Structure and the Subject. It has been shown why Kant spent so much time on 
dialectical Ideas in CPR. But there is an existential sense to this emphasis as well. In a sense it is 
these that truly structure the subject, as became clear, although abortively, in the Opus posthumum. 
It is in Kant's Paralogisms, the fIrst illustration of transcendental illusion in CPR, that the self is 
fIrst revealed as an Idea: it cannot experience itself but can only exist for itself spectrally. as an 
Idea that haunts its interiority but is always other to it. The self is tormented by the spectre of its 
own existence: thought and being can never coincide in experience. 
Deleuze appeals to psychoanalysis, particularly in its structuralist form, for the concrete 
forms this peculiar 'half-life' of the subject takes. Sexual Ideas are presented as problems for the 
subject, by which it attempts to grasp Ideas that are ontological in their signifIcance. In the psychic 
repetition of the primal scene, the subject attempts to think its own origin (cf. S. Leclaire, 'Jerome. 
or Death in the Life of the Obsessional', in S. Schneiderman, Returning to Freud (New Haven: 
Yale, 1980). The Idea of the origin of the subject is a transcendent Idea: it is by definition 
unrepresentable to a unified subject. The enigma of the origin of the subject Calmot be represented, 
but can only be dramatised in an Idea. Moreover, in this dramatisation the identity of the , . 
conscious subject is excluded: in order to enter into the transcendent exercise of thinking the Idea, 
it is not just permitted, but demanded that he practice mUltiple entries into the phantastic structure 
(cf. 1. Laplanche & 1.B. Pontalis, 'Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality', in V. Burgin et aI., 
Formations of Fantasy, London: Methuen, 1968; cf. DR 1241163 & note 27). The Oedipus 
complex, therefore, is strictly speaking never lived, because it embraces a structure that demands 
the simultaneous and coexistent action of three subjects. Hence the subject -places of this structure 
can only be repeated by the subject for whom the Oedipus complex is a problem: in the repetitions 
he will displace himself into each of the places. The Oedipus complex is an example of a problem, 
which although never lived, articulates the subject's thought of its own existence. For Lacan, there 
is no 'normal' position for the subject, and our attitudes to the question of origin may be lived in a 
neurotic or psychotic way. Neurosis and psychosis are not just pathological, but are in a sense 
'transcendental' positions in the question of the subject. Cf. 1. Lacan, 'The Neurotic's Individual 
Myth', (trans. M. Evans, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 48, 1979). 
Deleuze's Kantian approach to structuralism has the benefit of saving us from futile 
dispute over the role or absence of a role of the subject in structuralism, while also paradoxically 
allowing us to find an idea of the subject in Deleuze. The choice between an in principle fully 
reflexive conscious subject and impersonal structures over which this subject has no control has 
the perfect structure of an antinomy. The realisation that the subject is entangled in problematic 
structures which it CaIIDOt experience, but which dominate its experience, provides the possibility 
of a resolution of the antinomy. It does, however, entail emphasising the problematic character of 
the subject, at the expense of its reflexive structure. For Deleuze, ultimately this shift of emphasis 
will permit the abandonment of the word 'subject'. In terms similar to Lacan's, for Deleuze the 
subject is predominantly caught up in the repetitive movement of structureslIdeas to which it is 
subject; it is at the mercy of the singularities of the Ideas which give it the problems by which it 
lives, and in its ultimate signifIcation, it must be seen in the light of the eyer present ontological 
possibility of a third synthesis in which there can be no subject (it is clear enough from Deleuz~' s 
subsequent trajectory that this e).1remity must be conceived as akin to the pole of pSYChOSIS). 
Nevertheless, it should be clear how far this nuanced, graduated, account is from a dissolutio~ of 
the subject as it is conceived by critics of 'post-structuralism'. If all)1bing, the model of the ~bJect 
as the seeker of knowledge, as the passionate seeker of truth (as opposed to the model of the Ideal. 
abstract subject of knowledge or action) is intensifIed in Deleuze. Again, keeping sight of the 
Kalltian horizon here may be the only way to avoid the misinterpretations that have accumulated 
around Deleuze. 
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holds good for all worlds. As a problem in itself, it opens onto all the other 
problems that are ideally 'complicated' within it. On the other hand, for liS it 
becomes infused with the psychoanalytic properties of the 'lost object' .62 The 
object = x will thus have two face's: on the one hand a virtual face that always 
points away from the possibility of apperception and towards Gegenstdnde, and 
on the other an actual face that gives it its status as the form of empirical Objecte. 
It can be concluded that the transcendental philosopher "loses himself' in the 
immanence of the former precisely in order to produce an immanent critique of 
the latter. 
For Novalis and Holderlin, this loss of being is always indexed to the past, 
echoing Platonic reminiscence. This anxiety underlies the philosophy of self-
consciousness and reflection. The fear of the loss of the self can only be assuaged 
by turning to the world and God; without these the self seems sure to plunge into a 
bottomless chaos. But by returning to the Leibnizian and Spinozist background of 
Kantian philosophy, and connecting this up with the search for a synthetic apriori 
in structuralism, Deleuze shows that the loss of the object does not point to an 
origin, but is the effect of an ontology of repetition: the object = x is a floating 
signifier that permits the final coherence of the universe, no matter how strange it 
may be to the empirical subject. The cosmos is immanent without remainder, but 
transcendent from the point of view of experience; nevertheless it is possible to 
think, and to metacritically justify the thinking of, the problematic structure of the 
absolute. The structure of repetition provides the first key to the rationalist 
distinction between logic and reality, while the unfolding of the connection 
between synthesis and repetition secondly develops a new Objective account of 
cognition out of this structure, which thirdly terminates in the Subjective account 
of the play of faculties for the transcendental philosopher. Thus Deleuze presents 
a fulfilment as well as a transformation of Kantianism, considered as a project 
stemming from Kant's first works until his last. 
It is finally from this point of view that we can envIsage Deleuze's 
peculiar position between Kant and Hegel, between finitude and the absolute. The 
object = x is the sign of finitude that itself can have absolute properties if affirmed 
62 On the notion of 'lost sense' in Hegel, cf. 1. Hyppolite, Logic and Exist~nce, 26, 102 .. In his 
review of Hyppolite, Deleuze remarks that Hyppolite' s "allusions to ... forgettmg, remembermg. to 
294 
in its movement throughout all the divergent series. The third synthesis touches on 
the immanent state of Ideas in their complication, in which all problems are 
referred back to the complication of their relations and singularities. The thought 
of this synthesis for Deleuze is both apocalyptic and divine: it shows us the secret 
of the divine game, the "play in the creation of the world". For Deleuze, the 
ultimate justification of reality, the only "justice" that could be found, would be to 
affirm the world as such a game, as a realm of complete chance; it would be such 
an affirmation that allows all the series to communicate, for the object = x to 
traverse all the series: "immanence", to paraphrase Hyppolite, would be 
"complete".63 But I have only traced the theoretical background to Deleuze's 
philosophy; its practical significance must await another occasion. 
lost sense" suggest an alternative theory of expression (195). Deleuze has clearly attempted to 
elaborate these allusions. 
63 Logic and Existence. 176. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I Deleuze, Post-Kantianism and Metacritical Criteria 
In this Appendix I attempt to introduce Deleuze's approach to the issue of 
metacritique by evaluating a series of criteria suggested by the post-Kantians for the 
success of a metacritique. In the process I will point out critical evaluations that the 
Deleuzian and post-Kantian views could make of metacritical criteria posited by each 
other. After running the gamut of skepticism concerning the general possibility of 
metacritical criteria, we will arrive at the Hegelian and Deleuzian positions on the 
problem. In general, I hope an account of the post-Kantians will shed light on 
Deleuze's views, and vice versa. The following abstract account is a sketch toward a 
greater aim, to criticise, explore and expand the possibilities for metacritique. 
It should first be pointed out that the very notion of metacritique seems to 
have two strikingly different significations in the literature on po st-Kanti ani sm. On 
the one hand, it is taken in a purely formal signification to mean that dimension of 
critical and post-Kantian philosophy which is concerned with its own justification. 
For instance, L.W. Beck and Gunther Zoller use the word in this sense; my own use 
of the term conforms to theirs. 1 On the other hand, philosophers in the Hegelian-
Marxist tradition take the term specifically to refer to the philosophical requirement 
I L. W. Beck, 'Toward a Meta-critique of Pure Reason' in Beck, Essays on Kant and Hume (New 
Haven: Yale, 1978) ; G. Zoller, 'From Critique to Metaeritique: Fiehte's Transfonnation of K~t"s 
Transcendental Idealism', in S. Sedgwick The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy (Cambndge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); ef. 139-142. 
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to account for the historically situated aspect of critical procedure.2 Habermas has 
taken the notion in this sense, and has been followed by G. Kortian and G. Rose.3 For 
Hegel, it was indeed part of the procedure of metacritique to provide a socio-
historical account of the coming-to-be of the 'we' who are capable of critique. 
However, the Hegelian-Marxist reading often takes this part to be the most important 
and enduring aspect of the very notion of metacritique. I cannot provide a criticism of 
this position here, but I try to suggest in what follows that this "historicising" notion 
of metacritique ends up begging the questions that the "formal" notion of 
metacritique explicitly attempted to deal with. In order to avoid relativism the , 
historicising account often as not comes to rely on a teleological notion of history, 
whose power and validity could only rest on the presumption of success of certain 
formal metacritical criteria. 
The Problem and its Solution 
There is one constant that runs from Deleuze's first work until his last, which can 
give us a clue to the Deleuzian approach to the issue of the relation between critique 
and philosophy: the claim that the task of philosophy is to create concepts that 
respond to problems. This notion of creating concepts can easily look as if it involves 
the kind of pluralistic, arbitrary production of concepts involved in postmodemism; 
this impression is further exacerbated by the thought that Deleuze is, in some form, a 
'Nietzschean'. But in order to understand the notion of the creation of concepts it is 
necessary first to understand the notion of the 'problem'. I will suggest that this is 
2 This use of the term 'metacritique' can in fact lay claim to be the oldest, as it descends from the first 
explicit use of the term, by J.G. Hamann, in his 1784 unpublished essay, 'Metakritik tiber den 
Purismum der Vemunft'. Hamann thought a metacritique of Kantian philosophy was needed because 
of the dependence of concepts on linguistic forms, which themselves could not be universal, but \'aried 
with language structures throughout history and society. This vein of metacritique was continued in 
J.G. Herder's 'Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vemunft', in his verstand und Erfahrung (1799). 
For an account of this strain of metacritique, along with Fichte's and Hegel's involvement \\ith it see 
J.P. Surber. 'Gennan Idealism under Fire: Fichte. Hegel, and "Metacriticism"', in Ardis B. Collins ed .. 
Hegel and the A10dem World (Albany: SUNY, 1995). 93-109. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel probably 
avoided the term 'metacritique' because it would have been seen at the time to 'belong' to Hamann's 
and Herder's theories. 
3 J. Habennas, Knowledge and Human interests (London: Heinemann, 1972). eh. 1-2: G. Kortian. 
A1etacritique (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 28-33; G. Rose, Hegel Contra 
Sociology (London: Athlone, 1981), pp. 35.40. 
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where we can find the first step in Deleuze's 'metacritique': a general procedure to 
discern and evaluate the problems that animate philosophy. His first book 
, 
Empiricism and Subjectivity (1953), outlines his account of the primacy of problems. 
However, the terminology he will use later is reversed: the concept of a 'problem' is 
seen to be analytically linked to the notion of its solution, so Deleuze opts for 
'question' to express this fundamental 'field' within which philosophy moves. 
a philosophical theory is an elaborately developed question, and nothing else; by 
itself and in itself, it is not the resolution to a problem, but the elaboration, to the very' 
end, of the necessary implications of a fonnulated question. It shows us what things 
are, or what things should be, on the assumption that the question is good and 
rigorous (ES 106). 
Later Deleuze relegates the term 'question' and turns to Kant's "profound theory of 
Ideas as problematising and problematic" (DR 161/209) to demonstrate that 
'problems' are forms that "must be considered not as 'givens' (data) but as ideal 
'objecticities' possessing their own sufficiency" (DR 159/206).4 Deleuze argues for 
the transcendental priority of these 'problematic fields' with regard to the multiple 
'solutions' of which they may be capable (ibid). However, in a television interview 
from the 1990's, he provides a paradoxical account of the order in which problems 
are brought to light by philosophers working on them: 
the philosopher's task is already that of exposing the concepts that he is in the 
process of creating, so he can't expose the problems on top of that, or at least one can 
discover these problems only through the concepts being created. [But] if you 
haven't found the problem to which a concept corresponds, everything re~ains 
abstract ... The creation of a concept always occurs as the function of a problem.) 
The problem itself cannot be expounded until after the concepts articulating the 
problem have been put in place.6 Now Deleuze's insistence here would seem to rule 
out straightaway any attempt to formulate foundational principles; not just that, but it 
would particularly rule out the possibility of an adequately self-grounding principle 
4 It is the 'sufficiency' I wish to emphasise at the moment, rather than the 'objecticity·. which is 
broached in chapter 4. 
5 L 'Abecedaire de Gilles Deleuze, dir. P-A. Boutang (Video Editions Montparnasse). "H comme 
Histoire de la Philosophie' . . . . .' 
6 "One might wonder why the problem isn't stated clearly by a philoso~h~r smce It certaInly eXIsts In 
his work, but it's because one can't do everything at once", A becedaire , IbId. 
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or syste~ as the problem would always exceed its conceptual expression.7 But isn't 
precisely the concern of the post-Kantians to superimpose the issue of the problem of 
metacritique, the problem of self-grounding, upon its conceptual actualisation? In 
these terms, then, let us take Fichte's 1794 Wissenschaftslehre as an example. The'!', 
says Fichte, is not only a transcendental highest principle, but is also self-grounding. 8 
But, Deleuze would ask, to which problem does the requirement of a self-grounding 
principle of such a character respond? To this the Fichtean can respond in two 
complementary ways. Firstly, he can respond that the Idea of a self-grounding, 
principled system is intrinsic to philosophy itself in its highest form;9 he can identify 
his problem as the problem of philosophy itself Secondly, he can claim that his 
system nevertheless accounts for itself in its own terms, that is, states the problem to 
which it responds in the terms of the concepts that are developed at the basis of the 
system: the problem that leads Fichte to the writing of the Wissenschaftslehre is thus 
a manifestation of the striving of the I towards its full absolute status. However, 
Deleuze could reply that neither this preliminary Idea nor this accounting for itself is 
equivalent to the self-determination of the fundamental concepts at the basis of the 
system. The Idea comes first, and the self-accounting must come after. Even at the 
highest level of philosophy, whether it is conceived in ontological or critical terms, 
the fundamental concepts can only be justified after, and within, their elaboration, yet 
must nonetheless be conceived as responses to a problem that subsists before. 
Nevertheless, the 'Idea of philosophy itself' can only be expressed in the concepts 
that give the Idea form, just as the self-accounting must be limited to the structure 
permitted by the conceptual form. Deleuze would then be pointing out, metacritically, 
7 In Dialogues, Deleuze states that "philosophy always begins in the middle"; he suggests that 
Spinoza's Ethics carmot be said to 'begin' with the notions of substance and attribute, because they 
already presuppose a field which is best articulated in terms of the problem of 'expression'. (ibid 62). 
This is indeed the strategy of De leuze's monumental Spinoza and the Problem o/Expression (1968). 
8 Fichte, Science of Knowledge, trans. P. Heath & 1. Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1982), #1. . 
9 Despite his criticisms of Kant for restricting critique to merely propaedeutic status, Fichte contmues 
to preface his system with important propaedeutics, such as Concerning the Concept of the 
Wissenschaftslehre (in Early Philosophical Writings, trans. D. Breazeale. Ithaca: Co~ell 19~8) and the 
'First & Second Introductions' to the Wissenschaftslehre (trans. D. Breazeale. IndianapolIs: Hackett 
1994). In his early phase Hegel too provided an outline of the Idea of philosophy: cf. the sectIOn on 
'The Need of Philosophy' in The Difftrence between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy 
(Albany: SUNY 1977), 89-94. 
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that the problem has no expression outside of its conceptual articulation, yet at the 
same time the problem must have a status that subsists outside the concepts 
formulated in the system. 
This may seem like a hermeneutic point about philosophies that claim to be 
immanently self-grounding. However, what if Deleuze too wants to achieve a 
philosophy of self-grounding immanence? Deleuze has, after all, stated that problems 
are transcendental. Now, the term 'transcendental' is often used in a vague sense to 
mean some structure that provides general conditions for the form or existence of a 
group of particulars or propositions. However, I would maintain that Deleuze intends 
'transcendental' in a rigorous sense. That is, he intends his transcendental account of 
problems to be able to exhibit an apriori demonstration and justification of its 
internal relation to experience. Thus the point cannot simply be hermeneutic. But if 
this is the case, then Deleuze's 'transcendental' notion would seem to appeal to a 
distinctly Platonic hypothesis that problems must be wordlessly and nonconceptually 
prior to their definition and articulation. One's first objection, then, is: how can you 
justify this 'concept' of 'problems' in general? 
There is a tension in the notion of problem already present in the passage 
quoted earlier from the Hume book, where Deleuze writes that "only one kind of 
objection is worthwhile: the objection which shows that the question [ie. problem] 
raised by a philosopher is not a good question [ie. problem], that it does not force the 
nature of things enough".l0 A circle seems quickly to form: firstly, the nature of 
things is referred to the philosophical problematic that organised them; then 'the 
nature of things' returns almost as a Fichtean Anstoss, or at least a kind of 
philosophical conscience. Is Deleuze really alert to the labyrinth that awaits the 
philosopher who attempts to deal with the problem of metacritique? 
Deleuze's concept of the problem seems to work on two levels. Firstly, it 
applies to the history of philosophy. To do history of philosophy is to discover a 
previous philosopher's problem in a way that they themselves could not appreciate it 
Moreover, one cannot criticise another philosopher without fully divining what their 
10 Empiricism and Subjectivity. 107. 
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problem is. 11 But Deleuze' s view here seems to open itself up to a fragmentation of 
the history of philosophy. It becomes impossible to construct a 'history of 
philosophy' that is anything else than a discontinuous fabric of concepts 'belono-ino-' 
b b 
to 'great philosophers' .12 Secondly, the accuracy of the 'divination' of a previous 
philosopher's problem surely depends on the current concepts of the present 
philosopher: aren't they also trapped in their own problematic fields? 
These problems reach a 'critical' pitch at the 'transcendental' level of the 
concept of the problem. How is Deleuze's concept of a problem exempt from its own 
logic? What is his probleJ?1? This is the 'problem' that stares anyone in the face who 
is both 'doing the history of philosophy' in relation to Deleuze, and attempting to 
work out how his philosophy is metacritically justified. 
There are two aspects to this latter issue. First of all, how is one to make sense 
of this notion that problems are nonconceptually prior to their conceptualisation? 
This, I suggest, can be dealt with if we unfold Deleuze's properly transcendental 
theory, in which "problems or Ideas" form a distinct part of the hierarchy of objects 
for synthesis; I will attempt to do this in the body of the thesis. Secondly, though, 
there remains the reflexive problem of how Deleuze's own theory can be justified in 
its own terms: is there a 'special' problem that animates Deleuze? Thus the first 
metacritical criterion of the relation of problem and solution refers us to the central 
issues of metacritical reflexivity dealt with by the post-Kantians, 
II Circularity 
The criteria for the success of metacritique are fundamentally separate from the 
criteria for success of other philosophical problems, in large part because of its 
awkward position with regard to the issue of the truth. As Kant, Fichte, Schelling and 
Hegel are providing accounts of how knowledge and truth are possible, the issue of 
11 I use the word 'divine' advisedlY, In Bergsonism, Deleuze writes "True freedom lies in the power to 
decide, to constitute problems the~selves, And this 'semi ~vine' power entails the disappearance of 
false problems as much as the creative upsurge of true ones , ,15, " , 
12 Such a situation is familiar: if someone criticises, say, Heldegger from a Hegehan Slandpomt. 11 IS 
not unusual to hear the reply that Heidegger is 'doing something else', TItis ex-presses a general 
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which of their philosophies is the best cannot be judged according to some 
independent criteria of truth. How is one account of trut~ whether it be 
transcendental or absolute, to be preferred over another? Plainly, such accounts 
cannot be judged as to their truth. The criterion for the success of a metacritical 
system cannot involve the correspondence of the structures detailed in the system 
with the 'facts' accounted for by the system. Nor can a coherentist account of truth by 
itself solve the problem, as claims are only judged as coherent within the frame of 
reference that is being asked about ('facts' are not coherent by themselves). Finally, 
to take the view that coherentist accounts of truth allow for fallibility and revisability, 
and therefore permit a virtuously circular account of truth that can apply 
metacritically as well, would seem to depend on a pragmatic account of truth. But 
pragmatism is immediately incompatible with the whole project of critique and 
. . 13 
metacntlque. 
As suggested above, the issue of whether a system can be grounded in its own 
terms is vital to philosophy with a metacritical dimension. But even this most abstract 
of requirements is potentially open to confusion. First of all, it must be pointed out 
that the general requirement of self-grounding is really separate from whether the 
structure of the system itself is formally conceived in terms of its self-justification. 
Two great modem philosophies, Hegel's and Heidegger's, have made it central to 
their very form that the 'way in' to their philosophical structures is a part of the 
unfolding of the structure itself For Hegel this procedure is phenomenological and 
dialectical, for Heidegger phenomenological and hermeneutic. Both of these 
procedures make a virtue of circularity. Circularity serves as the assurance that 'we' 
who start out on the path of understanding a system will be able to account for 
ourselves and 'come back to ourselves' with a renewed systematic understanding of , 
who 'we' are. While Fichte and Schelling employ circularity, only in Hegel does this 
circularity actually form the structure of every part of the system. 
problem with philosophy in a post-Kantian age: how is one to relate metacritical systems to each 
~~ f" d 
13 This of course does not rule out the possibility that the failure of the project 0 cntIque an 
metacritique might result in pragmatism. 
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But what is the preCIse role of the criterion of circularity in securing 
metacritical validity? As suggested, it must be distinguished from entanglement with 
criteria of truth. For instance, the systematic explanation of the 'facts' of who we feel 
ourselves to be is not of itself grounded by the circular voyage of Hegel's system. 
Nor can Hegel's theory be sufficiently justified by his account of what happens in 
history, no more than Kant should be able to rely on selective details about the 
character of experience to ground the structure of possible experience. Circularity in 
such cases would be as good as the 'facts' and relations upon which it depends. The 
ground can only be the ground of the grounded for reasons internal to the structure of 
the ground itself (and of grounds in general). 
The formal circularity of a system that includes its beginning in its end is thus 
really an exemplary effect of a successful enactment of a metacritique, but it does not 
of itself provide a criterion for its success. In fact, an inordinate focus on circularity 
can lead to a skewed view of metacritical criteria. It is such an approach, I think, that 
is often responsible for Hegel's philosophy being described as a philosophy of 
'closure', 'identity', or 'totality', as in Habermas's account of metacritique in 
Knowledge and Human Interests,I4 where such closure is countered by reintroducing 
a potential infinity into the actual reflexive process of metacritique. But this 
opposition is the product of a misunderstanding. Firstly, the internal, general success 
of a system might indeed be realised without closure in its special details or in its 
empirical instantiation. Metatheoretical, structural closure does not entail closure in 
the system for which it accounts. IS Therefore, one shouldn't assume Hegel's system 
is complete or 'identical' in the sense Habermas thinks it is. Secondly, the idea that 
metacritique must become more and more socially determined stands to confuse the 
issue, as the object of metacritique clearly has to remain of the same kind as the 
metacritique itself. Habermas treats quite distinct criteria of metacritique as if they 
were a matter of degree. There may be certain fundamental metacritical criteria that 
remain quite untouched by social issues. 
14 Habermas Know/edge and Human Interests, 20. 
15 See 1. Pi;get, Structuralism, trans. C. Maschler (London: Routledg~, 197.1) l~f. for an a~~o~nt of 
how very simple structures operating together may lead to potentIally lnfinite compleXl~. The 
My general point is that even though a metacritique requires circularity at 
some point, this does not imply that 'monocentric' circularity is either the main 
character or the motor of the metacritical system. In fact, the proliferation of 
epicycles in Hegel's system is positively Ptolemaic. Moreover as Deleuze will sh 
, ow, 
it is even possible to come up with radical structural variations of the same 
metacritically justified system. 
III Systematicity 
The burden of metacritique thus seems to shift to criteria for the systematic coherence 
of the ground. However, I suggest now that it is possible to see Deleuze's work on the 
history of philosophy as a reductio of the criterion of self-grounding systematicity. 
Each text precisely presents a philosopher in terms of a fully articulated, self-
contained system. 16 Now, above we asked what the problem is that animates 
Deleuze's theory of problems, thus initiating our investigation into reflexivity. But if 
Deleuze's work does indeed circulate around a common problem, why does he 
devote so much effort and ingenuity to constructing a series of systems which, in the 
detail, are often incompatible?17 The very production of a plurality of philosophical 
systems would seem to imply a necessary incompatibility between these systems, if 
those systems claimed to be what, traditionally, philosophical systems claim to be: ie. 
self-grounding ideal constructions of mutually supporting, integrated propositions. 
An interesting and rare statement made by Deleuze about his own philosophy begins 
to address this situation : 
I believe in philosophy as system. I dislike the notion of system that is related to the 
coordinates of Identity, Resemblance and Analogy. It is Leibniz, I think, who first 
identifies system and philosophy. I adhere to the sense he gave to this. The questions 
about 'overcoming philosophy' or 'the death of philosophy' have never touched me. 
relevance of this will become clearer in chapter 4.3.iii when Deleuze's use of structuralism is 
examined 
16 Deleuze furthennore never provides a cross-reference from any of his texts to another. 
17 Inevitable confusion ensues when one seeks Deleuze's ideas in his work on other philosophers. Ho" 
are we to decide which element is Deleuzian and which just proper to the philosopher being studied? 
How, for instance, is one to square the notions of 'active' and 'reactive forces'. in .\'ietzsche and 
Philosophy with the account of instinct and intelligence in Bergsonism, or the doctnne of the facultIes 
in Kant's Critical Philosophy? They are sinlply not compatible, and their 'coherence' should mstead 
be referred to their metacriticaI status as problematic systems. 
I feel I am a very classical philosopher. For me, system should be not 1 . 
I h " h on y ill perpetua eterogenelty, It s ould be a heterogenesis' this it seems to me has 
been attempted. 18 '" never 
Nevertheless, if one can create a mUltiplicity of internally valid philosophical 
systems, doesn't this put the very notion of system into doubt? Inasmuch as each 
system would conform to the criteria of systematicity, there would exist an 
extrasystematic set of criteria, which would presumably have an extrasystematic 
validity. But by what right, if systematicity itself is supposed to constitute the criteria 
for validity? Most importantly, if multiple systems could be produced using the 
criteria of systematicity, wouldn't this render ineffectual the validity of systematicity 
as a criterion? That is, doesn't systematicity necessarily involve not just self-
grounding, but unity and completion (totality) as criteria? The absurdity of this 
position seems only to be heightened by Deleuze's comments in a 1980 interview, 
where he argues that, despite the contemporary sense of a breakdown of systems, or 
of an age of fragmentation, "systems have in fact lost absolutely none of their power. 
All of the groundwork for a theory of so-called open systems is in place in current 
science and logic,,19. For the question immediately arises: if this groundwork is in 
place, then what can philosophy, and specifically De1euze as a philosopher, 
contribute to actualise the plan? What is stopping him? 
In effect, Deleuze's stance here seems to produce a skepticism towards the 
notion of systematicity. We return to a point made by Fichte, that it is entirely 
possible "to ground a system upon a groundless and indemonstrable proposition: the 
proposition, for example, that there are in the air creatures with human desires, 
passions, and concepts, but with ethereal bodies".20 Fichte's way out was through the 
attainment of a self-grounding principle that is absolutely certain. If we do not have 
an independent moment of certainty or self-evidence as a criterion, might we not find 
ourselves lost without a thread in the labyrinth ofDe1euze's multiple systems? 
18 'Lettre-preface de Gilles Deleuze', in J-c. Martin, Variations (paris: Editions Payo!, 1993). p. 7 
19 Negotiations, 31-2. 
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iv Self-consciousness and the Antinomy of Post-Kantianism 
Now, very briefly, I would suggest that the development of post-Kantianism revolves 
around a particular antinomy that can be stated here succinctly, but is developed 
throughout the thesis through a return to Kant's own position on its elements. In order 
to avoid the charge of creating self-grounding systems that are ultimately arbitrary, 
post-Kantianism appeals fundamentally to the primacy of self-consciousness as its 
criterion of indubitable certainty. Yet the status of this appeal remains unstable. 
Either self-consciousness provides the fundamental form through which 
intellectual intuition once again asserts its rights. Kant's entire problem of how 
synthetic apriori knowledge is possible is 'solved' because the 'gap' between 
knowing, thinking and acting subject and things in themselves is overcome. 21 But the 
danger with this alternative is that it relies too much on the empirical, immediate 
'fact' or experience of self-consciousness,22 which was criticised most profoundly by 
Kant in his Paralogisms of Pure Reason. 
Or the certainty is expressed as an indubitable nonempirical, transcendental 
principle, which thus avoids the problem of the Paralogisms. Thus the primacy of 
self-consciousness is pre-reflexive, and if it is immediate, its validity and priority can 
only be inferred through transcendental argument. But this risks becoming detached 
from what it grounds altogether, and thus becoming metaphysical. 
This, I claim, is the core problematic of post-Kantianism III its 'classic' 
version of the period from 1789 (starting with Reinhold's ElementaJphilosophie) to 
1807 (Hegel's Phenomenology).23 Leaving aside for a moment Hegel's ultimate 
solution of the antinomy, there is an important tendency that also radiates from the 
core antinomy at the tum of the nineteenth century. The antithesis of the antinomy 
pointed towards a ground beyond reflection, and there remains the possibility of 
20 Fichte, Concerning the Concept o/the Wissenschaftslehre. p. 101. ... 
~1 I show in chapters 1-3 how 'Kant's problem' arose out of the disappearance of the poSSIbIlIty of 
intellectual intuition. . 
22 While Fichte does insist that the self-positing of the I is not a Tatsache (~act) .. what he objects to In 
this formulation is not the Tat but the Sache. The latter term suggests a reificatlon of the act of self-
positing. Hence he coins the tenn Tathandlung, which is not sinlply translated as '.act'. but is an act 
which is simultaneously a fact. Cf. 'Re\'iew of Aenesidemus', Ear(y Philosophical ffntmgs. p. 6~. 
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turning the focus of theoretical and practical activity away from grounding. and 
towards teleology. This tendency initially involves Holderlin and Novalis and the 
later Reinhold.24 The notion of time becomes speculatively important for this strain, 
for instance in Holderlin's mourning for a 'lost' being, and in the role of poetic 
'romanticisation' in teleologically figuring the future for Novalis. I suggest in 
chapters 4 & 6 that this turn to time and telos in both of these poet-thinkers plays a 
part (only sometimes explicit) in Deleuze's theory of repetition and the syntheses of 
memory and future. However, the teleologies of Holderlin and Novalis remain 
regulative and hypothetical without the ontological moves out of the antinomy made 
by Hegel and Deleuze. 
Now, if this post-Kantian antinomy is taken as all-consuming, then it can 
appear as if it and the period during which it unfolded are in tum framed by two 
newly obscured penumbrae. On the one side, Kant's own system risks getting 
distorted through the lens of post-Kantianism. Firstly, I claim it is not blind to issues 
of metacritique (see chapter 1). Secondly, it does not, on the whole, appeal to the 
methodological and systematic primacy of self-consciousness (chapter 5). Thirdly, 
the developments of the post-Kantians on the issues of self-consciousness are 
achieved at the expense of the suppression of the claims of the Paralogisms (chapter 
5).25 
The other side of the core antinomy is more problematic for it concerns Hegel. 
There is a problem here because some readers of Hegel might contend that he could 
in fact fall into either alternative of the antinomy as I conceive it. For instance, 
Stanley Rosen and Manfred Frank claim that Hegel does in the end rely on 
intellectual intuition,26 while others have claimed that Hegel's system finally rests on 
23 As we will see, there is a 'counter-history' which involves texts by G.E. Schulze (Aenesidemus) and 
Solomon Maimon. 
24 Cf Manfred Frank, 'Philosophical Foundations of Early Romanticism', in K. Ameriks & D. ~turma 
eds., The Modern Subject (Albany: SUNY, 1995), 68f; and Jane E. Kneller, 'Romantic Conceptions of 
the Self in HOlderlin and Novalis'. in D. Klemm & G. ZOller, Figuring the Self(Albany: SUNY 19?7). 
25 It is telling that for the opponents of the German idealists, such as A.--enesi~emus, the ParalogIsms 
were held up as the one successful development achieved by Kant s project; .cf G.~. Schulze. 
'Aenesidemus', in G. di Giovanni & H.S. Harris eds .. Between Kant and Hegel (Indianapohs: Hackett. 
?6000), ~26-129. . . . Frank. 
For different accounts, see S. Rosen, G. fLF. Hegel (New Haven. Yale, 1974). 266f., Manfred 
'Schelling's Critique of Hegel and the Beginning of Marxian Dialectics', Idealistic Studies (19, 1989). 
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a combination of transcendental and coherentist claims.27 However, one can also 
argue that Hegel does indeed make a breakthrough concerning this antinomy, as does 
Deleuze. 
v Two Resolutions of Metacritique 
In the wake of Schelling, Hegel's notion of the absolute manages to combine both the 
grounding and the teleological directions of the two currents just mentioned; it points 
both forward and backward. What Hegel does is to follow through the very notion of 
metacritique, as a critique that can fully account for itself in its own terms, at the 
levels of both experience and its conditions, in such a way that not only do they imply 
each other (as in Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism and Ideas for the 
Philosophy of Nature, in which the subjective and objective poles are developed 
separately but are held to imply each other), but they must be expressed together, in a 
continuous, circular development. Gillian Rose includes all non-Hegelian attempts to 
resolve the issue of metacritique, including Habermas's, in the category of 'neo-
Kantianism', which is caught in a continual 'bad infinity' concerning the accounting 
for its own transcendental conditions.28 But while she appeals to the Hegelian 
absolute (or 'infinity') as a formally adequate way of resolving this problem, we 
should specify the two levels on which Hegel fulfills the task of metacritique in a 
distinctive way. 
1. Hegel's account of consciousness and its object in the opening stages of 
the Phenomenology (especially the 'Introduction') is thoroughly metacritical in that it 
shows how consciousness itself must always be self-conscious. Rather than simply 
starting with the act of self-consciousness, Hegel generates the importance of sel f-
consciousness through showing the necessary dependence of all consciousness on a 
27 The coherentism here refers to the mutual referring of transcendental claims, not empirical o~es. Cf. 
Robert Pippin, Hegel's Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 94-108. TIus latter 
camp is much more various. d h 
28 G. Rose, Hegel contra SOciology, 42, 92: "If God is mUrnowable, we are mUrnowable. an ence 
powerless". While rightly emphasising the necessity for an absolute, Rose rests her accoun~ o~ how this 
is to be secured firstly o~ a (to my mind dubious) conflation of phenomenology and genesIs ill general 
(whereas in Hegel the two are separate; cf. 59, 188), and secondly on an unanalysed presupPOSItIon of 
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parallel dimension of speculative self-consciousness, which the former consciousness 
must always use to account for itself, in however a rudimentary way. An initial, 
"abstract" definition of consciousness is all that is needed: "consciousness 
simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time relates itself 
to it, or, as it is said, this something exists for consciousness".29 But this abstract form 
never appears in itself, only in its concrete variations. Thus the transcendental is 
developed internally to the very articulation of the experience of consciousness itself 
In general, Hegel shows how the circularity of philosophical reflexivity is implied in 
all kinds of experience, by exposing the dimension of speculative experience. Thus 
whereas for Kant the relation between experience and its conditions was continually 
caught in a potential regress because the two never 'met', Hegel interweaves 
experience with its speculative grounding. Speculative dialectic enabled one to be 
both 'in' and 'out' of experience. The task of accounting for critique - metacritique -
was not an infinite regress, because not only the first moves of critique, but the very 
first moves of consciousness, involved a metacritical double. Not only was the 
philosopher always already in the dimension of metacritique, but so was any subject 
at all. This offers a true resolution of an antinomy, in that it shows how neither side of 
the antinomy - the transcendental, nor experience - is privileged. 
2. Given this resolution to the problem of metacritique in each experience 
and each condition of experience, Hegel's task was to order all possible experiences 
and conditions into an all. Dialectic would allow experience and thought to justify 
itself progressively and exhaustively, thus realising in the fullest way the project of 
the self-critique of reason. In the Phenomenology, for instance, experience is united 
in a progressively complex fashion "for us", the readers of the book. In tum, Hegel's 
system in its entirety is an attempt to break through the post-Kantian antinomy and 
articulate the true roles of our first three criteria, problematicity, circularity, and 
systematicity. Firstly, with regard to problematicity, not only does Hegel uncover 
transcendental structures, but these structures express the process of problematisation 
and the conceptual articulation of problems. Dialectic is thus the intrinsic ordering of 
a "natural attitude" in epistemological and social forms (cf. 64, 184). Once again. ~e social emphasis 
in metacritical questions ends up distracting from formal and epistemological questIOns. 
29 . . AV Mill (Oxfi d' Oxfiord Universitv Press. 1977),52. HegeL Phenomenology ojSpmt, trans. . er. or. . . 
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problems. Whereas Plato's dialectic remained problematic, always ordered according 
to hypotheses, Hegel's notion that each problem is a determinate negation of simpler 
problems gives the dialectic a self-grounding form, and nests all problems within 
each other. Secondly, with regard to circularity, as Jean Hyppolite says, Hegel's 
system is an attempt to make Being say its own sense (or meaning)?O Being achieves 
full expression in its own articulation through history and philosophy. Thirdly, with 
regard to systematicity, each part of Hegel's absolute is utterly transparent to every 
other part; if there be contingency, and thus opacity, in the system, then this is 
because it is necessary that there be contingency in certain restricted regions of the 
absolute. 
But although these two mam Hegelian innovations, at the levels of 
consciousness and system, seem to express the very notion of metacritique to its 
fullest apogee, they are not the only solution. Firstly, I suggest in chapter 5.4.i that the 
notion that consciousness is intrinsically an activity of "distinguishing and relating" 
can be questioned by opening up a new historical context. Kant himself does not 
necessarily hold to such an essence of consciousness, and the adequacy and 
implications of the notion of 'distinguishing and relating' were a topic of direct 
concern in critiques by G.E. Schulze (or Aenesidemus) and Solomon Maimon of 
Reinhold's account of consciousness. In fact, it is peculiar that Hegel's "abstract" 
presentation of the basic structure of consciousness mirrors exactly Reinhold's 
formulation of the "fact" of consciousness. 31 The question is: how much work is the 
abstract notion doing, despite the fact that it never "appears" as such? In chapters 1 & 
2 I argue both that the question of consciousness is secondary to the issues of the 
Kantian distinction between logic and reality, and that the structure of transcendental 
reflection in Kant should be distinguished from the notion of the reflexivity of 
consciousness. 
With regard to the second Hegelian point, it may be possible to envisage an 
alternative development of the three criteria of problematicity, circularity, and 
systematicity. To begin in a reverse order, firstly it may be possible to conform to the 
30 1. Hyppolite, Logic and Existence (Albany: SUNY, 1997), 175., S~e lntr~uc~io~ below 
31 Cf Reinhold 'The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge, ill G. di GIO\anru & H.S. Harris. 
BelYveen Kant and Hegel, 70-74. 
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systematic criterion of metacritique - that every part of the system be fully accounted 
for - without implying that each part must be accounted for in the terms of all the 
others. Being says its own sense in Hegel's philosophy: but Hegel takes this 'saying' 
to be a collective articulation. Might there not be a distributive notion of the absolute 
in which each part of the system is fully self-justified in absolute terms, but is 
nevertheless not articulated through all the others? Nor would each part have equal 
value in the light of the eternal self-saying of being. The full self-justification of a 
metacritical system does not imply its uniform, single articulation. There may be 
parts of the absolute that can be fully justified, but cannot themselves be actually 
organised collectively with each other. I contend that Deleuze's attention to modal 
issues (roughly, a greater emphasis on the logic of possibility than Hegel, who 
emphasises actuality) creates an alternative path to the absolute. Secondly, as we have 
already shown, circularity may be a rather empty criterion for metacritique, and not 
as intrinsically necessary to metacritique as has been thought. Thirdly, the Platonic 
notion of dialectic will for Deleuze be a more profound conception of problems than 
Hegel's dialectic. Moreover, the problematic status of an Idea, for Deleuze, does not 
preclude its reality, or even its absolute status. For Deleuze, navigating between 
Platonic, Kantian and Hegelian conceptions of dialectic, there will be an alternative 
way of understanding the absolute Idea. 
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Appendix II Novalis and the Schematism 
Kant's Schematism is the starting point for his demonstration of the apriori intuitive 
form taken by the pure concepts of the understanding. Kant suggests that time is more 
general than space because while all outer sense must take place in inner sense not 
, 
all inner sense must take place in outer sense (cf A1391B178); therefore the 
schematism must be considered as "transcendental time-determination" (ibid). 
However, in the second edition CPR Kant modifies his views on the priority of inner 
sense by suggesting through the Refutation of Idealism that all inner sense must be 
referred to outer sense; nevertheless he does not correspondingly modify the 
Schematism. We have already seen Maimon's perspective on the mutual relation of 
space and time; Novalis too returns to this ambiguity in Kant, but in his case to 
develop a notion that there can be different forms of space-time indexed to different 
material forms?2 The notion of schematism becomes the crucial means of not only 
demonstrating the compatibility of conceptual with intuitive form, but of generating 
the material variations of Ideas in space-time. 
In his Fichte-Studien, Novalis develops an unusual hybrid of Kant's notion of 
schematism and Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, which he calls "magical idealism,,33 
Fichte's theory of the mutual relations between the I and not-I arises out of a 
fundamental distribution of transcendental and empirical accounts of the activity of 
the I. Transcendentally, the absolute I must be considered to limit itself, because its 
other is always understood as its other.34 Empirically ("conditioned as to content"), 
the I experiences this other as a not-I, in the face of which it acts in two different 
ways?5 Firstly, theoretically, it is faced with the not-I as an object of knowledge~ 
32 Cf. Navalis, Werke, II, 250 for one of Navalis' earliest appraisals of the importance of the 
schematism. "What kind of theory am I seeking? I seek to order what thinks in us - to bnng to order 
the transfonnations in us - and to fornI [bilden] an intWtye and conceptual whole out of them. 
according to wh.ich I can then order my inner appearances, and e),.l'lain [them]. One schema for 
myself' (all translations from Navalis are my own except where stated). . 
33'For contemporary appraisals of the importance of Novalis' philosophy, see lE. Kneller. 'Ro~nc 
Conceptions of the Self in HOlderlin and Navalis', in Klenun & Zoller (eds.). Figurin~ the Subject 
(Albany: SUNY 1997). and M. Frank, 'Philosophical Foundations of Early RomantIClsm . ill Amenks 
(ed), The A10dem Subject (Albany: SUNY 1995). 
34 Fichte, Science o/Knowledge, Part L #1. 93-102. 
35 Fichte, ibid #2-3, 102-9. 
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secondly, practically, it can act upon this not-I in order to dominate and overcome it 
For Fichte, the I can only realise its absolute status at an infinite practical horizon: it 
can never be the absolute I, but it ought to be it. For Holderlin, Schelling and Hegel. 
the fact that the I remained forever separated from itself in infinite striving \vas a 
symptom of a residual and intensified Kantian dualism in Fichte; they tend to 
concentrate on the structural limits in Fichte's account of the I and not-I in the first 
part of the Wissenschaftslehre. However, Novalis' contribution in his Fichte-Studien 
is to focus less on the ultimate horizon ofFichte's account than on the sections on the 
"interdetermination" of the I and not-I/6 the progressively realised "middle" in the 
ongoing striving of the I in relation to the not-I. There are actual results in this 
striving, which should not be downplayed because they appear to be dwarfed by the 
infinite horizon. The not-I is perpetually undergoing a formation or Bildung by which 
it becomes open to the absolute within itself, while on the other hand, the I realises 
itself materially. 
The proposition: I detennines not-I - is the principle of the theoretical part, and the 
proposition: I is detennined - is the principle of the practical part. The practical part 
comprises the self-fonnation [Bi/dung] of the I towards becoming capable of that 
communication - the theoretical part comprises the characteristics of genuine 
communication ... The practical part comprises the Bildung of the not-I towards 
becoming capable of experiencing a true influence, a true communication with the I -
'7 thereby also the parallel self-fonnation of the L.) 
In Fichtean philosophy, the determinations of the I articulate the sensible world, and 
thus "become intuitable"; the intellectual intuition of the absolute I is in effect 
'retrieved' by the striving of the empirical I. In exactly the same movement, Novalis 
reasons, "external things [are made] into thoughts".38 Novalis takes Fichte's notion of 
interdetermination very literally, and proceeds to project it as a synthetiC method for 
the genesis of real forms in nature, from psychology right down to mineralogy and 
geology.39 He envisages a new "magical idealism" as a consequence of the mutual 
36 Cf. Fichte, &ience of Knowledge_ Part II. 127L and especially the analysiS. of "feeling" in ~ III. 7 
37 Novalis, 'Logologica1 Fragments', # 20, translated by M. Stoljar in Novalis. Philosophical If ntm,~s 
(SUNY 1997), 53, translation modified. 
38 'Allgemeine Brouillon'. ibid, 126. _ . 
39 Cf Fichte-Studien # 645-7, 1Yerke III, 386-387 on analysis and ~nthesis. Cf # 6)7_ If erke III. 391. 
where Fichte is held to teach the unity of Tatsachen and Tathandlungen. ~acts and actIons III 
conceptual and real ex-perimentation Here Novalis outlines the ways in which concepts can be 
constructed and re\'ised with the help of schemata. 
realisation of nature and mind in this interdetermination. ''Fichte taught _ and 
discovered - the active use of our spiritual organ. Has Fichte perhaps discovered the 
laws of the active use of the organs in general? Intellectual intuition is nothing 
else".40 "Magic is the art of using the senses at will".41 
It is this interplay between the determination of thought and the 
determinability of intuition that requires a rereading of the schematism. ''Bodies are 
thoughts precipitated and crystallised in space".42 Novalis criticises Kant's 
mathematical schematism of space and time for remaining at the level of merel y 
"visible rules of the order of manifold space or of extensive objects".43 In the same 
passage, he states that Kant's doctrine remains restricted to "outer sensibility", by 
which he means not "outer sense" in Kant's sense, but something more along the 
lines of the "extensive magnitudes" we met earlier. He echoes the argument we have 
already encountered in Maimon about the reciprocity of time and space, and thus 
gestures in the direction of an "intensive" model of spatiotemporal differentiation: 
Time and space come into being together and are therefore probably one, like subject 
and object. Space is enduring time - time is fluid, variable space. Space - the basis of 
everything enduring - time - the basis of everything changeable. Space is the schema 
- time is the concept (genesis) of this schema.44 
As a mineralogist, Novalis looks to fossils and gems as "schemata of inner 
transformations",45 and likens the "synthetic method" to a "freezing', and then a 
"crystallising, figuring, successive method", by which physical schematisms generate 
the Bildung of the I in the not-I. If fossils are congealed time, then so are minerals, 
gems and tourmalines the result of a specific Bildung that could only occur within a 
precise coordination of certain physical 'singularities' over long periods of time. 
''Every body has its time - every time its body". 46 
40 'Logological Fragments II', ibid, 74. 
41 Ibid, 61. 
42 Novalis, Fichte-Studien, # 942, Werke, TIl, 449. . .. fi the case 
43Novalis, Kant-Eschenmeyer-Studien, # 46, Werke, II, 390. He repeats the same cntIClsm or 
oftime. . . . IF . . 1l~ Cf 136: 
4--1 Novalis, Fichte-Studien # 809, Werke Ill, 427; translated m Phrlosophlcal ntmgs. _. . 
"Time is inner space':'" space is outer time". 
45 Novalis. Fichte-Studien # 682, Werke Ill, 389. 
46 Philosophical Writings, 136. 
Appendix III Aenesidemus and the Idea of the Subject in Kant's 0 us 
posthumum P 
In his Aenesidemus (1792), G.E. Schulze asks whether the Kantian subject should not 
be thought as an Idea. If the synthetic apriori laws of experience, founded in the 
'transcendental subject', are to be true, they cannot themselves be subject to mere 
appearance. But if this is so, claims 'Aenesidemus' (Schulze's pseudonym), then the 
mind must have some noumenal status, or at least be a transcendental Idea.47 But the 
first of these suggestions would conflict directly with the Paralogisms, while Ideas, 
for Kant, cannot give us knowledge of any reality.48 Aenesidemus therefore claims 
that Kant does not successfully provide any synthetic apriori truths, and has not 
defeated Humean skepticism. He cannot give an apriori answer to the fundamental 
question posed by both Locke and Leibniz, ''where do the representations that we 
possess originate, and how do they come to be in US?,,49 
I suggest that it is interesting for this thesis to tum to Kant's response to 
Aenesidemus' criticisms. Aenesidemus doubts whether anything corresponds to 
Kantian representations. Kant's first reaction in a letter of 4 December 1792 to 1. S, 
Beck, is to quibble over the meaning of the word 'representation', which can only 
mean "a determination in us that we relate to something else" (C 445, Ak. 11: 395), 
However, this statement is opaque, as on Kant's own terms 'relation to an O~ject' 
implies no reference outside the representations themselves. Is he then referring to 
the notion that intuitions as receptive must refer outside themselves') But this is also , , 
hard to imagine, as a few weeks earlier in his important correspondence with Beck, 
he had begun to doubt this very presupposition: ''Perhaps you can avoid defining 
'sensibility' right at the outset in terms of 'receptivity', that is, the kind of 
representations that occur in the subject insofar as the subject is affected by objects, 
Perhaps you can identify it rather as that which, in a cognition, constitutes merely the 
relation of representation to the subject" (C 400, Ak, 11 :315),50 Evidence in OP in 
47 Schulze, 'Aenesidemus', 122. 
48 Ibid 127-9. 
49 Ib'dlO-9 1 ~- . be 1791' "The CrlflqllC 50 J.S. Beck had begIDl to press Kant on this problem in a letter of 11 Novem, r, . 
., 'eli 1 b' t But ill fact a rcpresentauon 
calls 'intuition' a representatlOn which related rrnme ate y to an 0 ~ec . , , " ' 
th 'S' ce intUItIOn similarh acqUires does not become objective until it is subsumed under e categones, ill . 
fact shows that Aenesidemus had encouraged a deep transformation in Kant's 
thought, precisely concerning this issue of representation, which in turn was to be 
precisely related to a new notion of the subject as Idea. 
Now, in CPR, Kant had begun to emphasise what he called the "paradox of 
the inner sense", whereby the transcendental subject could only experience itself as 
affected by itself through time (B67-69, B152-56). Moreover, in the Refutation of 
Idealism he had also said that inner sense was conditioned by outer sense; it was not 
possible to experience time without spatial permanence. These moves would seem to 
introduce the possibility of a new merely empirical criterion for self-identity as 
reidentification of the states of one's body. But the context in CJ and OP shows the 
situation is more complex. We have seen (in chapter 3.3.iii.) that in the first 
introduction to CJ Kant shows how "a system of experience" is required in order 
finally to ground the possibility of empirical concepts. In OP, Kant elaborates further 
on how the unity of the subject itself cannot be guaranteed without collective 
coherence in the systematic spatiotemporal world-whole. In order to secure this 
guarantee transcendentally, he must reconceive the relation of the subject to the 
world. Now, is it not precisely because the 'auto-affection' implied by the paradox of 
inner sense indefinitely withholds any actual awareness of spontaneity, that Kant 
must find a way to conceive how the subject "inserts itself' into or "posits itself' in 
the sensible manifold (OP 184; Ak. 22:420)? As was argued in chapter 5.4, the self-
relation of the subject in apperception is lacking a final ground according to which it 
could say that spontaneity is its spontaneity. In OP, the analytic unity of apperception 
is now held to depend fundamentally on the determinability of myself as object; self-
consciousness is now given the formula "I am an object to myself' (OP 167; Ak. 
22:450; cf. OP 183-5; Ak. 22:419-21).51 So if the 'I think' indeed "expresses only an 
indeterminate intuition" (CPR B422n.), then "this indeterminate perception" must 
precisely be expressed only through the form of determinability of intuition By itself 
this would still appear immediately to yield the peculiar situation of the paradox of 
. " . . f . t 't I am in favour of lea\ing oUl Its objective character only by means of the apphcanon 0 ~ategon~s 0 1 ." ..' , 
that definition of 'intuition' that refers to it as a representatIon relatIng to objects (C 396. Ak 11 .. ~.l). 
51 Cf. E. Forster, Km1t's Final Synthesis, 103; cf. 10 1-113 for an excellent account of "self-poSIting lJ1 
op. 
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auto-affection, in which my experience of myself is mediated through the forms of 
space and time (that I, moreover, as transcendental subject, give to my experience). 
But Kant now draws a consequence from the very notion of autoaffection. In CPR he 
says that "the subject, which is the object of [inner] sense, can only be represented by 
its means as appearance, not as it would judge of itself if its intuition were mere self-
activity, ie. intellectual" (B68); the subject is therefore "affected from within, ... as it 
appears to itself, not as it is" (B69). Now while Kant admits freely in CPR that this is 
a "paradox" (B 152), in OP it is as if he is now giving form to the paradox, but 
conceiving it more concretely. In order to be affected sensibly in time by my own 
thoughts, there must be some internal connection between the intelligible and the 
sensible. Kant therefore conceives of the self-positing of the subject according to the 
model of force. 52 So it is not only for the new 'organicist' scientific reasons he is 
unfolding in OP, that Kant will no longer characterise the intuiting subject as merely 
receptive, but as "conscious of himself as a self-moving machine" (OP 65-6; Ak.. 
21:212-3). The subject is conscious ofitse1f only because it is engaged in a relation of 
reciprocal action in the world. This, I suggest, is what happens to the notion of sel f-
relating subjectivity in Kant. 
More light can be shed on this move if we approach it from the other side, 
that of the form of intuition: if the subject is determined in and for itself in the 
spatiotemporal whole, it is dynamics, Kant says, that must be conceived as the 
condition for the "realisation of space as a single obj ect of the senses" (OP 21: 564) 53 
Space is therefore "inwardly determined" as force. Kant now suggests that space as 
pure form of intuition is mere spatium cogitabile (conceivable space), while the 
spatium sensibile is the true condition for unity. 54 In sum, the subject and the 
5: As Eckart Forster says, "Kant's reasoning in the Opus posthumum ... shows that .sensibilitycannot 
be described in tenns of passivity alone. Sometlring can be given to the subject only if It IS r~el\'ed b~ 
a corresponding motion. In other words, receptivity is only a relative foml .of ~Ssi'l~·.: It equall~ 
entails a reciprocal activity of the subject. Being reciprocal, the acti.vity .or motIon ill ~~e~on ~lUSt be 
subject to the same fOffilal constraints as the recepth i~' to which It corresponds . Kant s Final 
Svnthe si s. 109. .' .' 
53 Quoted in Jeffrey Edwards, 'Spinozism. Freedom, and Transcendental Dynallllcs In Kant S Fmal 
~ystem of Transcendental Idealism', 65. . - _ . >\k :>~ Cf. OP 154-: Ak 22:517, and Ak 21:235. In general OP 1~-1.69: Ak. 22.·B6-4)2 m;.d 17~ 2.. . 
22: 11-13. 22:28-30, deal 'with this fascinating new transfonnatlOn ill the Kantlan theo~ 0 spa . 
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spatiotemporal world are now completely bound up with each other in a 
thoroughgoing force relation. The whole of OP can be considered as taking the 
"paradox of inner sense" to a higher. power. 
Now we find Aenesidemus' name mentioned alongside some of these 
thoughts in OP: "The principle of ideality of all representations as pure apriori 
intuition: I make myself into a sense-object outside myself (Aenesidemlls)" (OP 196~ 
Ak. 22:99). Next to a statement that "metaphysics has to do with sense-objects and 
their syste~ insofar as the latter is knowable apriori", we find the words 
"Aenesidemlls, inwardly determining" (OP 198; Ak. 22: 105). We can conjecture, 
then, that Kant intended his new account of the self-positing of the subject in the 
material world as a response to Aenesidemus' problems with representation, and that 
this new system was to ground the critical project in a way not managed in CPR 
itself. The result of this new system of transcendental idealism is that the old problem 
of token-identity that Kant had unleashed with his earlier non-systematic 
transcendental idealism, is disenabled. Hence the object of Aenesidemus' concerns 
about representation is shifted (although, as has been suggested, OP is open to the 
charge of being a return to dogmatism). 
The consequence of this capitulation to Aenesidemus, is that the subject can 
indeed only be conceived as an Idea. The subject posits itself according to an Idea of 
the totality. Even though in OP Kant holds this Idea to be more than regulative, self-
positing is conceived more on the model of relation to Ideas, than through 
apperception. Importantly, Kant now places the weight of this conception of the 
subject on the thinker, indeed upon the transcendental philosopher himself. The sense 
that the latter is tracing out the implications of the knowing subject's structure of 
experience from the inside, a conception that I have criticised throughout this thesis, 
is now truly dissolved. All of these points are expressed strikingly in the following 
passage: "Transcendental philosophy is the act of consciousness whereby the subject 
becomes the originator of itself, and, thereby, also of the whole object of technical-
practical and moral-practical reason in one system" (OP 245; Ak. 21: 78). Two 
comments can be made. Firstly, the last clause refers to the fact that God is required 
" "" t "ble to explore this here, to ground the Idea of the subject as person; It IS no POSSI 
although it is important to note that Kant's final system does l'nd d b 
ee seem to e a 
reincarnation of his pre-critical system of self-world-God It was sh . h 
. own m c apter 
3.2.ii that Kant even compares self-positing to Spinozism: "according to Spinoza' s 
transcendental idealism [!], we intuit ourselves in God" (OP 214; Ak. 22:56), Kant 
refers to "Spinoza's God, in which we represent God in pure intuition" (OP 25 L Ak. 
21:87). My second point is related to this, but in a way much more complex than I 
spell out here. The notion that the "subject becomes the originator of itself' is 
profoundly new. In CPR the subject could only create itself if it acted through 
intellectual intuition; but here, because of Kant's increased attention to Ideas, it is the 
subject's positing of its own origin as an Idea that both expresses the operation of 
transcendental philosophy and the truth of subjectivity itself: "transcendental 
philosophy is the system of the Ideas of the thinking subject" (ibid). 
Kant therefore was not only responding to Aenesidemus' critique, but was 
also productively taking up his suggestion that the subject might be an Idea. The 
spontaneity of the subject is now thought together with its receptivity, and the 
possibility of auto-affection is now intrinsically related to a new system of self-world-
God. Nevertheless the criticism still stands that Kant's OP is dogmatic, or not 
adequately critical (chapter 3.2.ii). Kant is in effect undertaking the contradictory task 
of exacerbating the paradox of inner sense in the hope that a material condition of 
collective unity, a new ethereal incarnation of God, can finally ground it. This is 
contradictory because the paradox of inner sense precisely testifies to the radical 
impossibility of intellectual intuition - thought and being cannot be conceived in an 
immediate unity. If all determination must be referred to determinability in time, then 
any collective unity, whether it be God or ether, remains just as unjustified as the 
spontaneous determination of the 'I think'. Kant thus sketches a formal solution of 
what it would be like to 'solve' the paradox of inner sense, without giving a real 
justification for the affirmation of collective unity or totality on which the formal 
solution rests. Nevertheless, it is instructive to observe that for Kant the destination of 
SUbjectivity lies in an Idea. Moreover, as can be seen at the close of chapter 6, the 
suggestion of the subject as "originator of itself', a 'semi-divine' ollroboros, can be 
given a distinctive sense in Deleuze's "problematic" vision of the subject. 
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Appendix IV Repetition and the Syntheses of Time 
In Kant, the threefold synthesis that fonns the explication of the qUid facti (and sets 
us off towards the resolution of the quid juris) is fundamentally temporal. It is 
suggested in chapters 5.2 and 6.2 that the first two aspects of synthesis, apprehension 
and reproduction, are 'pre-conscious', in the sense that they are enacted by the 
imagination, prior to the unity of consciousness. Deleuze returns to and recasts Kant's 
threefold temporal synthesis in DR. But Deleuze will moreover also find such an 
initial emphasis on 'syntheses of time' in Hume too (as well as Bergson). In order to 
unlock the truly critical dimension of Deleuze's thought, and to ground the rather 
metaphysical account of repetition we gave in chapter 4, it is now necessary to 
redescend into the simplest possible forms of temporal repetition. The unfolding of 
the elementary syntheses of time will in fact retrace the fundamental unfolding of the 
notion of repetition itself. 
Repetition for itself: Duration 
As a preliminary, we should mention two aspects of Deleuze's basic position 
concerning time. Firstly, I can only suggest here that Deleuze takes duration to be 
absolute. Just as space is an actualisation of a real yet virtual Idea and is therefore not 
transcendentally ideal in the Kantian sense (at least in its intensive nature), so is time 
not transcendentally ideal, but for different reasons. Actualisation is only possible if 
time is fundamentally real in some form, and must somehow mirror the intensive 
genesis of Ideas. Obviously there is much that could be said here about the 
metaphysical status of Deleuze' s theory of time, but it will have to be left aside on 
this occasion. However, it is again clear that Deleuze is returning, via Bergson, to a 
rationalist position on the absoluteness of duration. 55 Bergson had precisely affirmed 
55 It is useful to return here to the early dispute about the reality of time between Kant an~ two. 
defenders of rationalism. Kant was criticised by Lambert and Mendelssohn for den~i~g the reality of 
change. when ironically this was what he had spent the previous 15 years atte~plmg to gran.t an 
ontological reality that "exceeded the logical detenninations of the predominant LelbnlZlarusm ~t. 
they said had inconsistently affirmed the reality of change while den~lng the realIty of orne. Lam rtf 
., " '.' bl . h t 0' me 1,/ chanaes are rea. 
argued that "all changes are bound to time and are mconcelva e mt ou . (-0 
against Kant the reality of duration, while contending that our '. . . orgamsm! C OnentatlOn 
in extensive space forced an external, homogenising pro1ection of' . . , . 
J an extenSI\ e tIme 
upon the internal differentiation of duration. 56 
The second aspect to be mentioned is the fundamental criterion that time (or 
duration) requires the notion of synthesis. Deleuze's reasoning is similar to Kant's at 
A99f: "A succession of instants does not constitute time any more than 't . I causes It to 
disappear; it indicates only its constantly aborted moment of birth r' 
. Ime IS 
constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the repetition of 
instants" (DR 70/97). Deleuze makes two moves that, while arising out of Kant's 
account, go beyond it. Firstly, he deepens the notion that the fundamental syntheses 
of the mind are passive, not active. Secondly, whereas Kant is ambiguous about 
whether there are three syntheses or rather three aspects of one synthesis, Deleuze 
grants his own three syntheses a certain independence. 57 
then time is real, whatever it may be" (C 116, Ak. 10: 107). Time is an ontological condition for 
change: "perceptions of temporal order need temporally ordered perceptions" (D.H. Mellor. Real Time 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 8; quoted in 1. van Cleve, Problems from Kant 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 56). Furthermore, Lambert argued that '"{tJime is a 
more determinate concept than durati on , .. Whatever is in time has some duration. But the reverse does 
not hold, in so far as one demands a beginning and an end for 'being in time'. Eternity is not in time. 
since its duration is absolute" (C 116, Ak, 10:106-7), Kant did respond to Lambert (and Mendelssohn) 
on the issue of the ideality of time: "Certainly time is something real, namely, the real fonn of inner 
intuition. It has therefore subjective reality in respect of inner eX'"})erience; that is, I really have the 
representation of time and of my determinations in if' (A371B54). He further says in the footnote that 
we are conscious of our representations following one another, but only as in a time sequence 
according to the form of inner sense. As J. van Cleve remarks, "the succession of experiences is by no 
means suffiCient for the experience of succession, since each experience might be forgotten before the 
next one begins" (Problems from Kant, 57). The perception of time and change are thus merely 
properties of the form of inner sense. However, if Kant were to conclude that the perception of time 
itself was ideal, then he would be open to an infinite regress. This is where the argument for ideality 
takes hold, for Kant argues that the perception oftime is itself'real' in the ontological sense, b~t as ~'a~ 
Cleve says, involves a "virtual" appearance (ibid, 59: van Cleve borrows the language of 'nrtuahty 
from Quine). To insist upon this is to insist that things in themselves do not change in the ~nse that we 
know. But this would suggest again the distinction between 'absolute' duration and an Ideal u~e. It 
will be necessary to return to the issue of inner sense in chapter 6.3, when dealing with the 'I think . 
56 Despite his ~mlation of the notion of duration. Deleuze does not make any terminological 
distinction (as did Lambert) between duration and time in DR. 
57 In Allison's interpretation of the 'second part' of the B-Deduction (Kant's Tr.anscendentalldealism. 
158-172), he interprets the mediating role of the transcendental synthesis of the Imagmatlon m lenns of 
its capacity both to reproduce and project the structure of the whole of space and tlme. despite their 
absence from what is given in the moment of empirical intuition. Thus the whole of tl~e. past and 
future, is projected (beyond apprehension and reproduction). Kant says that "The figuraoye ~ynthcs~s 
'" must be called. as distinct from the merelv intellectual combination. the transcendental s~ nthem 
of the imaginati~n. Imagination is the faculty for representing an obj~t eyen without its ~resence ~: 
intuition" (B151). In Kant's Critical Philosophy, Deleuze restnclS the role of s~nthcsls 
Deleuze begins his account of "repetition for itself' with a h f parap rase 0 
Burne to the effect that "repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does 
change something in the mind which contemplates it" (DR 70/96).58 The notion of 
synthesis is thus cooriginary with the movement of repetition. A repetition is not 
possible without a synthesis, but this synthesis makes possible a difference in the 
mind that has apprehended the repetition. In an important passage, Deleuze writes, 
In considering repetition in the object, we remain within the conditions which make 
possible an idea of rep~i~ion. But in considering the change in the subject, we are 
already beyond the condItIons, confronting the general form of difference. The ideal 
constitution of repetition thus implies a kind of retroactive movement between these 
two limits. It is woven between the two (DR 71/97). 
This "ideal constitution of repetition" will take the form of an ideal genesis of the 
structural possibilities of the relation between repetition, difference and synthesis. 
However, Deleuze's account of the simplest level of repetition is not so much 
a synthesis, as analogous to Kant's 'synopsis'. A repetition of identical particulars in 
duration produces a pure durational multiplicity as a result of the enduring character 
of duration. 59 Referring to Bergson's example of the successive tolling of four bells, 
Deleuze writes that "quite apart from any memory or distinct calculation, we contract 
these into an internal qualititative impression within this living present or passil '(! 
synthesis which is duration" (DR 72/98).60 The claim is that even in the simplest case 
of the synthesis of an apparently identical repetition, a difference is produced in the 
enduring mind that "contracts" these moments together. From this basic form 
Deleuze moves to the "first synthesis of time", in which two different particulars are 
now related. Rather than the tolling of a bell, take the tick-tock of a clock: the regular 
apprehension (in its narrow guise in the A-Deduction) and reproduction, thus sticking faithfully to the 
important discussion in A99 of which after all Kant says that "this is a general remark on which one 
must ground everything that follows". Deleuze's only (and important!) diversio~ is the exclUSIOn of 
recognition from the role of synthesis. Now in his reading in DR, Deleuze refers his first two syntheses 
to habit and memory, not to the imagination. De1euze thus generates the distinct senses of temporaht~ 
harboured in each s)'llthesis: so for instance habit will contain a structure of anticipatlon. while the 
'whole' that is found in men~on' will e:xiend only into the past. Deleuze thus does not posIt a whole of 
'. .' tha Alii' d d' a sense sta,'s faithful to the Kanuan tIme outSIde the syntheses m the way t son oes, an 11l - . 
. . -. . . - . 1 t1 es (Allison acknowledges he IS letter by remaInmg WIth what IS inI1erent III the e ementary 5)11 les . . . .. 
. t" roductive imagmatlon at 
embroidering on the te:xi here. The reference, for Instance, 0 rep 
A1561B195 goes against his interpretation.) 
58 Cf. Hume. Treatise, 1.16,205. a1 .. hapter 1 1) 
'9 . ..' YSIS In C - -
. This can also be seen as Deleuze's first move to spell out (m line mth our an . 
the "vectorial" nature of duration. 
alternation of the tick and toc~ leads to the expectation of the latter upon the 
appearance of the former. For Deleuze, habit is the fundamental mode for 
apprehending difference between particulars in duration. On the background, then, of 
the 'pure multiplicity' of duration as such, Deleuze will expound how a more 
articulated relation of difference is possible. 
II The First Synthesis: Habit 
Now part of the intention behind calling habit a "synthesis of time" is to displace 
Kant's insistence that only conceptualisation can account for generality. We saw that 
in Kant, the account given at A99 of temporal synthesis leaves the activity of 
recognition crucially dependent on reproduction and projection. Both Heidegger and 
Deleuze respond to this powerlessness of recognition as such by connecting it with 
some form of anticipation, but Deleuze finds the material for the elaboration of this 
already present in Hume. In an associative relation, the mind feels a "propensity, 
which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendent',61. 
This synthesis "posits the past as a rule for the future".62 Deleuze thus interprets the 
essence of generality as temporal. The repetition of a resemblance or contiguity 
between A and B, for instance, will produce an expectation if we apprehend A; thus 
two particulars become 'synthesised' not into a unity of a concept, but simply insofar 
as they give rise to an expectation: ''the difference produced in the mind is generality 
itself insofar as it forms a living rule for the future" (DR 71197). On the basis of this 
fundamental synthesis of habit, Deleuze suggests that Hume leads us to an account of 
temporal synthesis very close to Kant's: "we rediscover, therefore, this dynamic unity 
of habit and tendency, this synthesis of a past and a present which constitutes the 
future, and this synthetic identity of a past experience and of an adaptation to the 
present".63 This synthesis, says Deleuze, "constitut[es] the lived, or living present'", in 
60 Bergson, Time and Free f'Vill, 86-7. 
61 Treatise, 1.9, 165. 
62 Empiricism and Subjectivity, 94. . Del habit is a 
63 Empiricism and Subjectivity, 94. Again. it shou~d be pomted out that for euze. 's Humc IS 
"principle of human nature", and is not therefore denved from sense lmpreSSIOns. Deleuze 
not naturalistic, but proto-Kantian. 
which the dimensions of the past and the future have a primitive form, in which they 
are not conceived as abstract dimensions but as part of basic" t . ., 
, con ractIng 
movement. This account of time, while reminiscent of Heidegger's reading of Kant 
is novel in its identification of three distinct elements. Firstly, the temporal form of 
the living present is identified with the organic form of habit; but then habit is 
articulated as the fundamental form of generality. 64 Taken together, these aspects of 
this first form of synthesis allow Deleuze to begin to bypass the requirement of 
representational mediation, as generality is explained not through the function of 
conceptualisation, but as a particular, fundamental form of repetition. 
Habit therefore implies no "unity of an act". For Deleuze, Kant was wrong to 
seek the dignity of spontaneous thought in recognition. The first stage of Deleuze's 
critique of recognition is thus to analyse the function of recognition into more basic 
functions. In the second stage, to be detailed below, it is shown that recognition does 
not provide us with any right to claim objective reality for our concepts; this claim, as 
I mentioned earlier, is displaced by Deleuze onto the issue of teleology. 
With this first step also begins Deleuze' s displacement of consciousness from 
its usual role in post-Kantianism (although we have seen that the role of 
consciousness is perhaps not as vital as often thought in Kant's A-deduction). It is 
this aspect of Deleuze's thought that has led to the mistaken interpretation that, 
because Deleuze agrees with Nietzsche that "we are in the phase of the modesty of 
consciousness",65 he should be interpreted materialistically. However, if we keep in 
mind his modification of Kant and his 'transcendentalisation' of Hume then we can , 
avoid this mistake. The "unity" required for experience is effectively sought 
elsewhere than in recognition. With this first synthesis, Deleuze achieves a minimal 
temporal structure for the mind, in which generality is secured, without yet 
guaranteeing a global unity for the generalities found in this way. It is perfectly 
conceivable for a mind to synthesise data according to the rule of habit without yet 
having a global unity amongst its syntheses. In fact, Deleuze's point is stronger than 
64 " . . If' d t from past to future. Rather. the The present does not have to go outSIde of ltse m or er 0 pass .' f th 
. . .' . . t' "hich IS to sa\" also rom c hvmg present goes from the past to the future which It constItutes ill nne. , . 
particular to the general" (DR 71/97). 
65 Nietzsche and Philosophy. 39. 
this: at the level of this first synthesis the "subject" of repetl'tl'on . . . 
'J IS paSSlye. and IS 
nothing more than a "contraction", an expectation, and has no de . . Jure connection 
with other such contractions.
66 
Hence Deleuze's exotic denomination of such a 
subject as a "larval subject" (DR 7811 07).67 
This intimacy between the subject and synthesis also allows Deleuze to make 
a criticism of Kant's notion of sensibility. ''Perceptual syntheses refer back to organic 
syntheses which are like the sensibility of the senses" (DR 73/99). Sensibility is no 
longer merely characterised by "receptivity", as for Kant, but is related fundamentally 
to the form it takes in synthesis itself. Kant, on the other hand, describes the lowest 
levels of synthesis in terms of a "synopsis of intuition", and a "synthesis of 
apprehension"; these two are described as "gathering" the manifold, but this 
gathering is conceived atemporally as a spontaneous act. But here again we encounter 
the ambiguity of Kant's vacillation between describing the three syntheses as at once 
distinct and as "aspects" of one synthesis. For if the syntheses were aspects of one 
synthesis, then each of its elements would have to be described as temporal: not only 
would recognition and reproduction be intermixed, but also synopsis and 
apprehension. Deleuze's complex move here is to affirm this consequence, while at 
the same time affirming that there may nevertheless be more than one such temporal 
synthesis. This first "originary synthesis" of time thus allows a passage between 
temporal constitution and sensibility itself; sensibility must first appear in the form of 
the "living present". We have seen (in Appendix III) that Kant himself began to 
envisage the necessity for such a connection in the Opus posthumum: receptivity is no 
longer enough to ground the relation between the subject and the world. His move is 
analogous to Deleuze's: ''we have seen that receptivity, understood as a capacity for 
66 'Time is subjective, but in relation to the subjecti\"ity of a passive subject". (DR 71197). ,. " 
67 No doubt Deleuze's thought is far removed from the mainstream of KantIa~lls~. here. Ho\\e\er. \\l: 
don't really need to go further afield than Leibniz, with his "little perceptIOns, and this Humean 
account of habit in order to comprehend Deleuze's points. Nevertheless. Dele~e IS certallll~ 
. ' ., Hi t can be placed m the context of 
mfluenced by the likes of Whitehead and Raymond Ruyer. s accoun , . uaI 
moves in e~ly pragmatism and 'radical empiricism' to take the notion of habIt beyond I~S us , 
. ' ., l' f d Willi James -4 Plurairsl1c L nIver.'( 
epIstemological limits. Cf. Peirce, 'The FIxatIOn of Be Ie . an am ",.. Darn' ~l 
Del '''larval sub1ects and t; There are also similarities that could be drawn between euze s J.,. . 
f . ess m (on\'CIownc.\.'i Dennett's "homuncular" account of distributed processes 0 consclousn . . nd 
. . I' dental approach be kept \I1 1111 . Explained; but again, I would want to mslst that De euze s transcen 
experiencing affections, was only a consequence and that the passl' If. 
, ve se v. as more 
profoundly constituted by a synthesis which is itself passive" (DR 871':\.7-8). 
iii The Second Synthesis: Memory 
Now, we must return to the pure durational multiplicity noted at the beginning of this 
section. It is necessary to show how underneath this account of difference as 
generality, there is still the fundamental form of the internal differentiation of 
endurance itself (the four bells). So each of these "general contractions" itself takes 
place on a backdrop of a duration in which they themselves are pOlellfialzl' 
differentiable. 68 It is this that makes it possible to invert the relation between 
generality and particularity, and thus constitute a different kind of synthesis, that of 
memory. "On the basis of the qualitative impression in the imagination, memory 
reconstitutes the particular cases as distinct, conserving them in its own 'temporal 
space'" (DR 71/98). Now, the past becomes ''the past in general", while 
"particularity, therefore, now belongs to that on which we focus - in other words, to 
that which 'has been'" (DR 80/1 09). Thus, an active synthesis of memory seems to be 
possible in principle given the account so far. 69 
It is important to see here how Deleuze intends this whole account to present, 
as we have said, "the ideal constitution of repetition". He says: ''the constitution of 
repetition already implies three instances: the in-itself which causes it to disappear as 
it appears, leaving it unthinkable; the for-itself of the passive synthesis; and, 
grounded upon the latter, the reflected representation of a 'for-us' in the active 
syntheses" (DR 71/97). However, it is exactly with this third act of a representative 
subject that Deleuze introduces a new problem. The first "originary" synthesis of 
time, Deleuze claims, is paradoxical: "it constitutes time as a present, but a present 
which passes .... This is the paradox of the present: to constitute time while passing in 
68 Even if it is not clear how such differentiation could be articulated for consciousness. it is enough to 
. , . l' ., than that of two 
note, for instance, that the intonation of four bells has a different duratIOna mtensIOn 
bells, or a hundred . . 
69 •. .' . . N' h ' Tn W/I to Power" Memory latc. Deleuze's vIew here IS renuruseent of some notes III letzse e s l' e I . . .. 
insofar as here the drive to make equal seems already to have been subdued: differentIaUon IS 
the time constituted" (DR 7911 08). Deleuze suggests that "we ha b 
ve y no means 
shown why the present passes, or what prevents it from being coextensive with time" 
(ibid). So although we have identified the "origin" of time, we have not yet identified 
its "ground" (DR 7911 08). It is this elaboration of this ground that will allow us to 
solve the "problem of passage" which hinders any account of temporal becoming 
conceived on the model of the present.70 Deleuze argues that there is a 
"(transcendental) passive synthesis which is peculiar to memory itself' (DR 811110). 
Deleuze endlessly returns to the "paradox of the past" in most of his books up 
to and including DR?l How does a present moment become past? Does it become a 
past moment, simply because a new present moment arrives? The past in this case 
would be conceived as another present which has simply been displaced by a new 
present; the past would be conceived as an old present. But in that case a twofold 
problem emerges: how can the past be that past, the past of the former present, if its 
passage simply depends on the appearance of a new present; and secondly, how is the 
passage itself to be conceived? A text from Bergson serves as the source for 
Deleuze's paradox: 
I hold that the formation of recollection is never posterior to the formation of 
perception; it is contemporaneous with it ... For suppose the recollection is not 
created at the same moment as perception: At what moment will it begin to exist? ... 
The more we reflect, the more impossible it is to imagine any way in which the 
recollection can arise if it is not created step by step with the perception itself. 72 
"At what moment will it begin to exist?" The turning of the present into past cannot 
simply depend on a new, external present. For that would not explain how the past is 
the past of the former present. Its status as past cannot have been constituted after the 
moment has expired, as in that case there would be nothing which could constitute it 
as the past of that moment. Deleuze therefore suggests, "how would a new present 
come about if the old present did not pass at the same time that it is present?,,73. The 
past would never be "constituted" as the past, "if it had not been constituted first of 
ifi · d' nh ling' who is active')"" #':;01 Cf. preserved Remembering as a process of class IcatlOn an plgeo 0 . . . . 
also #502. #479. 
70 Nietzsche and Philosophy, 48. . ~7f 
71 Cf. Nietzsche and PhilosophY, 48~ Bergsonism, 58-62: Proust and Signs,) . 
7'2 Alind Energy, trans. H. Wildon Carr, London: Macmillan. 1920. 128f. Quoted in Deleuzc. 
Bergsonism, 125 (with wrong page reference). 
73 Bergsonism. 58. 
all, at the same time as it was present" (ibid). How else could we say th t th 
a e past was 
the present that it had been? However, Deleuze's conclusion is peculiar. He does not 
present this conclusion as a solution of the paradox; he admits the solution is still a 
paradox, but at the same time he says this "profound paradox" "gives us the reason 
for the passing of the present" (DR 81/111). But how can a paradox be a reason? 
Perhaps we can understand Deleuze's position more if we turn to his next inference: 
if ea~h pa~ is contemporane~us wi~ the present that it was, then all of the past 
coeXIsts wIth the new present rn relatIOn to which it is now past. The past is no more 
'in' this second present than it is 'after' the first - whence the Bergsonian idea that 
each present is only the entire past in its most contracted state (ibid.). 
The past coexists with the present; it subsists in a virtual state, providing the 
ground for our actions ("there is a substantial temporal element '" playing the role of 
ground" (DR 821112). Each present is nothing but the entire past in its most 
contracted state; the past is our enduring "substance", or essence, while the present 
moment is the "actualisation" of this realm of essences. In fact, this is still not quite 
right. For each present, there is a set of possible virtual levels of the past which 
provide possible contexts of significance for the present. But no present can exhaust 
these levels, and the fact that each present provides only a limited access into the 
wealth of memory suggests that the notion of the coexistence of the past with the 
present is really challenging us to displace present consciousness more radically from 
its usual role in temporal synthesis. As Deleuze claims, ''the past is not conserved in 
the present in relation to which it is past, but is conserved in itself' (DR 821112). 
We saw above that duration itself has its own form of "internal 
differentiation". Here, with the elaboration of the paradoxes of the past, it is possible 
to see this differentiation put to work. Although the living present "contracts" 
particulars, the memory of each of these contractions is preserved and their extraction 
of generalities is thus allowed in the virtual realm itself to vary and connect 
differentially with other general ideas, which therefore form 'elements' in differential 
relations. Each is virtually referred to a context of significance in which they are 
qualified and themselves differentiated by virtue of the endurance of past 
differentiations. But as each moment repeats the whole past, these differences remain 
preserved in the distinction of levels of the past in the virtual domain, and 
32X 
remembering thus involves the pursual of the right degree and context f 1" 
o genera It~ In 
order to help oneself act in the present. Each level, although infused with the whole 
past, has "dominant recollections, like remarkable points".74 Deleuze helpfully 
invokes Leibniz here: "everything can be said to be the same at all times and places 
except in degrees of perfection" (DR 841114). 
Deleuze's account of memory thus emphasises the basic fact, overlooked by 
philosophers who treat the past always from the point of view of the present that 
"memory is by its nature unconscious". 75 Bergson's distinction between 'pure 
memory', which denotes the "virtual" store of accessible memories considered in 
themselves, and the act of remembering itself, in which the mind somehow 're-
actualises' these memories, is vitally important for Deleuze, and it is clear that Kant 
for instance, ignores the first aspect of memory in favour of the process of 
reproduction and 'retrieval'. Memory for Kant is always seen from the point of view 
of the present. But this is to leave mysterious the question of how memories "subsist" 
while they are not present to consciousness. In fact, by keeping sight of this elusive 
ground for the possibility of remembering, consciousness once more is displaced. 
Deleuze cites Freud: "consciousness is born at the point where the mnemonic trace 
stopS".76 Consciousness, as intentional representational activity geared towards 
empirical judgment, would be impossible without the exclusion of the contents of 
memory, which would otherwise overwhelm its space of reflection. 77 
But how then is the present to be conceived, if our 'substance' is located in 
the past? We saw above how the "living present" contracted particulars into 
generalities. Deleuze now says that this "repetition of successive independent 
elements or instants" in the first synthesis must be considered a "repetition of parts", 
to be opposed to the continual repetition of the "whole" past in each present in the 
second synthesis (DR 841114). But this former "bare repetition must be understood as 
the external envelope of the clothed" (ibid). What we apprehend in the merely 
74 Bergsonism, 62; cf DR 2121274. 
75 Nietzsche and Philosophy, 112. 
76 Deleuze's account is based on chapter VII of The Interpretation o/Dreams. Doc· f 
77 I have discussed Nietzsche's approach to this problem in 'Nietzsche and hthe . tnnc 0 
. . eds) 1\T' l'" h nd the Dil'ine (Manc ester. Clinamen Metempsychosis', in 1. LIPPItt & 1. Urpeth ( , Hie .. sc e a 
Press, 2000). 
passing, transient present "conceals" this virtual dimension, whi h D I . 
c e euze says. IS 
nevertheless "real"; he goes so far as to say that "useless and inact" '. lve, ImpaSSlye. It 
IS, in the full sense of the word: it is identical with being in itself,.78 
The present, then, always involves a repetition of a level of the past; in other 
words, the present is an actualisation.79 Deleuze says obscurely that the present 
involves "a passage to the limit, a maximal contraction which comes to sanction the 
choice of a particular level as such" (DR 83/113). The reference to choice is again 
reminiscent of Leibniz. Deleuze is conceiving of the past as an ordered set of virtual 
sections, as if monads were not arranged on an eternal plane but according to the 
order of duration, "each being the repetition of all the others and being distinguished 
from them only by the order of the relations and the distribution of singular points" 
(DR 212/274). In themselves, these virtuals coexist in a state of "complication"; and 
while each level is like a monadic perspective on the 'whole', unlike windowless 
monads, their content is always really implicated in the other possible perspectives. 
Crucially, Deleuze says that "each present contracts a level of the whole, but this 
level is already one of relaxation or contraction" (DR 83/113). 
The present is no more than an actualisation of a particular virtual perspective, 
a way of seeing and being in the world, of inhabiting the problems that orient life. For 
Deleuze the synthesis of the past does not involve bringing it to the unity of 
apperception, but engaging in the quite peculiar process of memory. Its peculiarity 
stems from the fact that memories in themselves have their own order, which is not 
the same as the order they may assume once actualised. The passive synthesis of the 
past in duration itself produces a virtual network autonomous of the self-
consciousness to which Kant appeals in order to unify the past. The "substantial 
element" of the past is a "past that never was present" (DR 821111), composed of 
78 Bergsonism. 55. "Only the present is 'psychological'; but the past is pure ontology"~ 56. 
79 '. - l' thi thi ··st of the past \\lth the present Of Bergson creates a diagram of a cone to exl' am s, s CoeXl ence 
each moment TIle apex of the cone is the most contracted level of this whole (the presentJpas~. we are 
. '. uld be" th sand individual lUlages wluch m the process of endunng); the base of the cone wo a ou . 
.. . ral·t... (B on.. \Jaaer and \lemon'. trans. Nan,) compnse the partIcular elements taken up mto gene hi ergs " 1, • . . 
- Ii ecd 'm the Margaret Paul & W. Scott Palmer. New York: Zone Books. 1994. 162). But our yes proc . ~ 
. ,,' .. fr the matenal (71\"en offered at tht: 
middle' of this cone as our perceptIons are alwayS selectIons om 0- h h 
' . . ' hIt' I am not sure w et cr 
apex, and therefore resonate \V1th the vntual ground for suc se ec IOn. '. 
Deleuze's appropriation of the diagram of the cone is as useful as he seems to belle' e 
"non-Iocalisable connections ... which transcend spatial locations and temporal 
successions" (DR 831113). 
It is here that we can clearly perceive again Deleuze's transformation of 
themes in rationalism. He effects a return to the rationalist problem of 2rounding 
~ ~ 
coexistence and succession; we saw earlier that for Kant these principles were 
essential in order to ground sufficient reason and the concept of a 'world'. Deleuze 
writes that "duration is only succession relatively speaking ... [it] is indeed real 
succession, but it is so only because, more profoundly, it is virtual coexistence '" ~(I 
The 'third thing' is sought in duration itself, articulated as virtuality in memory. Here. 
in line with the 'pre-critical' Kant, the third has noumenal significance: while our 
"empirical character ... is constituted by relations of succession and simultaneitv 
what we call their noumenal character is constituted by. the relations of virtual 
coexistence between the levels of a pure past" (DR 83/113). 
We can further appreciate the rationalist character of the discussion by 
returning again to Deleuze's account of consciousness. Let us recall first Maimon's 
account of the "forms of differentiation", for his move away from Kant can now be 
continued further. For Maimon, space, time and the categories were seen as forms of 
conscious differentiation, tied to the synthesis in the present. Synthetic judgments 
were seen to say more about the requirements of this present -bound form of 
consciousness itself than about the differences in the things themselves. But Deleuze 
now follows the forms of differentiation beyond consciousness. Maimon had not 
realised the potential in Kant's notion that certain aspects of the threefold synthesis 
were unconscious. Thus, Deleuze's two passive syntheses of habit and memory are 
not themselves conscious at all, but rather give rise to effects in consciousness. For 
instance, if we recognise something, this is as a result of an habitual association 
which is itself pre-conscious; consciousness comes after. If we experience a sense of 
expectation, this is an effect of the functioning of the habit, rather than the habit itself 
Similarly, memory is something outside of conscious control in a twofold sense 
firstly, the virtual realm of memories subsists separately from its form in a judgment 
but secondly, memory often eludes our conscious control not due to empirical reasom 
80 Bergsonism. 60. 
3~1 
concernmg recall, but because its differential form is essentially different to 
conceptual recognition; as virtual, it obeys its own laws.81 In sum, Deleuze is 
returning to the rationalist point that if we experience only the effects of these 
syntheses in consciousness, the point is to return to their causes (if cause is 
considered as 'reason'). Nevertheless, there is good reason to think that Deleuze has 
succeeded here in powerfully reconnecting the rationalist requirement with a 
transcendental account of synthesis. The notion of repetition, as the differential power 
of the Idea, is explicated in its fundamental synthetic form through these two 
accounts of synthesis. 
. f the conscious ego. The ego is alienated from 
81 Deleuze is also influenced by the Lacaruan account ~ If entaU'on What motivates us as 
.. Th . a reified se -repres· . 
the true subject which is unconSCIOUS. e ego IS '. turn) fonns in the WlconsclOUS 
subjects (our 'problems', Deleuze w~uld say) ~env;s(g;79;~~~). 
Deleuze argues that Ideas are "necessarily unconSCIOUS 
Appendix V Remarks on Transcendental Empiricism 
In Empiricism and Subjectivity, Deleuze describes Hume's problem as "how is the 
subject constituted in the given?" He goes on to criticise the status of the Kantian 
subject as apparently entirely independent of (and merely receptive to) the gi\'en s: 
Deleuze questions the mutual exclusivity that seems to be predominantly accorded to 
the transcendental and empirical in Kant. (Again, we could say Deleuze is echoing 
Hegel's demand in the Phenomenology for a genesis of the subject in relation to its 
world.) But we have seen in chapter 3.2.ii how Kant in a sense refers his own 
'construction' of the subject to a kind of speculative experimentation. The subject can 
only account for experience once it has undergone the "negative extension" into the 
realm of the problematic; Kant later uses analogous words to describe the 
imagination's encounter with its limits in the sublime. These transcendent uses or 
exercises of certain faculties are key to the delimitation of experience. For the 
transcendental philosopher it is essential to ask what it might mean to think 
something without having a possible intuition for it (rational Idea), just as much as to 
think whether it is possible to intuit something without having a possible concept 
(aesthetic Idea); such questions are unavoidable and part of the construction and 
demonstration of the transcendental subject. 83 
Deleuze is thus faithful to Kant when he states if we do have access to 
intensities that can only be sensed, and memories that can only be remembered, such 
a use of the faculty is transcendent, and cannot be "experienced" (DR 140/182-3). 
They cannot be experienced as such, although they can be thought as a problem. 
Transcendental empiricism, then, is not so much an oxymoron, as a provocation that 
crystallises the ambiguity surrounding Kant's notion of experience. 84 
82 EmpiriCism and Subjectivity, 87. . d mor. 
83 Deleuze also describes how for Bergson our ex-perience is a composite of perceptIOn an me .. 
but it is theJ'ob of philosophy to think pure percepts and pure memory: Bergsomsm. 2.3.. bl f 
• • OJ h' ught up In this pro em 0 
84 When Deleuze asks 'what are the conditions of real ex-penence. e IS ca .. tha 
. . . ul H eans the aspects of cogmtIon t Kantian terminology. He does not mean empmcal partlC ars. em.. I th 
'gnifi sense for cogrunon. n 0 cr lie bevond empirical cognition, but nevertheless have SI cance or .' ha . th b,j Y"t 
.' . 'd . The spmts unUng e su :.rl:,-
words, he means the ideal and intensive domaInS OUtSI e e~-penence. 
Ideas, intensities, forces. 
Everything we have discovered so far leads to the conclusion that the 
'transcendental subject' simply denotes the set of functions and procedures by which 
kinds of cognition are made possible, and which are discovered, constituted, and 
justified by the transcendental philosopher. The internal constitution of the 
transcendental subject by the philosopher may continue to yield, through the 
development of its structure, other possibilities for cognition that the philosopher will 
be able then to explain and ground. For instance, the mutual relation of the faculties 
has its own principle that in turn conditions something other than "experience": 
aesthetic appreciation. Art testifies to the harmony of the faculties, \vhile 
contravening the unity of conceptual experience. The harmony experienced in the 
apprehension of an art-object possesses a unity due in the final instance to 
metacritical criteria, not according to the criteria of experience. We have seen that, as 
well as providing conditions for "experience", Kant also spends an inordinate amount 
of time on the role of nonexperientiai events in the life of the subject. Rational Ideas 
are only thought, but they do find a symbolic expression in art which can nevertheless 
be said to be a presentation of an aesthetic Idea, insofar as the analogies and symbols 
themselves communicate directly with the "feelings". Thus art must be seen as the 
indirect "incarnation" of the moral significance of the essences of things in sensible 
matter; the moral idea of innocence finds a sensible shape in a white lily, which 
henceforth becomes "more than" merely a white lily.85 Because Kant has defined 
experience as 'empirical cognition', he cannot call these 'experiences'. Although I 
can say, "I heard a Beethoven string quartet this afternoon", what I felt while 
listening to it is not an event in the world. No matter how much one wants to call 
such feelings an experience, one cannot, according to Kant. Aesthetic judgment is 
b· 86 entirely on the side of the subject; there is no "art" independent of the su ~ect. 
Now, although these aspects of the subject all have a vital role to play in the 
metacritical teleology envisaged at the limit of Kant's system, Kant himself does not 
explicitly thematise the sense in which he outlines a self-construction of the subject 
85 Cf. Kant's Critical Philosophy, 54. . ..... t v but it turned 
86 S· . .. .' ountmg a dream I sa, 'r OU \\ ere a ,'\.. lllularly, dreanung IS not an e~ .. penence: ill rec . ..' Dream Thoughl in which 
out that it wasn't you all along". Could there accordingly be a CntIque of 
It is left to Deleuze to claim that "the transcendental J: f J: . 10rm 0 a lacultv IS 
indistinguishable from its transcendent use" (DR 1431186) It' th" .-
. IS IS expenmental' 
aspect of 'transcendental empiricism' that is the most foreign to p t K '. b os - antlaOlsm, ut 
at the same time conforms to the Hegelian project to inscribe the activities of the 
transcendental philosopher within the movement of the subject itself 87 
Transcendental empiricism precisely denotes the procedure of discovery of the higher 
forms of the faculties. 
F or Kant such an exercise is merely dialectical. While Kant is right about the 
status of problems, he sees it from the wrong angle - thus problems are said to lack 
the capacity to be represented. But at the same time, Kant shows that an Idea is not a 
criterion in the sense of serving as a rule for an apperceptive subject, and that the 
apprehension of Ideas must involve some other form of cognitive access. It is this 
problematic or transcendent exercise which for Deleuze provides the key to the 
transcendental constitution of his version of the 'subject'. 
From an Hegelian point of view, all this points rather towards the fact that 
knowledge itself must be seen as intrinsically dialectical; especially insofar as we are 
pursuing the metacritical dimension implicated in cognition itself. However, there are 
two ways - Hegelian and Deleuzian - of seeing the dialectical nature of knowledge. 
On the one hand, Hegel directly takes up representational knowledge into the Idea, in 
the sense that the former only becomes adequate in the latter, while nevertheless 
being essential to the unfolding of the Idea itself. For Hegel, then, cognitive 
experience becomes both grounded and augmented by speculative experience But on 
the other hand, Deleuze returns to aspects of the Platonic dialectic, in which a harsher 
distinction between Idea and concept is preserved. For Plato, any conceptual starting 
the transcendental subject, perhaps through its faculty of memory, was further analysed in order to 
ground the possibility of dreams, nightmares, and other nonexperiential phenomena? . . .. 
87 Deleuze does liken transcendental empiricism to Schelling's superior or metaphyslca.l empmClsm. 
See E.A. Beach, The Potencies ofGod(s) (Albany, SUNY, 1994).148-162. and Alan White. Schelling: 
An introduction to the System of Freedom (New Haven: Yale. 1983). 161-9. There are two mam 
motives behind Schelling's doctrine. Firstly. he rejects Kant's Idea that thought IS not an e:\.-penence 
... . . ., bl t' real· ... · Secondlv however SchellIng Thus It IS poSSIble to "expenence" thought ill ItS pro ema IC hy.. . - " , . . 
intends the doctrine as the 'positive' counterpart to the abstract merely 'negatIye part of his ~ stem 
. . . . . l'd f God' presence in the world \\lulc both MetaphYSIcal empmcism shows us teleologlca eVI ence 0 s . 
. ' " t 't remains true that Dclcuze s 
of these aspects have their analogtes ,\\1th Deleuze s proJec, I 
methodology and materials are closer to Kantianism. 
point is always already problematic, and the 'ascent' to th Id I ~ 
e ea a \\ ays falls short at 
any rate of 'participating' in it, due to the material p . . . 
resupposltlOns of ordmary 
88 N I . 
concepts. ow, De euze thinks that we wrongly apply rep t' I 
resen atlOna thought to 
problems that are intrinsically nonrepresentational (represent t' . h ' a Ion IS t e Source ot 
transcendental illusion); he thus affirms a kind of Platoru'sm ab t Id B . ou eas. ut whIle 
Ideas are problematic, he does think that it is possible to "transce d" . n expenence so 
that this problematicity precisely can intrude upon representational experience. Ideas 
are thus "immanent" in this sense that they are available in principle to the 
philosopher (and to the subject of transcendent exercise), but they remain 
"transcendent" as far as experience is concerned. It is in this way that Deleuze 
presents his analogous notion to speculative experience - that of transcendental 
empiricism. Both the Hegelian and Deleuzian names refer to the incursion of the 
metacritical dimension into experience itself: they could almost be synonyms. 
However, they operate very differently. 
Kant's aesthetics also give us another clue to how this transcendent exercise 
could amount to an "empiricism of the Idea" (DR 278/356).89 For the harmony of the 
faculties that gives rise to pleasure in the face of art (or nature experienced as art). is 
correlated, says Kant, with an apprehension of the singularity of the art-object. But 
88 Cf. Republic, S09d-Slle. In the discussion following his paper at the Societe francaise de 
Philosophie, Deleuze admits his Platonism but contends that there are in effect two different 'Plat os'. 
A Plato who is concemed 'with Ideas as multiplicities, and for whom dialectic involves asking . ho\\ ? 
how much? in which case?', and the other Plato, the "partisan of a simplicity of essence. or of a 
sameness of the Idea" (A1ethode de Dramatisation, 118). 
89 If Deleuze can be called an empiricist at all. it is clear that it is by no means because he returns to a 
philosophy of things and relations, a philosophy most acutely characterised by William James. 
Deleuze discusses "the secret of empiricism" in the preface to DR: "empiricism is by no means a 
reaction against concepts, nor a simple appeal to lived experience" (DR xxl3). It is on the one hand 
"the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard", and also "a mysticism and mathematicism 
of concept, but precisely one which treats the concept as object of an encounter". Finally. for an 
empiricist, "concepts are indeed things, but things in their free and wild state, beyond 'anthropolOgIcal 
predicates'" (ibid). First, then, let us note the rationalistic implications of the statement above that 
"concepts are indeed things". A concept can only be identified with a thing if it is an mdIVidual 
concept, as with Leibniz, or eXl'resses a reality, as \\ith Hegel. But note that Deleuze qualIfies that.he 
means "things in their free and l\lld state". We can interpret these things precisely as obJectlye 
problems or Ideas. They are called 'things' because of their noumenal status. Thus. ~leUl.c finds the 
true home of empiricism in the Kantian Idea, considered as "objective probl~m . Secondly~ If 
empiricism is "a mathematicism of concepts", that is because for it concepts are akin to mathe~atJcJI 
schemata; a concept is a "representation of a method". Thirdly, if "empiricism IS a mystICIsm of 
concepts", it is because it attempts to eXl'ress Ideas by any means possible. And perhaps the reason 
again, the aesthetic Idea here has characteristics close to the rational Idea. \\,ith a 
poem, these words, although themselves general, enter into a relation of reciprocal 
determination which leads us to describe the poem as a whole. To change one 
element may be to change the whole sense of the poem. We saw in chapter 4.4.i, that 
in Proust and Signs, Deleuze interprets this possibility of art in high metaphysical 
terms, again appealing to Leibniz. Individual essences, he writes, can only be 
incarnated in works of art, as only these have a "subtle" enough matter to be able to 
realise the individualities of an essence. "These substances are ductile, so kneaded 
and refined that they become entirely spiritual; they are of course colour for the 
painter, like Vermeer's yellow, sound for musician, words for the writer".90 
The adequate expression of Ideas is not possible in a direct sense for finite 
beings, but the transcendent exercise of the faculties may help to produce a 
"perplexity" (DR 140/182), that problematises our experience. Concepts, as 
generalities, are not suited to the Idea, although obviously we have to use them, or 
rather misuse them, in order to think through problems. 91 But concepts must 
themselves rely on habits, memories, and problematic thoughts which provide their 
horizon and can determine the structural ideal relations which frame the phenomena. , 
Transcendental empiricism, or the "empiricism of the Idea" connects back up with 
the given, because every particular is the appearance of a problem, or is a "sign" to be 
interpreted by the subject. 
be D 1 stI'11 recogru' ses the validity of the Kantian concept for why it is "insane" is cause e euze 
representational experience. 
90 Proust and Signs, 46. . . . 1 ries The structure 
91 The structure of the passive syntheses allows the poSSIbIlIty of anoma ous me~~ U- . th its own 
.. .. 'd d bet\: T th passive pennanence of memof) ltse . \\ 1 
of reproduction ill memory IS diVl e ;\een. e B t ""cannot distinguish within 
virtual order, and the generalisation of memones ~der concef~s~ot ~.e~:ow would assume a certaIn 
the moment [what] ... sh~uld be retained, [that which ~ne] c~u which at the apposite moment. may be 
meaning" (Proust and Signs, 52). Thus a memory rna) SUbsISt 
reawoken by an association. 
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